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 Abstract 
This thesis argues that establishing legitimacy, both in relation to the international 
community and in relation to local populations, is a critical precondition for the success of 
international missions in post-conflict situations. The argument is developed through a study 
of post-conflict institution-building in Kosovo. In 1999, when the Security Council 
established the United Nations Administrative Mission in Kosovo, the international 
community had a unique opportunity to develop conflict management mechanisms capable of 
responding to the contemporary challenges posed by ethnic conflicts. By acting under the 
United Nations umbrella, the international community could have sent a strong message to the 
deeply divided population of Kosovo: this mission had the ability to protect them and provide 
them with institutional structures capable of sustaining long-term economic, political and 
social peace and stability. Yet the international actors failed to do so. They failed to grant the 
Kosovo population the security they so dearly needed, and they failed to construct institutions 
appropriate to the challenges faced by the territory. This thesis argues that this occurred 
because of the international community’s inability to provide legitimacy for their actions and 
policies. As the different actors focused their attention on attempting to secure legitimacy vis 
à vis the international community, they failed to nurture the roots of the new political system 
they wished to establish by obtaining the support of Kosovo’s population as a whole. After 
developing a working concept of legitimacy, I analyse the degree and nature of legitimacy of 
the different international actors, and their policies at each stage that led to the establishment 
of a new political system in Kosovo. Through this analysis, I provide an explanation for the 
failure of the international community to offer a satisfactory and sustainable solution to the 
Kosovo issue. 
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 Introduction 
With the end of the Cold War and the fall of Soviet bloc, the international order saw 
the multiplication of new kinds of conflicts. Since the Treaty of Westphalia, the international 
community has secured stability through mechanisms meant to prevent states from entering 
into conflict with one another. As the tensions of the Cold War diminished at the turn of the 
1980s/1990s, the international order was increasingly threatened by another kind of 
instability. Robert Hayden develops an interesting argument as regards the Former 
Yugoslavia.1 He argues that the void left by the weakening ideology that had ruled the former 
federal state until then left a space for ethnic nationalism to offer itself as the basis for the new 
states that issued from its dissolution. As Hayden argues, the development of states on the 
idea of nationhood is intrinsically exclusive of segments of its society that cannot identify 
with the nation, thus triggering intra-state tensions. Ethnic tension within states is not an issue 
that appeared with the fall of the Iron Curtain; yet the weakening of the authority of nation 
states that followed this period unquestionably provided a suitable environment for ethnic 
conflicts to grow. With the intensification of such violence the international community 
increasingly recognised the need for coherent responses to the problems of power vacuums in 
post-ethnic conflict societies. 
After the challenges they faced in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community 
was presented in 1999 with a new opportunity to develop effective conflict management 
mechanisms to deal with the growing contemporary challenges caused by ethnic conflicts. 
Strengthened by decades of trial-and-error,2 the international community designed a modern 
form of international administration to address the crisis presented by the case of Kosovo. In 
an innovative fashion, the United Nations Security Council established, through resolution 
1244, a subsidiary organ in charge of ‘organiz[ing] and oversee[ing] the development of 
provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government’.3 Thus, this 
international organ aimed to re-establish a political system capable of managing – and 
eventually reducing – tensions between the different factions of the society, and to then 
provide remedies for the economic and social crises faced by the province and secure long-
term stability. Yet, to what extent did the international administrative mission, its strategies, 
                                                
1 Hayden, R., ‘American Proposals for the Constitutional and Political Status of Kosovo: The State as Legal 
Fiction’ in East European Constitutional Review, vol. 7 (4), 1998. pp. 83-92. 
2 Caplan, R., International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005. 
3 Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, preamble.§11c. 
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actions and policies contribute to the resolution of the issues faced by Kosovo and manage to 
lead the province towards long-term stability? 
This is the question this thesis aspires to address. With the internationalisation of the 
‘Kosovo Question’ in early 1999, this small Yugoslav province became the focus of attention 
of academic debates in the regional studies literature, but also increasingly within wider 
international scholarship. Before this period, the Kosovo predicament was mainly dealt with 
within Balkan specialist circles. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
bombing of Serbia, Kosovo became associated in the academic literature with several 
international legal and political controversies revolving around three core themes: (1) the 
legality and legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state; (2) the 
development of an international administration to regulate ethnic conflict; and (3) the issues 
relative to the Kosovo Albanians’ right to national-self determination versus Serbia’s 
sovereignty and the implication of this dispute for the future status of the province.  
First, NATO’s unilateral airstrike against a sovereign state, outside of any Security 
Council resolution, on the grounds of mass human rights violations became the centre of a 
controversy regarding the validity of a duty to humanitarian intervention.4 Between 1999 and 
2001, the international legal and political literature articulated different views regarding the 
legality and/or legitimacy of the use of military force against a sovereign state on the grounds 
of mass human rights violations. This debate contributed to the development of the concept of 
an international ‘responsibility to protect’. This concept, which is supposed to impose legal 
obligations on states to protect their own populations, also makes a claim to promote the 
protection of human rights in foreign states. Although the actual obligation on states remains 
modest, the development of the notion, and the role that NATO’s action played in influencing 
the debate, shook the international order to its core by breaching the sacrosanct principle of 
sovereignty. Yet, the literature that explored this controversy failed to a certain extent to 
provide a stance on the implications that this intervention could have for Kosovo and its 
people, let alone the implications it might have for the long-term political future of Kosovo. 
Indeed, beyond the significant consequences this event had for the development of 
international law and politics, it also had had drastic effects on the future of the province.   
                                                
4 i.e., Cassese, A., ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritus: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ in European Journal of International Law, vol. 10 
(1), 1999. pp. 23-30; Simma, B., ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ in European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10 (1), 1999. pp. 1-22.  
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Second, the development of an international mission to manage the power vacuum 
and regulate ethnic tensions in the province after decades of hostilities was addressed both by 
the scholarship on ethnic conflict as well as the scholarship on international territorial 
administration.5 At the beginning, discussions revolved around the structure of the mission 
and the development of appropriate conflict regulation mechanisms to enable it to pursue its 
challenging mandate. This literature highlights the deficiencies of the mission in developing a 
coherent and efficient strategy for pursuing conflict regulation; yet it does not provide 
convincing explanations for the deep causes of that failure or the consequences it would have 
for the future prospects of the province. The scholarship limits itself to a descriptive rather 
than explicative or critical function. In fact, there is a tendency to blame the difficulties 
encountered on the unresolved status of the territory and to make the dangerous assumption 
that the determination of Kosovo’s status would provide a miracle cure for all the wrongs of 
the province. It does not, however, articulate a convincing explanation for how the settlement 
of the constitutional status of the province would solve the deep economic, social and political 
crises Kosovo faces.6 
Third, owing to the nationalist nature of the conflict and its critical implications for the 
established international order, a large part of the literature dealing with Kosovo concentrates 
on the national self-determination versus sovereignty debate and the different implications the 
alternative constitutional settlements of the province have for this debate. Aside from a 
handful of Serb hardline nationalists, most academics and analysts resigned themselves early 
on to the inevitability of Kosovo’s independence, even if this meant possible border changes 
and movements of population. Indeed, they have tended to assume that the resolution of 
Kosovo’s status is an end in itself.  
Despite the abundance of material, this scholarship has failed to draw attention to 
certain common and fundamental threads across those three debates; it has failed to illustrate 
the deep-rooted causes of the difficulties encountered by post-conflict Kosovo and their 
implications for the long-term development of the province, and, more generally, the role of 
international conflict regulation in post-conflict societies. Far from ignoring the complexity of 
the situation, this thesis aims to contribute towards filling this gap through an analysis of one 
                                                
5 Chesterman, S., You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-building, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004; Bieber, F., Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans Managing 
Change in Deeply Divided Societies, European Center for Minority Issues, Flensburg, 2004.  
6 e.g. di Lellio, A. (ed.), The Case for Kosova: Passage to Independence, Anthem Press, London, 2006. 
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of the intrinsic issues of the Kosovo question: the subject of legitimacy revolving around 
international involvement in ethnic-conflict regulation through the establishment of 
governmental mechanisms within third party states. Indeed, with the spread of collapsed 
states unable to deal with their internally precarious conditions, the international community 
has grown fond of intervening to prevent the potential threat of instability beyond the borders 
of the ‘failing state’ to its overall order. Following a Western liberal rationale, it increasingly 
resorts to the imposition of ‘democratic’ institutions, purportedly enforcing good governance 
and the rule of law as solutions to the void of authority in order to promote long-term 
stability.  
Drawing on Seymour Lipset’s argument as developed in his work Political Man,7 I 
assume a direct and essential correlation between the stability of a political system – the goal 
pursued – and its legitimacy. The key goal of international action in post-conflict societies is 
to provide sustainable stability through the establishment of a political system. In order to 
assess the actual and potential effects of this policy, I propose to investigate the ability of the 
international community to provide legitimacy to the new system. The relevance of the issue 
of ‘the legitimacy of contemporary international democratisation as a conflict regulation 
mechanism’ is evidenced by the growth of the scholarship on this theme since I began this 
research. 
Indeed, in the last four to five years, a literature has developed around what Denisa 
Kostovičová calls the ‘legitimacy gap’, which consists of two key themes.8 The first is the 
intrinsic oxymoron of the imposition of democracy through undemocratic means.9 This debate 
was foreshadowed by the earlier conflict regulation attempts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which 
emphasised the disproportionate ‘Bonn Powers’ granted to the High Representative in 1997. 
Nevertheless, it took on another dimension altogether in 1999 with the establishment of the 
United Nations administrative missions in Kosovo and East Timor. This criticism centres on 
the legitimacy crisis arising from the lack of accountability mechanisms between these 
international administrations and the people they governed. The second debate, concerns the 
questionable international legitimacy of imposing an ‘outside’ political model within a part of 
                                                
7 Lipset, S., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1983. 
8 Kostovičová, D., ‘Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo from a 
Human Security Perspective’ in International Peacekeeping, vol. 15 (5), 2008. pp. 633-635. 
9 i.e., Beauvais, J., ‘Benevolent Despotism: a Critique of the UN State Building in East Timor’ in New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 33, 2001. pp. 1102- 1171; Bain, W., Between Anarchy 
and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligation of Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Chandler, D., 
Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building, Pluto, London, 2006.  
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a sovereign territory.10 It emphasises the dubious usurpation of sovereign prerogatives – the 
foundation of a political system – by the international community, on some part of an 
independent state’s territory without its involvement, thereby encouraging this territory’s 
secession.  
Using the case of Kosovo to illustrate this argument, this thesis seeks to contribute to 
those debates by first establishing and drawing on the relationship between the different 
aspects of legitimacy relevant to the situation of international involvement in ethnic-conflict 
management through institution-building. Second, it assesses the impacts those aspects have 
on the success of the mission’s goal – the long-term stabilisation of conflicts – and thus on 
this model as a credible conflict regulation mechanism. As noted earlier, the focus of this 
research on one aspect of conflict management does not imply any underestimation of the 
complexity of the other issues at stake. Yet, by focussing on ‘legitimacy’, this study aims to 
single out one of the complex but crucial variables of international involvement in ethnic 
conflict management, thus modestly contributing to the overall debate. To do so, it is essential 
for me to first define a number of parameters of for the thesis.    
This research observes, in the context of Kosovo, the strategy and policies set in place 
to structure a political system to fill the governance power vacuum after the collapse of 
sovereign authority. By nature, institutions can be economic, social and political. Yet, this 
study is limited to those institutions that contribute to the development of the political system. 
This comprises legislative, judicial as well as strictly executive institutions. By limiting the 
scope of this research to governance-oriented political institutions, I do not mean to imply that 
institutional developments in other fields, notably in the economic sector, were not 
undertaken; nor do I wish to minimise their relevance for the stabilisation of Kosovo. Yet, for 
this research, I wish to limit myself to the policies that were carried out to design a coherent 
political framework, commenting on other developments when they are relevant to the central 
focus of the investigation. 
The focus of the thesis is geographically limited to the historical Yugoslav 
administrative province of Kosovo.11 Although this study has potentially wider explicative 
                                                
10 Zaum, D., The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
11 The Serbian spelling of ‘Kosovo’ will be used as opposed to the Albanian spelling ‘Kosova’. The appellation 
of the province is highly controversial due to the political nature of the ‘ethnicisation’ of the territory, all the way 
to names. By using the term Kosovo I wish to maintain some ‘neutrality’ by using an internationally recognised 
term that was commonly use in the academic literature until recently, when it started to reflect a political 
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and prescriptive implications for conflict management at large, it limits its scope to the case 
study of post-conflict management in the Yugoslav province. The choice of the case of 
Kosovo is explained by the specific nature and implications of the institution-building process 
on this territory. First, the United Nations Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was 
one of the two first and only international administrations of this kind, unprecedented in the 
extent of the powers vested in the mission as well as in the ambitiousness of its mandate – 
essentially quasi-unlimited power to develop from scratch a political system in a sovereign 
state. Second, the international action has implications for the sovereignty of the state in 
which it is performing. As opposed to East Timor, which benefited, in the context of 
decolonisation, from the right to have a say in the determination of its status,12 Kosovo was 
not under international law a candidate for ‘external’ self-determination. Yet, the institutions 
established and run by the international authorities in the Serbian province eventually 
provided the conditions for and empowerment for it to secede, thus breaching the rights of a 
sovereign state. Finally, international involvement in Kosovo over the past ten years has had a 
number of unprecedented and – not experienced since – implications for the international 
legal and political order, as is demonstrated through this analysis.  
The theme of the research is primarily on the specificity of multilateral involvement in 
post-conflict regulation. It concentrates on the structure of the international players involved 
in the process, as well as the strategy and policies they instigated, and finally, the outcome of 
their activities. The title of this thesis focuses on the term ‘actor’ rather than ‘community’ in 
order to highlight the diversity of players involved in the legitimacy process. Indeed the 
multilateral mission pursuing institution-building in Kosovo is headed and run by the United 
Nations, as the ‘executive’ branch of the community of ‘united nations’. Yet, various other 
international ‘actors’ – multilateral governmental organisations and individual states – are 
also involved at the different levels of the analytical framework in this study of legitimacy. 
Several local actors are identified and their roles are highlighted, but for this analysis they are 
considered as explanatory variables in the definition of international actors and the legitimacy 
of their policies. Indeed local players’ involvement in the institutions, and their degree – or 
lack – of participation in the overall process is crucial to my argument. In addition, it is 
important to specify that this research is concerned with the civilian aspects of the 
                                                
position. Throughout the thesis, when considering names of places I attempt to employ the most commonly used 
spelling in international circles, and where appropriate, give the bilingual equivalent. 
12 The East Timor Special Autonomy Referendum, 30 August 1999. 
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international mission. Indeed, with resolution 1244, the Security Council also mandated a 
military force to secure the province. Nonetheless, this study, owing to its research focus 
concerned specifically with the institution-building activities of the mission, concentrates on 
the civilian mission instituted by the Council.13  
By focusing on international involvement in conflict regulation through institution-
building, this thesis limits itself exclusively to the timeframe between June 1999 – when 
UNMIK was established – and 18 February 2008 – when the Kosovo assembly declared the 
independence of its institutions from Serbia, but also from UNMIK rule. This controversial 
point is extensively covered in the last chapter. The contexts prior to and briefly after those 
dates are examined when they have explanatory value for this research but are not, in 
themselves, fully explored.  
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the principle of legitimacy is the key variable 
in this study. Through my assessment of the nature and degree of legitimacy of the established 
political system,14 I aim to assess the successes and failures of the international action and 
determine the long-term stability implications for Kosovo’s deeply divided society. To do so, 
this research takes up a number of issues such as: What is the concept of legitimacy? How is 
legitimacy determined? How does it apply to the context of the international community? 
What implications does the notion have for international conflict management? And 
conversely, how does the international community’s action influence the understanding and 
concept of legitimacy? On which basis does legitimacy rest in ethnically deeply divided 
societies? Is intervention based on humanitarian arguments legitimate? On what grounds does 
the legitimacy of international territorial administrations rest? Are democracy and 
democratisation key components of legitimacy? How does the legitimacy of its political 
system influence the stability prospects of Kosovo? Through an exploration of those questions 
and the attempt to provide answers to them, this thesis aims to pinpoint one of the factors 
responsible for the failures of the international community in its conflict management actions 
– that is to say, the lack of local legitimacy. Given the complexity of the issue, this study does 
not embark on a search for an absolute answer. It rather aims to demonstrate the relevance of 
this issue, and to assess the extent to which tackling this issue might, hypothetically, 
                                                
13 Resoution 1244, § 5. 
14 Cf. Stillman, P., ‘The Concept of Legitimacy’ in Polity, vol. 7 (1), 1974. pp. 32-56; Barker, R., Political 
Legitimacy and the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990. 
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contribute to the improvement of the situation on the ground to enable the international 
community to attain its ultimate goal. 
By considering these different questions, this thesis demonstrates that the international 
community missed a unique opportunity to develop well-articulated management mechanisms 
to respond to the contemporary challenges of ethnic conflicts, in part due to its failure to gain 
legitimacy for its actions and their outcomes. By acting through an integrated ‘neutral’ and 
internationally sponsored organ, the international actors could have sent a strong message to 
the deeply divided society: this administration has the ability to protect and provide for the 
people of the province as a whole with an institutional structure capable of sustaining long-
term economic, political, and social peace and stability. Despite its bold moves to impose 
peace on the warring parties, such as the ‘occupation’ of Kosovo and the assumption of all – 
that is, executive, legislative and judicial – powers, the mission failed to enforce fully its 
policies, showing indecisiveness and insecurity in enforcing its own decisions and policies.15 
The mission failed to provide Kosovo’s inhabitants the security and the basic commodities 
they dearly needed, failed to strengthen and integrate into the system a form of ‘civil society’, 
and failed to structure an institutional framework within which the population of the province 
as a whole would recognise themselves. Yet, success in those fields would have been essential 
to gaining some legitimacy and thus providing some stability to the new political system that 
the international administration attempted to establish. As Seymour Lipset argues, cohesion of 
the political system is essential to provide some sort of realistic future for a political system. 
Nonetheless, nationalist ideologies prevented any shared basis for the political legitimacy of 
local institutions, and these proved to be even more entrenched after nine years of UNMIK 
rule. 
The conclusions of this research are based on the collection of information gathered 
through, first, the analysis of relevant documents, such as reports, policy papers and official 
documents published in English by the different organisations involved in the institution-
building process as well as translation of local newspapers and official documents such as 
political parties’ manifestos. Second, fieldwork analysis was conducted in the aftermath of the 
March 2004 violence. In particular, I was able to conduct valuable formal and informal 
interviews with international and local policy-makers, local political leaders and eminent 
members of Kosovo’s civil society. Finally, I draw on my extensive first-hand experience 
                                                
15 ie., Mitrovica. 
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working as visiting researcher at the European Centre for Minority Issues in 2001-2002 as 
well as an election monitor for the Organisation of Cooperation and Security in Europe in the 
Gjilan (Serb: Gnjilane) area during the first elections held in October 2000. In particular, in 
the former position, I worked on a ‘researched-oriented’ project involved in the development 
of Kosovo civil society, which enabled me to gain valuable contacts and insights into the 
political and daily lives of the people of Kosovo.  
Based on this experience and research, I developed a ‘double layer’ analytical 
framework of legitimacy to study international institution-building in a sovereign state. This 
framework comprises an international and a local dimension. The distinction is made on the 
basis of what Bernard Knoll has called ‘audiences’ – those who grant support, and thus 
legitimacy – and the criteria on which legitimacy is based.16 Through this analytical 
framework, I argue that as international actors focused on securing the legitimacy of their 
administration and its new institutional structures vis à vis the international community, they 
failed to ensure the support of the local population that is so crucial to the sustainability, and 
thus ultimately the success, of that system. 
To argue my case, I first develop a workable definition of legitimacy, which I apply to 
the different aspects/stages of international involvement in Kosovo, determining at each stage 
the repercussions the failure to secure legitimacy at the grass-root levels had on the overall 
process. As David Beetham argues, to evaluate the legitimacy of a system, it is not enough to 
assess its structure and policies; the context in which it evolves also needs to be considered.17 
In the case of Kosovo, to determine the sustainability of its Institutions of Provisional Self-
government, it is not enough to simply assess their (or their policies’) legitimacy. The 
circumstances in which the institutions were established influences the legitimacy of the 
political system and of the institutions that evolve within it. Thus this legitimacy matrix will 
be applied to each stage of the process. I use three tests to determine the absence or presence 
of legitimacy that I have adapted from Seymour Lipset. These tests cover rules, justifications 
and actions. I argue that UNMIK failed these tests because the rules were ambiguous. Neither 
the legality of the NATO intervention nor United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, 
which was contradictory, offered a basis for establishing legitimacy. In terms of justification, 
                                                
16 Bernard Knoll developed a similar argument where he distinguished ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ legitimacy. 
Cf. Knoll, B., ‘Legitimacy and UN Administration of Territory’ in Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 
4 (1), 2007. pp. 1-15.  
17 Beetham, Op. Cit., p. 23. 
 17 
the international community was divided at an international level between those who insisted 
on the importance of sovereignty and those who argued in terms of human rights; and, at the 
local level, UNMIK, unsure of is own legitimacy basis, pandered to nationalist sentiment 
rather than promoting an inclusive alternative through greater local individual participation. 
Furthermore, in terms of action, UNMIK failed to meet basic needs or to provide a framework 
for cooperative behaviour since it was obsessed with power sharing. ‘Standards before Status’ 
could have offered a possible way forward, but it was abandoned in the face of violence. 
Pursuing this line of thought, this study is divided into six chapters. Chapter One is the 
theoretical backbone of this research, providing a workable definition of the concept of 
legitimacy, and establishing the assessment tools and articulating the theoretical framework 
for the case study. Chapter Two assesses the foundations of local legitimacy in Kosovo, 
shaped by the difficult and tortuous history of the province. Chapter Three considers the basis 
of international legitimacy. It outlines the international circumstances that led to the creation 
of the international administration and highlights the causal relationship it has with the future 
political system. Next, Chapter Four analyses the policies pursued to legitimise the mission, 
first examining the conflict within the international framework and then increasingly among 
the grass-roots base, and highlighting the resulting conflict between the two. Chapter Five 
studies the institutions at the central and local levels, assessing the relevance of the 
democratisation process pursued by UNMIK for securing the Kosovo population’s support for 
the newly designed political system. Chapter Six rounds it all of with a discussion of the 
impact of the ultimate resolution of Kosovo’s final status on the long-term stabilisation of 
ethnic tensions therein. I summarise my findings and discuss some implications for future 
work in this area in the Conclusion that follows. 
In more concrete terms, Chapter One develops the theoretical framework of this 
research. I explore different definitions and dimensions of the concept of legitimacy at the 
national and international levels, observe their implications for the new trends in international 
administration, and establish a workable definition for the purposes of this thesis. Through the 
development of criteria to determine legitimacy, I sketch out and articulate the theoretical 
analytical framework as applied to the case study, providing the logical map of the reasoning 
underlying the subsequent analysis. Through this process, I define ‘legitimacy’ as a 
combination of beliefs and actions shaped both by rationality and powerful ideologies. I 
identify two distinct analytical frameworks: an international one and a national one. This 
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chapter demonstrates that due to its nature, the international community to its detriment has a 
tendency to focus on the former rather than on the latter.    
The purpose of Chapter Two is to explore the nature and consequences of the 
‘Question of Kosovo’ from its beginnings to the negotiations of Rambouillet. Through a 
historical perspective, it analyses how the patterns of legitimacy evolved in leading to the 
situation faced by the province in 1999. This chapter makes the case that due to the violent 
and intense past that Kosovo has experienced over the past 150 years, legitimacy is anchored 
in nationalist ideologies. Yet, this chapter further establishes that those nationalist ideologies 
are not primordial and unchanging, as evidenced by the relative success of the communist 
ideology to centre the debate on an alternative common theme during and immediately after 
the Second World War. Given that the rise of ‘new’ nationalist movements followed the fall 
of Communism,18 nationalist ideologies cannot not be taken for granted or considered as 
irreversible. Given time, appropriate support, suitable policies and the provision of alternative 
responses to the population’s numerous needs, those ideologies, I argue, could be moderated 
and, combined with other beliefs, could be supplanted by another ideology. 
Chapter Three maps out the roots of international legitimacy and considers the 
implications of NATO’s military intervention for the legitimation process of the international 
administration. This chapter analyses the fundamental opposition between the different core 
principles on which the future international order rests: sovereignty versus national self-
determination, and sovereignty versus human rights; it explores how this opposition affects 
the legitimacy of the order, the actors and ultimately, their policies. First I examine the 
sovereignty versus self-determination debate and how it affects the case of Kosovo. Then, I 
consider the sovereignty versus human rights debate and explore to what extent the 
emergence of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept at the international level made it possible 
– if at all – in order to find a basis to legitimise NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. I conclude 
with a discussion of the consequences of this intervention on the international system as a 
whole. I also discuss the repercussions it had on the legitimacy of the international actors 
involved in the post-conflict regulation of Kosovo and the policies they pursued to this end. 
The chapter maintains that even if arguably legitimate on moral grounds, the intervention was 
not legal in international legal terms. It merely managed to divide/ alienate parts of the 
international community and ultimately failed to obtain any grounded support from any of the 
                                                
18 Kaldor, M., New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Polity Press, London, 1999, p. 41. 
 19 
Kosovo population’s factions. This failure to secure legitimacy both at the international and 
local levels had serious repercussions for the fate of the new international mission. Indeed, the 
basis for the mission’s legitimacy proved to be already shaky before it even got the chance to 
organise and set its policies in place. 
The primary concern of Chapter Four is to assess the structures and policies of the 
international administration and highlight how these affected the established institutions. 
First, I examine the development of international administrations along the past decades and 
determine how their forms, aims and policies affected their legitimacy and the legitimacy of 
their strategies. Then I outline the context in which the Kosovo mission formulated its policies 
by outlining the expectations of the actors involved, determining the sources of their beliefs in 
the mission, analysing the structure of the international administration, and mapping out how 
this structure influenced the legitimation of the mission and of its policies. Finally, I observe 
the overall policies set in place by UNMIK, determining how they attempted to legitimise the 
mission’s position. This chapter argues that there was a clear will on the part of the mission to 
legitimise its actions; yet UNMIK tended to focus on self-legitimation at the international 
level rather than on securing the support of the populations its policies affected.19 Through the 
observation of the evolution of international territorial administrations, there appears a clear 
concern on the part of the international community to legitimise missions through their 
structures and mandates. Nonetheless, despite the modern and innovative design of UNMIK, 
its constant focus on securing international approval to compensate for the questionable 
source of its legitimacy at the international level prevented the mission from pursuing the 
policies necessary to secure the support of the populations it ruled. The lack of accountability 
of the mission and the lack of consistency in its policies seems more like an ad hoc crisis 
management approach rather than an articulate conflict regulation strategy – that of finding a 
long-term resolution to the problem. The decisive example of Mitrovica (Serb: Kosovska 
Mitrovica) illustrates this argument as, after imposing itself over the Serbian province, the 
international administration allowed a resistance pocket develop within its realm, without any 
real attempt to impose its dominion over it. This lack of consistency and inability to impose 
itself ultimately prevents the mission from securing the support it needs to ensure the 
sustainability of the political system it aims to establish. 
                                                
19 Legitimation being defined as the process of acquiring legitimacy. 
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Chapter Five examines the legitimacy issues surrounding Kosovo’s institutions 
themselves. After a discussion of the role of western liberal democracy in securing – or failing 
to secure – legitimacy and the specificities that democratisation faces in Kosovo, I proceed to 
the observation of the development of Kosovo’s new institutions at the central and local 
levels. In this chapter, I argue that democratisation in itself has trouble legitimising the 
processes and the outcomes of institution-building. The power sharing mechanism at the heart 
of the international administration’s western liberal conception of multiethnic democracy 
becomes in itself a barrier to long-term settlement. If at first unavoidable – if not necessary – 
to secure the access to power to all segments of the divided society, with time it entrenches 
barriers and resentment between groups and prevent the integration of the society as a whole. 
The resulting increasing lack of political support that the local institutions have and their 
inability to secure legitimacy ultimately endangers the sustainability of the conflict regulation 
process, thus the future of the province.   
Finally, Chapter Six concludes with an exploration of the influence the status issue has 
for the future of the province. It first analyses the different dimensions of the ‘final status 
question’ before outlining the different alternatives considered for the province. Next, I 
consider the Ahtisaari proposal, offered by the international community as an alternative after 
the obvious inability of UNMIK’s policies to provide stability. Indeed, as long as the two 
communities remained deeply divided, no status solution was possible. Yet, very little was 
done to weaken the ideological basis of the division. I conclude this chapter with some 
remarks concerning the consequences of the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 
February 2008, its implications for the international order, and more crucially, for the future 
of international conflict regulation in general. This chapter argues that it is not the status of 
the province that determines the legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions, but rather the legitimacy 
of the system that shapes the sustainability of its future status. Consequently, it concludes that 
the biggest challenge of the new state and government of Kosovo in securing long-term 
stability will be to find means to remedy to its failing legitimacy. 
Given the complexity of the situation, the ambiguity of the rules and the simple fact 
that the conditions are now changed, it is difficult to argue the counterfactual that a different 
approach would have had a different outcome. Nevertheless we can at least note that after 
nine years of UNMIK rule, basic needs were unmet – e.g. electricity and water supply; 
nationalist sentiments have since the beginning of the period grown stronger, leaving no space 
for a will to live if not together then at least side by side. Indeed, the division of Mitrovica, 
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now even more entrenched, has become the indelible symbol of the inability of ever reaching 
a common ground between the two communities. Had there been greater consultation with the 
civil society, at least after the Kouchner period, and with ordinary Kosovo inhabitants as 
opposed to nationalist leaders, and had this been built into the mandate, it can be argued that 
the basis for a long-term solution might have been closer.  
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 Chapter 1 - International Actors and Institution Building: 
Issues of Legitimacy 
As the international community is increasingly involved in regulating conflicts through 
shaping war-torn societies, an assessment of its role and impact is increasingly pertinent. 
Beyond the traditional peace-keeping task of keeping the warring parties at bay, the 
international community has increasingly endorsed the role of managing post-conflict societies 
to prevent the resurgence and exacerbation of violence. Initiated and led by Western nations, 
those missions proclaim a dedication to liberal democratic values and to the fulfilment of long-
lasting stability through the achievement of democratic regimes.20 Kosovo is a typical example 
of this trend. With the establishment of UNMIK, the international community has taken total 
responsibility for the establishment of a democratic political system in a deeply divided and 
shattered territory.21 To achieve this ambitious task, the mission has launched an array of 
policies, first to respond to the immediate needs of the population, providing humanitarian aid 
and security; and second, to bestow long-term regulation through the establishment of 
governmental, economic and social institutions. Contemporary research on democracy is in 
agreement that in order to establish a sustainable democratic system, a number of elements are 
required, such as economic development and stable institutions.22 Pursuing these 
recommendations, the international actors in Kosovo have attempted since 1999 to establish an 
adequate environment and institutional base to launch the democratic model they aim to 
develop. 
This thesis puts forward the argument that legitimacy is a key component in the 
establishment of stable democratic institutions.23 It argues that post 1999-Kosovo is a clear 
illustration of the importance of legitimacy as well as the consequences the lack of it has for 
the democratisation process and for the overall political stability of post-conflict divided 
societies. However, before debating the case of Kosovo, a number of clarifications need to be 
made about the concept of legitimacy itself. What are the different components involved in the 
concept of legitimacy? How does one determine the presence or absence of legitimacy? Is 
legitimacy based on belief, as suggested by Max Weber, enough to guarantee the sustainability 
                                                
20 Paris, R., ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’ in Review of International Studies, vol. 
28 (4), 2002. pp. 637-656. 
21 Society divided along religious, ethnic or politic cleavages, entrenched after a violent conflict. 
22 Connolly, W., Legitimacy and the State, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984. 
23 Lipset, S., Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1983. 2nd ed. 
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of institutions?24 If not, what are the other dimensions that define legitimate institutions? 
Furthermore, beyond the implications of the concept of legitimacy at the national level, does it 
have relevance for the international community, defined as a society organised around supra-
national institutions? How does the concept of legitimacy apply to the limited power 
international administrations enjoy? Finally, in what way is the issue of legitimacy pertinent to 
the specific issue of international involvement in post-conflict management? How does it 
enlighten us on the process of institution-building, and most crucially how does it enable us to 
assess the success – or failure – of the new political system in providing sustainable stability?  
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework underpinning this research. It proposes 
both a workable definition of the concept of legitimacy and defines the analytical structure 
which will enable the analysis of international involvement in post-conflict management 
throughout this study. I argue that the concept of belief introduced by Weber and developed by 
Seymour Lipset is too restrictive in terms of providing an adequate definition of the criteria on 
which legitimacy is based. Thus, to develop an appraisal model, as a supplement to their 
theory, I explore additional dimensions of the concept suggested by the Beethamian model as 
well as the contribution of the notion of justice developed by Allen Buchanan in determining 
legitimacy.25 I further advance the argument that international involvement in post-conflict 
institution-building involves two levels of legitimacy: one international and one local; and that 
to fully understand all the implications of the international action in Kosovo, two distinct issues 
need to be considered through this model: (1) the legitimacy framework in which an 
international actor shapes a political system through the establishment of institutions in a – 
sovereign – state; and (2) the legitimacy framework in which the new political system evolves. 
Both are deeply complex and yet both need to be taken into account to have a full picture of the 
ins and outs of the relevance of legitimacy in situations such as Kosovo.  
To pursue this task, I first provide an overview and explanation of the notion of 
‘legitimacy’ to develop a set of criteria to define a working concept and to provide the 
analytical tools necessary for the subsequent analysis. I then consider the relevance of the 
concept of legitimacy within the international community and the issues that arise from the 
involvement of international actors in institution-building in a sovereign state. I finish this 
                                                
24 Weber, M., Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Bedminster Press, Ney York, 1968. 
Edited by Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich. 
25 Beetham, D., The Legitimation of Power, Macmillan, London, 1991. pp. 16-20; Buchanan, A., Justice, 
Legitimacy and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004. p.233.  
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study by sketching out the analytical rationale running through this investigation and 
articulating the arguments that will be developed in the thesis, illustrating them with the most 
compelling case of post-conflict management through institution-building: the case of Kosovo. 
1. The Concept of Legitimacy and its Definition 
The concept of legitimacy, as others in political theory, is subtle and has given ground 
to considerable definitional arm wrestling.26 Various eminent theorists have attempted to 
discredit previous models to bring their own contributions to the debate. The focus of this 
research is not to establish a chronological progression of the concept; nor is it to establish my 
own imprint by offering a new definition. The objective of this section is to reach a practical 
definition of legitimacy, which I will use to conduct this analysis. To do so, I first explore the 
concept of belief in legitimacy elaborated by Max Weber, which is central to my model; 
second, I analyse Weber’s critics in order to develop a working definition of legitimacy and to 
establish criteria to determine it; I conclude this section with an observation of the relevance of 
the relationship between democratic institutions and legitimacy.  
a. ‘Belief in Legitimacy’ 
The obvious starting point for a study of legitimacy would be Max Weber, as he is 
considered as the first person to have articulated a coherent concept of legitimacy in relation to 
political power.27  In his Economy and Society , Weber does not define legitimacy as such, but 
rather makes the ‘belief in legitimacy’ a variable of his domination theory.28 He argues that a 
‘genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance’.29 In order to 
operate, a political system needs the support of the entity it rules. If this entity refuses to obey 
the political system’s commands, then the system encounters difficulties in ruling. He also 
emphasises the voluntary nature of this compliance. The system can impose itself by force, but 
in the long term, its power will erode and ultimately fail unless there is a minimum degree of 
voluntary compliance from the entity under rule.30 
                                                
26 Stillman, P., ‘The Concept of Legitimacy’ in Polity, vol. 7 (1), 1974. p. 39. 
27 Beetham, Op. Cit., p. 8. 
28 ‘Domination’ is defined as ‘the probability that certain specific commands… will be obeyed by a given group 
of persons’, and endeavours to explain authority. Weber, Op. Cit., p. 212. 
29 Ibid., p. 212. 
30 Indeed, rather than determining whether there is or not legitimacy, Peter Stillman argues that legitimacy is a 
matter of degree. He defines ‘a degree of legitimacy’ as ‘a function both of the results of the government output. 
Results that may be intentionally or unintentionally compared to the value patterns of some system and the value 
pattern of the relevant system’. Stillman, Op. Cit., pp. 32; 43.  
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Weber classifies ‘the types of domination according to the kind of claims to legitimacy’ 
they are based upon.31 He identifies three types of what he calls ‘legitimate domination’: a) 
rational (or legal), b) traditional and c) charismatic.32 Ultimately, the authority’s legitimacy 
rests on the belief of the entity it rules that it is the rightful authority. This belief is acquired if 
the system respects one of the three following criteria: (a) In the case of rational legitimacy, 
people’s belief in the system rests on the fact that the system follows a set of pre-established 
rules. If the system follows a set of accepted and recognised rules, then it is legitimate. For 
instance, governmental institutions are considered legitimate if they are formed according to 
constitutional rules; (b) In case of traditional legitimacy, belief is gained on grounds of 
traditional customs. Contrarily to rational legitimacy, the set of rules does not need to be 
formally stated or even formally accepted. It is the continuous practice of observing them over 
time that grants the set its authority. Therefore, if the system follows ancient practices, it will 
not be questioned. For example in traditional clan societies, the head of the clan will be 
acknowledged as such according to unquestioned customary rules. The other significant 
difference between this form of legitimacy and the previous one is that in traditional 
legitimacy, the rules are harder to change. In a rational context, at any time, provided there is a 
consensus that the rules should change, the criteria that define legitimacy change. In a 
traditional context, as the rules are instinctive and require practice, it will thus take more time 
for them to evolve; finally (c) Charismatic legitimacy rests on the personality of the head of the 
system itself. It does not require established rules or practices, as long as the people feel that 
the particular person heading the system deserves confidence – based on the belief that (s)he 
will act in their best interests – then the system (s)he sets and rules acquires legitimacy. This 
often occurs in post-war contexts or any similarly difficult situations. If a particular person 
personifies rebellion during a conflict, chances are that s/he will be considered as the ‘natural’ 
leader of the post-conflict system. The problem that might occur with this specific form of 
legitimacy is that when the leader disappears, the system as a whole that relied on him/her 
might be put into question. Furthermore, Weber emphasises that beliefs can rest on a 
combination of these three types.33 Yet, should beliefs fail to find root in any of those three 
types of ‘legitimate domination,’ then the authority will fail to secure legitimacy, and 
ultimately, the whole domination system will be in crisis.   
                                                
31 Weber, Op. Cit., p. 213. 
32 Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
33 Ibid., p.  954. 
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Weber’s third contribution to the concept of legitimacy is the distinction he makes 
between the different actors of the political system.34 As Weber explains, according to what he 
calls the ‘law of small numbers’, ‘the ruling minority can quickly reach understanding among 
its members, it is thus able at any given time quickly to initiate that rationally organised action 
which is necessary to preserve its position of power’.35 Hence, the ruling power can outplay the 
disorganised masses. By this ‘law’, the good functioning of the system justifies the 
establishment of a ‘structure of domination’ and the need for a concept of legitimacy.36 In this 
structure of domination, Weber identifies three types of actors placed along a pyramidal 
arrangement. At the top is the power holder heading the system; in the middle is the 
administration in charge of implementing power, following the power holder’s directions; and 
at the bottom, are the masses that live under the umbrella of the power holder and the 
administration. The power holder needs to maintain others’ belief in the legitimacy of its power 
to continue enjoying the benefits of holding power. Thus, it needs to preserve the beliefs of the 
other two actors, upon which it exercises its domination, that it is entitled to do so. The second 
actor, the administration, represents the organisational structure of power. As such, it needs to 
maintain the belief of the ruled in the legitimacy of its action. In addition, it also needs to 
maintain the belief of the power holder it represents, so that the power holder continues to trust 
the intermediary with the administration of power. By its nature, as the intermediary between 
the power holder and the masses, the administration can potentially be wedged between the 
two should their respective beliefs in legitimacy diverge. Finally we have the masses, whose 
belief in both the power holder and the administration is essential for ensuring the legitimacy of 
power, as the ruled are the base on which the political system is rooted. Should the ruled refuse 
for any reason and withdraw their belief in the system, it would lead to a systemic crisis. As in 
any game, should the players of the game start doubting the validity of the rules, they would 
have the incentive to stop playing, and the game would then lose its purpose. The ruled are not 
per se exercising power; yet they are the pillars of the whole system. As pointed out 
previously, their voluntary belief in the system and in the two other actors is essential for the 
durability of the system. Because this belief should be voluntary, if the ruled withdraw their 
belief in the system or any of its actors, the system will ultimately collapse.  
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 953. 
35 Ibid., p. 952.  
36 Ibid., pp. 952-953. 
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Nonetheless, besides the need of the power executive to justify themselves to the other 
actors of the domination structure, Weber highlighted another need: self-justification. He 
argues that ‘[f]or a domination, this kind of justification of its legitimacy is much more than a 
matter of theoretical or philosophical speculation. It rather constitutes the basis of very real, 
differences in the empirical structure of domination. The reason for this fact lies in the 
generally observable need of any power… to justify itself’. Weber continues by pointing out 
that ‘[i]ndeed, the continued exercise of every domination always has the strongest need of 
self-justification through the appealing to the principle of legitimation’.37 Beyond securing the 
support of the other actors within the domination structure, the power holder and the 
administration need to a certain degree to convince themselves that they are worthy of the 
power they have.38 Hence they need to reassure themselves by maintaining their belief in their 
own legitimacy. The masses, which by definition do not hold any power, do not need to justify 
their belief in their own legitimacy.       
The distinction between the legitimacy obtained through the appeal to the belief of the 
other actors and the one obtained through self-legitimation is theorised by Weber through the 
development of the notions of ‘external means’ and ‘inner justifications’.39 ‘External means’, 
defined as ‘the control of a governing apparatus and the material means for running it and 
using coercion and of the obedience of the subject of political power’,40 consist of the 
instruments used by the power holder and the administration to secure the belief of the masses 
in their legitimacy. ‘Inner justifications’ are the means used to fulfil their constant need to 
justify their own legitimacy. This last point is particularly relevant in the study of international 
territorial administrations’ institution-building, as it will be articulated throughout this thesis 
that international administrations tend to spend more energy on securing ‘inner justifications’ 
rather than developing coherent ‘external means’.41     
Although the relevance of Weber’s legitimacy theory to political science has been 
heavily criticised, it does provide us with essential analytical tools for this study. First, due to 
the nature of international administrations – internationally imposed after a violent conflict – 
we have to consider to what extent the new political system has achieved the population’s 
                                                
37 Ibid., pp. 953-954. 
38 For an extensive study of this phenomenon, see Barker, R., Legitimating Identities: the Self Presentation of 
Rulers and Subjects, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.  
39 Barker, R., Political Legitimacy and the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 47-48. 
40 Ibid., p. 48. 
41 Issue of the ‘audience’, cf. Knoll, B., ‘Legitimacy and UN Administration of Territory’ in Journal of 
International Law and Policy, vol. 4 (1), 2007, p. 1 
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confidence and compliance and, if so, to what extent it is voluntary, especially when it claims 
to be running according to democratic principles. Second, we need to identify the type of 
legitimacy established and eventually sort out the competing legitimacies that result from the 
confrontational nature of post-conflict Kosovo. Third, we have also to identify the actors and 
their roles in pursuing both ‘external means’ and ‘inner justifications’. Before proceeding with 
those tasks, we will have to consider a few other aspects of the concept of legitimacy. As 
Rodney Barker points in his study Legitimacy and the State, ‘Weber does not use legitimacy to 
explain obedience, but as a way of categorizing different forms of obedience’.42 For political 
theorists – as opposed to sociologists – this represents a problem, as Weber’s categorisation of 
legitimate domination tends to be descriptive and devoid of any explanatory value. We 
therefore need to look into some of Weber’s critics to find complementary analytical tools to 
determine legitimacy, or the lack of it. 
b. Beyond Belief 
 David Beetham is one of these critics, whose theory adds to and stages Weber’s 
concept. In his Legitimation of Power, he gives a review of Weber’s concept of belief, which 
he considers to be over-simplistic. According to him, ‘what is wrong with [Weber’s] definition 
is, first, that it misrepresents the relationship between belief and legitimacy; and, secondly, that 
it takes no account of those aspects of legitimacy that have little to do with the belief at all’.43 
He argues that Weber’s theory takes the notion of belief  to be a mere tool of the power holder 
to secure legitimacy; rather, he suggests, belief should be considered an independent variable 
through which the existence – or lack of – and the degree of legitimacy of a political system 
can be assessed. In other words, if the relationship between the power holder and the actors on 
which (s)he exercises power is based on the latter’s belief that the former is entitled to do so, 
then the power holder’s exercise of power is legitimate. In contrast, Weber’s theory implies 
that the power holder secures the belief of the masses in his/her legitimacy. Even if Weber 
considers that this belief is granted voluntarily by the masses, he implies that it is indeed 
‘engineered’ by the power holder. Thus, one cannot rely any longer on the notion of belief to 
assess the true nature of the system, as belief becomes part of the domination system and 
consequently, is potentially biased. Evidence of this phenomenon can be found in Weber’s 
theory of ‘external means’ and ‘inner justifications’, where legitimacy is malleable in the hands 
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of the power holder.44 This distinction is indeed ‘a fine distinction, but a fundamental one’ 
when one expects to use legitimacy to assess the nature of a political system.45  
The second critique offered by Beetham concerns the central role and the irrational 
nature that Weber assigns to the notion of belief, disregarding other elements that Beetham 
considers have an equally important impact on legitimacy, such as legality of action or consent. 
Indeed, as he points out, legitimacy cannot stand solely on some irrational belief of the masses 
but can also involve established laws.  According to Beetham, to be legitimate a system needs 
to secure ‘the legal validity of the acquisition and exercise of power’.46 He emphasises the 
importance of the notions of law and legality in the concept of legitimacy.47  The power holder 
needs to have come into power and exercise this power following pre-existing rules.48 Should it 
come to power and exercise this power against the established rules, then the power holder will 
not be able to have a claim to legitimacy. It is agreed that those rules do not have to be formal 
or even written.49 Rules are not necessarily made as a result of the explicit agreement of 
people. In what Weber defines as a ‘rational’ system, rules are rarely adopted by the express 
agreement of each individual in the system. Even in a so-called democratic system, legislative 
power is representative. Rare are the examples, like Switzerland, where legislation is drawn up 
regularly on the basis of referenda. In the same way, in ‘traditional’ systems, rules are 
established over time and practice, but practice is defined by the group and not by each 
individual. Yet, this point can be toned down by the fact that even if the masses do have little 
to no influence on specific rules, they can still have an influence over the ‘rule of law’ system. 
In a non-coercive political system, if the ruled refused to follow the legal system, then the 
political system as such has little chance to stand on its own.  
In this line of argument, Beetham concedes that rules still have to be accepted as law. 
He insists that the ‘acquisition and exercise of’ power according to law is not enough. He 
argues that ‘it is not what the law actually prescribes, but what it ought to prescribe that is here 
the central issue of legitimacy’.50 His concept of legitimacy therefore includes the need for ‘the 
justifiability of the rules governing a power relationship in terms of the belief and values 
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current in the given society’.51 The rules that the power holder follows need to be accepted by 
the masses. Here the notion of belief is key. Yet contrarily to being irrational as Weber is 
suggested as implying, it is enshrined in the society. Indeed, as Beetham points out, the system 
of values on which legitimacy is based is not constant and varies from society to society.52 He 
argues that ‘there is an underlying structure of legitimacy common to all societies, however 
much of its content will vary from one to another’.53 The idea that legitimacy should be based 
on rules grounded in values enshrined in the society is indeed supported by other theorists.54 
Some of those have even attempted to argue that this ‘core structure’ presented by Beetham is 
more important than Beetham supposes, and is in fact a universal core that ought to be 
common to all systems. In particular, Allen Buchanan clearly defines legitimacy in terms of 
rules, if and only if those rules are based on ‘justice’, which he defines in turn in terms of 
human rights.55 In a similar way, Sabrina Ramet, in her study of the legitimacy of the 
successive Yugoslav states, defines legitimacy in terms of a set of liberal values, which she 
presents as the only set that can provide the basis for legitimate rules. Yet, contrarily to 
Buchanan, she recognises that those values are indeed hers and that they may vary depending 
on the case under consideration.56 Therefore, as the legitimacy of a system depends on the type 
of belief rooted in the society it rules, in order to assess the nature and degree of legitimacy of a 
system, it becomes relevant to determine first the values that shape its belief.57  
Finally, Beetham pursues the development of this legitimacy theory by highlighting the 
need for ‘the evidence of consent derived from actions expressive of it’.58  He considers that 
belief without explicit proof of consent is not enough. He insists that there is a need for the 
people to prove ‘evidence of consent expressed through actions’.59 If no evidence of belief can 
be given, legitimacy is hardly established. Tacit belief is for Beetham not enough, for there is a 
clear need to act upon one’s belief and this expression of belief has to be in some way 
measurable. Yet it could be argued that the masses show their belief when complying with the 
political system. In liberal systems, such consent can be expressed through elections.  
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From his criticism of Weber’s theory, Beetham develops a theory of legitimacy by the 
rationalisation of belief. He delineates a tripartite structure that he calls the ‘levels’ of 
legitimacy based on what he considers to be the three different factors that influence the 
legitimacy of power: (1) rules; (2) justifications that are grounded in beliefs; and (3) actions.60 
According to Beetham, in order to justify the legitimacy of power, the three components need 
to be reached collectively. Short on any one, the legitimacy of power cannot be guaranteed. In 
consequence, when identifying the type of legitimacy our actors are pursuing/enjoying, we 
have to further look into whether they fulfil the Beethamian ‘levels of legitimacy’. 
Figure 1 – Political System Legitimacy: Analytical Framework 
 This short review of the concept of legitimacy does not claim to be exhaustive, or to 
shed any new light on how to resolve the historical debate involved with this notion. What a 
comparison between Weber and Beetham provides is a general outline of the ground rules 
necessary to determine the legitimacy of a political system. Although the notion of belief is 
crucial to the concept, other variables need to be considered. The reconciliation of both 
theories provides us with a set of tools crucial to the analysis of a system’s legitimacy (Figure 
1). Nonetheless, besides the normative basis of the roots of a system’s legitimacy or that of 
the framework within which it can develop its policies, the policies themselves inexorably 
have an impact of shaping beliefs, and hence ultimately legitimacy. This research aims to 
assess the impact of the presence or absence of legitimacy on the stability of a particular 
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1. Identification of the actors of the system 
a. The power holder 
b. The administration 
c. The masses 
 
2. Analysis of the normative framework of the domination system. 
a. Determination of the rules that underlie the domination theory: What kind of legitimate 
domination is it – i.e. what is the nature of the rules?  
i. Rational  
ii. Traditional 
iii. Charismatic 
b. Determination of the rules’ roots as based on beliefs enshrined in the values of the system: 
What is the function of those rules? 
i. ‘External means’ 
ii. ‘Inner-justification’ 
 
c. Determination of the expression of this belief through actions 
i. Is there compliance? 
ii. Is it voluntary? 
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system evolving in specific circumstances. To proceed with the analysis of international 
involvement in deeply divided post-conflict societies, a final set of theories need to be 
considered to provide further explanatory tools to determine the nature and interrelationship 
of legitimacy – the object of this research – with the stability of a political system – the 
declared aim of the international involvement – and the democratisation of divided societies 
as in our particular case. 
c. Legitimacy and Political Stability 
Seymour Lipset, in his work Political Man, draws a clear relationship between 
legitimacy, democracy and the stability of a political system, and as such adds a significant 
element to the debate framed by the positions of Weber and Beetham. Defined as ‘the 
capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’,61 legitimacy is a crucial basis in 
securing an obligation to a political system. As argued previously, in a ‘domination’ system, 
the Weberian notion of belief is subjective and varies according to the entities from which the 
system wants/needs the cooperation to function/govern adequately. The belief is then 
subjectively based on the entities’ perceptions and evaluation of the system’s ability to fulfil 
their own set of criteria, and can be based on their assessment of the system’s effectiveness to 
achieve its task. Consequently, should the political system lose the belief of those different 
entities, the institutional structure loses its support, and cooperation with and participation in 
the system cease, which ultimately plunges the system into crisis. 
In this model, unlike Weber’s, the focus is essentially on the legitimacy of the system 
itself – the set of formal institutions – and not on the individuals running them,such as the 
particular government body in power at any given time. The fundamental difference lies in the 
fact that if a government loses the support/belief of the society, it finds itself in a legitimacy 
crisis, but the society does not necessarily question the system as a whole, which would put 
the very institutional structure at stake. This phenomenon is particularly relevant in a 
democratic system, where it is part of the game for the group in power to be constantly 
questioned by the other segments of society that mandate it to fulfil the society’s will. 
However, if the institutions themselves lose their popular support, then the system’s 
legitimacy crisis translates into two reactions: either the population withdraws its support 
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from the institutions, creating a governance vacuum and leading the society into anarchy; or 
despite the system’s legitimacy crisis, the institutions coerce the society into accepting their 
authority, leading towards a totalitarian system. Either result reveals a deep systemic crisis 
and demonstrates the importance of legitimate institutions for the stability of the regime.  
Lipset’s model is, despite some degree of elusiveness, important in that it highlights the 
basic principles and criteria found within the concept of institutional legitimacy, and helps us 
to understand the relationship between a system’s stability and the sense of legitimacy. 
However, his model is based on the assumption that the system is an established democracy – 
or has previously been democratic – and it is difficult to apply to cases of democratising 
systems. Within his model, Lipset recognises the ‘contemporary’ challenges that communism 
and nationalism represented for the concept of legitimacy and ultimately for the concept of 
democracy itself.62 He dismisses this problem and fails to adapt his model to these evolving 
situations. However, since the first publication of Political Man, the core of the communist 
system has crumbled and nationalist ideologies have become the beacons of divided societies. 
The changes in the international society do not imply that Lipset’s model has become obsolete, 
but merely that it requires adaptation to new demands. Evidence is found within the new states 
that have emerged from communism, where a great demand for the democratisation of their 
institutions has developed and created the need for the legitimisation of those institutions.  
In order to preserve the democratic system’s legitimacy, Lipset argues that it is 
essential that the institutions ‘sustain the expectations of major groups’ (1).63 The model also 
advocates that the system meet a number of other conditions, such as the integration of all 
groups within the system (2), the ‘moderation of tensions among its contending political 
forces’ (3),64 and the creation of ‘cleavage[s] within… groups not between them’ (4).65 Yet, 
transitional and ethnically divided societies such as Kosovo do not meet those criteria. By 
definition, transitional and divided societies are unstable due to the power vacuum left by the 
inefficiency of the emerging system in regulating the existing tensions between groups, or even 
from the exclusion of some of those groups from the system. The central questions this thesis 
addresses are: can these obstacles be overcome? And if so, how? 
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Figure 2: Democratising Political Systems’ Analytical Framework 
1. Identification of the actors of the system 
a. Power Holder 
b. Administration 
c. masses 
 
2. Analysis of the system’s normative framework 
a. determination of the rules 
i. Rational 
ii. Traditional 
iii. Charismatic 
 
b. Determination of the basis of the rules on 
beliefs 
i. ‘External means’ 
ii. ‘inner justifications’ 
 
2. Assessment of the policies 
a. Sustaining the expectation of all major groups 
b. Integration of all groups 
c. Moderation of tensions among contending 
political forces 
d. creation of non-ethnical cleavages 
 
3. Assessment of expression of beliefs through action 
a. is there compliance 
b. Is it voluntary? 
In the specific case of Kosovo that illustrates this argument, the international 
community openly endorsed the task of establishing self-governing democratic institutions in 
parts of a sovereign state in order to regulate the conflict left by decades of opposition and 
divisions.66 To achieve a stable democratic system in Kosovo, besides the establishment of 
political system based on a normative framework anchored in the values of the society, the new 
institutions need to secure the belief of the population of Kosovo as a whole, despite the 
divisions that characterise it, in the new institutional structure’s legitimacy. In other words, 
UNMIK and the institutions they are setting up need to ensure the compliance and participation 
of the different segments of the society in the new political system, through their engagement 
in the system. Should they fail to obtain the society’s belief in the new system – i.e. the support 
and participation of the different communities – the new institutional structure would fail to 
integrate the people of Kosovo in a coherent political framework and would risk furthering the 
divisions left by ethnic tensions. Conscious of this phenomenon, UNMIK has set in place a 
number of policies to pursue the legitimisation of the system. To assess their success in 
achieving it, this study will have to further consider the ability of UNMIK and the designed 
institutions, through their policies, to: sustain the expectations of the major ethnic groups; 
integrate the different segment of the society; moderate tensions between the different forces; 
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and to substitute inter-group cleavages with non-ethnic ones. Figure 2 illustrates the levels of 
legitimacy to test the presence or absence of legitimacy of the different actors and their policies 
that are consistently applied chapter by chapter in this thesis, as sketched out in the last section 
of this chapter.  
2. Legitimacy and the International Community 
As Allen Buchanan underlines, the concept of legitimacy is mostly developed in the 
context of power within states.67 One explanation for this phenomenon is that the starting point 
of the concept of legitimacy is found in Max Weber, who argues that states, having the 
monopoly of legitimate violence, are the rightful bearers of power.68 Yet, in order to 
cohabitate, states have defined rules that regulate their interactions. Through time, this set of 
rules has evolved into an articulate supra-national system that regulates an international society 
of states.69  
As Ian Clark underlines in his book Legitimacy in the International Society, the notion 
occupies an important place at the international level.70 Due of the anarchic nature of the 
international system, there is no formal ‘power holder’; yet states are organised as a 
community ruled by formal laws, established on common values, which dictate the actions of 
its members. Evidence of the legitimacy of this society is reflected in the relative stability – 
absence of major war outbreaks – of the system that perpetuate through time. In his book, 
Clark observes the evolution of this international legitimacy since its origins – the treaty of 
Westphalia – to this day. One striking element that appears from this study is the evolution of 
legitimacy through time in response to the changes in the society. The following section first 
defines the concept of legitimacy within the international system, and then determines the 
theoretical implications recent trends of international involvement in institution-building have 
over the concept of legitimacy.  
a. Legitimacy in the International System 
The international system does not, as such, have a ‘power holder’. The particularity of 
the system relies on the states’ wish to remain together, by choice and not because of a supra-
national organ coercing them and imposing its power. However, the post Second World War 
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international system still relies on an ‘administration’ – the United Nations – which exercises 
relative power over the ‘masses’ – states. It is interesting to note that the ‘masses’ of the 
international system are the states and not the people that compose them. The states and not 
their people are the guarantors of the system’s legitimacy and are the bearers of rights and 
duties in the system. As Lassa Oppenheim puts it, ‘[s]ince the law of nations is based on the 
common consent of individual States, and not of individual human beings, States solely and 
exclusively are subjects of international law’.71 This phenomenon is interesting as it explains 
the quasi-inability of people – as individuals or groups – to affect the system. This 
phenomenon originates in the history of the system’s formation and evolution – in the 
Westphalian system – a system originally made by states, for states.72  
The particularity of the international system implies that its administration only enjoys 
limited authority over states. At the core of the United Nations system, and indeed of the 
international order, lies the principle of ‘sovereignty’. Sabrina Ramet defines sovereignty as 
‘the supreme political authority within a territorially defined area’.73 The bearers of this 
political authority are ultimately states, which agree to limit this right within limited 
prerogatives and with their express consent. The authority of the United Nations system relies 
on the power states grant the authority by treaty. In 1945, a group of nations founded the 
system by signing the United Nations Charter. Each new state accepted the authority of the 
administration through joining the system. The system’s authority remains, however, limited to 
the relation between states, and it preserves the sovereignty of states – i.e. preserves the 
authority of states within their own territories and over their own populations. Evidence of the 
limits sovereignty imposes on international authority is provided by the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms. The rule of non-intervention is embedded in the charter and can be contravened 
only in extreme circumstances.74 The principle of sovereignty is indeed the core value of the 
system as a whole, lying at the root of the international legal system. The question that arises 
is: why do states agree to limit their sovereign rights by taking part in the system? Part of this 
answer was given by the Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar: ‘joining the United 
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Nations is the final confirmation of independence, nationhood and sovereignty’.75 Acceptance 
of the administration’s authority provides membership of the system and enjoyment of the 
stability it procures. Membership in the system, respect for international law and the resolution 
of issues through diplomacy are proof of an active belief of states in the international system, 
and hence of its legitimacy.  
Yet, besides the concept of sovereignty at the base of the Westaphalian system, 
developments in international relations and politics have given rise to new concepts on which 
the new international order has grown. In particular, we can point to the idea of national self-
determination that flourished after the First and Second World Wars to respond to the demands 
of new states issuing from the dislocation of empires, as well as the notion of human rights that 
flourished with the establishment of the United Nations’ order.76 Both national self-
determination and increasingly human rights have grown and given rise to a questioning of 
sovereignty as the basis of the international order’s legitimacy. In particular, the latter has 
gained exponential importance in the last decades, calling for the strengthening of the role of 
individual within the international order. This development has been supported and articulated 
by the Globalisation school, which appeals to the adaptation of the world order to new global 
realities, articulating an argument in favour of the restructuration of the international order on 
the rights of individuals rather than states.77  
b. Legitimacy and International Administrations 
As the Westaphalian order is based on states, the international community has 
developed mechanisms to provide against threats to the stability of this balance, including 
when instability is caused from power vacuums within states themselves. This is not a new 
phenomenon; however the involvement of international actors in a state’s affairs to deal with 
its power vacuums has spurred concerns as regards the potential violation of the relevant 
state’s sovereignty. Throughout the twentieth century, the international community has 
institutionalised means to ensure the legitimacy of this practice and prevent any abuse of the 
system. The legitimacy of this intervention has relied on a number of mechanisms: a 
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legitimate mandate – by invitation of the state or mandated by the international community; 
legitimate goals based on the aim of resolving the power vacuum; a definite time-frame to 
prevent overstays; and more recent trends have seen multilateral actors being perceived as 
more ‘neutral’ and less likely to commit abuses.  
Nonetheless, at the turn of the twenty-first century, the cases of East Timor and 
Kosovo demonstrated an interesting development in the field of international administration. 
The specificity of these practices lie in the extent of power and the mandates granted to those 
administrations: the development of a full governmental institutional framework by an 
international actor on part of a sovereign state’s territory outside of its authority.78 Hence, an 
international body, relying on international rules and legitimacy, is involved in a domestic 
field without having legitimacy links to the domestic system. In this respect, the argument 
sketched by Bernard Knoll on the two ‘dimensions’ of legitimacy – ‘international’ and 
‘domestic’ – is particularly interesting.79 
The issue that arises is that the international action in developing domestic institutions 
occurs in two different legitimacy frameworks, and hence with different actors and different 
sets of values, from which legitimacy is required. Invested by an international body, the 
international administration needs to secure the support of the different actors involved in the 
international system. Yet, to provide success to the new set of institutions it is launching, the 
approbation of local actors is also essential. Nonetheless, within each of these frameworks, 
following different rationales and based on different legitimate dominations, rules differ from 
one level to the other. At the international level, the rules are typically rational and tradition 
dominated, as enshrined in the United Nations charter and principles of international law – 
i.e., sovereignty, self-determination and human rights. Justifications of belief are based on the 
Westphalian system, as well as increasingly on western liberal concepts of human rights, 
democracy, good governance and the rule of law.80 However, with more domestic concerns, 
local legitimacy is enshrined in sovereignty and national self-determination over territories 
and people. Justification of the belief in legitimacy is rooted in ‘effective provisions of public 
goods’, ‘local ideology and cultural background’ and I would add, ownership, defined as the 
capacity of the local community to influence decisions within the political system.81 In order 
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to respond to the different demands, it is essential for the international administration to 
develop different strategies aimed at its different audiences.82 Nonetheless, wedged between 
what are sometimes mutually exclusive demands that fail to provide for all, the administration 
has a tendency to reinforce its ‘inner justification’ rather than to develop coherent ‘external 
means’, with consequences for the effective legitimacy of the administration.83  
Given the distinction and definition of the legitimacy frameworks in which a study of 
international institution-building evolves, it is important to make a further point. Indeed, 
Beetham claims that ‘to be justified, power has to be derived from a valid source of 
authority’.84 From the demonstration of an international administration’s legitimacy, it 
appears that this source of legitimacy is not straightforward and involves further 
considerations. To evaluate the legitimacy of the new political system of the province being 
administered, it is relevant to analyse primarily the way in which it has been instigated, and 
hence the source of its authority. As a result of the peculiarity of the situation in Kosovo, an 
analysis of the province’s new political system inevitably has to take into account outside 
influences. The nature of this system, imposed as it has been upon Kosovo’s society by a 
foreign body, calls out for two distinct analytical levels – international and local – adding an 
interesting wider dimension to this study. 
3. Kosovo and Legitimacy 
Decades of social and armed conflicts, which culminated with NATO’s airstrikes, left 
in the Yugoslav province with a power vacuum, which made it unable   to deal with the 
challenges it had to face. The international community, through Security Council resolution 
1244, endorsed its own responsibility to fill this void and prevent the instabilities that it 
entailed. It established a subsidiary organ to administer the territory through the post-conflict 
transition and mandated it to establish a new political system capable of taking over and 
maintaining governance in the long-term. This strategy was adopted on the basis of the nature 
of the instability experienced in Kosovo. In 1999, the Yugoslav state proved unable to provide 
for the deeply divided society of its province. As the sovereign state proved unable to secure 
the stability needed for the exercise of governance, the international community offered an 
alternative involving outside intervention. Unbiased towards any of the parties to the conflict 
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and believing itself capable of securing support from all sides, the international community 
considered that their ‘neutral’ role represented a unique opportunity to regulate the conflict. 
Yet, through their actions, the international community gave an international dimension to a 
problem that fundamentally was a domestic issue.  
Given the complexity of the situation and the emergency nature in which the 
international actors had to perform at the time, we are only left to hypothesise potential 
alternatives to explain the failures of the international actors’ policies. Nevertheless, based on 
concrete examples and armed with our analytical framework, this study aims to provide some 
explanation of the shortcomings of those policies. The remainder of this section sketches out 
the theoretical rationale behind the analysis conducted in this thesis and articulates the 
theoretical tools identified in the first part of this chapter to assessing the legitimacy of the new 
Kosovo political system. The different arguments raised in this section will be developed fully 
in the next chapters of this thesis. In the light of the argument developed and provided for the 
particular case of Kosovo, to assess the province’s post-conflict political system, two distinct 
scenarios need to be considered: (1) the legitimacy issues surrounding international 
involvement in post-conflict crisis management; and (2) the legitimacy of the newly 
established institutions. Those two scenarios will be tested through both legitimacy 
frameworks – (a) international; and (b) local.  
a. UNMIK and Institution-building 
When considering the legitimacy of international institution-building in post-conflict 
Kosovo, the analytical framework identifies three relevant actors: (1) The United Nations 
Security Council which, as the executive organ of the international community, represents the 
‘power holder’ of the system. It exercises the overall decision-making power in the 
international society. Due to the anarchic nature of the international society, it does not have as 
such a ‘power holder’ to which it needs to legitimise itself. As a unitary actor, its exercises 
power by the consensus of its members. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the 
multiplicity of individuals that forms the Council and the requirement to reach decisions by 
consensus have an impact both on its exercise of power and its self-legitimation; (2) UNMIK, 
the subsidiary organ in charge of administering the policies set out by the international 
community represents the ‘administration’. It is in charge of implementing the decisions 
initiated from the Security Council; (3) Finally, in this analysis there are two kinds of ‘masses’ 
that reflect the peculiarity of the involvement of an international actor in a sovereign state, and 
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thus the superposition of international and local legitimacies. In the international framework, 
the ‘masses’ are the states that are the individual units of the international system. They are not 
technically affected by UNMIK’s decisions, and yet given that the international administration 
acts in an international framework, it ultimately needs to sustain its action through their beliefs. 
Within the local framework, the people of Kosovo, who accept the power administered by 
UNMIK, represent the ‘masses’ in this domination theory’s pyramidal structure.  
The non-unitary natures of both the power holder and the ‘masses’ are particularly 
relevant as their differences in the perception of rules and ultimately the basis of their beliefs, 
as determined by their individuality based on their own interests, has a potential impact on the 
legitimacy of the system. In the case of the Security Council, interests that impact on the 
‘power holder’ are: (a) NATO countries led by the Security Council’s veto powers: the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France, in favour of the stabilisation of the region through 
intervention of the international community; (b) Russia, also a veto power but in favour of the 
resolution of instability under the cover of Serbian sovereignty; (c) other state actors, who as 
non-veto powers do not have the express power to reject Security Council resolutions, but can 
however have and express their own support in the Council’s decisions according to their own 
specific interests.  
The population of Kosovo naturally reflects the diversity of the deeply divided Kosovo 
society. After the violent ethnic conflict that the society underwent, it is characterised by 
heterogeneity, and lies divided along deep fault-lines. Beyond the obvious inter-ethnic 
divisions between Kosovo’s Serbs and Albanians, the society experiences further intra-ethnic 
rifts, products of the evolution of the difficult political and sociological situation of the region. 
In particular, it is interesting to note that in this international framework, Serbia – the state with 
sovereign power over the province – is indeed a mass, both at the international and local 
frameworks. It does not have direct control over the policies implemented by UNMIK, and yet 
is affected by them. Furthermore, as a member of the international society, it can express 
support or oppose the overall actions of the international administration. The heterogeneity of 
the different actors is important to note, as it strongly reflects on the legitimacy of the 
administration. The mutually exclusive expectations of the different actors, complicated by the 
multiplicity of analytic frameworks which involve different set of rules, heavily influence the 
legitimate domination framework of the international administration. 
In this system, the Security Council, through its subsidiary organ, has established a 
political system in one of its sovereign states. The authority of the Security Council, and by 
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extension UNMIK, relies on the Charter – the basis of the post-Second World War 
international order – and norms of international law based on a balance between the principles 
of sovereignty, national self-determination and human rights. Sovereignty protects states from 
outside interference but allows intervention in their affairs under strict circumstances. To retain 
their legitimacy, both the Security Council and UNMIK need to follow those prerogatives. 
International law allows intervention only in two cases: either with the express and formal 
approval of the state; or with the ‘benediction’ of the Council rooted on the consensus of its 
members, on the basis of defined circumstances as laid out in chapter VII of the Charter. In 
either case, the aims and means should be determined prior to intervention, either by agreement 
between the state and the intervening power or by the Security Council through the adoption of 
a resolution. Both exceptions to the non-intervention principle emphasise the importance of 
rules to legitimise such an intervention action. 
Figure 3 - Scenario 1 'Actors' 
The justification of the rules that maintain the legitimacy of the system is based on the 
values of the Westaphalian system upon which the international order itself is based. Yet, some 
actors of the system increasingly have based their belief on alternative internationist principles 
such as human rights or, for example the developing notion of a ‘responsibility to protect’ for 
states. Through the respect of the international legal norms, the international community and 
UNMIK not only maintain their self-legitimacy but also legitimise themselves to the different 
masses. It can be argued that Yugoslavia, a member of the international order, supports the 
international mission by letting UNMIK take authority and run policies in its Serbian province. 
Yet, down the years, Serbia has questioned the international mission and the international 
community’s action by arguing that: (1) the settlement was coerced on them through the use of 
illegal force – i.e. NATO intervention; and (2) the mission did not respect the commands of the 
Security Council resolution, which recognised the Yugoslav sovereignty over the province 
even as the mission was developing an institutional structure that ultimately drove the province 
toward the option of independence.  
Power holder United Nations Security Council 
US; UK; France Russia  Other States 
  
Administration United Nations Administrative Mission in Kosovo 
Masses States (Serbia) Kosovo population 
Serbs; Albanians, other minorities, Belgrade 
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Furthermore, it is difficult to find a legitimation link between the Kosovo society and 
the other actors of the system. The international legal system has been established by states for 
states, and therefore does not grant legal personality and indeed authority to local populations. 
It is unable to influence a system based on a different system of values. Thus it is hard to 
establish the belief of the Kosovo population in either of the two actors. In fact there is a 
certain distrust of the populations in laws that they cannot affect, which they hence consider as 
against their interests.85 For Kosovo’s Albanians, the Westphalian principle of sovereignty 
violates what they view as their right to national self-determination. In the same way, Kosovo’s 
Serbs distrust a system of law which did not protect them either from NATO’s intervention or 
the Kosovo Albanians’ retaliations, and made them second class citizens in their own nation-
state. In fact, the problem is deeper, as both communities’ beliefs rely on a set of values shaped 
and even entrenched in nationalist ideologies.86 Decades of opposition on national grounds and 
the ensuing violent conflict had entrenched their conceptions of legitimacy along nationalist 
lines. 
The first conclusion that comes out from the study of the legitimacy of the international 
action in post-conflict Kosovo is the confirmation that there is, within the same system, two set 
of beliefs in legitimacy: one international and one local. At the international level, there is a 
tension between the dominant geo-political set of assumptions drawn from the Westphalian 
system, and the growing salience of human rights. At the local level, embedded national 
ideologies make it very difficult to establish a shared set of beliefs that could underpin 
legitimacy for all. As the actors of the system rely on two different sets of values to define the 
legitimacy of the system, what is legitimate for one is not obviously legitimate for the other. 
The central argument of my thesis is that the international administration got wedged between 
the two legitimacy frameworks. The failure to sustain both ultimately calls into question the 
legitimacy of both the international administration and its post-conflict regulation actions. In 
this context, a number of factors have consequences in shaping the beliefs of the different 
actors involved in the process, and hence, in shaping their domination’s legitimacy. First, part 
of the international legitimacy requirements is to establish political stability in the province; yet 
the failure to obtain the support of the local population – i.e., their participation in the new 
institutions – is a source of illegitimacy, instability and ultimately questions the legitimacy of 
                                                
85 Knoll, Op. Cit., p. 8. 
86 Hayden, R., ‘Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics’ in Slavic Review, vol. 51 (4), 
1992. pp. 654-673. 
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both the administration and of the process. Second, their overall legitimation is indeed 
complicated by the multiplicity of actors at the ‘power holder’ and ‘masses’ levels. In the 
former case, there is a tension between geopolitics and rules, as well as within the hierarchy of 
norms. Political interests exercised within the Security Council bring into question the 
impartiality and reliability of the executive branch in enforcing international law. Moreover, 
the commitments of states to the international legal framework are questionable on the basis of 
the inconsistency in their support for international rules. Finally, the inability of UNMIK to 
assess for its own purposes the nationalist ideologies had a further effect on the legitimacy of 
the process. Indeed, national ideologies shape the local notion of belief; yet after ignoring this 
reality at first, UNMIK took for granted that the integration of extremism in its overall policy 
would provide it the legitimacy it lacked. Instead of promoting and relying on moderate trends, 
it created further polarisation.  
Figure 4 - Scenario 1 'Levels of Legitimacy' 
 International level Local level 
Rules United Nations Charter, International Law 
(principles of sovereignty, national self-
determination and human rights) 
Sovereignty and National Self-
determination 
Justification Westphalian system, increasingly promotion of 
Human rights 
National ideology 
Action Adhesion and participation to the system in 
accordance with its rules, Renewal of UNMIK’s 
mandate 
Participation in the new political 
system 
Figures 2 and 3 schematise the analytical framework of the international conflict 
resolution’s legitimacy in Kosovo. The next chapters of this thesis will develop the arguments 
sketched out in this section. Chapter two observes the origins and determines the nature of the 
national ideologies that shape the belief in legitimacy of the local actors, thus defining the 
legitimacy framework at the local level. It outlines the mutually exclusive interests of the local 
actors, prefiguring the difficulties of reconciling the different groups. Yet, it also argues that 
those national ideologies are indeed not pre-determined but rather the result of a long 
development process, which leaves potential breathing space that might be adapted for 
alternative ideologies to grow. Chapter three turns to the source of international legitimacy. It 
evaluates the strength of the concept of sovereignty vis à vis two other significant concepts of 
international law: national self-determination and human rights. I assess the practical 
implications that this theoretical debate has for the case of NATO intervention and the overall 
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legitimacy of the Security Council. Ultimately, it advances the articulation of a concept of a 
‘responsibility to protect’ as evidence of the tensions at the basis of international order, and 
outlines the implications this tension has over the management of post-conflict Kosovo itself. 
Chapter four analyses the legitimacy framework of international institution-building in 
Kosovo. After observing the development of the root of international administration’s 
legitimacy, it analyses how UNMIK adapted its policies to find a balance between inner-
justification and external means in order to reconcile the various expectations from the 
different legitimate domination levels. This chapter tests the international actors’ policies in 
relation to the criteria developed by Lipset. In particular, it highlights three fundamental flaws: 
(1) their inability to provide a secure environment for the population to prosper; (2) the relative 
failure to develop and rely on a strong civil society to check and balance the political 
institutions; and (3) the contradiction of UNMIK and the international community in dealing 
with the division of the city of Mitrovica, which ultimately became the landmark and emblem 
of the rift within the Kosovo society. 
b. Legitimacy and the Kosovo Political System 
In the analytical framework of the new Kosovo political system’s legitimacy, the 
identified relevant actors are: (1) the international administration, in charge of establishing the 
institutions that support the political system, which plays the role of ‘power holder’. The 
interesting aspect of this legitimate domination structure is the fact that in this domestic frame, 
the power holder is actually a foreign actor. This has a number of implications as regards 
legitimacy relationships. Its involvement undeniably affects the overall legitimacy of the 
political system, and yet the masses have a limited amount of leverage in affecting the 
legitimacy of the power holder, as there are no formal accountability mechanisms for the 
administration to the ‘masses’ actors. (2) In charge of administering the power delegated to 
them by the international mission, the institutions of provisional self-government are the 
‘administration’ of the system. It is composed of central and municipal institutions. The former 
is divided between an executive and a legislative organ. Given the sensitivity of justice in post-
conflict society, the judicial power is withheld within the power holder. For similar reasons, 
especially at the beginning of the international involvement, both the legislative and executive 
branches were mostly run by international personnel. The lack of separation of powers caused 
by the involvement of the power holder in the administration has inevitable consequences for 
the legitimacy framework. (3) Finally the Kosovo society, divided along inter- but also intra-
ethnic lines, represents the ‘masses’ in the system. It is interesting to note that there seems to 
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be an additional divide that affects the system, between the elites and the people that they 
represent. Indeed, it is often taken for granted that elites represent their groups; yet by 
concentrating on elites’ demands, there is a risk of missing important requirements of the 
community simply ignored by the elites for ‘the sake of the greater good’.  
In this system, both the authority of the international administration and the Kosovo 
institutions rests on resolution 1244, which founded the international administration and 
mandated it to establish local institutions according to international norms.87 As a subsidiary 
organ of the Security Council, UNMIK is entrusted to define the legal and political structures 
of the new political system of the province. Nonetheless, the questionable legitimacy of the 
founding document on which the system bases its self-legitimacy has important implications at 
the root of the system itself.88 Although the institutions of self-government are the focus of this 
analysis, they enjoy only a limited authority. As in the previous scenario, the rules that 
establish the authority of the two actors are based on international norms. The Security 
Council, as the ultimate political authority within the United Nations system, entrusts them 
with international legitimacy. This legitimacy is validated at the international level as long as 
the actions and policies of the two actors follow international norms and principles: human 
rights, good governance, rule of law, democracy based on the liberal concept of 
multiethnicity.89 Yet again, those justifications at the basis of belief are in sharp contrast with 
the belief of local actors, who base their claims on sovereignty and national self-determination, 
require local ownership and the provision of economic and social benefits.  
Figure 5 - Scenario 2 'Actors' 
 In the same way as in the previous scenario, the gap between the beliefs in the 
international and local legitimacy frameworks has deep implications for the sustainability of 
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the system itself, in an even more acute manner, as in this case, an international model is 
imposed from the top in a domestic context. The lack of leverage the ‘masses’ have over the 
norms that shape the system reinforces their distrust. It weakens their support for the authority, 
and hence its legitimacy. In particular, the population blames the international administration 
for the lack of clarity of its goals and for its lack of accountability to the Kosovo institutions 
and population.90 The institutions, on their part, are blamed for their lack of autonomy vis à vis 
the international community, their limited prerogatives and their lack of accountability to the 
population despite their – supposedly – democratic nature.91 As in the previous scenario, local 
legitimacy is based on values shaped by national ideologies, and in the same way, those values 
have played little role in the establishment of the authority of the system. It can be argued that 
resolution 1244 reflects a balance between the Kosovo Albanian and Serb national ideologies, 
in attempting to design institutions that respect Yugoslav sovereignty while providing self-
government to Kosovo. Yet their mutually exclusive nature and the inability of the 
international community, despite its responsibility to take a proactive stance to influence the 
efficiency of the system ultimately plagues the legitimacy of the system as a whole. A classic 
example of this trend would be the way in which international actors failed to take and enforce 
decisive policies in Mitrovica. Indeed, by attempting to favour one or the other, through ad hoc 
policies rather than by developing an integrative strategy for the population as a whole, the 
international administration increasingly alienates itself from all parts of the population. 
 Finally, the participation of the Kosovo population – or its lack of participation – in 
political life according to the rules designed and enforced by both UNMIK and the Kosovo 
assembly illustrate the support – or lack of support – for the ‘power holder’ and 
‘administration’.92 This phenomenon is all the more important for the institutions as the system 
claims to be democratic, and hence to reflect the will of the population. The lack of 
participation in elections, in the institutions, and lack of respect for the regulations and laws by 
a part of the population demonstrates the limited legitimacy of the system and the 
compromised prospects of success of the process as a whole. 
                                                
90 Ibid.p. 13. 
91 Ibid., p. 5. 
92 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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Figure 6 - Scenario 2 'Levels of Legitimacy' 
 The study of the legitimacy of the institutional system of Kosovo validates the 
analytical framework based on two levels of legitimacy. Based on the different and diverging 
values of the international order and the local population, it becomes difficult to legitimise the 
new institutions in the eyes of both at the same time. Furthermore it proves increasingly 
difficult for the international administration to develop a domestic political system on the basis 
of international norms of democracy while taking little account of local needs. The 
international administration’s inability to reconcile the goals and aims of the international 
community with local needs and wishes ultimately influences the overall legitimacy of the 
system, and thus its stability. Conscious of the issue, the international community nonetheless 
has been unable to respond adequately and has ultimately failed, at the time of the Kosovo 
declaration of independence, to resuscitate its legitimacy as well as that of its actions.  
The last two chapters of the thesis further reflect on the overall institutional structure of 
the Kosovo political system. Chapter five assesses the relevance of UNMIK’s democratisation 
policies and their relevance as a legitimising factor for the political system. It assesses the 
liberal conception of multiethnicity in post-ethnic conflict societies and analyses the relevance 
of the central and local institutions of Kosovo, and in particular, how the institutional design 
managed to provide stability as defined by Lipset’s criteria. Chapter six concludes this study by 
considering the issue of status that is fundamentally at the root of local beliefs. I finish with a 
review of the Ahtisaari plan and of the consequences of the February 2008 declaration of 
independence on the prospects of the province. Ultimately, all this highlights the failures of the 
international community to depart from their top-down approach,93 further worsened by their 
inability, despite the critical situation, to settle their political differences for the good of 
Kosovo.  
Conclusion 
                                                
93 Kostovičová 2008, pp. 631-647. 
 International level Local level 
Rules Resolution 1244, UNMIK regulations, Assembly laws National self-determination and 
sovereignty 
Justification Human rights, liberal democracy based on  
multiethnicity, good governance and rule of law. 
Local ownership, economic and 
social benefice 
Action Participation in the new political system including participation to election process 
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This chapter outlines the theoretical and analytical framework supporting this 
research. Legitimacy is an old concept that forms the basis of power domination theories. 
Originally developed within a state framework, the evolution of the international community 
on a similar power domination structure implied the need to define a specific system to 
respond to the particularities of this society of states. This prerequisite has been integrated 
into the development of the legal framework underlying the international order. Clark’s 
remark about the evolution of the legitimacy framework in line with changes within the 
international political system is interesting and relevant to the study of the case of Kosovo.94 
Indeed the specific requirements of the resolution of the Kosovo crisis required the 
international community to develop new conflict regulation mechanisms and entailed a 
reappraisal of the international legitimacy framework. It is clearly not the first time that the 
international community got involved in the regulation of threats to the international order in 
unstable states through the administration of territories. Yet with Kosovo, it was the first time 
that the international community, through the United Nations, was granted so much power 
and responsibility in a sovereign state without its full support, ultimately leading to the 
secession of the territory. The study of international involvement in institution-building 
indeed requires an open mind and a constant questioning of the basis of the international 
order. Ultimately the case of Kosovo requires us to reflect upon the fundamental basis of the 
state-based order, perhaps to decide in favour of alternative models such as global 
governance. The next chapters illustrate and explain this argument. 
                                                
94 Clark, Op. Cit. 
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 Chapter 2 - The Yugoslav Context and the Question of Kosovo 
In the last two decades, the term ‘the Balkans’ has come to be associated with war, 
ethnic cleansing, genocide and other inhuman behaviours. The terrifying images of 
destruction and suffering broadcasted over and over across the globe during the 1990s 
enabled, in people’s minds, the association of the Balkan region with the phenomenon of 
perpetual hatred and conflict, to the point where terms such as ‘Balkanisation’, have become 
synonymous with disaster.95 In an attempt to rationalise these behaviours, ‘ancestral ethnic 
hatreds’ have been commonly blamed: these horrible and inhuman deeds can only be 
explained because these people have been hostile to each other for so long that the 
accumulation of such tensions has naturally resulted in such levels of violence. The danger of 
so simplistic a syllogism is that, beyond being historically inaccurate,96 it induces the false 
assumption that it is a logical outcome, and consequently unavoidable; hence ultimately, little 
can be done about it. As Elisabeth Allen Dauphinée argues that the international community’s 
approach to the Kosovo conflict has been biased from the start by such erroneous 
judgments.97 I would further argue that such judgments are at the root of the international 
community’s approach to the resolution of the Kosovo issue and are, to a certain extent, the 
source of the difficulties encountered by the current international mission in Kosovo. 
It would be absurd to ignore or dismiss the dramatic and chaotic history of the 
Western Balkans and of the central role played by the national ideologies that have shaped it. 
Yet, it would be far too simple to define the Balkans’ dynamics purely in terms of ‘ancestral 
hatreds’. The history of the Balkans is rich in short- and long-term forces that indisputably 
played a role in the 1990s conflicts, and these will continue to play a role in shaping the 
region for the next decades. But in order to assess the political situation in Kosovo and 
determine its future, it is essential to go beyond this prejudice and endeavour to understand 
the wider forces that influence the political context in the province. The aim of this chapter is 
                                                
95 For example, in the French political discourse on issues such as the possibility of rehabilitating regional 
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not per se to determine the cause of the Kosovo conflict. Instead, it attempts to pinpoint the 
underlying influences that continue to have an effect over the future of the province.  
Through an analysis of the historical and political developments in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo over the last century, I wish to determine the context in which the 
post-conflict political system has developed. In particular, I analyse the development of the 
rival Serb and Albanian national ideologies, determine how they have shaped people’s 
allegiances and ultimately, the legitimacy structure of the present political system. This 
chapter argues that contrary to common belief, the Former Yugoslavia’s political culture is 
not based on irrational ‘ancestral ethnic hatreds’. On the contrary, this culture has been shaped 
by carefully and consciously designed nationalist ideologies that developed within a specific 
regional context. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that the way these ideologies were 
‘constructed’ leaves room for potential alternatives. To reach this goal, I first analyse the 
development of national ideologies in the context of the Former Yugoslavia, and then observe 
the particular context that developed in Kosovo before concluding with a description of the 
allegiance patterns in the wake of the recent international involvement.   
1. National Ideologies and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
Like in other parts of Europe, nationalist ideologies have been a driving force across 
the Balkans through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nationalism places the ‘Nation’ at 
the centre of its discourse. Ultimately, it strives for the creation of a ‘nation-state’, where the 
Nation defines the state: territorially, politically, economically and historically.98 Under this 
concept, the nineteenth-century model of ‘modern’ state is defined in terms of territory, 
population, effective government and capacity to enter into relations with other states.99 The 
definition of Nation has been the object of subtle and tortuous academic debates that bring 
little light in the context of our present analysis. A Nation can be defined as a group of people 
united around a common identity. Theorists of nationalism have made the distinction between 
‘civic’ as opposed to ‘ethnic’ concepts of Nation.100 In the former case, the people unite 
around a common project, such as in 1789 France, while in the latter case, people unite 
around a natural criterion defined in ‘ethnic’ terms, as in Germany (1871) or Greece (1829). 
Nationalism expresses the claim to political authority over a territory in the name of a 
                                                
98 Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2005. 2nd Edition. pp. 2-5. 
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common identity.101 It includes demands for political independence or ‘national self-
determination’.102 This national ideology is indeed the dogma that promotes the congruence of 
a territory and a people within the political realm of a nation-state.  
The concept of Nation and its related corollaries, such as national ideology and 
national self-determination, have played a major role in the creation, transformation and 
disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia. Understanding the checks and balances this involves 
is crucial to comprehending the role these will play in the creation of any future institutions 
for Kosovo. National ideologies have served, through twentieth century Yugoslavia, two 
essential functions: first of integration and then, increasingly of disintegration. In both cases, 
their importance has been promoted by the central role they have held in the political 
discourses and games of the different political actors of the Former Yugoslavia. For that 
reason, understanding the evolution of national ideologies within the Yugoslav context is 
crucial to understanding the way in which they developed in Kosovo.     
a. The First Yugoslavia and the Growth of National Ideologies 
During the nineteenth century, national ideologies were nurtured and gained 
increasing support within intellectual circles in the Western Balkans as the principle of nation-
state building spread across Europe. Intellectual and political elites, upset by the submission 
of their lands to foreign empires,103 developed the concept of Yugoslavism, which aimed at the 
unification of the ‘Southern Slavs’ scattered across the different empires that divided the 
Balkan Peninsula.104 The self-determination claims of the Southern Slavs eventually 
materialised on 1 December 1918 with the proclamation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes. The ‘Yugoslav’ enthusiasm displayed at the Versailles Peace Conference 
(1919) in support of the creation of a united kingdom of the Southern Slavs, which emerged 
from the dismemberment of the older European empires, concealed the divergences of its 
different constituent parts as regards the practical implementation of a single united state.105 
                                                
101 Nationalism ‘exprime d’abord la revendication de populations qui pensent se ressembler et qui aspirent, 
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2625 (XXV), 1970. 
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104 Rusinow, D., ‘The Yugoslav Idea before Yugoslavia’ in Djorkić, D. (ed.), Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed 
Idea 1918-1992, Hurst, London, 2003. p. 12. 
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The Serbian political elite aimed, in line with the nation building aspirations they had pursued 
throughout the nineteenth century, to use the new kingdom to fulfil their ambition of a 
‘Greater Serbia’,106 where Serbia would be the dominant constituent unit in charge of a strong 
centralist state. Unlike Serbia, the Slovenes and Croats had not, by the beginning of the First 
World War, attained independence. Hence, they saw in the new kingdom a sponsor to secede 
from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Devoid of a state of their own, they were in a weak 
position to quell Serbian hegemonic claims. Nevertheless, they attempted to promote a looser 
association on a federal or even confederal model, and stressed the idea of equality between 
the three national subgroups to constrain Serbian aspirations of dominance.107 The clash of 
those mutually exclusive conceptions of the Yugoslav state had heavy repercussions for the 
development of the state and ultimately led to the failure of the first implementation of 
Yugoslavism. Interestingly, the Yugoslavist ideal, rather than adopting an outright ‘civic’ or 
‘ethnic’ model, seemed to blend these two conceptions of the Nation. The new Yugoslav 
nation centred on an ideal of political unity while recognising and preserving ethnic 
differences. It attempted to establish a balance between the two models in order to 
counterbalance their respective deficiencies; yet, this fragile equilibrium proved difficult to 
maintain given the radically different conceptions on which it was built. It is, however, 
interesting to notice that this concept of double-layered nationhood at the base of 
Yugoslavism seemed to reproduce the Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman models of state, where 
both empires controlled the territory under their command but recognised and supported, to a 
certain extent, the different nationalities that composed the state. 108   
Beyond the centralist versus federalist disagreement, a number of other flaws inherent 
to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in terms of the implementation 
of national claims, quickly surfaced. Although the Kingdom was founded on the recognition 
of the equality of the brotherly but distinct three constituent nations, governmental policies 
came to assume a collective civic identity and to disregard cultural specificities.109 Besides, by 
definition the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes assumed the existence of only three 
constituent South Slav nations, hence ignoring other Slav identities: Montenegrins, 
Macedonians who were considered to be Serbs, and even a separate identity for Muslim Slavs 
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who were considered as either Muslim Serbs or Croats.110 In the same way, non-Slav nations 
were ignored and refused any political role in the new kingdom.111 In the case of the Albanian 
clans living in Southern Serb territory, this stance stirred up specific resentments linked to the 
territorial settlement of the London Peace Conference (1912). At that conference, the 
dismemberment of the weakened Ottoman Empire enabled the creation of an Albanian state. 
However, following different European geo-political concerns, Kosovo and the surrounding 
Albanian-majority populated areas were handed over to Serbia, much to the great displeasure 
of Albanian nationalist elites. 
The different issues raised by the different national concerns within the new kingdom 
soon gained importance and deepened. What was then to become known as the first 
Yugoslavia easily fell apart in 1941, in the face of the Axis threat. Despite the different 
attempts to reassert the Yugoslav state during the 1920s and 1930s, either by force or through 
more liberal means,112 Yugoslav leaders had failed to respond adequately and find a balance 
between the different national claims and to acquire sufficient elite and popular support for its 
preservation. This inability to either accommodate national aspirations, or reunite the national 
aspirations around a stronger central civic theme, led to further resentment and increasing 
radicalisation along national/ethnic lines.113   
The disenchanted ethnic claims of the first Yugoslavia were easily seduced by 
National Socialist racial rhetoric that promoted the redistribution of territory according to 
national expansionist strategies and the implementation of ethnic cleansing policies.114 By 
1942, Serbian territory was heavily cut down, while the Ustaša Independent State of Croatia 
(Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) was granted a large portion of historic Bosnia. The 
Albanian state, under the Fascist Italian protectorate, was allowed to satisfy its territorial 
cravings to build a Greater Albania. The ensuing fascist policies implemented within the new 
Croat and Albanian states contributed further to the radicalisation of ethnic divisions and 
became a crucial issue in future nationalist rhetoric.115 Despite the increasing ethnic division, 
Josip Broz (known as ‘Tito’) and his Partisans succeeded in their attempt to mobilise the 
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different anti-fascist factions within the Yugoslav territory.116 The success of the Partisans 
essentially depended on their success in sweeping aside ethnic dissension in favour of the 
realisation of a common goal. The resultant organisational structure that was shaped around 
this common aspiration formed the ideological basis for the establishment of the so-called 
‘second’ Yugoslav state.117  
b. Titoist Model of National Self-determination 
The Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia endeavoured from the very beginning 
to correct the mistakes committed in previous decades as regards national self-determination 
issues in two ways: first through attempting to respond to the different and exacerbated 
national claims, and second by trying to unite the different Yugoslav state’s entities around a 
common politico-economic theme, communism. One striking example of this dual policy is 
encapsulated in the Yugoslav motto: ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ (‘Bratstvo i Jedinstvo’), 
symbolising the independence of the different groups living peacefully, alongside, building a 
higher project together.  
From the end of the Second World War until the death of Tito (1980), those two 
policies were used in parallel, with the emphasis one or the other according to the different 
internal and external political contexts at hand. The 1946 Constitution of the Federative 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia illustrates this stand very clearly.118 It encompassed the 1943 
ANVOJ principles of equality of the Yugoslav people and of acknowledgement of the 
Montenegrins and Macedonians as constituent people/nations (narodni) through the 
recognition of their right to self-determination within the Yugoslav state. The constitutional 
interpretation of this right was heavily rooted in the Leninist approach to national self-
determination, namely that the de jure recognition of national self-determination was 
imperative to the stability of the country, but it could not have any kind of de facto 
application.119 This element is reflected in the Soviet format of the 1946 Constitution, where 
the republics, home to the constituent nations, are legally recognised but enjoy no decisive 
decisional power, which is monopolised by the central government.  
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In this context, the 1946 Constitution has a number of interesting elements regarding 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Vojvodina. First, the constitutional implementation of 
national self-determination was achieved through the territorial division of the country into 
different republics, each attributable to one overarching nation which enjoyed a de jure 
national self-determination right over it. However, despite the non-recognition of a distinct 
identity for the Muslim Slavs, Bosnia-Herzegovina was also granted the status of a ‘republic’, 
attributed to no specific nation and delimited according to its historical borders, in preference 
to the alternative of splitting it up between the Serb and Croat Republics. Second, while not 
given the same rights as republics, Kosovo and Vojvodina were respectively granted the 
status of ‘autonomous region’ (autonomski oblast) and ‘autonomous province’ (autonomska 
pokrajina) within the Republic of Serbia.120 Under the 1946 Constitution, the status of the two 
Serbian territories appeared to be little more than an issue of terminology as no specific rights 
were attached to it.121 Yet, the creation of those two entities demonstrated the will to tackle 
the Albanian and Hungarian national minority issues, as well as an attempt to mitigate Serb 
nationalist demands. As Aleksandar Pavković argues, the creation of those entities 
intentionally attempted to restrain Serb nationalism, but unintentionally enabled the creation 
and strengthening of other national myths.122  
Despite the communists’ attempts to contain nationalist demands, external and internal 
pressures led to political adjustments and numerous changes in the fragile Yugoslave 
constitutional balance over the next thirty years. Events such as the Tito/Stalin split forced 
drastic international and national policy changes. At the international level, Realpolitik 
advanced the need to look for alternative political and economic support. The loss of its 
foremost partner/patron and the ensuing rupture with its Albanian neighbour compelled 
Yugoslavia to open up to the West and look for alternative partnerships.123 Those 
international strategic changes implied national adaptation, such as a containment policy 
towards the Albanian minority, suspected at first to be a fifth column of the now-hostile 
Albanian neighbour. As Yugoslav–Albanian relations improved, the status and rights of 
Albanians in Kosovo also improved; particularly important was the opening of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries in 1971, which corresponded with the achievement of the 
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de facto republican status of Kosovo, formally codified in the 1974 Constitution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.124 As de Waele and Gjeloshaj argue, Tito hoped 
that the Kosovo Albanians would play the role of a bridge between the two countries.125 
Improvements in the Yugoslav Albanian minority’s conditions were believed to have a 
potentially positive impact on the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania themselves. 
Another effect of the Tito/ Stalin split was the need to change policies to justify the 
ideological break between the two leaders.126 At the state level, divisions along economic 
lines, such as the economic disparity between the republics and the redistribution of wealth, 
continuously created pressure to enable the greater political and economic independence of 
the republics.127 This drive for the liberalisation of the system was progressively reflected in 
successive constitutions. Ultimately these internal and external pressures led to the 1974 
Constitution and its loose confederal arrangements. 
The 1974 Constitution was the last constitutional attempt to appease the constant 
growing national self-determination demands and save the Yugoslav model.128 The federal 
republics gained sovereignty over most governance powers, while the autonomous provinces 
gained, if not in name at least in fact, the same rights as the other republics. The Albanians 
and Hungarians living in Yugoslavia were each upgraded from ‘national minority’ to the 
status of ‘nationality’ (norodnost). Article 245 guaranteed that ‘[t]he nations and nationalities 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall have equal rights’. Yet the distinction of 
terminology between ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ implied that the latter, if entitled to self-
government, did not enjoy the right to secession that the former had in theory. This distinction 
was argued on the grounds that the Albanian and Hungarian nations already had separate 
independent states and therefore already enjoyed their nation’s right to self-determination. 
Although, the constitution seemed to enforce greater decentralisation in favour of the 
republics, the socialist state tried to keep a balance, and to maintain links between the 
different nations through the establishment of a complex constitutional system, where the 
republics’ increasing autonomy was interwoven with social entities and principles. The new 
constitution strengthened the 1963 Constitution’s principle of self-management, and 
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reinforced its complex governance levels.129 Through outweighing the republics’ influence 
within the Yugoslav institutions, by using trade unions and other civil society based 
entities,130 the constitution attempted to compensate for the power gained by nations in the 
republics’ emancipation process.131 
Nevertheless, those safety mechanisms relied on very thin ground: a power-sharing 
form of national self-determination, the cohesion of the communist league and industrial 
economic welfare, to represent alternatives to nationalist inducements. First, the 1974 
Constitution raised high expectations with regard to the right to national self-determination, 
especially for the Kosovo Albanians, who saw in the accession to de facto republic status a 
highway to full accession within the decade.132 The failure to achieve this status led to 
increasing discontent, violent protests and retaliation against the Serbian state and what was 
perceived as their fifth column: the Kosovo Serbs. Second, with the death of Tito, the 
communist league and the rotating presidential system found themselves in limbo in the 
middle of individual politics and disputes. The inability of the weakened league to respond 
adequately to the need for ideological change that was fostered by the collapse of the 
communist/socialist model across Eastern Europe ultimately lead to the final implosion of the 
league at the Fourteenth Extraordinary Party Congress in January 1991.133  Finally, the 
decline in Western aid and the growing governmental ineptness that resulted provided 
grounds for national ideologies to shape their discourses on the limiting of resources to 
governance.134 The deep economic crisis that affected Yugoslavia represented the last straw 
that convinced the wealthier Republics of Slovenia and Croatia that the weak federal 
economic policies and the principle of redistribution of wealth to poorer underdeveloped 
regions were slowing them down in the international competitive market, and convinced them 
to find refuge under the increasingly attractive secessionist nationalist rhetoric.135 
Although Tito’s Yugoslavia attempted to reinforce a civic sense of national identity, it 
failed to impose it over ethnic nationalist claims. Ironically, instead of taming the latter, it 
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increasingly got coerced into integrating them into the system: because of the natural strength 
of the ideologies, but also because it reinforced the system as it used nationalist ideologies to 
play higher Realpolik at the international and internal levels. Communism, as in the first 
Yugoslavia, failed to impose itself over or integrate fully the disparate national ideologies. 
Crucially, the lack of public debate and discussion about the fundamentals of the Yugoslav 
state as embedded in the socialist model of the state prevented the development of an 
alternative ‘civic’ identity. This in turn enabled the polarisation and strengthening of socio-
political forces against the socialist Yugoslav ideal.      
c. Nationalist Rhetoric and the Dissolution of the Yugoslav Ideal 
As secessionist and counter-secessionist discourses began to take increasing 
predominance within the political arena over the traditionally pursued strategy of ethno-nation 
balancing,136 nationalist rhetoric appeared to the elite as an opportunity rather than a threat.137  
After an initially unexpected political success on the theme of the defence of the Kosovo 
Serbs in April 1987,138 Slobodan Milošević used the opportunity presented by the six 
hundredth anniversary celebrations of the Serbian national day to deliver a speech in defence 
of the ‘oppressed’ Kosovo Serbs.139 The incredible support he received for this speech had 
two important consequences. One was for Kosovo, as the speech prompted the Serbian state 
to attempt a policy to reintegrate the province within its realm.140 Another was for Yugoslavia 
as a whole, as by presenting himself as the defender of the Kosovo Serbs and of their cause, 
Milošević turned himself into a champion of the Serbian minority cause in other republics.141 
Both developments sparked further polarisation along ethnic lines. In the Yugoslav republics, 
the mobilisation of Serbian national minorities by Milošević was perceived as a threat and 
further alienated the republics from involving their minorities in the internal political life of 
each. As tensions between the republics grew along with the wider political and economic 
crisis and new national radicalisation, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia decided to call for 
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republican elections, and soon after, petitioned for their respective rights of secession as 
guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution. 
The 1990s events exposed the fatal flaw of the socialist Yugoslav expression of 
national self-determination. In the 1974 Constitution, the right to national self-determination 
was granted to the republics of the federation, but also to the different nations that were 
constituent parts of the state.142 In theory, both republics and nations had a right to self-
government and ultimately to secession. In practice, this element did not present any major 
difficulty in cases such as the Republic of Slovenia, where the republic was relatively 
ethnically homogeneous (hence where the republic and its ‘nation’ were congruent). 
However, it became a source of conflict in other cases where large ethnic minorities dissented 
from the principal nation’s will. For instance, in the case of Croatian secession, the Croat 
nation claimed its right to national self-determination through the secession of its national 
republic. However, Serbs from Croatia assumed that if there were to be a change in the status 
of the republic in which they were living, they had the right to call for their own claim to 
national self-determination and, in turn, to secede from the Croat republic.143 The problem 
essentially stemmed from the ethnic claim to sovereignty, which defined citizenship of the 
republic in terms of ethnicity, discriminating de facto against other ethnic groups and coercing 
those who refused to identify themselves through their ethnic appurtenances.144     
National ideologies have clearly been, all along the past century, a significant driving 
force for political instability in the Former Yugoslavia. From its origins, Yugoslavia has been 
teetering between two concepts of the Nation. It was unable to establish a ‘civic’ nation due to 
the multiplicity of cultures that embraced nineteenth century national romantic ideals and no 
real framework to address the problem through free public debate.145 It was also unable to 
form an ‘ethnic’ nation because of the divisions and weaknesses of the national groups, split 
across the territory between the different colonial powers which prevented them from being 
economically viable, but also because of a general lack economic incentives. The Yugoslav 
ideal required establishing a balance between the two. Yet as history, politics and economics 
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played an increasing role in reinforcing ethno-national discourses, the lack of support for a 
civic discourse made the balance tilt toward the ‘ethnic’ side. Other political ideologies such 
as communism/socialism, at first, played that role as they managed to integrate national self-
determination claims in their discourse; yet they proved unable to emerge as clear 
alternatives. On the other hand, other ideologies such as democracy or liberalism were also 
unable to impose themselves for different reasons, including the lack of a liberal democratic 
culture or the weight of historical influence.146  
The recent history of ethnic cleansing has further polarised the local populations and 
elites on ethno-national terms, putting into evidence the legitimacy crisis of Yugoslavia as a 
nation and promoting ethno-national ideologies as a key variable in the future reorganisation 
of the region and shaping the concept of legitimacy along ethnic lines. This phenomenon 
demonstrates that contrary to popular assumptions, national ideologies are not the product of 
irrationality, but are embedded in a complex socio-economic and political matrix. Given the 
complex general Yugoslav context, we need to address the specific issue of the question of 
Kosovo to determine and understand the legitimacy allegiance structures.  
2. The Question of Kosovo  
The region commonly known as Kosovo is roughly formed where two valleys plateau: 
Kosovo and Metohjia (Alb: Dukagin).147 This region has been the scene of the clash of two 
nationalisms: Albanian and Serbian. The issue known as the ‘Question of Kosovo’ lies at the 
heart of the region’s instability for the past century, and deals with the accommodation of 
both ethno-national claims. Although nationalist politics plays a central role in the whole of 
the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has been one of the more persistent issues, accommodated to 
different degrees but never resolved up to this day. Understanding the question of Kosovo 
requires understanding the two ideologies as well as the evolution of the competing claims 
over the central issue of territory. 
As Hugh Poulton highlights, the Albanian sense of national identity and related 
demands occurred very late compared with other national self-determination movements in 
the region.148 However, as in the case of the other Balkan nationalist movements,149 it 
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appeared with the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent loss of grip of the 
Porte over the region. Poulton argues that the lack of national sentiment under the Ottomans 
could be explained by the religion shared between the majority of Albanians and the 
occupiers, which gave them access to governmental positions and enabled them to benefit 
from numerous advantages within the empire.150 Without dismissing this explanation, I would 
rather emphasise as an alternative explanation the deep divisions within Albanian society, 
essentially rural and based on clan units that left little room for a united national 
consciousness. In fact some of the big names of the national Albanian Renaissance were part 
of the small urban Albanian community educated in Istanbul, which would have taken 
advantage of the returns offered by the Ottoman administrative system.151  
Regarding Serb nationalism, without trying to oversimplify an intricate phenomenon, 
it finds its roots in a complex balance of myths, victimisations and religious beliefs. The first 
component rests on the glorious myth of the first Serbian state established under the Nemanjić 
dynasty in the twelfth century, who built their power base at the centre of their empire: the 
Plateau of Kosovo. The second component is the overinflated myth of the Battle of Kosovo 
where a Balkan coalition led by the Serbian prince Lazar was defeated by the Ottomans in 
June 1389, which forced Serbia to abandon large parts of its prosperous empire to the 
invaders and consequently to give up their regional supremacy.152 Finally the last component 
of Serbian nationalism is the Autocephaly Orthodox Patriarch established in Peć (Alb: Peja) 
in the thirteenth century, and closely linked to Serbian power. The establishment of the 
Serbian autonomous patriarchate enabled Serbia to break free from the domination of the 
Byzantine Empire first and Greece thereafter, to become a power in its own right.153 Kosovo, 
being geographically at the centre of those three components of Serbian nationalism, 
represents the jewel of the Serb nation, the symbol around which the Serb national ideology 
defines itself, which explains the importance of the region in Serbian nationalist rhetoric. 
a. Origins of the ‘Question of Kosovo’ (1878-1945) 
Without attempting to ignore the long and intricate history of the province, the Kosovo 
question has its roots in the end of the First Balkan War (1878) where two significant events 
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for both Serbian and Albanian national ideologies took place. The first, resulting from the 
weakening of the Ottoman Empire over the region, was the independence of Serbia. The 
central concern of the newly constructed Serbian state was to expand to all the territories 
inhabited by Orthodox Slavs defined as Serbs.154 Part of this claim encompassed the valleys 
of Kosovo and Metohjia, considered as the heartland of the Serbian nation because they were 
at the centre of the first Serbian state,155 and thus held a fundamental place in the Serbian 
national myth.  
That same year, the ‘League of Prizren’ was created. It originally was a loosely 
associated military brotherhood composed of Albanian intellectuals who pledged to further 
the Albanian national interest. Their main claims grew from the creation of a largely 
autonomous Albanian administrative structure within the Ottoman Empire.156 They 
endeavoured to unite the Albanian tribes, merge the territories they inhabited, and protect 
them from the expansionist claims of surrounding newborn nations, mainly Serbia but also 
Montenegro and Bulgaria. The League clearly wanted the Albanian community to be 
recognised as a distinct autonomous entity with specific rights such as the use of their own 
language within the administration.157 But at this stage, there was a decisive will to remain 
within the sovereignty of the Porte, and claims to outright independence were contained 
within the members of the League itself.158 As the first significant expression of Albanian 
national consciousness, the ‘League of Prizren’ has gained a mystical aura in their national 
ideology. This new myth elevated the town of Prizren in Western Kosovo into some kind of 
national ‘heartland’. However, as regards the roots and development of Albanian nationalism 
itself, Rajwantee Lakshman-Lepain underlines: 
‘La construction du modèle identitaire albanais à cette époque suit avec un certain 
décalage une trajectoire tout à fait similaire aux modèle serbe et bulgare. Elle se centre autour 
de la construction de mythes historiques: mystification du héros national Skandërbeg, 
mystification de la lutte contre les Ottomans... mystification des Illyriens qui font des 
Albanais le plus vieux peuple des Balkans et de l’Albanie le berceau de l’Europe’.159  
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 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the Second Balkan War, and the ensuing 
territorial rearrangement of the Balkans, were seen by both Serbs and Albanians as an 
opportunity for national enhancement.160 The Serbs aimed to satisfy their dream of a Greater 
Serbia, and attempted to obtain access to the sea through claims to those areas that nowadays 
roughly comprise Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania; while the Albanians aimed to fulfil their 
growing desire for a nation-state that had been overlooked by the international community at 
the treaty of San Stefano (1878). With their competing claims, both sides sought the support 
of the different European empires, turning their local competition into a full-blown European 
arm wrestling match. The Albanian claims received support from Britain and Austria-
Hungary, who opposed the Kingdom of Serbia, which was naturally backed by its traditional 
allies, Russia and France. Both Britain and Austria-Hungary saw the growth of a new power 
within Europe as very suspicious, the former wanting to prevent a new competitor on the seas 
and the latter fearing the growing role of Serbia in steering nationalist feelings within its own 
territory.161 The ensuing London Peace Treaty (1913) settled the creation of an Albanian 
nation-state short of a number of Albanian inhabited territories, which were granted to 
Montenegro and Serbia.162 As a large portion of the Albanian population was left out of what 
was intended to be their nation-state, deep resentment within the Albanian national 
consciousness emerged. As Noel Malcolm points out, it is also interesting to note that despite 
the fact that Serbia claimed the territory of Kosovo for historical and religious reasons, it still 
agreed to grant the patriarchy of Peć, despite its crucial significance, to Montenegro.163 The 
exact boundary design was relegated to a special international commission, which ran short of 
time to deliver its findings as the First World War broke out in Europe. 
The frustration that the Albanian nationalists had felt after the London Peace 
Conference deepened when, in 1918, the Albanian-inhabited areas of Montenegro, Kosovo 
and Macedonia were definitely placed under Serbian sovereignty. Albanians within those 
boundaries organised themselves within an insurgent movement, the Kaçak, which aimed to 
pursue the reunification of these Albanian inhabited territories within the Albanian national 
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state and to oppose the insertion of Kosovo into the new Yugoslav kingdom.164 However this 
movement soon fell short due to the lack of political and financial support from Albania 
proper, which was suffering internal political difficulties of its own.165 As mentioned earlier, 
under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, all nations within the Serbian boundaries 
were considered as Serbian and denied any self-identity other than a Serb one. Despite being 
party to the Treaty on the Protection of Minorities (1919),166 Serbia openly disregarded rights 
such as education in its own language to its Albanian minority.167 In fact, two stances were 
promoted in order to justify this attitude: either that Albanians were in fact Slavs that had 
been corrupted by Turks and simply needed to be ‘Serbianised’ again, or simply that they 
were immigrants who just needed to be sent back from where they came from. The latter 
became the main stance adopted. From the 1920s, the Serbian state set in place a vast agrarian 
policy aimed at giving land to Serbian settlers, taking it from Kosovo’s Albanian farmers. 
This resettlement policy became an outright official strategy with the publication in 1937 of 
the Čubrilović Memorandum on ‘The Expulsion of Arnauts’ and the later signing of an 
agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey on the deportation of Albanians to Turkey 
(1938).168 
This situation was reversed during the Second World War with its territorial division 
under the Axis countries’ zones of influence; fascist Italy set in place a puppet regime in 
Tirana and supported their Greater Albanian aspirations. The territory of Kosovo was divided 
into three parts, with the rich northern mining zones attributed to Germany, an eastern strip to 
pro-Axis Bulgaria along with a large part of Macedonia, while the rest was granted to Albania 
along with the Albanian inhabited parts of Montenegro and Macedonia. Strengthened by the 
support of Italy and behind it, the other Axis powers, the Albanian regime did not have many 
second thoughts on taking revenge on the Serbian population under its control for what they 
considered to be the abuses undergone by the Albanian people under Serbian rule. However, 
despite the support of the Axis for the Greater Albanian cause, anti-fascist and outright 
communist movements also developed and were organised in Kosovo and Albania supporting 
the wider anti-axis effort. In order to win the support of Albanians to the Partisan cause, Tito 
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dangled in front of their eyes the possibility of accessing to the right of self-determination for 
Kosovo within his larger Balkan confederation ideal.169  
b. Kosovo under Tito’s Yugoslavia (1945-1981) 
Wartime promises were, however, poorly kept. The 1946 Constitution indeed granted 
Kosovo an ‘autonomous’ status; yet it remained within the sovereignty of the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia and it was granted the status of ‘region’ (oblast) only, as opposed to 
Vojvodina, which was promoted to ‘province’ (pokrajina). The distinction between the two, 
although subtle at first glance, has a heavy significance and implications indeed in Yugoslav 
constitutional terms. The status of ‘region’ as opposed to ‘province’ implied a stronger degree 
of control from Belgrade and was clearly perceived as such, by both the Serbs who wanted to 
retain a maximum control over the province and by the Albanians who had hoped for 
maximum autonomy.170 A strong Serbian centralist system was imposed, with repression 
against Albanians quasi-institutionalised by the Serbian Minister of Interior Aleksandar 
Rancović.171 He considered Kosovo Albanians as fascist collaborators responsible for 
exactions against the Serbs during the war, and suspected them of being the fifth column of 
Enver Hoxha’s regime in Albania. For that reason, the consequences of the Tito/Stalin split 
worsened the condition of Yugoslav Albanian minorities now that Albania was considered to 
be an outright foe.172 Further mass expulsions of Albanians were conducted in line with the 
emigration policies promoted by Vaso Čubrilović, who had joined the party and pursued the 
nationalist policies that he had developed in the 1930s, now implemented under the cover of 
the communist ideology.173 In line with the Rancović policy, the 1963 Constitution aimed to 
further reduce the status of Kosovo. Although the region was upgraded to the status of 
‘province’ on the same terms as Vojvodina, the autonomy of both Vojvodina and Kosovo was 
now guaranteed only by Serbia. They no longer had a constitutional existence at the federal 
level, strengthening the already firm grip of the Serbian central government.174 
The fall of Rancović in 1966, and the new détente and ensuing rapprochement 
undertaken with Albania from 1962, permitted a loosening of the situation and significant 
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improvements for the Kosovo Albanian community.175 In an effort to reflect that trend, the 
1968 revision of the constitution endeavoured to reset the injustices done in 1963.176 
Amendment VII re-established the province at the federal level and withdrew the Serbian 
nationalist appellation of Kosovo-Metohija (or Kosmet) from the official name of the Socialist 
Autonomous Province. Amendment XVIII granted a constitutional equality between nations 
and nationalities in line with Tito’s 1946 aspirations, giving the Albanians at least a 
semblance of autonomy vis-à-vis Serbia proper.177 This first step towards greater autonomy 
from Serbia only encouraged the Kosovo Albanians to claim additional rights. 
Demonstrations conducted in November 1968 enabled, beyond the lobbying for additional 
amendments to the constitution, the opening of the University of Prishtina (Serb: Priština) in 
1969, with classes taught in Albanian, which led to the creation of an Albanian elite core.178 
In addition, during those demonstrations, the idea of a sovereign republic of Kosovo within 
Yugoslavia was for the first time publicly voiced.   
In line with the gains achieved in 1968, the 1974 constitution furthered Albanian 
ambitions by providing at the federal level for the complete constitutional equality of the 
province with the other republics including Serbia.179 The Albanians, the most populous 
ethnicity in the province gained, through the province’s representation, direct access to federal 
governance structures. Despite being still officially part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 
the republic still had little to no right of control over the internal affairs of the province 
though. At the federal level, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was granted the 
right to participate in federal decisions ‘according to the principle of agreement among the 
Republics and Autonomous Provinces’ and to have a say on the coming into force of changes 
to the federal constitution.180 In order to achieve this, the province was granted a distinct 
representation in federal organs and the ability to determine its own constitution.181 In 
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addition, it was awarded state-like attributes such as a national bank and the power to engage 
in foreign relations within the limits conferred by the federation.182 
At the level of the republic, the province did secure the rights to autonomy and 
sovereignty.183 The province was granted its own constitution, which its own organs had 
‘directly and exclusively powers to amend’.184 Article 427 states, though, that changes in the 
Republic’s constitution can only be made ‘with the consent of the Assemblies of the 
Autonomous Provinces’.185 
As mentioned earlier, this de facto republic status still fell short of de jure recognition. 
The only, but very important, ‘right’ that the province was still denied was the legal 
recognition of a right to secession. In Belgrade, meanwhile, the double representation of 
Kosovo within the new constitution both at the federal and republic levels was denounced. 
Serbia strongly resented its inability to influence the province’s affairs. As the Kosovo Serb 
community became a minority on the territory of its own republic, its lack of decisive 
representation within the province’s institutions was perceived as an injustice and as placing it 
at the mercy of those whom they perceived as ‘barbarians’ and ‘foreigners’. Within the 
Kosovo Albanian community, the improvements contained in the 1974 constitution were 
nevertheless welcomed by the Albanians, who saw in this document and in its implementation 
the sizeable advancements they had achieved since the Rancović era. Yet, far from fully 
satisfying them, the constitutional improvements succeeded in unlocking further ambitions for 
self-determination, while the failure to achieve them led to further discontent.          
c. The Break-up of Yugoslavia and the Milošević Era (1981-1999)  
After the death of Tito, the father of the convoluted 1974 constitutional arrangements, 
Serbs in both Belgrade and Kosovo increasingly voiced their discontent with them. The 
Kosovo Serbs’ dissatisfaction with their living conditions became more acute. First, since 
their birth rate was lower than that of the Albanians,186 they represented a decreasing 
proportion of the population of the province, despite the numerous – failed – colonisation 
policies implemented over decades by Serbia, and were therefore losing political power 
                                                
182 SFRY Constitution (1974), arts. 262, 271. 
183 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1974. Basic Principles, arts. 2, 3, 291. 
184 Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, 1974, art. 300. 
185 SRS Constitution (1974). 
186 Though still far higher comparatively than in Serbia proper and the rest of Yugoslavia, Malcolm 1998, Op. 
Cit., pp. 331-333. 
 69 
within the local institutions. Second, in parallel with the increasing representation of Kosovo 
Albanians in the province’s institutions, their traditional customs – deeply anchored in their 
society – gained further ground, slowly excluding non-Albanians from the political and 
cultural life of the province.187 Finally, the miserable economic situation of the province 
increasingly convinced Kosovo Serbs to move out of the province to find better living 
conditions elsewhere.188  
Within the Kosovo Albanian community, the same irritation with the economic 
difficulties of the province, coupled with growing frustration over the non-recognition of 
Kosovo as a republic, peaked in March 1981 with a student strike that soon turned into a 
province-wide general demonstration. The psychological impact of the demonstration was 
deep and the protests were soon met with the establishment of a momentary state of 
emergency, mass arrests, and a deep purge of the local party apparatus. As Malcolm points 
out, ‘[i]n the final analysis, the political reaction to the crisis in Kosovo did little to improve 
the situation and much to harm it’.189 The socio-economic grievances of the protesters were 
never taken seriously, and instead were dismissed as an Albanian irredentist and nationalist 
move.   
The mass exodus of Kosovo’s Serbs and the growth of Albanian grievances gave rise 
to growing nationalist rhetoric on both sides. On the Serbian side, a significant step occurred 
in 1986 with the publication of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences.190 While criticising the Yugoslav apparatus as a whole and formulating a Serbian 
nationalist case, it clearly attacked the constitutional status of its autonomous provinces, and 
what it perceived and portrayed as a quasi-ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Serbs. Considered as 
the basis of the subsequent growth of Serb nationalism, it represents the platform on which 
Milošević formulated his rhetoric. As Lenard Cohen notes, ‘[i]t was the question of Kosovo… 
that was the “trigger” or “catalyst” for greater “self-awareness” among the Serbian people 
regarding their situation as an ethnic group in the country’.191 As already observed, the use of 
the issue of Kosovo at the centre of Milošević’s speech in Kosovo Polje (Alb: Fushë Kosovë) 
on 28 June 1989 brought him strong popular support, not only from the Kosovo Serbs but also 
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from Serbs across the federation. From then on, the constitutional status of the province and 
the situation of Kosovo’s Serbs became two essential concerns of his policy and ultimately, of 
Milošević’s tactics to stay in power.192 
In early 1989, the Serbian Assembly prepared constitutional amendments that aimed 
to restrain the powers of the province’s institutions: ‘they would give Serbia control over 
Kosovo’s police, courts and civil defence, as well as such matters as social and economic 
policy, educational policy, the power to issue “administrative instructions”, and the choice of 
official language’.193 These amendments were received in Kosovo by a series of strikes that 
paralysed the country, giving an excuse to the Serbian government to re-establish a state of 
emergency in February 1989 and send in troops to ‘calm down’ the situation. As I pointed out 
above, under article 268 of the 1974 Federal Constitution, changes to the constitution needed 
to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Kosovo assembly. On 23 March 1989, the 
Kosovo assembly delegates were coerced into approving the amendments. Despite the 
absence of the constitutionally required two-thirds majority, the Serbian parliament ratified 
those amendments on 28 March 1989. Apart from the questionable way in which they were 
adopted, it is interesting to note that Milošević insisted on pursuing a constitutional procedure 
to convey the amendments through a puppet vote at the Kosovo assembly, enwrapping this 
coup in a veil of legitimacy. Deprived of authority and under Serbian military occupation, 
Kosovo’s institutions lost control over the internal affairs of the province, leaving the Serbian 
government in control. In June 1990, under the cover of the Serbian Parliament’s ‘Law on the 
Activities of Organs of the Republic in Exceptional Circumstances’, Serbia imposed 
‘temporary’ measures that led to the suspension of the Kosovo Assembly on 7 July 1990, the 
suppression of the main Albanian language newspaper Rilindjia, the closing down of the 
Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the mass dismissal of state employees.194 
Lacking any constitutional or military means to appeal against the Serbian 
‘discriminatory’ and unconstitutional policies, the Kosovo Albanian political and intellectual 
elite decided to react within what they still considered as the legitimate institutions of the 
autonomous province. In early September 1990 the assembly, as the self-acclaimed 
parliament of Kosovo, convened secretly and voted for the promotion of the province to 
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republic status, federated within Yugoslavia. Despite its lack of realistic implications, this act 
remains important in two ways: first, the lack of enforcement of this act became an important 
symbolic and moral ground for ‘victimisation’ – Kosovo was now an independent republic 
under occupation. Second, it shows that at this stage, Kosovo’s Albanians were still 
promoting their independence within the context of the Yugoslav federation and did not 
intend to secede or join Albania as Serb nationalists claimed.  
With the situation further worsening in 1991, Kosovo’s Albanian elites organised in 
September a underground referendum on the sovereignty of Kosovo to demonstrate the 
legitimate support of the majority of the population for their project and to denounce the 
oppression of the population’s will, and hence the illegitimacy of the Serbian government. 195 
The referendum was followed in early 1992 by clandestine general elections to elect a 
legislature and a president, and to enable the formation of a government in charge of 
providing basic services that the Serbian authorities were not providing any longer to Kosovo 
Albanians.196 Elected President Ibrahim Rugova, head of the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK),197 became the charismatic figure of this ‘parallel’ government, promoting a policy of 
peaceful resistance.198 This strategy aimed to boycott Serbian institutions and prevent 
confrontation with the Serbian authorities, wwhile expecting the international community to 
condemn Belgrade’s abuses, support their cause and put pressure on Serbia to recognise the 
sovereignty of Kosovo.  
Following the recognition of the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina by the international community, the new shadow institutions attempted a last 
symbolic gesture by declaring the full independence of the legitimate and sovereign Republic 
of Kosovo and voting for a new constitution.199 They supported the argument that the 1974 
Constitution had granted Kosovo a de facto republic status, and that the withdrawal of 
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Kosovo’s autonomy was unlawful while the declaration of republic status by the assembly in 
1990 was constitutional and legitimate – as expressed by the people in the 1991 referendum. 
As the international community had supported the right to secession of the other Yugoslav 
republics, they believed the international community should recognise the right of Kosovo to 
full independence.200 At this stage, the claim to national self-determination had changed in 
nature, as the Kosovo Albanian political elites were not supporting sovereignty within the 
Yugoslav federation any longer but clearly wanted complete independence. As the 
international community failed to support their case down the years,201 and specifically when 
dealing with the break-up of Yugoslavia at Dayton, Rugova’s peaceful strategy started to lose 
support within the population to groups that promoted more radical alternatives.202 
In parallel to the creation of the LDK, other small political groups emerged to oppose 
the Serbian policies. Yet, as a result of the conscious need for the Kosovo Albanians to 
remain united in front of the Serb enemy and because of their radical nature, those groups did 
not gain much popular support at first.203  One of them, the Popular Movement of Kosovo 
(LPK),204 originated among the 1981 student demonstrators who, disillusioned with the 
Dayton negotiations and the general strategy of the so-called ‘parallel’ government, became 
more active in promoting an armed response to end Serbian oppression and to reach 
independence.205 From 1996, a paramilitary group linked to the LPK, the UÇK, started regular 
small-scale offensives on the Serb military and police. This movement raised funds, as Mary 
Kaldor has argued, thanks to the Albanian diaspora’s support, through their support of a 
‘Home Calling’ fund. More crucial was the sudden availability of large quantities of weapons 
in the region, following the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997 and the ensuing looting of 
its large arms reserves.206 The UÇK’s actions were strongly criticised by Rugova, who 
accused them of being Belgrade’s agents, and giving a good reason to the Serb police and 
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military to intensify their repression. Despite those accusations, UÇK started to gain more 
popular support and the growth of violence linked to their actions increasingly captured 
international attention. 
The social, political and economic situation left at the death of Tito by the general 
decay of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism across the 
country did not spare Kosovo. On the contrary it propelled the Kosovo issue into the first rank 
of growing jingoistic discourses, exacerbating the radicalisation of national ideologies on both 
sides. After the failure of the ‘civic’ communist alternative, and unable to counter a Serbian 
nationalism in full expansion, Kosovo’s Albanians, increasingly saw their salvation in the 
involvement of the international community. However, the inability and/or unwillingness of 
the international community, who felt constrained in getting involved to appease the tensions 
given Serbian sovereignty over the province, left space for increasingly violent clashes 
between the two nationalisms. The intensification of hostility between Albanian paramilitaries 
and Serbian military forces, and its dramatic humanitarian consequences, left little room for 
the international community to ignore the problem any longer.207   
3. The Question of Kosovo and the International Community 
Lacking leverage within the Yugoslav federation to push forward their demands and 
under continuous pressure from Serb forces, which enjoyed exclusive control over the 
province, the Kosovo Albanian community as a whole saw their ultimate salvation in the 
involvement of the international community. They felt it would be the only actor capable of 
pressurising Belgrade into granting them more freedom and alleviating the humanitarian crisis 
in Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova and his ‘elected’ shadow government established a strategy of 
pacific resistance which encompassed two axes: (1) the organisation of parallel infrastructures 
to provide help for the Kosovo Albanian population that did not enjoy the social services 
offered by Serbian state run institutions any longer;208 and (2) prevention of the escalation of 
violence in response to Serb provocations as well as that within the Kosovo Albanian 
population itself by organising a moratorium on clan feuds. The ultimate goal of this strategy 
was to ensure the international community’s compassion and support for what they presented 
as a pacific population, a victim of a brutal Serb policy, rather than what the Serbian 
government portrayed as the repression of criminals and terrorists. Indeed this tactic gained 
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Rugova the support and compassion of a large part of the international community, but it was 
clearly not enough to instigate their active involvement.209  
The failure of the international community to include the case of Kosovo in the 
Dayton agreement demonstrated the limits of the pacific resistance tactic and encouraged the 
radicalisation of the Kosovo Albanians’ actions.210 This radicalisation of the anti-Serb 
movement expressed itself in two ways: first with the growth of the UÇK and the 
intensification of its engagement, and second within the general population as evidenced by 
the student demonstrations in autumn 1997, which met with a violent crackdown by Serbian 
forces.211 Alas, as Stefan Tröbst points out, this alternative proved to be more effective as ‘[i]t 
was the possibility of a flare up of violence which in the winter 1995/96 significantly 
increased the awareness of international actors’.212 The remaining section of this chapter 
observes the internationalisation of the conflict before analysing the different actors’ positions 
on the eve of the allies’ intervention.  
a. The Internationalisation of the Conflict 
The international community observed with a suspicious eye the growth of violence in 
the province that threatened to spread to and destabilise the whole region  – all just a few 
years after the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. Yet, bound by the 
international principle of sovereignty and by a Serbia that ultimately viewed the Kosovo issue 
as an internal problem, the international community favoured the option that the problem 
should be solved within Yugoslav borders.213 Besides, at the geopolitical level, bounded by 
the game of alliances, the community was divided in two: between, on the one hand, the 
European Union and the United States who were worried about the human rights and 
humanitarian abuses and the resulting wide movements of populations that would inevitably 
impact the fragile regional balance; and, on the other hand, Russia which inflexibly supported 
Serb territorial integrity and threatened to veto any international decisions that would impose 
decisions on its Slav ally. This division and the boundaries imposed by the international legal 
framework shaped the different approaches initiated by the international community to deal 
with the Kosovo issue. 
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The first decisive impact of the international community’s division came in the form 
of the inability of the United Nations to occupy a leading role on the political scene to solve 
the conflict. Bounded by the persistent threat of Russian and Chinese vetoes, the United 
Nations General Assembly as well as the Security Council limited themselves to monitoring 
the deteriorating human rights conditions in the Serbian province and issuing mild and 
unbinding resolutions to condemn the situation.214 Because it was unable to take any decisive 
action, the space left by the supreme multilateral organisation was filled by smaller and less 
political organs, which attempted to deal with the critical situation. 
The first body to deal with the Kosovo issue was the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE).215 Designed by the Helsinki Final Act, this inter-governmental 
organisation grounded its legitimacy in its relatively apolitical and technical role of pursuing 
regional stability. Its involvement was justified through the mandate of its National Minority 
Office, which had expressed concern for the situation of Kosovo’s Albanians in the Serbian 
province from 1991. In 1992, thanks to a loosening of the pro-western political forces on the 
Yugoslav political scene, the multilateral organisation was allowed to initiate an ‘Observer 
Mission of Long Duration” in Sandžak, Vojvodina and Kosovo to monitor the conditions of 
Serbia’s minorities.216 Yet, the mission was short lived as it was quickly asked to leave Serbia 
after another shift in Belgrade’s political make-up in July 1993. The organisation then limited 
its monitoring actions to annual parliamentary observer missions relying on the strict 
approbation of the Serbian authorities.217 In the same way, the Council of Europe’s parliament 
attempted mediation between Belgrade and Prishtina, focusing on technical issues like 
education. Nevertheless, Milošević also boycotted this mediation, pleading in 1993 the tense 
political situation in Yugoslavia.218 
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The first body that really attempted to weigh in on the situation was the Contact Group 
on Bosnia-Herzegovina,219 which from 1996, after the addition of Germany and Italy, 
declared that it would focus on Kosovo as a matter of high priority.220 In a first communiqué, 
the group emphasised that it would support neither the independence nor the status quo, 
calling for the parties to settle their differences through negotiations.221 Yet, here as well, the 
efficiency of the group was plagued by internal dissensions. As Tröbst argues, the Drenica 
massacre in March 1998 proved to be the first big test for the Group, and its ensuing 
statement ‘indicated, the contact group was completely preoccupied with sorting out its 
internal differences in opinion. There was only little energy left to tackle the issue of 
preventing conflict in Kosovo’.222 As a consequence, the Contact Group limited itself to 
enabling indirect negotiations through ‘shuttle diplomacy’ between Belgrade and Prishtina.223 
As the humanitarian situation in the province deteriorated and the threats to regional 
stability became more acute, three significant initiatives were undertaken by Europe and the 
United States. The first one, in November 1997 resulted from the growing concerns of the 
Contact Group and the European Union over the intensification of the violence between the 
UÇK and Serb military forces. Led by the foreign ministers of France and Germany, the 
Kinkel-Védrine initiative called upon Belgrade to: (1) participate in a dialogue with Prishtina; 
(2) accept third party mediation; and (3) grant a special status to Kosovo.224 This first 
European attempt to take a decisive lead on the situation in its periphery was met with disdain 
by the Yugoslav authorities and, the following year, by more violence exemplified by the 
Drenica massacre in March 1998.225  
Following the failed European attempt to weigh in decisively on the resolution of the 
Kosovo issue, a second initiative was conducted by the American Ambassador to Macedonia, 
Christopher Hill. Over the summer 1998, he conducted a round of shuttle diplomacy between 
Prishtina and Belgrade to attempt to find some agreement between the parties.226 The ‘Hill 
process’ eventually led to the draft of a document proposing an interim period where North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops would ensure the security of populations in the 
province. The remainder of the document failed to have any effect on the final settlement of 
the status of the province, but provided an outline for a structure of authority with different 
levels of governance for the province.227 The document was met with suspicion by the 
Kosovo Albanians, who considered that the proposed three years of interim status would lock 
the province into limbo status for an undetermined period of time.228 On their side, 
Yugoslavia and Serbia favoured the less political settlement proposed by another initiative, 
conducted in parallel by and relying on the personal charisma of the Special Presidential 
Envoy to the Balkans, Richard Holbrook. Belgrade legitimised their choice to the 
international community by arguing that they had the support of the non-Albanian minorities 
of Kosovo, and to the Yugoslav public by the agreement’s acknowledgement of the 
subordination of the province to Serbia. The Holbrook–Milošević agreement, announced in 
Belgrade on 13 October 1998, provided for the withdrawal of the Serb military force and its 
replacement by a 2000-strong Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
force to ensure compliance with previous Security Council resolutions, backed by non-combat 
aerial support.229 
Nevertheless, with the failure of political initiatives to retard, let alone scale down 
tensions in the province, strategic and military concerns were raised in anticipation of a 
potential spillover of the conflict beyond the region. Already in 1992, President George Bush 
senior had sent a strong message to Milošević known as the ‘Christmas Warning’; he 
threatened Serbia with unilateral airstrikes against strategic targets should the ongoing 
violence in Kosovo against minorities intensify.230 This threat, taken up by the new Clinton 
administration on 10 February 1993, was however never given an opportunity to be taken 
seriously, as violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified and pre-empted the 
attention of the allied military forces. Later on, with the need to secure the implementation of 
Dayton, the allies felt that they needed to rely on Milošević’ support, leaving their initial 
threats without any real sting.231 Bound by diplomatic and political concerns, NATO followed 
the lead of the Contact Group until the end of 1997. At this time, the non-containment and 
expansion of violence in Kosovo increasingly concerned the strategic organisation. After the 
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Drenica massacre, the European Commissioner for External relations, Hans Van den Broek, 
warned the Belgrade authorities that due to the threat of the spillover of violence, the 
European Union had started to consider Kosovo as no longer merely an internal matter for 
Yugoslavia, opening the door to potential military coercive threats on the Federation.232 
Indeed with the deterioration of the situation in the province and the increasing failure to 
contain the conflict within the international legal framework,233 threats about a military 
enforcement of peace by NATO were increasingly made.     
The intensification of violence over the question of Kosovo demonstrated the limits of 
the Yugoslav structure’s capacity to provide an answer or simply to contain the discontent of 
both parties. The growth of violence and threat to regional stability drew the attention of the 
international community. Yet despite its growing concerns, the community as a whole did not 
dare to take any decisive initiative that might have prevented the degradation of the situation. 
The lack of involvement of the international community demonstrated a grave malfunctioning 
in the structure and operation of the international order. This involved a number of features. 
First, there was a multiplication of actors with mandates that crossed over, leaving none with 
any real power to influence the situation and confining them to the role of observers. Second, 
there was a clear lack of political will on the part of the actors bound by international law as 
well as the configuration and needs of the international political scene. Third, a clear 
misunderstanding of the roots of the problem itself existed; the clash of ideologies was taken 
for granted and dealt with as such within the international framework. With the 
internationalisation of the question of Kosovo, an issue that until now fundamentally was a 
problem of local legitimacy entered the international legitimacy framework. With this shift, 
the question was no longer about the local people but clearly became an issue of states. As 
such, it had to be dealt with by states within states’ rules. Eventually, faced with the flagrant 
disjunctions between the existing international procedures and the needs on the ground, 
segments of the international community came to question the legitimacy framework itself.  
After the Raçak massacre in January 1999,234 the international community finally 
decided to take the Kosovo question into its own hands and recognised the inadequacy of its 
                                                
232 Tröbst, Op. Cit., p. 56. 
233 Including the expulsion of the head of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission in January 1999. Weller 1999, 
Op. Cit., p. 221.  
234 The Raçak massacre (15 January 1999) refers to an incident where a number of men dressed in civilian 
clothes were found murdered in a small village whose the population had been displaced. At the time, the 
Serbian military forces were accused of having killed civilians, while they argued that they were paramilitary 
 79 
attempts in the last decades to prevent human rights and humanitarian violations in Kosovo 
through the framework of various multilateral forums. The first decisive involvement of the 
international community on the issue of Kosovo occurred in February/March 1999 at 
Rambouillet, where the European Union attempted to have the different parties to the conflict 
to agree over a Dayton-type agreement to settle the conflict and arrange a governance 
settlement between Belgrade and Prishtina.    
b. The Rambouillet Conference  
Despite the international community’s clear awareness of the urgency of the situation 
and the need to find an outcome to the question of Kosovo, Marc Weller, legal advisor to the 
Kosovo Albanian delegation at the conference, noted that ‘[t]he Rambouillet Conference 
represents a theatre in which many of the tensions underlying the continuing post-cold war 
transformation were played out’.235 He describes two fault lines: (1) between the West and 
Russia, as the latter would not accept any settlement that might be imposed by NATO; and (2) 
within the Western camp itself, between the United States and the European Union, the latter 
hoping to portray itself as the strong international actor it had not managed to portray during 
the earlier Bosnian struggle. The first tensions became manifest when considering the 
implementation body for the peace process. Russia backed the OSCE, over which it had 
influence in its decision-making process, rather than the European Union or even NATO as 
advocated by the United States and the United Kingdom. The second opposition was 
noticeable in the choice of the negotiation’s venue. The choice of the French Chateau 
symbolised the will of the Europeans to influence their periphery.236 Although the conference 
convened in Rambouillet endeavoured to obtain a compromise between the two conflicting 
parties over the issue of the status of the Yugoslav province, international concerns that had 
previously plagued the ability of international actors to settle the issue also invited themselves 
to the negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the delegation sent by Serbia was composed essentially of Kosovo Serbs 
and other minorities from Kosovo. This choice, far from being innocent, followed a carefully 
crafted strategy that aimed to point out that: (1) the issue of Kosovo was genuinely a problem 
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of Serbs living in the province rather than a nationalist instrument; (2) they represented the 
interests of the minorities contrary to those of the Albanian majority;237 and ultimately, (3) to 
prevent Belgrade from taking responsibility for the consequences that the failure of the 
negotiations might have over Serbian politics.238 The composition of the Albanian delegation 
reflected the international community’s attempt to represent the different factions of the 
community. The next major fault of these negotiations arose from the heterogeneity of the 
Albanian delegation. Ultimately the Kosovo Albanian negotiators mirrored different and 
contradicting approaches to resolving the issue, which had developed over the last decade 
within the Kosovo Albanian community. In the end, the delegation was headed by a young, 
then not well-known politician emerging from UÇK’s elite, Haçim Thaçi, who had strong 
support from Madeleine Albright;239 while Rugova, who was considered by comparison 
moderate and favoured by the Europeans, was relegated to a subordinate position.240 
The third obstacle to the success of the negotiations derived from the format of the 
talks. Locked up in different rooms with a minimum access to or contact with the outside 
world, the two negotiation teams were not given the opportunity to enter into direct 
communication. The aim of this negotiation tactic was to coerce both parties into settling as 
soon as possible. The lack of direct exchange between the two delegations has been later 
criticised for its lack of transparency.241 Strategically, it gave leverage to the international 
actors in bridging the two sides, by controlling the information and advancement of the 
negotiations. The leverage of the international community was indeed furthered by the 
constant threat of the use of force, hardly masked, should the parties fail to come to a 
compromise.242 Those negotiating tactics are clearly questionable in the face of the legitimacy 
and the sustainability of their outcome. Worse, the insistence of the international actors on 
influencing the talks increasingly made them a third party to the conflict, far removed from 
their intended role as neutral mediators. 
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Entering the first round of negotiations, it was clear to the Serb delegation, which had 
been summoned unwilling to the negotiation table, that they would have to compromise their 
sovereignty over the province. Yet, they came with a choice of two alternatives for which they 
would be ready to settle: (1) either the preservation of Kosovo within Serbia, with a large 
autonomy for either community; or (2) the division of the province into two, with 
independence granted to Albanian inhabited territories. The former solution was supported by 
the Serbian parliament. This alternative would have indeed maintained Serbian sovereignty 
over the province while granting autonomy to their nationals, hence giving them a margin of 
manoeuvre over their community and the affairs of the province. The latter solution was 
somehow favoured by the political circles surrounding ex-president Dobrica Ćosić and the 
Science Academy of Belgrade, as it aimed for Serbia keeping control over the natural wealth 
of the north of the province. As regards the Kosovo Albanian delegation, the Europeans 
hoped that the ‘moderates’ would somehow subdue the radical core into accepting a 
‘substantial autonomy’ rather than outright independence. Although by the end of the 
negotiations they eventually accepted settling for autonomy, it is clearly not convincing that 
this was the aim pursued by any of the Kosovo Albanian participants. Although it can be 
argued that some genuinely favoured avoiding violence, all of them ultimately pursued the 
territorial integrity of the province and its independence.243 If any of them accepted settling 
for less, they clearly saw it as a step towards their final goal and were hoping that if they 
showed signs of goodwill, the international community would in the end coerce Serbia into 
giving them independence. 
The proposal made by the international community was issued in a document ‘The 
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government’, which was composed of a framework 
recognising Yugoslav sovereignty over the province while underlining the need for the 
Province’s autonomy.244 It contained eight chapters dealing with the governance mechanisms 
of the autonomous province on the basis of the earlier Hill proposal.245 The proposal was first 
rejected by the Albanian delegation, which refused to settle for a simple autonomy without 
guarantees for a revision of status in the future, or for the maintenance of Serb troops within 
the province. The delegation was ultimately assured of a revision of the status by means of a 
referendum, enforced by the international community, without however including any 
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precision on whom would the referendum include;246 and of the deployment of NATO troops 
in the province but also on Serbia’s territory.247 This last point could obviously not be 
accepted by the Serb delegation, which naturally refused to sign the compromise, despite 
showing some encouraging signs of willingness to compromise at the beginning of the 
negotiations.   
The inability of the international community to appreciate the fundamentals of the 
Serb–Albanian opposition over Kosovo and its insistence on imposing its own view vitiated 
the outcome of the negotiations. Through the internationalisation of the issue, the 
international community attempted to solve the problem by considering it within the 
international legitimacy framework, ignoring the fact that the question of Kosovo was 
fundamentally a local legitimacy issue. Through trying to fit the parties and the problem 
within their own perspective while ignoring the deep local implications, they missed the 
opportunity to provide any sustainable answer to the problem at best, and in fact worsened the 
chance of settlement. The issue of Kosovo is particularly intricate and occurs in a rather 
complex setting. Dealing with it requires a good understanding of the aspirations of the 
different parties, decisive actions and a tailor-made solution attuned to the difficulty of the 
situation. Instead of working on a common platform, the Rambouillet negotiations entrenched 
existing divisions. They crystallised the political environment and legitimacy allegiances in 
Kosovo and overshadowed the possibilities of the ensuing negotiations: the relatively 
powerless Kosovo Serbs depended on Belgrade’s power elite; a divided Kosovo Albanian 
political elite was left competing for power; and an international community, unable to find a 
sustainable solution to a problem that they did not understand fully, became deadlocked. The 
ensuing controversial bombing did little to resolve the issue and left at the end a total political, 
social and economic vacuum that the international community had to fill to avoid chaos 
spreading throughout the whole region.  
 Conclusion 
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The ‘Question of Kosovo’ symbolises the clash of two nationalisms competing over 
the same territory.248 Two nationalisms claimed two distinct ‘truths’. As Julie Mertus argues 
in her book How Myths and Truths Started a War, each of these ‘truths’, although 
contradicting the other, is real and makes sense within each national rationale.249 Defining the 
opposition between Serbs and Albanians as grounded in ‘ancient hatreds’ is inappropriate. 
The Balkan region, at the meeting point between two great civilisations, religions and 
empires,250 has naturally for centuries been the scene of clashes between those entities. 
Furthermore, the rugged geographical situation of the region did also play a role in creating 
physical barriers between the different communities. Yet, none of this explains fully the 
visceral violence between the different groups that is witnessed nowadays. The convoluted 
history of the region and the central role played by nineteenth century romantic idea of the 
nation and eighteenth century concept of ‘modern’ state, provide a more rational explanation 
of the phenomenon. Attempts to establish their own nation-states by each claiming the 
territory and establishing a political structure has been at the centre of the dispute between the 
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The competition of two national ideologies over the same 
territory has brought them to define themselves in opposition to each other, with the situation 
being exacerbated by the failure of the civic ideal to bring real long-lasting benefits to the 
local population. As Jean-Arnault Dérens argues:  
‘L’objectif des deux nationalismes était et demeure de créer – ou de défendre – des Etats-
nations homogènes, où toute la légitimité politique reviendrait à un seul peuple. L’enjeu porte 
donc à la fois sur la définition même de ce peuple et sur les territoires auquels il peut 
prétendre, d’une manière dont l’exclusivité est plus ou moins ouvertement revendiquée’.251  
 The history of the national ideologies’ confrontation is characterised by the oscillation 
between balance and counterbalance of power politics. A power relationship, where the 
‘strong’ uses its comparative advantage to take revenge and impose itself against the ‘weak’, 
has repeated itself in turn all through the century.252  
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During the period of Socialist Yugoslavia, both Serb and Albanian nationalists sought 
to pursue their causes through federal institutions: Belgrade attempted to impose the 
recognition of its sovereignty over the province, while the Kosovo Albanians lobbied for 
greater autonomy. Unfortunately, it was not possible to find a sustainable solution that 
satisfied all parties. In the 1980s and 1990s, Kosovo witnessed the building of resentments 
over political deceptions, which were now entrenched in the political discourse. Milošević, 
but also Kosovo’s Albanian politicians, increasingly polarised the political debate on the 
Kosovo issue and used nationalist rhetorics to affirm their respective claims to political 
power. During this period, as a political and economic crisis affected the whole of the former 
Yugoslavia, all ‘evils’ occurring in the province were explained through the prism of 
nationalist rhetoric and on the basis of political myths.  
 The issue of constructivism in relation to the nation and nationalism is hotly 
debated.253 In this research, I do not aim to establish if Serb or Albanian identities are 
constructed or not. For Kosovo’s Serbs or Kosovo’s Albanians, an academic explanation that 
their identity is not natural but constructed is irrelevant. The distinction between Serbs and 
Albanian, and its implications, are very clear within the Kosovo population, where everyone 
knows what they are and how they feel. In the same way, I do not aim to determine the reality 
of the Serb and Albanian nations. The attachment of the respective communities to their own 
ideas of the nation is a reality of the province. Nevertheless, I argue that visceral opposition of 
the two nations, far from being an irrational sentiment originating in some shadowy past, is a 
carefully crafted outccome of their respective national ideologies and ensuing policies. 
Evidence can be found in the interesting research that has been conducted by Denisa 
Kostovičová,254 which demonstrates how nationalist policies and their implementation have 
enabled the establishment of geographical, and ultimately psychological, barriers between the 
two communities. 
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 Chapter 3 - International Legitimacy and Legitimation  
By the time the Rambouillet negotiations failed, the divisions engendered by the 
Kosovo question on the Yugoslav political scene had served to entrench the stance of the 
international community. The rifts reflect the fundamentally different conceptions various 
actors had of the relative roles of and relations between the principles of sovereignty, national 
self-determination and human rights, which have underpinned the international order since 
1945. NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia over Kosovo, beyond the consequences it had over 
the province and the Balkan regions, more crucially put into question the future of the 
international order as established under the United Nations regime.    
This chapter investigates the impact the issue of Kosovo had on the fundamentals of 
the international order, and how those fundamentals now affect the prospects for the province. 
It analyses: (1) the way in which the issue of Kosovo affected the relationship between the 
principles of sovereignty and the concepts of national-self determination and human rights; 
(2) the impact this situation and the ensuing intervention had on the international order; and 
(3) the consequences it held for the legitimacy of the international community’s action and 
future international involvement in the territory.  
This chapter demonstrates that the events that occurred in 1999 Kosovo had an 
important impact on the international order as they brought into question its normative roots 
as well as its political configuration as embodied in the United Nations Security Council. 
Furthermore, it argues that if the 1999 events call for a reappraisal of the existing normative 
order, to date the international community has not been ready to upset, for purely political 
reasons, the primordial role sovereignty has played and continues to play in this order. 
Ultimately, it reveals the extent to which United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 
1244 served more to legitimise NATO’s intervention through the reconciliation of its action 
with international law than it attempted to establish the necessary basis for a post-conflict 
settlement, thereby foreshadowing the lack of any legitimate basis for future international 
missions.  
 To argue those points, I first propose to analyse the sovereignty versus national self-
determination debate and to provide an international legal outlook on the Kosovo Albanian 
and Serbian feud. I then consider the inconsistency between sovereignty and the human rights 
violations that were permitted under its realm, and in particular, the causes of the allies’ 
intervention against Serbia from March till June 1999. I finally complete this study with an 
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analysis of the consequences of the intervention on the UN regime and the implications of 
resolution 1244 for the legitimacy framework in which any post-conflict settlement for 
Kosovo will evolve.  
1. Sovereignty vs. National Self-determination 
The principle of national self-determination, on which the Kosovo Albanians based 
their claim to independence, is an ancient and well-established principle under international 
law. This norm grants ‘peoples … [the right] freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political status’.255 In response to the danger this principle represents for the 
international tenet of sovereignty, the cornerstone of the international order, the international 
community has attempted throughout the twentieth century to limit the purpose and scope of 
this principle to well defined cases.256 As explained in chapter one, sovereignty is the 
cornerstone of the international legal order as it provides the guarantee for states that their 
territorial and political integrity will be respected, and kept free from outside obstruction. In 
fact, Stephen Krasner defines the international system in terms of ‘Westphalian states, 
understood as unitary rational actors operating in an anarchic setting and striving to enhance 
their well being and security’.257 National self-determination at first underwrote state 
sovereignty in the nation-state era of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Later, with the 
growth of the concept of nations within states, it increasingly became a threat to the 
international principle. To determine the implications national self-determination has in the 
case of Kosovo, it is essential to first determine the field of application of the notion and the 
implications this entails.  
a. Sovereignty vs. National Self-determination 
As one can observe from the number of legally and non-legally binding documents 
that deal with national self-determination, the international community has a clear and distinct 
concern to define the field of application and consequences of this principle. With the 1960 
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Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,258 the 
international community provided a set of definitions, rules, and rights intended to restrict the 
application of national self-determination to a limited number of cases. Under this regime, the 
right to national self-determination is restricted to the enjoyment of a defined colonial 
‘people’, under strict decolonisation rules.259 This framework allowed for a consistent 
application of the principle to the cases of African and Asian colonies seeking independence 
from their colonial powers on the grounds of national self-determination. In 1966, with the 
inclusion of the concept in two international covenants,260 the principle found new support 
within the human rights regime. Although national self-determination claims on the grounds 
of human rights violations had little empirical application at this stage, it does indicate the 
will of the international community to give the principle some additional relevance beyond 
the strict decolonisation context. Yet, at this stage, the crucial questions that the international 
community failed to clarify are: (1) who is entitled to the right to national self-determination; 
and (2) what implications does national self-determination entail? 
According to different international documents, national self-determination grants 
rights to a ‘people’; yet, these documents only provide a vague definition of what constitutes 
such a people. Beyond the general definition of a people as ‘an aggregate or a mass of 
individuals who have a common identity and are entitled to express their collective and 
political potential capacity’,261 the international community has attempted to clarify the 
understanding of the term by redefining it within precise circumstances. Under General 
Assembly resolution 1514,262 where national self-determination is only intended to apply to 
the decolonisation context, a people are colonised entities defined under strict rules.263  
Beyond the decolonisation context, the universality principle of the human rights 
regime creates a further problem for the applicability of the principle of national self-
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determination. 264 As all individuals are normally entitled to human rights, if national self-
determination is a human right, then national self-determination holds a universal application 
and the limits imposed by the decolonisation context fail to serve as a strict constraint. Yet, 
the universal nature of national self-determination holds a number of doctrinal limits. Those 
limits can be found in the answers to the following questions: (1) is national self-
determination granted to an individual or a community? and (2) to what extent can national 
self-determination be given to ‘everyone’ without restrictions? 265 
A partial answer to the first question can be found in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which grants human rights to ‘persons belonging to such 
[groups]’.266 Therefore rights are granted to individuals on the grounds that they belong to a 
community of individuals, not on the grounds that they are individuals. In regard to the 
second question, the international order is quite clear. Although national self-determination 
has grown into a legally accepted principle, it has not been granted without qualification. On a 
practical level, the reluctance of states to grant national self-determination to entities such as 
the Basques in Spain, Chiapas Indians in Mexico and Tibetans in China, is a proof of the 
unwillingness of states to grant a boundless universal character to the principle of national 
self-determination.  
On the doctrinal level, beyond the expressed will of states to limit national self-
determination to the decolonisation context, the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law267 is further evidence of the wish of the international community to limit the scope of 
national self-determination to defined entities, even within the human rights regime. 
According to that declaration, in order to be legally accepted by the international community, 
the people should not endanger the sovereignty of the state of which they hold citizenship, or 
international peace and security. However, beyond those criteria remains a grey area in which 
the debate over minorities and their right to national self-determination develops. 
In contrast to the terms ‘self-determination’ and ‘people’, ‘minority’ is a well-
established legal principle under international law. The concept was legally recognised at the 
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end of the First World War through ‘special treaties on minorities with the allied or newly 
created states ... on the rights of minorities within their borders ... [and] included in the peace 
treaties with ex-enemy states ... [as well as] declarations before the Council of the League of 
Nations as a condition of their admission to the league’.268 The minority rights regime was 
originally established as a response to minority claims within multi-ethnic states, by 
attempting ‘to prevent those ethnic groups which had been separated from their respective 
nation-states ... from claiming a right to self-determination’.269  The concept of minority was 
adopted as a way to reconcile state territorial integrity and heteroclite groups’ demands. 
According to Thomas Musgrave, the concept of minority was specifically differentiated from 
the concept of a people entitled to national self-determination. This argument is supported by 
the ICCPR’s interpretations, where a distinction is drawn between a ‘people’ entitled to 
national self-determination and a ‘minority’ entitled ‘to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practice their own religion, or use their own language’ within a larger state.270 
Under international law, the distinction between a ‘people’ and a ‘minority’ is further 
enforced as modern international opinion tends toward the idea that minorities should be 
granted a specific kind of self-determination. In the case of the Former Yugoslavia, the 
Badinter Commission dealt with the topic of minority rights to self-determination in its 
opinion no. 2;271 yet, the distinction this decision supports remains subject to debates. In 
particular, the Badinter opinion created a precedent, while failing to specify the exact legal 
implications of this right for minority.  
The first relevant implication of the distinction between the rights granted to a 
‘people’ and a ‘minority’ appears when it comes to its legal consequences. It is commonly 
assumed by secessionist groups that this right automatically implies the right to break away 
from the state and attain independence. However, according to the international normative 
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framework, national self-determination can be achieved only with the approbation of the 
sovereign state from which it wishes to separate. This tenet is legally supported by General 
Assembly resolution 2625, which states that national self-determination should ‘not consist of 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent states’.272 As such cases rarely occur, modern 
international law has introduced an alternative to secession that could result from a consensus 
between the parties. In this respect, international law professor Antonio Cassese, in a study of 
the legal implications of self-determination, highlights an interesting trend for the concept.273 
He observes that self-determination can take two distinctive forms: internal and external. 
According to this distinction, on the one hand, external self-determination is the ability of the 
entity granted self-determination to determine its own status under international law, to 
establish its position within the international community, and to launch relations with other 
states free from third-party intervention.274 On the other hand, internal self-determination is 
the ability of an entity to establish self-government over a defined territory in agreement with 
the state to which the territory belongs. In other words, a group seeking national self-
determination would be granted the right to secession should it fulfil certain defined criteria. 
Should it not, it can still enjoy self-determination through autonomy within a sovereign state. 
In international legal terms, the distinction lies in the former right being granted exclusively to 
a ‘people’ with the latter being the prerogative of minority groups. This trend reflects the 
Yugoslav practice and was promoted by the Badinter Commission, which supported the right 
of the Serb minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina to internal self-determination, but clearly not to 
secession, independence or association with the Republic of Serbia.275  
Nevertheless international law, in its distinction between a people and a minority, fails 
to provide criteria for defining how groups can be rigorously defined as one or the other, and 
hence what exactly they are entitled to. The second debate that lingers is the one over the 
determination of who makes the distinction to grant a given group the status of a people or 
minority. Due to its nature, international law tends to leave to existing states the prerogative of 
deciding the nature of the groups that constitute each. The state is therefore judge and party in 
securing the legitimacy of all groups it represents, and can prevent any given group from 
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parting without its consent. Contrary to the literal meaning of ‘minority’, a group that 
qualifies as such is not obviously a group that contains fewer members than another. Given 
this, a minority should be defined as a group that has less leverage within the state’s political 
and decisional systems. In the case of Yugoslavia, this distinction has particular relevance. 
Constitutionally, the Yugoslav state makes the distinction on ethnic criteria between nations 
(narodni) and nationalities (narodnosti). The former are defined as the founding ethnic 
groups of the state, while the latter are groups which are ethnically different, but whose 
nations already have a state outside of the Yugoslavia. As demonstrated in Chapter two, the 
definition of a group according to one or the other typology has great relevance for the rights 
the group enjoys within the state, and consequently shows how important it was for groups to 
be defined as one rather that the other.  In the first Yugoslavia, groups such as Macedonians 
and Montenegrins were not given a status at all, and fought to gain one in the succeeding 
state. More crucially to this argument, the distinction between nation and nationality was and 
is at the centre of the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia as the former aim 
for more rights and the latter aim to restrain the former’s expansion of power within the 
Yugoslav state. 
As the distinction remains the prerogative of the state, the problem that arises is that of 
how to prevent the state from abusing the system. As Krasner contends, ‘national self-
determination … could not resolve the problem of minorities. Therefore, the rights of 
minorities had to be protected so that they would accept and support the democratic polities 
within which they resided’.276 Then again, in cases where the state uses the distinction to 
bolster the power of the group whose interests it defends at the expense of other groups, to 
what extent does an outside power, such as that of the international community, have a right 
to repair the ongoing injustice? In the case of Kosovo, the Rambouillet negotiations and the 
subsequent NATO intervention directly challenged the international legal base on which the 
system was based. 
b. Kosovo and National Self-determination 
In this context, the issue now consists in determining whether the claim to 
independence of Kosovo’s Albanians is admissible under the principle of national self-
determination and, if so, what form of self-determination they are entitled to. Kosovo 
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Albanians argued their entitlement to independence on three grounds: (1) that the province 
under the 1974 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Constitution was granted a de facto 
republic status, and as such had the same right to self-determination as the other republics; (2) 
that Kosovo had been, since 1912, a de facto colony of Serbia and as such could claim the 
right to national self-determination granted in the decolonisation context; and (3) that they 
were part of the Albanian people and therefore should enjoy the same rights as Albanians in 
Albania. 
With respect to the first claim, Chapter two clearly demonstrated that the 1974 
Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) did not grant Kosovo 
the right to secession, since Albanians were considered as a nationality (narodnos) and not as 
a constituent nation (narod). The second claim can also easily be dismissed, as the case of 
Kosovo clearly does not fit the international legal definition of decolonisation. According to 
the criteria listed in the General Assembly resolution 1514, the colonised territory should be 
‘geographically separated’ and ‘distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country 
administering it’.277 Although, Kosovo Albanians are distinctly different ethnically and 
culturally from Serbs,278 the geographical criterion does not apply. Moreover, under the 
Serbian Constitution,279 the province is clearly an integral part of the republic and therefore 
neither a colony nor a ‘non self-governing territory’. Finally the Kosovo Albanians’ claim of 
belonging to the Albanian nation cannot be accepted. This claim relies on the continuous 
rejection of the border drawn in 1912, which, as Kosovo Albanians argue, has divided the 
Albanian people into two separate territories and condemned part of the Albanian people to 
oppression and non-recognition of their legitimate rights.280 This claim can easily be rejected 
on three legal grounds. First, the change of internationally recognised borders would be 
condemned on the grounds of uti possidetis, an international principle that prevents any 
change of international borders without the express consent of the countries involved. This 
tenet is closely associated to the principle of national self-determination, including in the case 
of the Former Yugoslavia, as the Badinter Commission recalls.281 For Kosovo to become 
independent or to join Albania, it would, in any case, need the express consent of Serbia. 
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Second, the Badinter Commission reminds us that there is a clear international principle that 
prevents a people that has attained independence to claim sovereignty over further territory 
belonging to another sovereign state. 282 This principle is an ultimate safeguard intended to 
prevent any further instability caused by the multiplication of irredentist claims.283 Thirdly, 
the Yugoslav claim that the Albanian people already enjoy external self-determination within 
the Albanian state is already accepted according to international legal principles, thereby not 
permitting Kosovo’s Albanians a further right to national self-determination.  
While, according to these arguments, international law would have difficultly 
recognising the right of Kosovo to secede, the province could however qualify for internal 
self-determination. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the SFRY constitution clearly 
recognised Kosovo Albanians as a minority which, as such, entitled them a certain right of 
autonomy.284 They also would qualify under our legal definition of minority groups, and as 
such, should enjoy the protection granted by the minority rights regime. This distinction 
becomes important when the political and human rights violations of Kosovo’s Albanians 
since 1989 are considered. As the autonomous status of the province was an expression of the 
rights of the Kosovo Albanians as a minority, the withdrawal of this autonomy without their 
consent,285 besides being unconstitutional,286 was also illegal under international law. It 
represented without doubt a violation of the Kosovo Albanians’ right to internal self-
determination as granted under the minority rights regime.287 The crucial issue which then 
arises is to determine whether there is a moral case for groups whose minority rights are 
grossly violated to claim independence in order to preserve their group and its members. And 
if not, what might be an acceptable alternative? 
In conclusion, although there has been some liberalisation within the national self-
determination vs. sovereignty debate, states are still very fond of their territorial integrity and 
are uneasy when it comes to granting statehood to a new entity. In strict international legal 
terms, and as far as the principle of national self-determination is concerned, it seemed fair to 
presume that Kosovo was not, in the wake of 1999, a potential candidate for independence. 
                                                
282 Badinter Commission, Opinion No.3., § 4. 
283 Musgrave, Op. Cit., p. 170. 
284 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 21 February 1974. 
285 Constitutional Amendments of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1989, in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, No. 30/89, in Weller 1999, Op. Cit., p. 59. 
286 The suppression of autonomic status of the province of Kosovo without the prior approval of the Provincial 
Assembly is clearly a breach of article 427 of the Serbian Constitution. Cf. Serbian Constitution (1974). 
287 Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 2, § 2 & ICCPR,  art. 27, etc. 
 94 
Nevertheless, under the minority rights regime, international law did provide an alternative to 
pressurising Yugoslavia for external self-determination for Kosovo through enabling its self-
government. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that a theory claiming minority rights can 
lead to external self-determination has been formulated. According to this ‘right of 
reversion’,288 when ‘a minority suffers oppression; [...] the minority attains the status of a 
people and may exercise a right to self-determination’.289 To support this theory, Lee 
Buchheit argues that the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 is an example of a 
successful expression of the minority right to secession.290 However, this remains an isolated 
case and it has failed to translate into an international legal norm to this day. Indeed the 
international community has adopted quite a different attitude towards other oppressed 
minorities, and the suppression of secessionist movements such as in the autonomous 
province of Chechnya by the Russian government in the late 1990s early 2000s. Those cases, 
and the absence of an international norm establishing a ‘right of reversion’, reinforce the 
conviction that at the turn of the century, states were still not willing to accept the granting of 
external self-determination to minorities. 
2. Sovereignty vs. Human Rights  
Beyond issues of national self-determination, the principle of sovereignty has come 
into conflict with the regime of human rights. According to the United Nations system, as a 
condition of their sovereignty states have the duty to promote human rights within their 
borders.291 In cases where states fail to fulfil this duty and conceal themselves behind their 
sovereignty, the international community is now armed with a legal framework to promote 
and defend human rights, but this lacks efficient implementation mechanisms. NATO 
attempted to legitimise the bombing of Yugoslavia with claims of preventing human rights 
abuses by that state against its population. Nevertheless, outside of the international legal 
framework, this action marked the beginning of a serious legal and political debate regarding 
the fundamentals of the international order.  
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a. The Human Rights Regime 
The principle of human rights is at the base of the United Nations system, as 
evidenced by the United Nations Charter.292 Since 1945, the international community has 
codified the human rights regime’s principles and attempted to spread the concept across 
political and cultural boundaries.293 Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 
notes that ‘[t]he concept of human (or fundamental) rights is certainly a dynamic one and has 
been subject to change and expansion as can be seen from constitutional history of Western 
states. But it is important to retain the essence of the concept, which is that every individual 
has certain inalienable and legally enforceable rights protecting him or her against state 
interference and the abuse of power by government’.294 Although, human rights have come to 
be accepted as fundamental, issues remain regarding their definition, nature and most 
importantly, their implementation. Those issues ultimately undermine the regime as a whole 
when it comes to imposing itself over states hiding behind their sovereignty to avoid their 
obligations vis-à-vis human rights.295  
 The first predicament concerns the problem of finding a consensus over the definition 
of ‘universal’ rights.296 The most crucial example concerns the opposition between, on the one 
hand the ‘liberal’ West emphasising the need for civil and political rights, and on the other 
hand developing countries stressing instead the importance of economic and social rights.297 
This discrepancy was concretely codified in 1966 with declaration of two separate 
covenants.298 The two covenants established two sets of rights and, in effect, enabled states to 
subscribe to what they defined as core rights while refusing to legitimise the rights that they 
did not wish to subscribe to. This failure of the international community to establish universal 
human rights beyond a core few principles leaves human rights law, to a large extent, in the 
domain of treaty law. The problem of basing the human rights regime on treaty law is that it 
further undermines the ‘universality’ of the system as a whole, as states have the option of not 
taking part in the system by not being party to the relevant treaties, or even opting out of 
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certain provisions of each by stating reservations about certain clauses of the regime.299 
Finally the last debate that undermines the human rights regime is that, besides the moral 
obligation on states to implement what they interpret as human rights, in practical terms the 
regime remains subordinate to the principle of sovereignty, thus allowing freedom to the state 
to enforce it to whatever degree it chooses.300 If a state agrees to abide by the human rights 
regime but fails to implement it, the anarchic nature of the international community prevents 
it from enforcing punishment on the state that hides behind its sovereign prerogative.301  
Nevertheless, article 2 of the United Nations Charter attempts, under the cover of the 
principle of sovereignty, to constrain states to refrain from violence towards other states and 
to respect the sovereignty of other states within their own borders.302 In this system, the 
international community is armed with measures to condemn states that violate their 
obligations under the international order – including those relating to human rights, with a 
whole set of non-violent measures – enumerated within chapter VI of the Charter.303 Armed 
measures can only be legitimised under three strict and well-defined circumstances: (1) 
following the failure of non-violent measures to resolve the situation; (2) as a response to a 
threat to the peace and stability of the international order resulting from armed violence;304 
and (3) on the express mandate of the Security Council within the boundaries defined by 
chapter VII of the Charter. Yet, should the Security Council fail to find a consensus to launch 
measures against the rogue state, there is no scope for appeal; nor do alternative pressure 
mechanisms to impose punishment exist. This situation has occurred in a number of cases, 
where the international community has helplessly witnessed a breach of international and 
human rights law without any licence to interfere.305 
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To respond to the regime’s failures to take on a universal character at the international 
level, human rights systems have developed at the regional level, as evidenced by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.306 
These regimes aim to overcome the problems encountered at the international level through 
the definition of a clear and applicable set of rights attuned to the relevant regional political, 
economic and social cultures, while attempting to provide efficient enforcement 
mechanisms.307 Within the European framework, Stephen Krasner notes that the Europeans 
have attempted, under the cover of the Cold War détente, to establish a regime balancing the 
demands of sovereignty and human rights. He points out that the Helsinki accord ‘was a 
contract between the Soviets and the West in which the Soviets nominally accepted some 
human rights principles and the West recognised existing borders and regimes in Europe’.308 
Yet, he argues that ‘the West used the Helsinki accord to pressure the Soviet Union on human 
rights, rejecting the charge that this amounted to interference in internal affairs by claiming 
that human rights were universally recognized and that non-interference referred only to 
efforts to dictate to other countries’. Thus in effect, the West established a basis of reprisal in 
cases of human rights abuses, thereby compromising what Krasner calls ‘the principle of 
autonomy’ at the base of sovereignty.309 
In the 1990s, after the atrocious genocides witnessed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Rwanda, the international community started to question the omnipotent state’s impunity. 
Images of mass graves haunted Western countries, which blamed themselves for their lack of 
suitable responses. In particular, the images released of the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, 
when the international community, unwilling to take decisive military action against 
Yugoslav troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stood by while eight thousands Bošniaks were 
murdered, remains a vivid memory in the Western consciousness. The promise of ‘never 
again’, made after the Second World War and the discovery of the genocide against the 
Jewish community, didn’t seem to have been fulfilled. The United Nations system, shaped 
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with the explicit goal of never allowing the horrors of the Second World War to be repeated, 
had clearly failed to prevent further atrocities at the turn of the new century.310     
b. NATO and the Intervention Precedent 
It was in the tense atmosphere left by the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations that, 
on 25 March 1999, NATO started the bombing of Yugoslavia. Fighting between the Yugoslav 
military and Albanian paramilitaries had intensified, claiming a growing number of civilian 
victims and causing thousands of others to flee their homes. After the failure of a number of 
peace initiatives, the escalation of the armed conflict and increasing displacement of the local 
population, the international community311 felt it could no longer sit aside and watch what 
some portrayed as another ‘genocide’ occurring at the European periphery. After intense 
discussions at the Security Council, the Americans, British and French, while supported by 
their NATO allies, failed to convince their Russian and Chinese counterparts of the urgency 
of the situation and of the necessity for intervention. The Russians, supporters of their 
traditional Slav ally, would not allow any sort of military intervention, while the Chinese 
government, fervent opponents of intervention and secessionist movements, was not 
supportive of any kind of action that might threaten the territorial integrity or sovereignty of 
Yugoslavia. Both threatened to use their vetoes against any resolution presented to the 
Security Council promoting military action against the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state. 
Nonetheless, as the economic sanctions and arms embargo set in place against Yugoslavia 
since the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts had clearly failed to prevent Milošević’s 
Machiavellian scheme,312 NATO started to consider military alternatives outside of the 
Security Council mandate on the grounds of the serious humanitarian crisis occurring in 
Kosovo, in line with the threats evoked at Rambouillet.  
By the time the bombing started, the violence between the Yugoslav forces and 
Albanian paramilitaries had intensified, with important consequences within the civilian 
populations – deaths, but also internally displaced persons. Nevertheless, a debate regarding 
the cause of the mass displacement of population in the province appeared. Leonard Cohen 
argues that Milošević used the time ‘wasted’ trying to achieve a consensus in Rambouillet to 
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realise his policy of the expulsion of the Albanian population from the province.313 On the 
other hand, Milošević defended himself in front of the International Crime Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia by arguing that the mass flow of Kosovo Albanians to neighbouring states 
was in fact provoked by the NATO bombing rather than by any articulated Serbian ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ plan.314 Although the mass exodus did indeed correspond with the start of NATO 
intervention, large population movements had started in zones where Yugoslav military and 
Albanian paramilitary clashes had intensified in the run up to March 1999. Conscious of the 
questionable legality of their action in international legal terms, NATO member states 
organised a vast public relations campaign to justify the legitimacy of their action. This 
legitimisation campaign had two lines of argument, aimed at two different audiences. NATO 
argued first to the international community that its action was indeed justified under the 
human rights regime.315 Then, as Roland Paris underlines, these arguments were also aimed 
increasingly to their own populations to gain the support they needed for their action.316  
As to the arguments, first, conscious of the doubtful legality of their intervention 
outside of a clear Security Council mandate,317 NATO attempted to argue for the deep 
humanitarian crisis and the grave human rights violations caused by the Yugoslav state 
against its own population as a justification for the breaching of their international legal 
obligations not to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. What they presented as a 
‘genocide’ orchestrated by Milošević, was, for a number of protagonists, a compelling enough 
reason if not an obligation to take action.318 Others went further and underlined the need for 
international law to adapt to the new international order’s realities. They argued that the 
allies’ intervention in Kosovo revealed the evolution of a new trend in the principle of non-
intervention and the origin of a ‘responsibility’ to protect populations, even from their own 
state if necessary.319 Furthermore, as previously discussed, Krasner has ambiguously argued 
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that regional practice and law had developed to consider a threat to regional stability as 
providing a rationale for intervention, although this argument was never fully developed in 
the case of the Kosovo intervention.  
Second, NATO states felt the need to legitimise their action to their own populations. 
From a practical point of view, the failure of NATO’s democratic governments to obtain the 
support of their own legislative branches – as representatives of their populations’ wills – 
would have entailed a failure to obtain funding for military intervention and a de facto 
desertion of any such action.320 Paris makes an interesting analysis of the way in which they 
attempted to gain this support. He focuses his study on the vocabulary and historical analogies 
used by state leaders, which he claims, demonstrate the conduct of politics at large.321 In 
particular, he studies the emotional appeals governments made to their own populations by 
comparing Milošević’s policies and the situation in Kosovo to painful moments of their own 
past.322 He argues that by comparing Milošević to Hitler and the situation in Kosovo to the 
horrors of the Second World War – or even to the Srebrenica massacre, closer in history and 
vivid in the publics’ memories – they justified their action by underlining the need, indeed 
their quasi-obligation, to intervene.323 Both sets of arguments employed by the allies aimed to 
legitimise their military action in two ways: (1) at the legal level by attempting to undermine 
the structure of the international legal system itself – which they now portrayed as archaic; 
and (2) at the political level by obtaining support from their bases – i.e. their citizens – for 
their action through emotional appeals. In these tasks, the role of the media proved crucial. 
The support obtained from the media, which faithfully relayed and even amplified the 
governments’ rhetoric, enabled Western governments to secure the backing of their 
populations.324 
The bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO launched a heated legal and political debate 
within the academic and political communities.325  Those who opposed the intervention based 
their arguments in international legal terms, stressing the dangers of breaching the sacrosanct 
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principle of sovereignty at the very base of the international legal order. Those who favoured 
intervention based their case on the malleable nature of international law and the need to 
adapt it to the needs of modern international society. The former stressed the dangers of 
opening the door to violence and the risks embedded in the subjectivity of this kind of ad hoc 
policy, as any state could find an excuse to invade its neighbour with questionable 
justification.326 They emphasised the importance of the Security Council as the ultimate 
authority and the need for it to retain its monopoly over violence at the international level.327 
Yet, in cases where states abused their right to sovereignty to breach basic obligations within 
their own borders, in particular towards their own populations, the latter argued that there 
should be clearly established rules that would clearly define the grounds for intervention.328 
International law professor Antonio Cassese drafted a list of seven conditions that had to be 
fulfilled in order to legitimise any intervention.329 To promote such a change in international 
law, proponents of intervention argue that international involvement is a necessity;330 
therefore, designing strict rules and defining specific conditions in which such interventions 
could occur would be the best way to prevent abuses in cases where the United Nations 
Security Council could not agree. In particular, they emphasised the emergence of a 
‘responsibility’ to protect that falls upon states in cases of abuse in third countries. They 
denounced the hypocrisy of a system that placed human rights at its centre, but nevertheless 
turned a blind eye when actual infractions occurred.331 Beyond the international legal 
community, high-ranking officials such as United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan 
have called for an evolution of the system.332  
In 2000, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded in its report 
that even if unquestionably illegal in terms of international law, the NATO intervention was, 
to a certain extent, legitimate.333 The legitimacy of the action rested on its aim: to put an end 
to a serious humanitarian crisis. Yet, the Commission questioned the overall legitimacy of the 
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intervention on the grounds of the means set in place to achieve those aims. Although the ends 
were arguably noble, the means set in place were much less so. NATO bombing caused a 
large number of civilian casualties, a further mass displacement of civilians, and even a 
regrettable diplomatic incident when NATO bombed – allegedly mistakenly – the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade.334 The ‘collateral damage’, as NATO called it, involved a high human 
toll, which undermined its efforts to legitimise the mission.335 
 Although NATO claimed it had to intervene to alleviate human suffering, it is 
indisputable that the bombing greatly increased the distress of the local population, and the 
Western allies failed to prevent retaliation by Kosovo Albanians against the Kosovo Serb 
population when the bombing ended. Under international law, there is a norm compelling an 
occupying power to protect the population it occupies.336 Hence, as NATO officially took 
control of the province with the signature of the technical military agreement with Yugoslavia 
on 9 June 1999,337 it inherited the duty to protect the remaining Serb population and all other 
minority groups under threat. The lack of a post-intervention strategy for this and the inability 
of the allies to organise themselves in time caused a power vacuum as the Yugoslav troops 
withdrew. During those few days, the inability of NATO to protect the Kosovo Serb and 
Roma populations from the Kosovo Albanians’ thirst for revenge was an indisputable mistake 
on their part, and put a serious question mark on the legitimacy of their overall intervention. 
Professor Bruno Simma goes further by arguing that even if, according to the 
International Court of Justice, ‘in the face of Genocide, the right of states, or collectives of 
states, to counter breaches of human rights most likely becomes an obligation’338 – hence 
evoking an evolution in the international legal frameworks establishing an obligation of 
intervention – in fact ‘in Kosovo however… [there were] massive violations of human rights 
and rights of ethnic minorities, but no act of genocide in the sense of the 1948 convention’.339 
In addition, he further emphasises that a mass exodus of the kind experienced in Kosovo does 
not qualify as an armed attack, and hence did not justify the implementation of military 
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measures.340 Besides discrediting the foundation of NATO’s argument, the polemic went 
further to question the root of the allies’ motives for intervention. Anthony Weymouth 
comments: ‘in Kosovo, in the apparent aftermath of the Cold War, a clear Western motive 
was more difficult to perceive. The Balkans, historically turbulent, geographical inaccessible 
and of little direct strategic or economic interest to the West seemed a most unlikely region 
for NATO to intervene militarily, and yet that is precisely what happened.’341 Yet arguments 
have been developed to demonstrate that in fact, NATO intervention in Yugoslavia did enable 
the United States, Britain, France, Germany as well as the European Union and NATO itself 
to reassert their position on the international scene and within their own constituencies.342 
Along this line, Professor Mary Kaldor makes the case that ‘[t]he preference for bombing as a 
military strategy has to be understood in terms of a combination of American domestic 
politics and institutional interests’.343 
Nevertheless, the fundamental question remains: ‘should one remain silent and 
inactive only because the existing body of international law rules proves incapable of 
remedying such a situation?’344 There is clearly a discrepancy between the international law 
of states inherited from the Westphalian system and the evolving system of modern 
international law,345 which grants human beings – i.e. individuals – rights in the system. In 
this evolving system, it becomes obsolete for states to hide behind their sovereignty rights and 
violate their obligations.346 There is therefore a need for international law to develop 
enforcement mechanisms. The Security Council has been blamed as being inadequate to deal 
with to this issue. There is a need for international law to adapt in order to improve the 
compliance of states with universal rules and their concomitant responsibilities. Examples like 
the later American intervention in Iraq show that there is a real need to develop clear 
boundaries for an intervention doctrine. The NATO bombing, although condemned as illegal, 
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created a precedent for intervention. It opened the door to abuses of the system, as the Iraq 
intervention was not even openly argued for on the basis of human rights violations by the 
Saddam Hussein regime, but rather as a preventive action meant to pre-empt what the regime 
might do to other states. The lack of suitable regulation of such cases and the inability of the 
international community to face the changes it is undergoing can prove to be more dangerous 
than admitting the need for intervention. In this regard, beyond Cassese’s criteria, the 
proportionality of means used and the duty to protect turn out to be crucial in the development 
of an intervention doctrine.   
At the 2005 United Nations World Summit organised on the occasion of the General 
Assembly’s sixtieth anniversary, a first step was taken in that direction.347 In the summit’s 
outcome, the United Nations’ members emphasised the responsibility of a state ‘to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. The 
resolution emphasises that ‘[t]his responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes’.348  In 
cases where a state would seek to escape its responsibility, the draft resolution provides that  
‘[t]he international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters 
VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organisations as appropriate should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations’349    
The resolution demonstrates that there is a clear will on the part of the international 
community as a whole to recognise and endorse the responsibility of states to prevent and 
protect their populations from humanitarian and human rights abuses. Even further, it 
attempts to impose a duty on the community to enforce this responsibility in cases where 
states do not live up to their obligations. Yet, it is important to note that the international 
community has acknowledged that this duty should be exercised first through peaceful means. 
Nevertheless, should that avenue fail, the resolution anticipates military action only with the 
Security Council’s express agreement through the provisions enumerated in chapter VII of the 
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Charter. It is further important to note that the document does not consider any other 
punishment for states that fail to protect their populations (such as possible independence for 
populations victimised by such abuses).  
Before turning to the specific issue of the Security Council and its role in legitimising 
interventions, we should conclude this discussion with a remark regarding the issue of the 
legitimacy of intervention vis-à-vis the Kosovo local population. NATO’s efforts to legitimise 
their action centred on justifying their action to the international community and to the 
populations of the allied countries. Indeed little was done to justify their action to the 
population of Kosovo. This failure will prove detrimental to the future of the allies’ and the 
international community’s actions in the region. Kosovo’s Albanians welcomed the 
international involvement on the Kosovo issue. For a long time, they had been longing for the 
international community’s support against Yugoslav policies. The intervention was very 
popular among these Kosovo Albanians; yet it spurred a number of false expectations. They 
assumed that the international community had gotten involved to solve the human rights 
abuses and humanitarian crisis of course, but also, in the longer term, to give them their long 
awaited independence. They believed that the military intervention would be followed by 
independence and the return of political power to local elites. As their long awaited 
independence remained beyond reach, with the establishment of a long-term international 
post-war mission, specific resentments arose. As for the Serbs, both Belgrade and the Kosovo 
Serbs viewed the intervention as illegal and as a blatant aggression. The mass revenge 
campaign against the Kosovo Serbs and other minority populations following the 
intervention, and the inability of the international community to protect them did little to alter 
their views and further alienated the Serbs against anything that would come from the allies or 
the international community as a whole. This resentment inevitably deepened with time as 
Belgrade was kept away from the governance of their province, and it had tremendous 
implications for the legitimacy of the post-war mission. 
3. Kosovo, the Security Council and the International Legitimacy 
Framework 
Besides the direct consequences of NATO’s bombing for the province and the region 
and the Balkans as a whole, the allies’ unilateral intervention highlighted the failure of the 
United Nations system in general, and the role and legitimacy of the Security Council in 
particular.  Intervention outside of any Security Council mandate revealed the flaws of the 
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principal political organ of international society as it raised new issues, but also revived older 
issues regarding its functioning, and brought into question its overall legitimacy. 
a. The United Nations Security Council and Issues of Legitimacy 
The Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations.350 
According to the United Nations Charter, ‘[UN] members confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, and as such it 
is the primary political organ of the organisation.351 The Council finds its legal roots and 
legitimacy within the United Nations Charter, where, under treaty law, signatories agree to 
subordinate their sovereignty willingly to its power. On this point, article 24 is particularly 
enlightening as it states that ‘[UN] members … agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’. This specific provision has two 
implications: first, it demonstrates that the Security Council is the ultimate authority in 
international politics; and second, it establishes that its decisions are binding for its member 
states.352 These two implications have a binding effect on states’ sovereignty within the 
international sphere. States retain their sovereignty within their boundaries, and accept 
willingly, through becoming members of the United Nations, the Charter’s prescriptions, the 
Security Council’s decisions, as well as any responsibility they face to implement them. In 
concrete terms, states retain the liberty to engage freely in international activities as long as 
they respect the mandatory provisions of the Charter.  
The essential problem faced by the Security Council’s working is the issue of 
implementation. As noted previously, the United Nations and its bodies lack implementation 
mechanisms because of the anarchic nature of the society established by the principle of 
sovereignty. As states enter freely into the United Nations system, its decisions have only a 
moral value and cannot be enforced on them with one exception, namely in cases of severe 
breaches against peace and security. The Security Council is granted by article 29 the right to 
create subsidiary bodies in charge of implementing its decisions. In cases requiring the 
enforcement of peace and security, it can ask member states to form an international peace-
keeping military force, which would then act within very strict rules as defined by a clear 
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mandate obtained by consensus at the Security Council.353 The failure of the Council to reach 
an agreement over a possible intervention in Yugoslavia, and to deal with the threat it 
represented in the Balkans, underlined the question of the Security Council’s effectiveness in 
pursuing its goals and purpose.  
This specific problem raised by the malfunctioning of the regulatory mechanisms of 
the United Nations system brought up some old issues regarding the structure and functioning 
of the system itself. According to the Charter, the Security Council is composed of fifteen 
members: ten chosen on a rotating basis, and five permanent.354 The permanent members are 
granted – individual – veto power over any decisions taken by the Council. Hence any one 
permanent member can block a decision, without having to justify its decision. The choices 
and privileges associated with the so-called ‘permanent members’ are a legacy of the Second 
World War and of the bargaining that occurred at the end of the war between the winning 
powers. The then victorious allies and instigators of the United Nations system relied on the 
United Nations’ structure to create a form of post-war balance between the superpowers of the 
time, granting themselves the role of regulators. Changes in the international political balance 
of power and the advancement of the international relations since 1945 have led a number of 
states to question this structure and ask for major changes in the organisation’s structure. 
Specifically, the way permanent members use their vetoes has been criticised as it turns the 
Council into an arena of interest feuds between the superpowers. The Yugoslav bombing was 
a clear example of opposition between the ‘liberal West’ – United States, Britain and France, 
which were in favour of the intervention, and the post-communist states – Russia and China, 
which were against. The Security Council system was created in the first place to act as an 
independent and impartial organ; yet, in practice, decisions have often been taken not on the 
basis of solving the problem under consideration, but of serving the great powers’ interests 
along the traditional divide: liberal West versus former communist totalitarian block. As 
regards the specific case of Kosovo, the question of the legitimacy of the Security Council 
had heavy implications for the overall international involvement in the Kosovo situation. 
Neither Serbs nor Kosovo’s Albanians, the main parties to the conflict, were represented. This 
lack of representativeness encouraged backstage bargaining and partisan tactics to gain the 
support of the veto powers to their respective causes, relegating the humanitarian crisis to a 
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distinctly second rank position. Moreover, the Serb/Kosovo Albanian rift clearly seemed to 
become secondary to United States/Russian interests.355  
 The existence of such partisan feuds within the system undermines the support for its 
decisions and actions, and hence its legitimacy. As Agnes Hurwitz argues, the partisan 
decision making ‘demonstrate[s] that the … agenda has been guided for the most part by 
external considerations, rather than domestic demands, and that the notion that … [the] 
processes should be demand driven’.356 Through her specific analysis of the development of 
the rule of law, she notes that the new bottom-up approach developed recently within United 
Nations circles has not succeeded in imposing itself as the norm.357 Besides, she points out 
that ‘in institutional terms, the limited legitimacy … [of these decisions as perceived] within 
the UN membership is partly due to the relative absence of General Assembly involvement 
and the overwhelming prerogatives of the Security Council in this policy area’.358 As a 
response, she underlines that there have been recommendations to enlarge Security Council’s 
membership with a view to making it more representative, and hence more legitimate. In 
particular, states such as India, Japan, Brazil and Germany have called for a revision of the 
Council’s structure on a model more representative of the structure of modern international 
relations through their demands for seats as permanent members.359 Such demands further 
undermine the legitimacy of the Security Council as well as its legal basis.  
Another criticism of the legitimacy of the Security Council concerns its lack of 
accountability. As the ultimate international political organ, the Charter has not provided for 
any accountability mechanisms. In particular, as Hurwitz notes, the link with the General 
Assembly, the only United Nations body to represent all the members of the organisation’s 
membership, and the Security Council is minimal.360 There is no mechanism designed for the 
Council to be accountable either to the whole community of states or to their populations. In 
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addition to the specific claims to permanent UNSC membership from a few countries that 
have gained importance within the international community since the Second World War, 
there is a further demand to expand the representativeness of the Council, based on the limits 
imposed by the current design limiting it to fifteen members. Finally, the veto system and the 
criticisms associated with it further alienate popular support for the Council’s decisions and 
work.  
The Security Council’s legitimacy, grounded in norms and beliefs, is losing its support 
through its structure, processes and outputs. With the issue of Kosovo and the controversial 
bombing campaign carried out by the allies, the problems that appeared could not be hidden 
or ignored any longer. Yet, as Hurwitz underlines, close to a decade later, those flaws have 
still not been rectified. The later crises in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that not only had 
they not been addressed, but that they were in fact becoming more acute. Ultimately, it leads 
us to question the specific implications this legitimacy crisis of the Security Council had on 
the conflict regulation initiated in Kosovo following its failure to prevent the ‘aggression’ 
against one of its sovereign member states. 
b. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 
After the differences that surfaced at the Rambouillet conference, the questionable 
bombing of Serbia and Kosovo proved to be not very efficient in coercing the parties into an 
agreement over the question of the province’s status. Indeed, it worsened the situation by 
entrenching the Serbian position and polarising the international community over the status 
issue. Russia and China condemned the allies’ military intervention and endorsed Serbian 
interests within the Security Council. Furthermore, numerous negotiation attempts fell 
through as Milošević used the allies’ action to underpin his nationalist rhetoric. As the allies 
and Serbia finally reached an agreement, sealed by the signature of a ceasefire in Kumanovo 
on 9 June 1999,361 the international community faced the difficult task of filling the political 
vacuum as well as of resolving the economic and humanitarian crises left by the long-term 
Serbian/Albanian as well as the more immediate international conflicts. On 10 June 1999, the 
Security Council passed resolution 1244 as a means to set in place an adequate response to 
these crises and to provide a status quo position to the status questions that remained 
unresolved. 
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In light of the difficult international and local conditions under which resolution 1244 
resolution was forged, it could only aim to provide a diplomatic – i.e. simplified – alternative 
for the province. Based on the Rambouillet draft agreement, resolution1244 provided the 
guidelines for, what was assumed to be, a temporary settlement of the province’s legal status. 
Based on the minimum political consensus reached between the parties at Rambouillet, it 
aimed to satisfy Serbian claims by recognising Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over the province; as 
well as to satisfy the Kosovo Albanians’ claims by formally recognising the province’s right 
to ‘substantial autonomy’ and suggesting the possibility of a final settlement later on in 
time.362  
Sobered by the experience of Rambouillet, the document attempted to respond to a 
number of significant issues that might turn out to be potential problems for the settlement. 
First, it recognised the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and not formally of the Republic of Serbia. 
It could be suspected that the text was purposely ambiguous so as to leave an exit door should 
Kosovo evolve into the third entity of the then Federation of Yugoslavia on an equal footing 
with the republics of Serbia and Montenegro.363 This interpretation was in total contradiction 
with Serbian sovereign claims to the province that they considered to be part of Yugoslavia 
only as a sub-entity of Serbia. Second, the document failed to provide a clear definition of the 
concept of ‘substantial autonomy’. It is clear that the drafters deliberately aimed to reassure 
Kosovo Albanians of their autonomy from, what they considered as, a repressive 
government.364 Yet again, the vague formulation of the document left a wide range of future 
alternatives open to the province. Finally, it failed to provide a timeline for negotiations or a 
deadline for the resolution of the final status of the province. In favour of a relatively 
uncomplicated ‘freezing’ strategy,365 the international community clearly aimed to leave all 
options open in the hope that time would bring the necessary changes needed for the peaceful 
resolution of the issue.  
Despite its weaknesses, it should be kept in mind that resolution 1244 was the 
expression of the unfavourable situation in which it was approved. First, the bombing of 
Serbia and Kosovo and the ensuing humanitarian crisis it created on both territories required 
urgent action and a rapid ceasefire acceptable to all parties. Second, it bore the heavy burden 
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of the diplomatic imbalance between the two superpowers divided on the issue. In order to 
reach its aim, the document required a measure of diplomatic subtlety and ambiguity. Finally 
the political situation in Serbia itself, where Slobodan Milošević was still in power, required 
caution and the idea was to leave doors open in the event of a political change in the region. 
Indeed, Milosevic was considered to be the mastermind behind Yugoslavia’s Kosovo policy 
as he had used it from the start to establish his power in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Should he be 
later removed, Western leaders believed that Yugoslav policy in Kosovo would be liberalised, 
and they hoped Kosovo Albanians would then drop their independence claims and calm the 
lingering animosity in the province.  
Given the conditions in which it was negotiated and voted for, it can be acknowledged 
that resolution 1244 succeeded in achieving its prime objective: an end to the conflict around 
a workable consensus. Yet it did not provide the province with a sustainable settlement for the 
future. When in March 2004 violence erupted in Kosovo, the international community figured 
that the ‘freezing’ policy pursued since 1999 was failing and a legal settlement of the 
province’s status had to be reached. Yet, questions about the adequacy of the document had 
by then appeared. 
Conclusion 
The Yugoslav government’s inability to contain the Kosovo crisis propelled the issue 
onto the international stage. The instability of the situation in Kosovo and the threat it 
presented to the regional balance obliged the international community to give serious 
attention to the issue. Yet, as the crisis became internationalised, it left the local political 
arena to be dealt with at the international level and in international terms. This chapter 
explains how the international legal framework and actions based on it failed to provide 
adequate answers to the issues at stake, and outlines the consequences this failure has had 
over the establishment of a legitimate framework for any alternative settlement. The 
international legal system, based as it is on state interests, cannot provide adequate answers 
for populations that feel that their state has failed them. The concept of sovereignty at the base 
of this legal system, made by states and for states to rule the relations between them, fails to 
provide satisfactory solutions in cases of modern national self-determination claims and intra-
state human rights abuses. In line with the argument developed in the previous chapter, we 
observe that the present state system, designed in another time, fails to provide answers for 
contemporary problems. As such, the system is called into question and the legitimacy crisis 
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of the legal aspects of the system foments a further political legitimacy crisis. As people 
cannot recognise themselves and their interests in the legal system, they cannot give their 
support to the solutions it offers them. The allies’ bombing of Yugoslavia is a flagrant 
example of the failure of the system, as the norms and the organs that are in charge of 
maintaining its balance failed to provide for issues beyond those that concerned states.  
Beyond these formal issues, the legitimacy of the system is further brought into 
question by the top-down approach it embodies, which the international community does not 
seem to be able to change. All along, when dealing with issues of national self-determination, 
or humanitarian crises, or even with the structure of the system itself, states seem preoccupied 
with maintaining their legitimacy at the international level rather than with their obligations to 
the populations who ultimately experience the consequences of their actions. Kosovo’s Serbs 
and Albanians seem to be involved in a game of skittles which they cannot influence due to 
the lack of accountability of the system, where they have little say due to their lack of access 
to the decision-making structures and decision makers, and where their interests seem to be 
subordinated to the higher interests of the great powers. As those higher interests are served, 
the population’s expectations are lowered and their resentment grows, and the failure of the 
system to provide specifically for their needs brings an ever deeper resentment towards the 
international top-down approach. 
Finally, the failure of the allies to find a legitimate basis within the international legal 
framework for their actions continues to have serious consequences for their subsequent 
efforts to deal with the Kosovo issue.366 With resolution 1244, the Security Council 
established a subsidiary organ to pursue its action in the province. This organ, founded 
according to a predetermined regional policy, inherited the resentment forged against the 
international community and their general Balkans policy. The legitimacy of the new 
international mission was missing from the start due to the inability of the international 
community to legitimise its earlier actions and its policies. Before the United Nations 
Administrative Mission in Kosovo had a chance to establish itself and provide a framework 
for its work, it was tarnished by the resentment associated with issues linked to the 
fundamentals of the international community’s crisis as a whole. The Kosovo Albanians 
expected the international community to grant them outright independence and saw the 
establishment of a lengthy international mission as an obstacle to their goal. Meanwhile, the 
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Kosovo Serbs considered this mission to biased against them as it has been imposed on them 
by an illegitimate organ which had coerced them through an illegitimate act of aggression. In 
this context, next chapter analyses the difficulties and responses faced by the mission in 
establishing its own political legitimacy and that of its policies. 
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 Chapter 4 - International Territorial Administrations and the 
Case of Kosovo 
By the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation airstrikes, Kosovo was left in 
total chaos. A decade of state emergency, civil conflict and finally allied bombing left the 
poorest province of the federation with hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, a 
nonexistent economy, no governmental services or institutions, a population in shock and a 
total power vacuum, with no authority in charge or capable of dealing with the situation.367 
This apocalyptic scenario fits what is commonly referred to as a collapsed state or failed 
state. William Zartman defines the concept as ‘a situation where the structure, authority – 
legitimate power, law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some 
form, old or new’.368 This situation has crucial consequences for the Westphalian System. As 
the ‘state’ is the central unit of the international order, the failure of a state to sustain itself is 
perceived as a threat to established society as a whole. Conscious of this problem, the 
international community has, over the last one hundred years, developed formal institutional 
mechanisms to deal with the problem of power vacuums in collapsed states.369 These 
mechanisms have the objective of restoring the missing state structure and preserving 
international equilibrium.370  
UNMIK is arguably the most developed version of such attempts.371 The United 
Nations Security Council passed resolution 1244 to establish a subsidiary organ in charge of 
‘provid[ing] transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo’.372 The powers and responsibilities granted to this 
mission were far beyond the scope of any international territorial administration mandate to 
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date, their extent justified only by the extent of the needs of the ravaged province.373 
Nevertheless, the questionable circumstances that resulted in the establishment of the mission 
– its nature as well as its goals and means – raise a number of issues, in particular as regards 
the legitimacy of the mission and inevitably, over the legitimacy of its action.374 
In this chapter, I assess the legitimacy of the framework of the mission and of its 
policies. I develop the argument that UNMIK has proven, like/because of the international 
community that mandated it, to focus disproportionately on securing international legitimacy 
rather than on gaining support from the local population it is meant to govern. This 
phenomenon has ultimately affected the overall success of its long-term action in the 
province. The evolution and adaptation of the policies set in place by the mission demonstrate 
some awareness of this deficiency, but at the same time, also its inability to respond 
adequately to the increasing lack of local support. To develop this argument, I first review the 
basis of the legitimacy of previous administrations in similar circumstances, observe the 
‘lessons learned’ there and establish the legitimacy framework within which these 
international territorial administrations evolved. Second, I review the stances and expectations 
of the different actors involved that shaped the beliefs on which the mission’s legitimacy was 
based at the international and local levels. Finally, in line with the legitimacy analytical 
framework developed earlier, I analyse the ground upon which UNMIK attempted to 
reinforce its legitimacy both in terms of its design – i.e. the actual structure of the mission 
which, in line with past experience, attempted to provide the mission with a solid institutional 
basis to put down the roots of its administration – as well as the specific policies implemented 
in response to the specificities of Kosovo’s divided society to determine how – and to what 
extent – they manage to reinforce this legitimacy.  
1. International Territorial Administrations 
Unstable and failed states are perceived by the international community as a threat to 
its equilibrium. This fear is based on the concern of a possible ‘domino effect’,375 where the 
instability of one state would successively spill over into surrounding states, shaking the 
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overall equilibrium of the community.376 This fear, legitimate or not, has persuaded the 
international community to develop mechanisms to contain potential instability and restore 
state control over the relevant population and territory. In extreme situations, the international 
community has developed policies that enable international actors to get involved in a state’s 
internal affairs when that state reveals itself to be incapable of responding to its internal 
instabilities. However, in cases where the international community unilaterally decides to get 
involved in a state’s internal affairs, concerns over the breach of this state’s sovereignty arise. 
Such concerns are taken seriously by the international community, which has carefully 
designed safeguards to prevent the ultimate subjugation of the state to a foreign power. 
International territorial administrations are the mechanism the international 
community has adopted to respond both to its needs and its concerns. Limited in time, those 
administrations’ primary role is to substitute for deficient state institutions and assist in re-
establishing them until international support is no longer needed and the state can reclaim its 
prerogative. Experience over the past century shows that these missions have taken different 
forms, encountered different problems and responded to them in different ways. There is no 
consensus on which the first of these missions was. The lack of consensus derives from the 
difference in defining what represents an international territorial administration.377 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an agreement that this phenomenon is relatively modern and 
appeared as a response to the development of modern international relations politics at the 
turn of the twentieth century. From then on, the succeeding design of international 
administrations evolved to respond to the needs created by international politics.378  
Since then, the international community, through the League of Nations and later the 
United Nations, has attempted to bring a formal framework to bear on the problem of states 
lacking functional governmental institutions. The evolution of international involvement can 
be seen through the establishment of the ‘mandate system’ under the League, and later in 
United Nations’ ‘trusteeship system’, which dealt with the so-called non self-governing 
territories. The importance the international community places upon states’ domestic stability 
is demonstrated by the fact that mechanisms to deal with state-level political vacuums were 
expanded from a single article within the League’s Covenant to three entire chapters in the 
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United Nations’ Charter.379 Nevertheless, in establishing those frameworks, the international 
community faced a number of practical and ethical issues to which they provided responses 
through a commitment to constantly improve the system.  
a. The Mandate System 
The mandate system was initiated through article 22 of the Covenant. It was meant to 
be implemented within the ‘colonies and territories’ of the defeated empires of the First 
World War that were ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world’. The system allowed the League to assign a 
sovereign ‘advanced nation’ the mandatory responsibility to govern and provide a territory 
the necessary, but lacking, governance capacity.380 The territories subsumed by the system 
were divided into three categories according to their stages of development, the amount of 
resources available and their existing governmental capacity.381 The mandated state was given 
the responsibility of administering the territory following a number of principles including: 
‘guarantee the freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public 
order and morals, the prohibition of abuses… the prevention of the establishment of 
fortifications or… military training of the natives… secure equal opportunities for the trade 
and commerce of other Members of the League’. In other words, the territory under 
consideration was not to become another colony of the mandated state and was to be ruled 
according to defined criteria set by the international community.382  
Beyond the immediate responsibility to administer domestic governance, the 
responsible state had to establish proper self-running and sustainable administrative 
institutions, established according to defined principles. The article also provided for a 
monitoring mechanism where the mandatory state had to deliver an annual report to the 
League’s Council. This Council had the responsibility of defining and regulating the 
conditions of authority for the control and administration of the territory by the mandated 
state. All those precautions were aimed at giving the arrangement full legitimacy in the eyes 
of the international community and providing normative justification for the intervention of 
the mandated state in the governance issues of another state. 
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The mandate system can be considered as the first articulated attempt by the 
international community to solve the problem of failed states through institutionalised 
mechanisms.383 The success of the initiative relied in the first instance on the 
institutionalisation of the process. The mandate given by the international society to intervene 
in another state gave legitimacy to the mandated state without contradicting the sovereignty 
principle so dear to the Westphalian state system. The next crucial element was that the 
mandate system was strictly limited in time. The mandated state was in charge of setting up 
governance mechanisms to enable, in the longer run, the territory to govern itself.384 Finally, 
the last important aspect was emphasised by the rules binding the system and the requirement 
to transfer a number of international normative principles to the newly established institutions. 
Before the formal codification of human rights, a number of acceptable governance 
principles, defined as appropriate and necessary, regulated the actions of the mandated state. 
Nevertheless, the system has been criticised on various grounds, not least the 
colonialist attitude underlying the framework. The territories were placed under their 
mandated state’s tutelage because they were considered as underdeveloped.385 The concerns 
of the local populations were generally not acknowledged. Furthermore, the system remained 
limited to colonies of empires defeated at the war.386 The colonies of the victorious allies were 
not considered candidates for self-determination, which left a feeling of resentment within 
victorious imperial territories. Finally, the system heavily relied on the League itself. As the 
League lost credibility and influence in the 1930s, so did the mandated states’ commitments, 
and slowly the territories under mandates were to become just another set of colonies of the 
mandated states.387 
With the end of the League of Nations and the beginning of the Second World War, 
the mandate system collapsed. Yet, with the rise of a new world order, the issue of non-
governing states reappeared. In the footprints of the previous attempt to institutionalise a 
remedy to this problem, the international community revived and expanded the older system 
into the so-called ‘trusteeship system’. Throughout this development, the international 
community dedicated much more time and attention to defining and delimiting the normative 
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principles underlying the system. These principles were concerned with both the new post-
war international ethical trends as well as with consolidating the new structure by addressing 
some of the criticisms of the mandate system.388  
b. The Trusteeship System 
Chapters XI to XIII of the United Nations’ Charter are entirely dedicated to the 
question of non self-governing territories.389 Articles 73 and 74 both outline the recognition of 
non self-governing territories by the international community and underline the community’s 
commitment to respecting, considering and treating the territories and their populations as 
equals. They outline the status of such territories, aiming to counterbalance the underlying 
discriminations of the former article 22 by recognising the territories and their populations as 
part of the international community as well as providing for their sovereign identities free 
from any colonial threats.390 However, article 78 introduces the idea that even if they are part 
of the international community, the trusteeship territories are not recognised as being equal to 
other states, even though the ultimate aim is for them to become so. This distinction has 
important repercussions for the rights and obligations of non-governing territories.  
Article 76 explicitly articulates the aims of the new scheme. The Trusteeship system is 
established in order to pursue ‘international peace and security’. Paragraph 2 outlines the aims 
– per se – of the system, namely: the promotion of ‘the political, the economic, social, and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive 
development towards self-government or independence … and the freely expressed wishes of 
the peoples concerned’. In other words, the system intends to pursue the setting up of 
governance through the establishment of principles underlying the Charter and the 
international community’s ‘new’ global order.391 The difference of the aim expressed in this 
article to the aim sketched in the old article 22 is that here the aim is clearly stated, and the 
principles on which the new governance mechanisms have to be built are clearly defined to 
mirror the evolution of the international community’s concerns and principles. Finally, 
chapter XIII of the Charter outlines the composition, functions and working mechanisms of 
the Trusteeship Council responsible for supervising the system. The detailed explanation of 
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the role and functions of the Council indicates the will to monitor the performance of the 
‘administering authority’ in pursuing its mission in accordance with its given mandate.392 
In its concern to formalise and further institutionalise the process, chapter XI largely 
describes the responsibilities and duties of the administering state to the international 
community and to the trust territory. Article 81 indicates that the mandate of the administering 
authority should be clearly determined by agreement at the beginning of the mission and that 
it is required to remain within the boundaries of this mandate. Article 84 emphasises the 
administering state’s duties in regards to its responsibility to keep the trust territory within the 
established international order so that it does not disrupt peace and security. However, the 
Charter remains silent with regard to the procedure for the administering authority to establish 
self-government within the trust territory.   
An interesting aspect of the trusteeship system is that, beyond its original purpose to 
bring towards independence the post-war non self-governing territories,393 the system 
eventually played a role within the decolonisation process in the 1960s. In this context, the 
trusteeship system became an institutionalised mechanism for territories that were recognised 
as having the right to self-determination but was not yet capable of self-government to pursue 
statehood.394   
The system came to an end in 1994 with the accession to independence of the 
Republic of Palau, the last trust territory.395 However, rather than dissolving the framework, 
the United Nations emphasised that the Trustee Council would only be adjourned until the 
day a new demand for the system might arise.396 In fact, the suspension of the trusteeship 
system has not meant the disappearance of the problem of non self-governing territories.397 
On the contrary, the multiplication of internal conflicts, and in particular of ethnic conflicts 
and ensuing collapse of states in the Balkans and elsewhere, has renewed the need for external 
help in setting up governing institutions.398 Nevertheless, since 1994, it seems that new 
alternatives have been used by the international community to deal with those demands, away 
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from the single state involvement on which the mandate and trusteeship systems were based, 
and increasingly towards a corporatist system of intervention.399 
c. Modern Trends of United Nations Involvement 
Although the United Nations’ involvement in peace building is not recent,400 since the 
late1990s it has taken increasing predominance. This new role can be observed in two ways: 
(1) in the role of the organisation, and (2) in the scale and nature of its involvement.401 The 
essential difference is that, instead of resorting to the trusteeship system that mandated a state 
to establish self-governing institutions in non self-governing territories, the responsibility is 
given to the United Nations itself as an independent entity, whose multilateral character is 
considered to be more appropriate to constraining the partial interests of individual states in 
getting involved.402 However, despite the ‘neutral’ nature of a joint action, United Nations 
involvement still represents interference in a state’s sovereignty. Short of a specific agreement 
from the state to accept the takeover of its governance prerogatives, the Security Council 
plays an important role. As the supreme political entity of the international order, the Council 
plays a primary role in legitimising the action of the United Nations through the establishment 
of each mission’s mandate, as was the case with the Trusteeship Council within the 
trusteeship system.403  
United Nations involvement represents a further asset as its specialised agencies are 
able to provide states with assistance in disparate specialised fields. In fact, its involvement in 
peace-building has been historically limited to technical assistance and capacity building.404 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, a new trend developed where technical assistance was 
increasingly focused on governmental capacity building. Through an analysis of the missions 
undertaken, it can be observed that the role of the United Nations has become ever more 
extensive in this field, to the point of taking over the role of administering authority.405 The 
growth of the United Nations’ involvement can be seen in the transition from a technical 
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assistance and capacity building mandate in Eastern Slavonia406 to full responsibility for 
building and running the administration in Kosovo.407  
The different missions and involvement of the United Nations’ agencies in peace 
building have received various responses, reflecting a generally ambiguous feeling. On the 
one hand, the argument has been made that ‘[peace building should] obtain the backing of the 
international community but should be carried out by individual states – historically, the most 
successful agents of state building.’408 On the other hand, the important role the United 
Nations has in carrying out those missions has been defended on the ground that the aims 
pursued by those missions fall within the purpose and competencies of the organisation, such 
as democratisation, the reinforcement of human rights and development, and above all, the 
maintenance of peace and security as prescribed by article 24 of the Charter.409 In sum, the 
United Nations’ involvement enables the internationalisation of the issue. The international 
organisation appears more neutral than states, which can be suspected of plotting to 
manipulate the mandate in order to pursue colonial aims. Finally, its technical capacity, 
through the expertise of its different specialised agencies, is perceived as valuable. Yet, with 
the increase of its responsibilities in the field of governance, traditionally a state’s duty, the 
international organisation reinforces the discrepancy between its obligations towards the 
international community that mandates it and the local population that it will govern – and 
with respect to which, accountability mechanisms are often lacking.  
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that most major critics of United Nations 
involvement in peace building have come from within the United Nations itself. Objections 
came from the Secretariat, which commissioned a detailed report on the organisation’s 
peacekeeping activities. The report, later known as the 2000 Brahimi Report, underlined a 
number of important concerns, such as the inadequacy and lack of readiness of the 
organisation to maintain such missions and above all its lack of preparation, structure, 
cohesion and planning.410 Missions appeared to be set up at the last minute and a huge number 
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of elements such as the structure, coordination and personnel seem to be unequal to the 
demanding situation on the ground.411  
An essential element of the report is its discussion of the lack of ‘exit strategies’. The 
term exit strategy indicates a planned policy to establish a sustainable structure in the state, 
capable of handling responsibilities, which will be gradually devolved to it. The ultimate aim 
of such exit strategies is the total withdrawal of the international administration when its 
assistance is no longer required. There are three sets of reasons to push the organisation to 
develop an exit strategy: legal, economic and logistical. First, the essential criterion 
legitimising the breach in the state’s sovereignty is its temporal limitation. The mandates 
delivered to the external mission are always temporary.412 The missions need to keep this in 
mind, as there is a point beyond which the legal justification of their presence lacks 
legitimacy and they need to retire.413 Second, peace-building missions require vast financial 
resources. The funding comes ultimately from member states and donors, which are certainly 
not ready to donate vast amounts of money indefinitely without positive results. Finally, in 
addition to money, those missions require a large degree of human and technical logistical 
support. With the multiplication of conflicts around the globe and the consequent 
multiplication of requests for assistance, it becomes difficult to stretch the available logistical 
resources between the different necessary missions around the world. The United Nations 
therefore needs to cut down on certain missions in order to provide others with adequate 
amounts of the necessary resources. Consequently, to achieve a coherent exit strategy, 
thorough planning is necessary to efficiently match the resources to the needs. Failure to 
achieve this in planning does undermine the successes of the mission and consequently its 
ability to withdraw.414 
The review of the development of international territorial administrations clearly 
shows that prevailing international practice on issues of non self-governing territories has 
turned, for clear legitimacy reasons, away from individual states to international community 
involvement.415 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that this 1990s trend has in no 
way excluded the future of state involvement. There was a clear will to maintain the 
Trusteeship Council, which had after all only been suspended, not abolished. In addition, 
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since the suspension of the trusteeship system, no state has been empowered to administer a 
non self-governing territory, but states have still been involved in the process.416 As 
Mandelbaum points out, states are the ideal candidates to administer states. The essential 
reason is that they have the expertise, the capacity, and the structure to do so, which 
international organisations often lack.417 As they are states themselves, they plausibly have a 
greater expertise in the intricacies of state administration and governance. Besides, they can 
provide the appropriate civilian structure with experienced civil servants. Finally, they already 
have the chain of command to enable unity in decision-making and implementation. Those 
advantages over international organisations enable states to have a more direct and precise 
impact on governance. Yet, for the political and legal reasons outlined here, international 
territorial administrations have recently come to implement the mission mandates set for them 
by the United Nations. It is important to note that, even if the multilateral framework of the 
mission seems to reinforce its international legitimacy, the lack of decision-making by the 
local populations and the externally imposed nature of the mission in its establishment, 
running and policy making represent a serious problem as regards the legitimacy of such 
administrations at the local level.418 
2. International Administration, Kosovo and the Question of ‘Belief’ 
The evolution of the international territorial administration model demonstrates the 
international community’s concern to define a political, institutional and legal framework to 
provide legitimacy for its actions while ensuring an efficient answer to the problem of ‘failed 
states’.419 The international involvement in Kosovo enters this category, as the international 
community endorsed the task of UNMIK’s fulfilling governmental functions to fill the 
vacuum left after a conflict.420 Yet, legitimacy does not depend solely on a legislative 
framework. As defined in Chapter one, to be truly legitimate, the law needs to be accepted 
and acted upon as such. In order to fully understand the legitimacy concerns faced by 
UNMIK, it is essential to understand the interests and stakes of all the actors involved. A 
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pattern of what each actor considers as legitimate needs to be mapped out to figure out on 
what grounds they are ready to support the mission before observing more closely the 
structure and policies of the international administration and determining to what extent this 
reinforces – or not – UNMIK’s legitimacy. 
The issue of Kosovo, both in the Yugoslav and international contexts, has been a 
particularly thorny issue when it comes to considering the legitimacy framework in which it 
evolves. The distinction in the understanding of the concept of legitimacy across the 
international and local levels on the one hand, but also within those levels on the other hand, 
reflect the multiplicity of actors and ultimately, of what those actors consider as legitimate, 
based largely on what seems to be their specific interests in the conflict. At the international 
level, the issue of legitimacy polarised the international community roughly between 
interventionist and non-interventionist countries. Meanwhile, at the Yugoslav level, there is a 
clear split between Kosovo’s Albanians, the Serb government in Belgrade and the Kosovo 
Serbs. 
a. The International Community and Legitimacy 
Within the international context, the legitimacy of the international administration 
rests on its ability to re-establish order under international law. To do so, UNMIK was 
mandated to develop and perform within the limits of a compromise between Serbian and 
Kosovo Albanian claims.421 Bound by international legal principles, the international 
community could not legally impose any decision on the state of Serbia; nor could it 
implement any decisions that might have long-term consequences for the republic’s sovereign 
prerogatives, such as its borders. Yet, the continuous claims for self-determination from 
Kosovo’s Albanians entailed specific concerns about the potential domino effect that those 
demands could have on other secessionist movements, and the ensuing catastrophic 
consequences it would have on the international order if successful by threatening the stability 
of a large number of multiethnic states in the region and beyond, causing further unsteadiness 
through the multiplication of microstates.422 Despite this delicate situation, the international 
administration bears the heavy responsibility of responding to specific internal disorders in 
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the province and providing for the population undergoing their effects. The resurfacing of 
these wounds represents a further destabilising factor for the international order. To 
counteract those effects, the international mission is expected to manage the different issues 
according to standards recognised by the international community: human rights, the rule of 
law, good governance and democracy. 
Although the principles on which international legitimacy is based are codified in 
international law, considerable divergences in the interpretations of such international law and 
its means of implementation appear among the different actors of the international 
community, ultimately affecting the legitimacy of the mission. In this case, divergences 
appeared along the split, between the allies – roughly the United States and the European 
Union; versus Russia – supported silently by China, which had similar concerns.   
i) The ‘Allies’ 
Home to a large and politically very active Albanian Diaspora community,423 the 
United States was a key actor behind the Rambouillet negotiations and the launching of the 
bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. Besides the meticulous lobbying by American-
Albanian associations in Washington, the interest of the United States in getting involved on 
the issue of the province is explained by the Clinton administration’s overall policy for the 
Balkans.424 No matter the motives behind the American involvement, the United State’s 
stance and support on the issue of Kosovo gained it a hero’s status among the Kosovo 
Albanian community, who granted it unquestionable loyalty.425 Despite this fervour and the 
hopes that it raised after NATO airstrike, the Clinton administration pursued its pre-war 
policy, which did not support Kosovo Albanians’ claims to outright independence, which was 
believed to be impracticable and which would only spur additional destabilisation at the 
regional and international levels.426 Clearly opposed to Milošević’ schemes in Kosovo and the 
wider Western Balkans, the United States did not support the return of the province to 
unlimited Serbian rule either. Instead, it pushed for the alternative it had supported all along, 
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since its initial mediation involvement, which implied the establishment of an international 
administration to regulate the deep humanitarian crisis in the province and establish the 
appropriate political and social conditions to enable a dialogue between the parties, towards 
the development of a permanent settlement of the issue.427  
Nevertheless, with the election of a new administration, the United States withdrew 
perceptibly from the front scene of Kosovo after 2000, although its participation remained 
active in the fields of peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, capacity building and micro-
economic support through organisations such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID).428 In comparison to the United States’ decisive role in the settlement 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bush administration decided not to occupy the forefront of 
decision-making for two important reasons: first, because of the belief of the administration 
that the Balkans should be dealt with by Europeans;429 second and more importantly, because 
of the high demand on American resources caused by the ‘War on Terror’ launched following 
the 2001 September 11 attack.430 
Divided over the issue of the bombing of Serbia in 1999, the European Union 
nevertheless developed a common policy regarding the management of the Kosovo issue. 
With the extension of its borders to the east, and the reinforcement and affirmation of its 
institutional structures, the European Union has consciously asserted itself as a credible and 
strong geopolitical actor in the region.431 The attempts to take and demonstrate its lead in the 
management and settlement of the issue were demonstrated by the choice of venue of 
Rambouillet in France for the negotiations in winter 1999,432 and its active involvement in the 
management of the province post-crisis, as leader of the economic reconstruction pillar of the 
international administration. In line with their Atlantic ally, further motivated by the clear 
opposition of some of its member states, the European Union did not support outright 
independence for Kosovo Albanians. Instead, pursuant of its core philosophy,433 the Union 
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nourished the belief that the improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the province 
and eventually a change of government in Serbia would provide the environment necessary 
for the negotiations between the parties over the issue of a long-term political settlement to 
succeed, clearly favouring a solution within a federal framework.434 As such, the European 
Union was supportive of the international administration’s mandate. In line with the American 
position, the European Union backed an international mission that it expected would deal with 
the social and economic crisis, while developing a political environment to establish a 
sustainable long-term solution of the Kosovo question.  
ii) Russia 
As a historical ally of its Southern Slav cousins, Russia unsurprisingly supported 
Serbia throughout the negotiations that preceded and occurred during the bombing. It had a 
crucial role in promoting Serbian interests at the international level, stalling the Security 
Council’s decision to side with the United States and European Union’s clear inclination 
towards the Kosovo Albanians, or at least of open opposition to Milošević.435 In addition to 
the Slav brotherhood argument, Russia, along with China, had a strong interest in preventing 
the multiplication of successful secessionist movements. Fear of the effect the independence 
of Kosovo could have on reinforcing secessionist claims within the Russian Federation and 
the People’s Republic’s borders remained vivid.436 
  After the bombing, despite their involvement in the negotiations, Russia bitterly 
agreed not to be granted control over any military zone, which was distributed between the 
United States, Britain, France, Italy and Germany.437 Instead Russia was formally attributed 
the protection of the Serbian enclaves scattered across the Province’s territory and other 
strategic zones that they had managed to occupy before allied troops.438 Yet their 
humanitarian presence proved to be very difficult to maintain. Their army on the ground 
encountered violent opposition from the Kosovo Albanians, who perceived them as the 
instrument of the Serbian government.439 Besides, the military presence in Kosovo received 
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increasing criticism at home on the grounds that Russian soldiers should instead be defending 
Russian interests on its own territory, especially in Chechnya.440 After a few years, the 
Russian military presence in Kosovo was scaled down drastically to just a few posts in some 
Serb inhabited areas by mid-2003. In the political arena, Russian active involvement also 
diminished substantially. It confined itself for a number of years to monitoring the respecting 
of Serbian sovereignty through remaining active within the Security Council and the Contact 
Group’s initiatives. Moreover, proactive with its recognition of the legitimacy of Serbia’s 
claim to its province, Russia did not hold formally a liaison office in Prishtina, leaving such 
representation to one of its high-ranking UNMIK officials.441 
For Moscow, UNMIK represented a barrier to the Kosovo Albanians’ unilateral 
declaration of independence after the NATO airstrikes and a means to delay the settlement of 
the issue since. Realistically short of the option to let Serbian rule return to its province, 
UNMIK became a tool to supervise the running of Kosovo. As a subsidiary organ of the 
Security Council, the administration was meant to administer the province within the 
boundaries set by the Council. While it remains far from gathering the majority within the 
United Nations’ political organ, Russia nevertheless holds the crucial right of a veto. Russia’s 
position enabled it to prevent the Security Council from going too far towards the Kosovo 
Albanians’ wish of independence. The decisive role played by the international administration 
in Russia’s political game is clearly illustrated in the way that Moscow has insisted on 
UNMIK running the province beyond the declaration of independence in February 2008, de 
facto leaving the province in further political and legal limbo.442 Its argument rested on the 
greater legitimacy of an international mission as opposed to a European one – over which, 
incidentally they would have no leverage. UNMIK became the international legitimate 
obstruction to the European mission’s assisting in the development of a post-independent 
Kosovo.443 
Whatever the stances and motivations of the international actors, it is clear that they 
expect the new international mission to provide enough internal stability within Kosovo to 
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restore its political balance at the international level along international legal and political 
principles. Hence, to be legitimate in the eyes of the international community, which it 
represents and acts in the name of, UNMIK needs to establish a balance between Serbia’s 
sovereignty and the Kosovo Albanians’ aspiration to national self-determination. To do so, 
the international community deputed the mission to develop a democratic political system 
representative of the multicultural specificity of the society and in line with its aspirations.444 
Unable to promote a balance between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians’ prescriptions throughout 
the negotiations that preceded the controversial airstrike, the international community 
unrealistically put enormous pressure on the new mission. Yet, in order to retain its legitimacy 
in the eyes of the power that established it, the mission needs to fulfil the expectations of its 
mandate to gain and retain its support.     
b. The Yugoslav Context and Legitimacy 
Established, run and supported by the international community, the international 
mission performs, however, by nature in a specific national environment with specific 
national actors. Besides the expectations of the international community, the efficiency, and 
ultimately the legitimacy, of UNMIK and of its policies also rest on the belief of the local 
actors. In the same way as at the international level, the national level at which Kosovo 
evolves is fragmented along the aspirations of the different groups that compose it. 
i) Kosovo’s Albanians 
Longing for the internationalisation of the Kosovo question all through the 1990s, the 
bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in the spring of 1999 enhanced the Kosovo Albanians’ hopes 
for an independent state, free from the Serb government’s threats. The establishment of the 
international administrative mission in the province after the bombing was perceived by the 
Kosovo Albanians in two ways: first positively, as it demonstrated that the international 
community was finally determined to get actively involved in the political change of the 
province, and made it clear that Belgrade would not have further carte blanche in the 
province again; second, with suspicion and some disappointment, as Kosovo’s Albanian elites 
understood that they would not have their way in the manner they had hoped to run the 
territory. It seems that in the Kosovo Albanians’ eyes, there was a clear distinction between 
the allies’ military peacekeeping presence – the Kosovo Force (KFOR) – welcomed in its 
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large part as a liberator and protector versus Serb forces, and UNMIK, a civilian 
administrative organ that ultimately obstructed their aspiration to self-government. Initially, 
the Kosovo Albanians resigned themselves to the international presence, which they assumed 
was meant to be temporary and helping them in the establishment of a clear and effective 
institutional structure that would enable them ultimately to run an independent Kosovo.445  
Hence, the Kosovo Albanians’ expectations of the international mission are to provide 
them with the tools necessary to eventually run an independent state.446 Furthermore, pursuant 
of their policy to gain support from the international community to their cause to speed up the 
process towards independence,447 the Kosovo Albanian elites realised that the political system 
established by UNMIK ultimately would gain the support of the international community, and 
in the end both the institutions that composed the system and the decisions that they would 
take would be legitimised in their eyes. Before the bombing and especially after, the Kosovo 
Albanian elites’ discourse was filled with ‘buzz words’ such as ‘democracy’ and 
‘multiethnicity’, which sounded relatively awkward in the ethnically deeply divided society 
that had never experienced liberal democracy and clearly was longing for independence at any 
cost. This phenomenon is observable through the multiplication of good intentions expressed 
in Western liberal rhetoric, while the apparatus in Kosovo clearly lacked the structures and 
mechanisms necessary for its implementation. Elites’ discourses intertwined independence 
and democracy without explaining how all this would eventually emerge in concrete terms.448  
Nevertheless, the participation of Kosovo Albanian elites in the UNMIK-designed 
new political system clearly rested on their belief that their support would facilitate the quick 
development of the situation towards their ultimate goal. Suspicion and frustrations grew with 
the slow pace or even lack of positive improvement in that direction. The international 
administration, failing to help them reach their aims, and worse, increasingly representing the 
main obstacle between Kosovo Albanians and independence, became the focus of all the 
discontents of the elites and population. Conscious that their participation in the newly 
designed institutions was purely representative, or at best used by the international 
administration on a consultative basis but lacking any real decision-making power, the elites’ 
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resentment towards UNMIK grew, as it did within the Kosovo Albanian population as a 
whole.449  
On 17 March 2004, what was portrayed as an ethnically motivated incident that 
resulted in the tragic death of Kosovo Albanian children, 450 became transformed into a 
violent protest directed at the Kosovo Serb population but also, and equally as violently, at the 
international community.451 This event made the point that the international administration’s 
top-down approach and consequently its legitimacy was being seriously questioned and 
needed serious reconsideration. Ultimately, it underlined the expectations the Kosovo 
Albanians had of the international administrative mission: that of driving them towards their 
long awaited dream of independence.452 
ii) Belgrade 
Resulting from a violent assault and imposed on it literally at gunpoint, UNMIK is 
perceived by Belgrade as an intruder interfering in its internal affairs.  Although a signatory of 
the ceasefire agreement,453 Belgrade had no say in the elaboration of the mission and it was 
coerced into accepting its presence and involvement.454 Worse, all of this was based on a 
series of compromises and agreements to which they had clearly been opposed.455 
Furthermore, resolution 1244 specifically provides for the reintegration of ‘Yugoslav’ civil 
servants in the province in due course. Yet, the international administrative mission, in 
addition to taking over the administration of their province and making all decisions without 
any consultation with the sovereign – i.e. legitimate – government, never made any efforts to 
comply with this particular term of the Security Council resolution.456  
From the start, Belgrade resented bitterly the lack of consultation of the international 
administration and its inability to participate in the decision-making process. Considering the 
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international administration as clearly biased towards the Kosovo Albanians and working 
towards their independence, the Serb government quickly organised itself to provide for the 
Serb population of Kosovo through the establishment and financing of institutions in what it 
deemed – and which was still acknowledged at the international level – as its territory. In 
effect, those institutions undermined UNMIK’s efforts to establish a coherent and articulate 
institutional structure and were reminiscent of the tactics Kosovo Albanians had resorted to 
against the Serbian state’s policies in the 1990s.457 This system aimed to provide for the 
Kosovo Serb community that lacked basic commodities, but also to ensure their loyalty.458 
The Serb government launched a new department of state with an independent budget voted 
for by the Serb parliament in charge of managing those ‘parallel’ institutions.459 The 
Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija (Koordinacioni Centar za Kosovo i Metohiju) 
effectively managed a whole set of civilian services intended for the Kosovo Serb population 
north of the Ibar River and in accessible enclaves. It proceeded with the distribution of 
salaries to Serb civil servants such as teachers and medical personnel in addition to normal 
UNMIK wages or simply, in some cases, instead of it.460 Until 2002 and the opening of the 
first official UNMIK office north of the Ibar,461 the Coordination Centre was clearly and 
effectively the only source of authority in this zone. The role and influence of the 
Coordination Centre and of its head, Dr. Nebojša Čović (SDP) was clearly aimed at 
weakening UNMIK’s legitimacy and that of its policies, which Belgrade perceived as 
contributing towards the independence of its province. The importance of the centre and its 
animosity towards UNMIK was obvious before the different elections in the province. The 
election campaign period was marked by difficult negotiations between the centre and the 
office of the Special Representative to convince the Centre to support UNMIK in its efforts by 
using its influence to convince Kosovo Serbs to take part in the elections. The propensity of 
the Kosovo Serb community to participate or not in the elections that had been organised by 
the international administration according to the direction of the Coordination Centre 
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demonstrates the influence the centre holds over this crucial part of the Kosovo population, 
and consequently the absence of grass roots legitimacy of UNMIK.462 
iii) Kosovo’s Serbs 
Without any real decision power and crippled by their numerical inferiority, the 
Kosovo Serbs are however essential in the legitimation process of the international 
administrative mission. For the same reasons as Belgrade, yet more acutely, they resented the 
mission that entrenched the conflict and made them lose the political connection of their 
government, and more concretely their homes and everyday lives. Divided politically and 
geographically, they are trapped between genuine fear for their own physical security and 
their lack of access to resources needed to fulfil basic needs.463 Instinctively, the Kosovo Serb 
population was not inclined to accept UNMIK’s authority and policies. Yet, out of pragmatic 
considerations, essentially needing resources which Belgrade had difficulties providing for 
either for ideological or geographical reasons, they grew more predisposed to accept, to some 
extent, UNMIK’s authority.464 In concrete terms, for those that were ready to take part in 
Kosovo’s new political system, the base of the mission’s legitimacy depended on the ability 
of the international administration to provide normal living conditions, including access to 
effective decision-making.465 Ultimately, in line with Lipset’s criteria, the support of the 
largest minority of the province is essential for the legitimation of the international mission 
and of its policies. Short of this support, the international administration fails to secure the 
belief of a large part of the population, appears partial towards the Kosovo Albanians, and 
therefore loses any kind of legitimacy.  
Entangled as they were in the age-old issue of the Kosovo question, instead of taming 
the claims of local actors, the bombing of the province exacerbated them. The expectations of 
all parties were for the mission to help them in achieving their mutually exclusive goals. But 
to gain the support of one party, the mission risked alienating the others. The international 
mission therefore found itself in the delicate situation where the expectations of the local 
actors focused on the issue of status, rather than on the political and social progress that it 
could achieve and which it was ultimately mandated to pursue. Increasingly, much less 
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attention was given to long-term strategy and policies the international administration was 
pursuing according to its mandate. Under these circumstances, UNMIK found itself in an 
uncomfortable position of trying to secure the unanimous legitimacy it required for the 
achievement of its assignment to which it attempted to respond in two ways: through the 
design of its structure and the adoption of appropriate policies in order to ensure the 
international and local belief in its role and action.466  
3. The United Nations Administrative Mission in Kosovo 
The dubious circumstances that resulted in the establishment of the international 
administrative mission revive the issue of its legitimacy at the root of the mission itself. To 
counter this effect, the international community has paid attention to the design of a modern 
international territorial administration to respond, both to the international concerns raised by 
previous missions – the lessons learned – and to the diverging expectations of different actors. 
Wedged between clearly diverging expectations, the mission has attempted to respond to both 
concerns, first through its design and then, through the different policies it has implemented in 
an attempt to depoliticise the mission by focusing on technical issues – i.e. the humanitarian 
needs to the population of Kosovo.   
a. The International Territorial Administration’s Design 
United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, which founded the international 
territorial administration, remained vague as to the structure it should take, leaving a large 
degree of latitude to the mission itself to determine the most appropriate structure to perform 
its tasks. The resolution, however, specifies three significant guidelines: first it entrusts the 
United Nations ‘Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a 
Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence’;467 
second, it ‘authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo’;468 finally, it openly 
‘welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations’.469 
Those parameters emphasise the overall structure of the mission: under the leadership of the 
United Nations, the scrutiny of the Security Council and with the collaboration of a number of 
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expert multilateral organisations.470 Technically working under the umbrella of the United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations typically used more for the deployment of 
military peacekeeping operations, it later acknowledged that it was indeed ill-prepared for 
such a mission.471 Nonetheless, the structure that was then allotted to UNMIK reflected the 
will of the mission to perform the task assigned to it in the best possible manner. 
i) The Pillar Structure 
Thus, to respond to the concerns raised by the sensitivity of the issue of Kosovo and 
the multitude of interests at stake, both at the international and local levels, the overall 
management of the mission was attributed to the United Nations itself. This choice reflects the 
trust in the impartiality of the organisation, the need for its technical expertise and to some 
extent, the stakeholders’ confidence in their ability to balance the decision-making power of 
the organisation. As a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, the different international 
actors retain some leverage over the mission’s overall strategy.  
As outlined previously, it was the first time that an international organisation had been 
granted such a colossal task. The management of the mission was entrusted to the executive 
branch of the international organisation: the Secretariat. The Secretary General appointed a 
Special Representative in charge, within his office, to coordinate the mission as a whole.472 
Yet, showing some concern for effectiveness, specialised governmental and 
intergovernmental agencies were appointed to second the office of the Special Representative 
in various fields of their specialisation.473 The administration was divided into four pillars 
according to four areas of concern: (1) policing and justice; (2) civil administration; (3) 
democratisation and institution building; and (4) economic reconstruction.474  
Pillar I was in charge of dealing with the crucial task of re-establishing a sense of 
security and justice after decades of ethnic opposition and bitter conflict. The long opposition 
between the local population and the central government, the atrocities backed by Serb 
totalitarian rule under the cover of a state of emergency along the 1990s and finally the 
airstrike left deep feelings of insecurity and injustice among all segments of the population. 
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Void of all formal executive institutions and in the face of a flagrant lack of properly trained 
personnel, the United Nations first substituted a police corps and justice structure with trained 
professionals wwho were seconded by its member states. The sensitive nature of both tasks, 
which required a sense of impartiality to enforce the rule of law, naturally meant that the 
United Nations picked itself for the job, both for its expertise and presumed neutrality.  
For similar reasons the United Nations was assigned the management of the second 
pillar: civil administration. This pillar aimed at first to fill the void left by the withdrawal of 
the Serbian governmental agencies by running the current affairs of the province and 
managing its administration, while local staff and institutions were developed. Subsequently, 
pillar II engaged in the development of the new political system through the design of 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions.475 Finally, this department was in charge of 
gradually transferring governance responsibilities to the new institutions. Again, in this role 
the United Nations was expected to provide a sense of impartiality and stability to ensure the 
support of both local and international actors. 
Closely involved with the Kosovo Question for the past decade, and specialised in 
post-socialist transitions, the OSCE was given the duty of securing the third pillar, i.e. to 
proceed with the democratisation process, training of local staff and the establishment of core 
democratic institutions, including some segments of the civil society.476 In contrast with 
pillars I and II, the organisation was not in charge of running the administration but rather of 
developing the technical capacity of local personnel to progressively take over the 
administration of the province. Police, rule of law, community rights, party development, 
elections, etc. being within its remit, the organisation used its decades of expertise in assisting 
in the democratic transition of post-communist countries to develop the basis of the new 
political system for the province.477 The long-term knowledge of the specificities and 
sensitive issues of the Kosovo problem and the technical expertise of the organisation 
guaranteed the central position of the organisation within the mission. 
The last pillar was assigned to the European Union,478 which was put in charge of 
providing at first for the material immediate humanitarian needs, and later, for the 
                                                
475 Beauvais, J., ‘Benevolent Despotism: a Critique of the UN State Building in East Timor’ in New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 33, 2001, pp. 1009-1110; Paris 2002, Op. Cit. p. 645. 
476 i.e. media, political party development, civil society projects, etc. 
477 OSCE Mission in Kosovo Mandate, Decision No. 35, 237th Plenary Meeting, PC Journal No. 237, Agenda 
item 2, PC.DEC/302, 1 July 1999. 
478 Resolution 1244., § 17. 
 138 
reconstruction of the economically ravaged province. Eager to gain ground on matters 
occurring at its doorstep and strong in local and technical expertise, the European Union 
accepted this challenging task. The expertise, capacity and role of the EU in the regulation of 
conflicts in the Western Balkans made this inter-governmental organisation an appropriate 
candidate for the task.479  
Strengthened by the support provided by the moral and technical legitimacy of both 
the United Nations and the European institutions, UNMIK’s design responded to the concerns 
raised through former international territorial administrations and to the specific needs of the 
Kosovo case. Nevertheless, despite the care the international community put into the design of 
the mission, a number of concerns arose around the core of the mission and its staff. Planned 
in a situation of deep crisis and granted it had never assumed such a demanding responsibility 
before, the United Nations, and to a lesser extent the European Union, did not have adequate 
personnel and the structures required readily at hand. The last minute organisation of the 
mission, the one-year renewable mission mandate,480 and the difficult working and living 
conditions, especially at the beginning, compelled UNMIK to be less rigorous on the training 
of the staff chosen and sent by member states. In addition, the six-month renewable contracts 
and the inflexible ‘quota’ method of recruitment imposed by multilateral organisation, and the 
sometimes-exorbitant salary requests, were blamed for attracting less than the best candidates 
for the jobs.481 In some cases, the staff was judged as lacking in professionalism or simply 
being not properly trained and sufficiently aware of the specific issues involved in the 
ethnically-sensitive case of Kosovo. More crucially, criticism increasingly targeted the lack of 
structured internal controls that allowed the development of corruption and organised crime 
within the ranks of the mission and under its cover. In the case of the European Union, despite 
its economic development and governance expertise, it realistically was the first time that this 
federal type inter-governmental organisation – lacking a coordinating decision-making centre 
– was involved in post-conflict management on such a scale and with such responsibilities. 
Finally, it is important to note that, at the centre of the coordination of the pillar structure, the 
Office of the Special Representative is ultimately empowered with giving the impulse to the 
civilian mission. Furthermore the overall structure relies de facto on the efforts of the Special 
Representative himself. The importance of the responsibility, but also power, in the hands of 
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this one individual, without clear control mechanisms highlighted the critical issue of 
accountability.482   
ii) Accountability Issues  
With respect to control mechanisms, resolution 1244 does not provide any 
instructions. As a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, the international mission is indeed 
accountable to the Council, but no real formal liability framework was designed. In practical 
terms, the Security Council retains all rights on the selection of Special Representative. 
Moreover, the Secretariat was required to report regularly on the progress of the mission to 
the Security Council in order to, eventually, renew the mission mandate on a twelve-monthly 
basis. In actual fact, the leverage of the Council on the day-to-day operation of the mission 
was limited by a lack of real concern for UNMIK’s daily functioning and policing.483 In 2004, 
after the blatant failure of the international mission to maintain internal stability, the Secretary 
General ordered a number of assessment missions, which were not however directly aimed at 
the evaluation of the international administration itself. The Eide mission in the summer 2005 
and the Ahtisaari one in 2007 were concerned with the settlement of Kosovo’s status and the 
development of the local institutions’ progress to pursue this settlement; indeed they paid little 
attention to the international administration’s policies and their implementation.484 
Nonetheless, mandated by the international community but managing local actors – 
thus affecting their daily lives and future – the international mission soon faced increasing 
demands for accountability towards the people they were administering. In 2000, UNMIK 
regulation 2000/38 established an Ombudsperson’s office in charge of investigating 
individual complaints against international and local administrations.485 This mechanism, if 
not aimed at providing accountability of the mission and its policies to the population of 
Kosovo, at least provided those people with a formal channel of complaint against individual 
members of the mission, setting a limit to the de facto impunity of the mission staff.486 
Although not a formal judicial official, the Ombudsperson had the duty to investigate 
complaints and provide opinions and recommendations to the mission, which could then 
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eventually prosecute suspected individuals.487 Yet, the efficiency and impartiality of this 
office was questioned on the grounds that the office was founded and financed by the OSCE, 
itself part of the international administration. Furthermore, the international Ombudsperson 
himself, Marek Nowicki, complained that the international mission rarely acted upon his 
reports and conclusions.488 Ultimately, UNMIK resolution 2006/06 prescribed the transfer of 
competencies of this office to the local administration and with it,489 the regulation eliminated 
the capacity of the office to investigate any case against international administrations. In this 
way, it waved away the only real framework where the international administration had to 
face some kind of accountability towards local actors.  
Despite the concern to take into account the set of lessons learned from previous 
international territorial administrations, UNMIK’s structure reflects a difficult compromise 
between the international actors’ expectations and concerns. The ‘top-down’ structure and 
decision-making process failed to take into account effective ways in which local actors could 
have an impact, such as the existence of operative mechanisms of check and balances for 
them to hold accountable the international administration. The failure to involve local actors 
in executive decisions, let alone to provide them with a framework of accountability, has been 
the source of much criticism against what is portrayed as a hypocritical administration that 
claims to launch ‘democracy’ through manifestly undemocratic means.490 Dr. Kouchner’s 
efforts to establish early on integrated consultative political organs – i.e., JIAS – demonstrates 
a clear consciousness of the need to involve all segments of the local society within the 
institutional structure. Yet the failure to speed up the devolution of effective power in later 
stages, once the institutions were established and running, inevitably affected the legitimacy 
of the international administration, as local actors called for increasing responsibility. 
Eventually, some form of access to effective decision-making is essential to sustain the 
legitimacy of the intervening mission and ultimately its success. Failure to transfer effective 
power to the institutions that they created proved a heavy handicap and one of the causes at 
the root of its failure to secure the belief of the local actors in its legitimacy over the years.  
Consciousness of this deficiency is evidenced by the development of the ‘light foot approach’ 
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in the later missions that was  supposed to be applied in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the local 
actors were directly empowered from the beginning of the institution-building effort.491  
b. UNMIK’s Policies 
Aware of the deficiencies rooted at its core and the growing criticism against its 
operation, the international administration attempted, through its policies, to close the 
increasing gap in its perceived legitimacy. As the first Special Representative Bernard 
Kouchner pointed out, the mission was given an unclear and somehow contradictory mandate 
– establishing an ‘autonomous’ political framework within a sovereign state – in a politically 
sensitive setting where any action was bound to be politicised and the mission would be given 
the role of scapegoat.492 De facto, the mission found itself confronted by the realities on the 
ground, that is to say stretched between the mutually exclusive expectations of, first the 
international and local actors, and then the actors within those levels. 
In this setting, the mission resigned itself to fulfilling the technical tasks mandated 
under paragraph 11 of resolution 1244. Those errands included the alleviation of the deep 
humanitarian, economic and social crises and development of the political structure required 
to sustain governance in the longer term, based on international principles of democracy, the 
rule of law, good governance and human rights.493 The mission therefore entered a difficult 
game, seeking to avoid influencing either way the sensitive political issue of the final status of 
the province, which ultimately, it had no mandate to affect. Nevertheless, with increasing 
pressure from the Kosovo Albanian majority, adaptations were made by UNMIK in their 
policy, sometimes clearly on an ad hoc basis. Those changes follow two patterns: (1) realities 
on the ground and their evolution, in particular growing ethnic tensions; and (2) the frequent 
changes of Special Representative observed in the first five years of the mission, which 
coincide each time with a change of strategy.494 Ultimately, UNMIK’s policies in responding 
to its legitimacy crisis seem to have had mixed results. 
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i) The Emergency Period 
The first set of policies UNMIK implemented coincides with the establishment of the 
mission on the ground, and is referred to as the ‘emergency’ period. Despite the difficulties on 
the ground – the deep divisions of the society – and the intricacy of its founding document, 
the economic and humanitarian crisis called for the international mission to mobilise rapidly 
and set in place a series of policies to alleviate the population’s distress and provide a sense of 
security. UNMIK’s strategy was threefold: (1) to prevent the cooptation of power by 
extremist forces – political security; (2) to restore law, order and justice – physical and 
psychological security; (3) to provide for the humanitarian crisis – economic and social 
security. 
Following NATO airstrikes, the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of Serb forces 
and civil institutions was rapidly filled by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) 
who proclaimed themselves Kosovo’s legitimate representatives.495 The UÇK based its 
legitimacy on its active participation in the ‘liberation war against Serbian oppression’. To 
limit their role and avoid the spill over of violence, Bernard Kouchner launched the first set of 
policies to appease tensions in July 1999. Regulation 1999/1 attributed all governmental 
powers – executive, legislative and judicial – to UNMIK on the basis of powers granted under 
resolution 1244 and on the grounds of its aura of international legitimacy.496 The aim of this 
regulation and ensuing policies in the following six months was to prevent the extremist elites 
that had gained support during the conflict from monopolising power and imposing a 
totalitarian regime.497 The international mission, on the account of its supposedly ‘neutral’ 
nature and legitimacy ‘imposed’ some normalisation in the relations between the different 
communities. The first aim of this ‘emergency’ period was to establish a secure environment 
for all communities with respect to each other. This was the first step that represented an 
imperative in the wake of a violent conflict where the different groups still deeply feared each 
other. 
Second, after years of the ‘state of emergency’ imposed under the Milošević regime 
and the violent military and civil ethnic conflict that followed, the population as a whole 
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needed reassurances about their personal safety.498 This was pursued through two steps: (1) 
the establishment of policing, first relying on the military presence of KFOR and then on the 
backing of a civilian police force, staffed with trained police officers seconded by the 
international organisation’s member states; and (2) the rehabilitation of a justice system that 
could prosecute the crimes committed over the long period of lawlessness. This phase is 
particularly relevant after large-scale ethnically – or not – motivated crimes. Nonetheless, to 
implement this policy, the mission faced the crucial problem of the void of judicial structures 
at all levels: judges, prosecutors, registrars as well as lawyers.499 Serbian judicial civil 
servants had left with the rest of the Serb civil service in June 1999; as for the Kosovo 
Albanians, most of them had been out of office since the beginning of the 1990s, and thus 
lacked training and practice.500 Besides, the ethnic sensitivity of the crimes under review 
required impartiality. Accordingly, UNMIK flew in a number of international judges assisted 
by local officials.501 Yet this practice proved problematic on a number of grounds, including 
the unfamiliarity of the judges with the local laws and legal practices,502 as well as the crucial 
question of which law they should implement.503 
The issue of legitimate applicable law proved delicate.504 The Kosovo Albanians 
refused to be governed by Yugoslav law, which had been applicable in Kosovo until the 
NATO airstrikes. Enforced under the cover of state emergency, Kosovo’s Albanians believed 
the law to be partial and representing the symbol of a totalitarian and oppressive regime. 
Given that it was one of the first times that a territorial administration was asked to define 
applicable law over a sovereign territory, the international community did not have a ready set 
of municipal laws applicable to the case of a post-conflict society.505 Yet, UNMIK resolution 
1999/24 provided an answer to this issue by declaring that the law in force on 22 March 1989 
– i.e. before the establishment of the state of emergency – would be in force,506 along with 
international instruments of humanitarian and human law and more controversially 
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‘regulations promulgated [unilaterally] by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General’.507 Armed with all these powers according to regulation no. 1999/1, the Office of the 
Special Representative also awarded itself the power to legislate. This prerogative was heavily 
criticised on the grounds of the lack of transparency – of a non-accountable entity that was 
granting itself the power to impose law in a sovereign state, which would furthermore have 
legal implications beyond his term of governance.508 Nevertheless the urgency of the situation 
and the need for the international administration to provide for the legal vacuum justified, if 
not legitimised, this specificity of UNMIK. 
Third, owing to the difficult history of the province over the past ten years, 
investments in public facilities, infrastructure, public companies, and social facilities had been 
largely scaled down if not virtually abandoned.509 In addition, months of violence, which 
peaked with the NATO airstrikes, had damaged what was left and spurred mass movements of 
populations, leaving behind them their homes and belongings. From the onset, the mission, 
under the auspices of its pillar IV, set in place a whole program of reconstruction of housing 
and infrastructure as well as legislation to enable the recovery of the economy and the return 
of the large numbers of internally displaced persons. Within the first year, the mission 
achieved a number of significant successes in providing for the return of a large number of 
Kosovo Albanian refugees. Yet, recurring issues marred the performance of the mission: first 
the inability of UNMIK to provide a secure environment and proper living conditions to 
Kosovo Serbs and promote their return; second, its failure to provide basic infrastructure, such 
as electricity and running water, years after their taking over the reins of governance;510 and 
finally the inability of UNMIK to contain corruption, especially within its own ranks, further 
weakened the legitimacy of the ruling institutions.511  
Ultimately, the discrepancies in UNMIK’s ability to enforce the rule of law, provide 
basic services, as well as to contain rampant corruption, greatly undermined its legitimacy 
among the Kosovo Albanians and crucially encouraged the Kosovo Serbs’ dependence on 
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Belgrade’s structure. The lack of access to effective decision-making power was increasingly 
resented by the Kosovo Albanian elites, at the central and municipal levels. For example, it 
became increasingly difficult to deny power to extremist groups that enjoyed de facto control 
within municipalities.512 Ultimately, from an ethical point of view, as the administration was 
charged with establishing autonomous institutions, it would become increasingly difficult to 
justify the monopoly of decision power for a inappropriate period of time. To respond to both 
needs, Dr. Kouchner initiated a move to empower local elites as a means to appease 
resentment and legitimise the institutional structure he had established through the 
advancement of a ‘democratisation’ process.513 
ii) Between a Multiethnic Society and Pacific Co-existence  
When UNMIK took over the governance of the province, its first action was to ensure 
the non-cooptation of power by extremist groups and ensure a legislative basis for its own 
authority.514 Nonetheless, instructed by resolution 1244 to work on ‘organizing and 
overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-
government’,515 the office of the Special Representative cautiously set in place policies to 
organise the political environment of Kosovo. The ideological basis of the politics pursued is 
rooted in the dominant western liberal concept of peace building. In practical terms, the policy 
pursued by the international administration consists of a model of democracy based on 
multiethnic participation, established through power-sharing mechanisms.516 The basis of this 
concept and how it was implemented in Kosovo is extensively analysed in chapter five; yet, 
here I wish to sketch out and assess the ideological basis and the evolution of the policies 
pursued by UNMIK. 
When the international administration launched its ‘emergency’ phase, the political 
scene of the province was deeply divided along inter- and intra-ethnic lines. Dr Kouchner set 
in place a series of measures to reintegrate all segments of the political scene at the central but 
also local level. He organised a consultative council in which were rerepresented the main 
Kosovo Albanians political parties as well as representatives of the Kosovo Serb 
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community.517 This council was formally institutionalised in December 1999 as the Joint 
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS).518 This structure was composed of bodies with 
consultative powers on decision-making and executive issues, structured on a so-called 
system of ‘co-heads’, where governance departments were headed by international 
administrators and local counterparts. The importance of this system lies in the fact that it 
attempted, first, to involve local actors in the political system both at the decision-making and 
implementation levels; and second, that it institutionalised the participation of all segments of 
the society. Yet, at this stage, the system suffered increasing pressure from the Kosovo 
Albanian elites, who perceived their participation in the system as purely formal and without 
real political impact;519 it was also questioned by the Kosovo Serbs who, beyond not having 
any impact on the decision-making process, further protested against the inability of the 
political system to provide for their safety and to ameliorate their difficult living conditions.  
To respond to some of those concerns, UNMIK established a formal basis for the 
system by launching local elections in the autumn of 2000. The elections were perceived as a 
success by the administration thanks to the Kosovo Albanians’ enthusiasm in taking part and 
the balanced result, which elected as a majority the historical Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK), perceived in international circles as less radical. Yet, in my experience as an election 
supervisor during those elections, a large number of electors, unprepared for the rules of 
democratic elections, came to vote for what they perceived as a referendum on 
independence.520 Moreover, the vote suffered from its boycott by the Kosovo Serb minority.   
Nevertheless, with the JIAS system, the institutional basis of UNMIK’s multiethnic 
Kosovo was set. This policy was reinforced in the next stages of development of the political 
system. Under increasing pressure to devolve power to the local population, the new Special 
Representative Hans Haekkerup launched the ‘Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government’ that formalised the institutionalisation of local empowerment.521 This document 
aimed to give the local population a feeling of progress towards local empowerment. Besides 
the institutionalisation of the executive, it enabled the creation of a legislative body in which 
local actors would be able to legislate.  In concrete terms, the international co-heads, and 
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especially the Special Representative, retained the last word on any sensible decisions and 
even veto power over the legislative decisions of the local body on the basis of a ‘reserved 
powers’ clause in the framework.522 On the model of the so-called ‘Bonn powers’ attributed to 
the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this clause enabled the Special 
Representative to veto laws passed by the assembly and remove elected members of 
government as he saw fit.523 This measure in effect granted a single unaccountable individual 
the power to overrule the will of the people. As the international administration attempted to 
establish democratic institutions representative of and accountable to its population, it created 
an undemocratic supra-institutional body to censor the expression of the people’s will.  
Beside the technical aspect of those policies,524 what is interesting is the way in which 
the international administration institutionalised multiethnicity through the creation of 
institutions and regulatory mechanisms. Efforts to develop multiethnicity went further than 
the political sphere. Through a system of quotas the scheme was established at all levels of 
formal and informal power. In particular, the OSCE played an important role in attempting to 
ethnically diversify recruits for the new police force and to develop ‘multicultural’ radio and 
television programs. In 2003, in front of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, 
the next Special Representative Michael Steiner declared:  
‘Multi-ethnicity is the key to stability in Kosovo and the region. It is also Kosovo's key to 
Europe. Kosovo's integration in Europe requires the integration of all communities in 
Kosovo… Some commentators say that we should just settle for coexistence. But this is 
simply not good enough. The European Union embraces multi-ethnic society and it should 
expect nothing less from Kosovo.’525 
This address spells out clearly UNMIK’s policy line and the will of the international 
community to this day. The multiethnic character of Kosovo is recognised and has to be 
preserved under all circumstances. Kosovo is, according to them, inhabited by different 
populations that should in the end form an entity, together. A number of reasons explain this 
attitude: from ethical ones, not to promote cleansing policies by rewarding conflict, to more 
practical ones, preventing population movements and consequently new discontents.526 Yet 
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realities on the ground – the multiplication of violent ethnically motivated crimes, physical 
division of the society along ethnic lines, etc. – call into question this strategy and promote a 
more realistic approach of ‘peaceful coexistence’.527 In practical terms, UNMIK encountered 
serious problems in maintaining the participation of Serbs and other minorities in all 
institutions.528 Jacques Rupnik questions the legitimate basis of what he calls ‘armed 
multiethnicity’, arguing that multiethnicity was imposed on Kosovo’s society through NATO 
intervention, and then the imposition of a political system without any clear agreement of 
Kosovo’s people.529 Moreover, it can be argued that instead of enabling the integration of the 
different groups to find a common basis necessary to the stability of the political system – as 
proposed by Lipset’s model – the imposition of multiethnicity ultimately entrenched 
ethnically based divisions, and created the conditions for further opposition to grow. Finally, 
it is interesting to note that the efforts of the Special Representative in developing a 
multiethnic Kosovo were mainly concentrated on the political level. The promotion of the 
concept at the level of the society, the crucial base for the maturity of multiethncity, did not 
receive high-profile effective support.530 In any case, the UNMIK democratisation policies of 
the next decade clearly demonstrate the mission’s dilemma, caught between their ideals and 
reality.  
iii) ‘Standard Before Status’ 
Despite UNMIK’s attempts to pursue the goals set by resolution 1244 through the 
development of a multiethnic political system, demands from Kosovo’s Albanian elites for 
more political involvement and ultimately, a political settlement – in the form of 
independence – became an ever more insistent problem. The United Nations administration 
found itself increasingly caught between the Kosovo Albanians’ thirst for independence and 
Belgrade’s allegations that the United Nations had exceeded its mandate and delayed 
unnecessarily the restoration of Serbian sovereignty to the province.531 Despite the attempts 
by the international administration to focus its political energy on technical issues, the 
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question of the status issue indeed remained at the centre of local political interest. The 
attempts to pursue what Alexandros Yannis, former political advisor to Special 
Representative Bernard Kouchner, called a ‘freezing strategy’ – i.e. the freezing/ 
immobilisation of the issue of status – clearly failed to achieve its aim.532 Instead of bringing 
the final status issue to a standstill in order to enable the development of an efficient political 
infrastructure and improvement in the local social and economic situation, local actors 
pursued and increasingly voiced their discontent over the lack of progress in what remained 
clearly their prime objective. Consequently, the issue of status increasingly weighed on the 
legitimacy of the mission inasmuch as its capacity to lead towards a political settlement 
represented the base on which the local actors based their ‘belief’ in the administration and 
the new political system. Instead of sustaining the expectation of major groups or enforcing 
non-ethnically based cleavages, UNMIK found itself wedged between their divergent claims 
and faced with a still weak and anarchic political system. Under growing pressure, it 
eventually gave in and responded to those diverging claims by laying down the performance 
of the local institutions as a prerequisite to the opening of status talks – not independence. 
In autumn 2002, the office of the Special Representative laid out a number of 
‘benchmarks’ that Kosovo institutions had to meet in order to start the considerations of the 
final political settlement of the province.533 This set of criteria was based on the idea that 
under the current circumstances Kosovo’s institutions would be unable to sustain political 
stability in either an autonomous or independent Kosovo. The institutions were too 
inexperienced and would have to face the challenging socio-economic situation in the 
province. Despite UNMIK’s efforts to improve democratisation, there were still several 
problems: the integration of minority groups in policy-making remained weak, ethnic 
cleavages and hostility still dominated the political agenda, permanent fears of ethnic 
cleansing predetermined and reinforced the divergent aspirations of both factions. Using the 
old ’carrot and the stick’ method, the ‘Special Representative of the Security General’s 
benchmarks’ ultimately attempted to strengthen the democratic foundations of the institutions 
and to secure their legitimacy in the eyes of the wider Kosovo population. Through 
reinforcing integrative institutions, run by the rule of law, and by ensuring the physical 
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integrity as well as the protection of every citizen’s rights, UNMIK ultimately aimed to 
further reduce mutual fears as well as to strengthen the Kosovo population’s ‘belief’ in the 
political system. 
Nevertheless, far from strengthening and broadening the allegiance of the people of 
Kosovo to the new institutions, the Special Representative’s initiative was again received with 
suspicion and hostility. Kosovo Albanians viewed this new policy as yet another device to 
delay the transfer of power, and thus independence. The political elites accused UNMIK of 
fixing a set of random and evasive criteria.534 Kosovo’s Albanian elites argued that the 
benchmarks lacked formal evaluation criteria to judge the institutions’ progress, which made 
the measurement of improvements impossible. Furthermore, they also protested that UNMIK 
had created unequal standards that were not met by other independent Balkan countries. On 
the other hand, in Belgrade the ‘Standards before Status’ policy of UNMIK was perceived as 
an implicit public acknowledgement and support for secession. Instead of reassuring the 
Serbian government and Kosovo Serbs that their support of the institutions was essential to 
the political future of the province, it made them see UNMIK efforts to strengthen Kosovo’s 
institutions as reinforcing the Kosovo Albanian capacity to override Serbian sovereignty and 
proceed with their policy of cleansing the province. 
On 17 March 2004, the Ibar River incident, which set alight the accumulated 
frustrations of the Kosovo Albanian community, clearly indicated to UNMIK but also to the 
international community that the status quo could not hold for much longer and that 
substantive progress needed to be made towards a political settlement. As a response, the 
‘Standards for Kosovo’ were launched in April 2004. Based on the earlier Benchmarks, the 
standards were further developed and proposed a number of formal criteria divided into eight 
areas of improvements, which the Kosovo institutions needed to fulfil to enable a sustainable 
political system. As opposed to the previous Benchmarks, the Standards aimed to be the 
feuille de route for the development of the political system. The conditionality of the 
fulfilment of those standards to initiate the status talks were underplayed, and in the autumn 
2005, after just a year, the Eide report gave the green light to the opening of the talks, despite 
doubts about the evaluation of the local institutions’ actual progress.535 The rapid development in the 
international action to proceed with the opening of the status talks following the Kosovo Albanian demonstration of force leaves an 
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acute feeling of the failure of the democratisation initiative undertaken by UNMIK.536 Beside 
the failure to obtain the support of Kosovo’s population as a whole, the shift of the 
international community’s strategy after the March 2004 demonstrates the end of its support 
to the administration, which they believe ultimately failed in the development of a democratic 
and multiethnic Kosovo.    
The ‘standards before status’ concept was interesting but proved to be not enough. 
Ultimately, the international administration and the international community did not manage 
to establish and enforce a more effective dialogue with Belgrade, and to enable the integration 
of the Kosovo Serb minority into the process. Just as the mission failed to set in place policies 
to back-up their institutional design, such as policies aimed at shifting the local political elites 
and the people’s energy away from ethnic concerns to more concrete concerns common to all 
segments of the society. As argued earlier, this point is crucial for the development of an 
integrated society capable of sustaining stability. Yet, the violence and the entrenchment of 
the conflict and opposition within groups raise the justifiable question to what extent this 
prospect would have been realistic? It is clear that given the complexity of the situation and 
the impossibility of testing counterfactuals, it is difficult to argue that a different approach 
could have had a different outcome. In the same way, it is difficult to convincingly argue that 
the problems of Kosovo were fully soluble. Yet given the ad hoc nature of international 
policies and the flagrant inability to enforce them, it can surely be argued that had the 
administration had clearer goals, a more co-ordinated and integrated strategy and the capacity 
to implement them, they could have relied on their ‘neutral’ role and contributed to a stronger 
integration of Kosovo’s society.  Thus, if not solving the problem, at least they could have 
provided some of the conditions that might have enabled the people of Kosovo to advance 
towards stability. 
Indeed the ‘Standards before Status’ approach is proof of the ad hoc nature of policy. 
The administration never managed to enforce these standards and when the March 2004 riots 
took place, exemplifying the lack of standards, the policy was abandoned. Another 
compelling example is the case of north Mitrovica, which in the aftermath of the bombing 
became the refuge of a large part of the Kosovo Serb population. Ultimately, it became a 
secluded anti-UNMIK resistance pocket within Kosovo, rejecting the administration’s 
authority and institutions with the help of Belgrade and its financing. A major question is that 
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of why the international administration allowed the city to remain under Belgrade’s influence 
without convincingly imposing itself. Why did the international community not make an 
effort to demilitarise Mitrovica, deal with the various militias and criminal gangs in the city, 
and create a situation free of fear where at least there would have been a possibility of Serbs 
and Albanians living together? Some might argue that the imposition of UNMIK authority 
through military occupation and policing of the city might not have been sustainable. Yet the 
same argument could have been made about the unrealistic prospect of maintaining Kosovo 
under international supervision through military means prior to the bombing in 1999, or about 
implementing an electoral process in October 2000, when the international community feared 
a flamboyant act from Milošević, who earlier that month had denied the election victory to its 
opponents and was desperate to show its strength and capacity to stay in power.537 Yet, in just 
over a hundred days of bombing, Serbia left its ‘sacred’ lands in the hands of the international 
community, which managed – with difficulty at times – to preserve its authority over Kosovo. 
In the same way, that October, despite the movement and deployment of troops along the 
border, the Yugoslav forces did not attempt to undermine the electoral process or threaten the 
province. Therefore there is no evidence that enforcement of UNMIK’s authority through 
military and policing over the north of the Ibar river would have been more challenging for 
the allied forces than it was for them to occupy the rest of the province. Indeed, in the first 
year of UNMIK rule, KFOR had a number of violent encounters with Kosovo Albanian 
extremist demonstrations of force, in particular regarding the issue of the division of 
Mitrovica.538 Yet, in those cases, KFOR did pursue their agenda and arguably managed to 
establish some order. This is not to say that pursuing the same policy in the north of Mitrovica 
would have been an easy task. Yet, I am arguing that by not enforcing their policy in the north 
as they did in the south of the province, UNMIK inevitably showed some weakness, a lack of 
commitment, of a coherent strategy and an unfortunate lack of confidence in its own policies 
and its capacity to fulfil them. 
Why didn’t the international community pursue the same policy in both north and 
south Mitrovica? Rather than finding an answer within the un/realistic prospect of 
establishing military power in Kosovo Serb area, I would instead look into the political 
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concerns of the international community at the time. Indeed, the de facto loss of Kosovo was 
perceived as an insult by Serbia; the allies possibly wanted to soften the affront. Possibly in 
autumn 1999, the international community did not want to contribute to the reinforcement of 
the existing pro-Milošević sentiment, while after 2000, they did not want to undermine the 
new government. Should those hypotheses turn out to be true, it would only be evidence of 
the supremacy of the international political agenda at the expense of the local good, and 
eventually, of ensuring local support. Ultimately, the international administration entered 
negotiations with Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs as the underdog, unable to impose its 
conditions and thus undermining its own legitimacy.  
Despite UNMIK’s attempt to concentrate its efforts on strengthening integrative 
institutions, the persistence of the ‘final status’ question, which polarises the communities of 
Kosovo, is a clear indication of the deep legitimacy crisis faced by the international 
administration. The mission’s will to set the basis for democratic and legitimate foundations 
can be observed through the evolution of its policies. Yet, its success in achieving this goal is 
relatively limited. Beyond the limited effective integration of minorities is the inability of the 
institutions to provide for the populations. The attention of UNMIK and its critics has tended 
to focus on the number of Serb or other minority participants in the new institutions. Yet, no 
real attention has been given to the fact that beyond ethnic issues, this lack of participation 
could be due to the lack of efficiency of the administration’s policies in providing for the 
basic needs of the population. The failure to provide a safe and just environment, and access 
to basic commodities, can indeed explain part of why minorities, and Serbs in particular, have 
turned to Belgrade’s parallel services.539 The international administration did realise this 
partly, but seemed to have its energies caught in providing political justifications rather than 
in developing the efficiency of the institutions they were setting up. The response of the 
international community after the March 2004 events is evidence that UNMIK was given little 
credit or support for its technical work, and that international attention was indeed also 
focused on political issues. Nevertheless, on the ground, the inability of the international 
mission to sustain the divergent expectations of the Kosovo Albanians, Belgrade and the 
Kosovo Serbs nourished the growing tensions between the ethnic groups and further built up 
inter-group cleavages. The Kosovo question continues to be a crucial issue deeply rooted in 
the society, which represents a severe barrier to the solution of the conflict.  
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Conclusion 
International territorial administrations are not a new occurrence but the fruit of a long 
international practice to bring a solution to collapsed states. The legitimacy of those missions 
has always been of concern to the international community. When one observes the evolution 
of successive missions, some ‘lessons learned’ seem to have been taken into account in the 
establishment of new missions. Yet, a crucial problem lies at the root of the principle of 
international territorial administration: the interference of an outside power in the governance 
of a sovereign state, outside of its political control mechanisms. Thus, a foreign power 
interferes in the state without any accountability to either the state or its population. To 
counteract the potential effects this situation might have on its order, the international 
community has carefully elaborated a legal framework to prevent the abuse of the system. Yet 
this design fails to take into account another crucial aspect of the problem: the lack of 
accountability to the population governed. As Bain puts it, an international administration’s 
‘legitimacy [is not determined] by the consent of the governed but by the will of the Security 
Council.’540  
Nonetheless, as Chapter one argues, in order to be legitimate, an international 
administration needs both the support of its ‘power holder’ and its base. Until now the 
international community has ignored that latter need and failed to establish review 
mechanisms of the administration by the population it rules, with awkward results, as the case 
of Kosovo illustrates. Established as a result of controversial events, UNMIK’s mandate 
‘appears more like a substitute for a solution’.541 Thrust between diverging expectations, 
UNMIK has concentrated its policies on fulfilling what it deems to be the expectations of the 
authority that mandated it. However, beyond the establishment of the political system relying 
on belief rooted in rules, as Lipset argues, the legitimacy that will enable sustainable stability 
also depends on an ability to integrate the society and enable competition on cross partisan 
issues. Yet, lacking support from its divided authority and unable to sustain the divergent 
expectations of the local actors – and thus to secure grassroots support – and unable to 
establish a situation free of fear, the international administration attempted to adapt its 
policies in an ad hoc manner, too late and without conclusive success. 
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Despite the international administration’s efforts to concentrate the political debate on 
the purpose of its mandate – the establishment of a new political framework – the mission has 
been assessed on its failure to provide something which ultimately it had no power to 
influence: the final status of the province. Even if it is acknowledged that the international 
administration has indeed managed to establish a political structure in Kosovo, especially at 
an early stage, its failure lies in its inability to integrate the population within it. This failure is 
even more regrettable as the governance structure UNMIK has instituted in the province is 
essential for the future of Kosovo. Undeniably, whatever its final status, the ability of the 
institutions to provide for the population is crucial, and this seems to have been overlooked 
from time to time in the overall debate. Indeed, the sustainability of a long-term political 
solution for the province relies on stable and legitimate institutions. Thus, before approaching 
the hot subject of the status issue in the last chapter, I wish to discuss the new political system 
of Kosovo and analyse its legitimacy base. 
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 Chapter 5 – Democratisation and Legitimation 
By definition, ‘democracy’ is about the people. In practical terms, people express their 
political will through a set of institutions. Institution building plays, therefore, a critical role in 
the process of democratisation as it involves the development of the institutions that will 
reflect the will of the people. As Seymour Lipset argues, democracy rests on stable/legitimate 
institutions. Thus, the conflict resolution literature, faced with extreme cases of instability, has 
focused on the development of institutions in post-conflict societies to ensure the pursuit of 
democracy and to restore – or in some cases, establish – stability.  
Mandated by resolution 1244 for ‘[o]rganizing and overseeing the development of 
provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government’,542 the United 
Nations Administrative Mission in Kosovo set out to develop governance institutions that 
would ultimately exercise the power necessary to run and stabilise Kosovo in the long term. 
In this chapter, I propose to assess the legitimacy framework of the central and local 
institutions of the province and examine the reasons why they struggle to secure sustainable 
rule. I argue that these institutions, established by an international administration, have failed 
to gain the support of the different segments of the population, and hence lack legitimacy. 
This happened for two important reasons: first, the questionable legitimacy of the 
international actors and their methods have heavy repercussions on their output: the 
institutions they establish – i.e., the way the institutions are created – influence their own 
legitimacy; second, the format of the institutions themselves, which are clearly designed to 
ensure international legitimacy and fit the international legal framework rather than ensuring 
the supporting of people and getting the people’s support. This argument is demonstrated 
through the analysis of the evolution of the international community’s institutional design 
attempts at the central and local levels.  
To support this argument, I begin with an analysis of the concept of democracy and 
relevant democratisation mechanisms, before briefly outlining the social, political and 
economic contexts in which institution building occurred in Kosovo. Then, I examine the 
institutional design introduced by UNMIK to establish the new political system at the central 
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level; I finish with an assessment of the efforts to develop local democracy, and in particular 
some issues related to the decentralisation process in Kosovo.  
1. Democratisation and Legitimisation 
Democracy is one of the fundamental concepts on which the international community 
relies. From Kant‘s Perpetual Peace essay to modern day international theory, democracy has 
been adopted by Western thinkers as the essential stabilising model for the international 
order.543 Although there exists a vast debate over the relationship between democracy and 
peace, it is not the focus of this research. Yet it is interesting to note that democracy has come 
to be accepted as the most appropriate way to solve ‘failed state’ problems.544 Roland Paris 
underlines that this has become in itself a source of legitimation for the international 
community.545 Any international action becomes unquestionably legitimate if the intervening 
administration pursues the establishment of democracy. However, this simplistic equation 
entails a number of concerns, from basic definitional issues – what kind of democracy to 
implement? – to more fundamental ones – if the aim pursued to establish democracy is 
legitimate, does that imply that any means to implement this political model are also 
legitimate?  
a. Aim 
Without attempting to provide a simplistic definition of democratisation, the term can 
primarily be understood as the process that enables the development of a democratic political 
system. Yet, what is implied by the term ‘democracy’? It is often argued that when one talks 
about democracy in the international context, it is assumed to be of a western liberal 
democratic type.546 To establish this type of democracy, two criteria are essential: (1) bringing 
the concept of democracy to the conscious level of citizens. Since democracy is first about the 
role of the demos’ participation – i.e. the people, in order to develop a ‘form of government in 
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which the [people] rule’,547 the people should be able to understand the rules of the game so 
that they can influence the political system; (2) establishing democratic institutions, which 
represent the people’s will.  Both are essential, indeed complementary, and should be pursued 
jointly. Despite the rise of a number of criticisms of the liberal democratic model, it has come 
to be accepted by the international community as the model to be promoted in institution 
building.548 
To pursue democratisation, a number of measures and concepts need to be 
implemented.549 First, it is important to strengthen the basis of democracy, namely the rights 
that democracy encompasses – rights of expression, association, etc. – but also a number of 
duties – i.e. civil duties. Without respecting those principles, a democratic system cannot 
sustain itself. Second, an electoral system should be designed and set in place, so as to enable 
the expression of the people’s will. Third, appropriate institutional structures should be 
pursued through constitutional arrangements. The democratisation process should enable the 
establishment of: (1) a representative government that will pursue socio-economic policies 
and other governmental tasks for the benefit of the population; (2) a parliamentary assembly 
to legislate in a manner supporting the community as a whole; and (3) a judicial system, 
which implements the rules of law. 
Post-ethnic conflict societies feature a number of characteristics that will inevitably 
influence the development of the democratisation process. First an issue specific to 
democratisation itself: the literature recognises that the development of democracy is a long-
term process. To assess the results of democratisation, a reasonable time frame is necessary to 
enable the observation of an evolution in the political consciousness of the population and the 
full development of institutions. People used to non-democratic traditions need to adapt their 
mentalities and behaviours to the requirements of the new system. A long educational process 
has to be set in place to change the traditional habits of the society – whether patriarchal, clan-
based or totalitarian etc., where the population is used to abiding by the leader’s will, or where 
there is a traditional use of violence to gain power.550 Besides changes in their attitudes, 
parallel socio-economic improvements are necessary to reach optimum benefits. These 
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improvements also require time. The advancement of political freedom turns out to be futile 
in a society where the population’s prime concern is access to basic human needs. 
Improvements in health, education, and economic opportunities have to be reached to proceed 
towards a successful transition to democracy.551 Furthermore, ethnic conflict settlements are 
characterised by fear and resentment among the population. There is a need to restore the 
population’s confidence in the institutions and in their representatives. This fear and 
resentment is not a phenomenon that disappears overnight but one more likely to lift along a 
generational timeframe.  
Secondly, a number of other specific issues will arise in regards to democratisation in 
the context of post-conflict societies. Generally groups that have undergone conflict are 
characterised by the fear of being under the rival group’s rule, especially in cases where there 
are a clear minorities or no clear majority. Thus, during the democratisation process, it is 
important to avoid the creation of an oligarchy where the concentration of power is in a 
majority group or a coalition’s hands and could be used against a third party. This concern 
should be addressed through the establishment of an appropriate institutional architecture 
together with the emphasis on key principles such as accountability, peaceful management of 
issues and renewal of elites, etc.  
Nonetheless, despite the positive connotations democracy and democratisation have 
gained, concerns remain as to their effect on legitimisation: the fact that liberal democracy has 
proved to be a stabilising factor in the West does not imply that it will automatically have the 
same effect on politically destabilised and economically underdeveloped countries. The 
question of whether democracy is ‘exportable’ is too often avoided. Democracy has gained, 
within the Western liberal world, the reputation of being the best, and hence most legitimate 
form of government. This halo has been transposed to international circles.552 Yet the fact that 
the process has gained international legitimacy does not automatically imply that it will gain 
local support. As has been pointed out, the process is long and difficult to implement. As a 
result it can appear meaningless to a population in dear need of the rapid changes that the 
democratisation process is unable to provide in an appropriate, timely manner. Again the 
international community clearly seems to avoid the issue and maintain its belief in its prime 
syllogism: democracy ensures legitimacy.  
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Besides the crucial issue of democracy’s goals raises the question of the effective 
means used to implement democratisation.553 Should democratisation be established 
according to democratic means or should a transitional period of state emergency be 
established in order to launch the basis for democracy? In the latter case, who should be the 
responsible actor in charge of emergency rule? As Paris notes, often democracy is imposed 
through highly non-democratic means.554 The whole system is imposed on peoples without 
their say in the process. Decisions are usually taken by leading elites that have gained power 
during the conflict, if not imposed on them too. Little to no consultation is allowed to the 
people themselves, who are obliged to accept the democracy forced on them. Often, the 
administration in charge of establishing and running the political system is not chosen through 
a democratic process and therefore, accountable to no one. Nominated by their own states or 
organisations, the international territorial administrations’ personnel in charge of establishing 
democracy are neither chosen by, nor accountable to, the people they are in charge of 
governing.555 In a word, both the process and the administration in charge of establishing 
democracy are in themselves undemocratic. This fundamental contradiction at the root of the 
democratisation process has simply been avoided by international actors concerned primarily 
with the legitimation that their ‘good’ intentions will, or so they assume, provide the process 
as a whole.556  
b. Means 
Despite the dubious legitimacy of both aims and actors, it is important for this study to 
investigate the different means of implementation of democracy in failed states. In particular, 
it is interesting to examine the nature of those means – legitimate or not – and to understand 
how, ultimately, they influence the legitimacy of the system. Mary Kaldor develops a 
distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ democracy. The former is based on the 
development of a set of institutions, and the latter on institutions ‘accompanied by and indeed 
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constructed by a strong and active civil society’.557 Based on this distinction and for the 
purposes of this research, I have identified two means that are essential to the democratisation 
process in post-conflict societies: (1) the design and establishment of the new institutions for 
the new state; and (2) policies aimed at the civil society, in particular policies developing a 
civil society consciousness within the territory and giving the people a sense of citizenship 
rights and duties. Yet, to those two crucial elements I would like to add another crucial one, 
i.e. (3) the design of an electoral system, which in a democratic system links the citizens to 
the institutions by providing a channel for expressing their will in the system.  
i) Institutional Engineering 
Conflicts are characterised by anarchy. The development of institutions, and hence the 
establishment of an ordered structure, is believed to be the most efficient way to launch 
regulatory means dealing with lawlessness and the subsequent discontent of the population. 
The new institutions need to respond to demands of the conflicting parties and deal with the 
roots of the conflict, such as the lack of access to government, economic resources, and the 
experience of unfair violations. The concern is then to give enough strength to the institutions 
to allow them to deal with the deepest roots of the conflicts.558 For the past few decades, 
conflict regulation has concentrated on reinforcing existing institutions that have proved too 
weak to deal with the issues at the root of the conflict, or in the case of absence or inadequacy 
of such institutions, to set up new ones from the ground.559 
Attempting a democratic transition in a failed state implies reinforcing or founding 
appropriate institutions. In the case of ethnic conflicts, there has been a conscious will on the 
part of the international community to maintain the multiethnic structures of the relevant 
states, and this is reflected in their institution designing activities. Indeed, models of 
institutional design were specifically developed to respond to the needs of divided societies 
for their governance mechanisms. Those models entail power-sharing mechanisms intended to 
involve the different groups of the society and prevent the cooptation of power by a majority 
as is common in a traditional representative democracy.560 Thus power-sharing mechanisms 
have revealed themselves as increasingly important in peace building. 
                                                
557 Kaldor 2008, Op. Cit., p. 42. 
558 Barnes, Op. Cit., p. 100. 
559 That is, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq. 
560 Kaldor 2008, Op. Cit., p. 36. 
 162 
Power-sharing aims to respond to divided societies’ need for governance mechanisms 
through the engineering of a division of power among the different parties.561 The aim is to 
involve, in the governance process, all the different groups and give them each a sense of 
ownership. It intends to enable minorities to gain access to power while not excluding the 
groups already in power. In this way, it is believed that the needs of all for governance would 
be to a certain extent fulfilled, thereby diminishing the tensions between the minority and the 
majority.  
In power sharing, the concept of ownership has a central role. To achieve this goal, the 
different parties need to see the benefits of their participation in the process. All parties need 
to feel that their action within the newly engineered system is going to have an effect in 
orienting the system to being beneficial for them. In sum, all parties need to feel that through 
their participation in the engineered system, they can master their destinies free from outside 
threats. Since the aim of power sharing is to diminish tensions through institutional 
engineering, it is in essence the institutional mechanism of peace building. It is essentially 
pursued through constitutional arrangements.562 As is evidenced through the long and wearing 
debates that have been going on over the past decades, institutional engineering is a complex 
matter with considerable mitigating factors. Finding a working compromise between the 
claims of opposing parties is further obscured by the dramatic nature of ethnic conflicts and 
their associated claims. The debate over institutional arrangements has been divided into what 
are presented as two opposite poles:563 Arendt Lijphart’s consociational and Donald 
Horowitz’s integrative models. 
Lijphart presented his consociational model in an article published in 1969 before 
refining the concept in his later work Democracies in Plural Societies.564 He defines a 
‘consociational democracy’ as a ‘government by elite cartel designed to turn democracy with 
a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy’.565 The model attempts to design an 
institutional framework that explicitly recognises the ethnic divisions of the society and 
attempts to establish governance mechanisms where all parties would have the ability to 
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control outcomes. Consociational democracy is based on a number of institutional devices: (1) 
a power-sharing government and parliament where all parties will take part in policy 
formulation and implementation; (2) a mutual veto right where all groups can veto a decision 
or law they feel is harmful to their group; (3) proportionality in the electoral system, so that 
the society’s plurality and proportions can be represented in parliament; (4) civil service 
segmental autonomy is needed for each group to deal with its own relevant technical issues, 
independently of the central authority. This last mechanism is particularly advised in cases 
where groups are not homogenous and therefore cannot subscribe to territorial autonomy. 
Thus, this elaborated model attempts to reflect the ethnic ratios of the relevant society, thus 
enabling, according to democratic principles, the majority of groups access to decision-
making power irrelevant of their actual numerical size. It attempts to secure the minorities 
from the majority’s ‘dictatorship’ and enables them to deal at the local level with group 
specific issues.566   
Although considered as a major breakthrough, Lijphart’s theory has been subjected to 
a large number of criticisms. Among others, it has been argued that the veto mechanism has 
the potential to block the decision-making process, leading to the constant rejection of 
policies and a political dead end. In addition, it is argued that allowing a specific mechanism 
for segmental autonomy reinforces group identities and restrains the incentive for groups to 
participate in a shared public life.  
Donald Horowitz’s integrative model has been developed as a critique and an attempt 
to fill the gaps in Lijphart’s theory. Horowitz’s theory is considered within the power-sharing 
debate as occupying the strategic opposite end of the spectrum. He focuses his argument 
around the concept of elite incentives to cooperate within institutional arrangements. Far from 
Lijphart’s concern for the preservation of group identities, Horowitz aims to establish an 
institutional design that will ultimately reduce ethnic divides. In order to achieve this, his 
theory concentrates on electoral engineering. The aim is to design a preferential system 
where, to be elected, elites will have to gain the maximum of support, not only from their own 
group, but also from others. This system has a double implication: first for elites who, in order 
to achieve exogenous support, need to moderate their discourse; and second, for the voters, 
who have to consider a second preference in their choice of candidates outside their group. 
Similarly to a consociational mechanism, the integrative model does focus on the federalist 
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system and the concept of devolution. However, contra Lijphart, its federal system should in 
no way be based along homogenous lines. On the contrary, it should be based on 
heterogeneous zones to further promote ethnic cooperation. The ultimate focus of the 
institutions is not groups but citizens as a whole. In the same way, policies should not support 
the segregation of the society through the promotion of group rights; instead, the centre of 
attention should be on individual rights. In the same way, devolution of power to 
heterogeneous local governments should support inter-ethnic cooperation through the entire 
society’s participation in public life at all levels.  
Neither theory has been applied in a systematic manner to cases of deeply divided 
post-conflict societies. However, the institutional designs applied in peace-building efforts 
have usually been based on a mixture of the two, depending in each given case on the nature 
of the society and the extent of the divide between the groups. Power-sharing arrangements 
have proved essential for promoting peace through institution building. Not as such 
democratic in stricto sensus, such approaches attempt, however, to respond to the society’s 
division and find a power balance between the different groups interested in maintaining 
peace. 
Nevertheless in practice, institutional engineering tends to demonstrate two further 
flaws. First, power arrangements tend to assume groups to be unitary and seek to 
accommodate them without integrating intra-ethnic cleavages in the matrix and, most 
crucially, without recognising individuals’ wishes. What is perceived as group interests might 
in fact be very different from the individual interests of the members of the group. Second, 
when considering groups as units, institutional engineers tend to consider elites as the sole 
representatives of these units. However, by the end of a conflict, elites tend to push forward 
radical agendas, which are quite far from the concerns and needs of most individuals within 
their groups. To get around relying on radical wings, international actors have attempted to 
look for alternatives within diasporas. Yet, cut off from their cores and given their painful 
histories, they have not proved to be credible alternatives.  
Institutional engineering attempts, through different mechanisms, to legitimise itself 
by attempting to provide the support of all segments of the society in which it performs. Yet, 
as Kaldor points out, ‘the spread of rules and procedures is not the same as the spread of 
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substantive democracy’.567 Further mechanisms need to be implemented to achieve 
substantive democratisation.  
ii) Citizens 
Citizens are indeed the basis of any democratic system. Beyond the notion of ‘people’, 
the concept of ‘citizen’ grants the people a political dimension and an attachment to both the 
state and the territory.568 In a liberal democracy, they are the basis of the state. By definition, 
the institutions should represent the citizens. Besides, according to the conception of 
legitimacy developed in Chapter one, these are the actors that should hold the belief that the 
system is legitimate. In any democratisation process and in particular in a case of 
democratisation after ethnic conflict, it is fundamental for the international administration to 
establish a ‘citizen consciousness’ within the population of the failed state, as well as a feeling 
of ownership of the system.569  
In the case of institution building at the end of an ethnic conflict, the international 
community has invariably attempted to maintain the multiethnic character of the state.570 In 
cases where the roots of the conflict indeed lie in the diversity of ethnic groups, the 
international community considers that finding a balance between the groups’ demands is, 
indeed, a factor of stabilisation of the conflict and ultimately of peace. At the root of this 
policy is the belief that partition on the basis of the post-conflict demographics, which involve 
movements of populations or more radically exchanges of populations, would be a factor in 
causing further instability and grievances.571 Yet, authors like Nicolas Sambanis have argued 
in favour of partition on the grounds that it would ‘freeze’ the status quo between the warring 
parties.572 Hence, halt the conflict by separating the conflicting parties. Nonetheless, with the 
partition approach, even if the conflict is put on hold, grievances would still remain and new 
causes of conflict would emerge. In practice, after the exchange of populations between 
Greece and Turkey at the end of the First World War, this alternative was rarely considered, 
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let alone favoured.573 One further reason is that it would justify the ethnic cleansing and the 
conflict in the first place. Thus it has in fact generally been very opposed by the international 
community. 
As a democratic system rests on the will of the people, the international community 
has felt obliged to reflect and enforce the multiethnic nature of states in any new political 
system. To do so in each specific case, the international administration needs to design 
specific institutions to accommodate multiethnicity. To maintain frail ethnic balances, the 
international community needs to create a sense of security within populations, so that all 
members of the population do not feel the threat and fear engendered by the conflict. This 
should be done in the initial phase through two sets of policies: first, by securing the area 
through military force followed by the deployment of civilian police to prevent further threats 
on the population; and second, through healing the wounds left by war and meeting the calls 
for revenge/justice of the population through the establishment of transitional justice and 
reconciliation policies. Nevertheless, when this first emergency phase is in place, the nature of 
the deeply divided society poses a number of further problems that have consequences for the 
establishment of a multiethnic democracy in a post-conflict society.  
First, as the democratic system rests on its representativeness of the population, there 
is a need to deal with the problem of displaced persons.574 As one characteristic of ethnic 
conflicts is to create ethnically pure zones, should the post-conflict demographic stand, the 
new system might indeed acknowledge, or even worse, legitimise, the ethnic cleansing policy 
of the conflict period, as was observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.575 To maintain the pre-conflict 
multiethnic character of various regions, international administrations have put in place strong 
return policies for internally displaced persons, which until now have been pursued with 
mixed results. 
Second, the international administration’s main task is to develop the understanding of 
the population about its role in the new political system and ultimately, to establish a feeling 
of ownership. Yet, international administrations usually act in a population that has rarely 
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experienced democracy. This situation brings additional difficulties and requires additional 
time, to explain and let sink in through the population the ideas and principles of democracy. 
In particular, the fundamental role ‘the people’ have in the future system has to be understood, 
as they will elect their representatives and most importantly, they are the entity to which the 
new system is accountable. This requires the tutoring of the population in the principles of 
democracy and in their roles as citizens.576 Specialised agencies such as the OSCE have 
developed specific structures to do this.577 Yet, the resources dedicated to this fundamental 
step of democratisation are often meagre and provide very poor results, as can be observed in 
the case of Kosovo.  
Third, when it comes to establishing a feeling of ownership, the international 
administration itself – as an unaccountable actor imposing a new political system from above 
– has been the object of strong criticism. Those critiques denounce the hypocrisy of the 
situation, of preaching about a sense of ‘ownership’ among the very same population that the 
mission is preventing from running the institutions.578 Yet, in cases of collapsed states, which 
by definition lack the appropriate political structures and administrations to run the states, a 
time span is indeed needed to establish those institutions, and more fundamentally, to train the 
staffs that will be in charge of running them. The ultimate goal is to transfer competencies as 
the staffs and structures are consolidated.  
Finally, it is important to note that at the end of an ethnic conflict, some sort of civil 
system indeed exists. As the state institutions have collapsed, the people have often managed 
to reorganise themselves in parallel circles that provide for themselves while the state is 
unable to.579 This is particularly true in the case of Kosovo during the 1990s ‘state of 
emergency’. However, although the resources dedicated to the consolidation of civil society 
exist, this aspect of democracy is largely under-resourced and often not the centre of attention 
for international administrations, undermining to a certain extent the legitimacy of the system 
as a whole. 
Although essential to the new democratic system and in particular to its legitimation, 
the citizens, either on their own or organised within the civil society, have been 
underestimated by the international administrations. This reality is often due to a lack of 
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resources, but also to an underplaying of the role of citizens in stabilising the system, and in 
fact of their capacity to legitimise it.  
iii) Electoral Engineering 
The last element essential to democratisation, and one to which international 
administrations pay careful attention, is the issue of electoral laws. Elections are a basic 
element of democracy where citizens are given the opportunity to interact and influence the 
institutions that govern them. As such, election rules design is a tricky, but important, part of 
the whole process of peace building. This is first because participation of the population in 
elections grants the system some legitimacy, and second, because the outcome of elections 
has an impact on the running of the institutions themselves. An essential element of the 
success and sustainability of a political system is the ‘belief’ that people put in it. 
Participation in elections shows the willingness of the population to participate in the 
institutions, and hence, their belief in the institutions as appropriate and legitimate.580 The 
boycott of elections within a democracy is a clear sign of the failure of the political system to 
maintain this legitimacy. Indeed, just as participation in the electoral process enables 
individuals to have their say in the political process, their refusal to participate reflects their 
rejection of the system as a whole, or at least the feeling that their vote does not have a 
significant influence on the system. 
Furthermore, the electoral process is at the root of any democratisation process 
because it enables the citizens’ voices to be heard, through their choice of representative 
agents as well as in the policies they pursue. In this framework, the concept of accountability 
should be emphasised in relation to both the elected representatives and to the population. 
This means that representatives should be elected by an expression of the citizens’ will, to 
accomplish a specific mission. This mission, or goal, is to pursue the citizens’ will as a whole, 
and not just the personal aims of the representatives or of an oligarchy. Thus, the 
representatives should be ready to give feedback to the whole population on their successes or 
failures in pursuing the people’s mandate. In the same way, the population, in electing their 
representatives, should understand the importance of this act. They need to keep in mind that 
their representatives will have to be accountable to them, and they should be ready to ask their 
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elected representatives to give feedback on their actions and, should the need arise, to 
sanction them through a vote of no confidence in the next election. 
Due to the importance of the electoral system in legitimising and ultimately enabling 
the success of the political system as a whole, international territorial administrations have 
‘devis[ed] new electoral systems to ‘manage’ democracy and diversity in post-conflict 
society’.581 Yet, given that after conflicts extremist elements are galvanised by the tensions 
within the political arena, the international community has been tempted to play with electoral 
rules to influence the results, so as to prevent the system legitimising such groups through 
elections.582 Yet as Florian Bieber and Stefan Wolff interestingly argue, after a review of 
electoral laws and their effects in different post-ethnic conflict situations, that such electoral 
engineering is ultimately counterproductive. In fact, they argue that this practice tends to bias 
the running of the institutions and makes them less efficient, ultimately undermining them 
rather than strengthening them.583 On a more theoretical level, such electoral engineering 
brings us to question the legitimacy of a system resting purely on international design efforts. 
Indeed it will result in a system, which, even if technically legal, is questionably legitimate. 
In conclusion, to enhance the process of democratisation, three processes need to be 
conducted in parallel: the design of democratic institutions, reinforcement of the society, and 
the development of an electoral system to ensure the access of the citizens to their institutions. 
Yet, before looking at the specific strategies set in place by the international mission for 
pursuing democratisation in Kosovo, it is crucial to have a general understanding of the 
social, political and economic environment in which the democratisation of Kosovo has to 
evolve. Those factors have an impact on the process, and are thus essential for understanding 
and evaluating institution-building processes in the province. 
2. Democratisation in the Kosovo Context 
The context of Kosovo is primarily defined by the claims of two nationalisms over the 
same territory. Yet, pretending that the socio-political scene of Kosovo is solely determined 
by nationalism would be to ignore the rich and intricate social and political evolution of the 
province. Indeed, to understand post-conflict Kosovo, one needs to go beyond this prejudice 
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and observe the socio-political development of the province that enabled the growth of 
nationalism, as well as some of the responses that the society has set in place to regulate some 
of its ill effects.584 Owing to the nature of the conflict, the literature has been inclined to 
analyse the case of Kosovo on a par with other post-conflict situations. Yet, this case entails a 
large number of specificities embedded the socio-political and economic development of 
Kosovo that distinguishes it from others, even barring its similarities to the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Indeed, as both conflicts issued from the break-up of Yugoslavia and arguably 
involved a number of similar actors, both conflicts are often conflated; yet they have little in 
common in their roots, development of tensions and post-conflict situations. The next section 
outlines the context of Kosovo international actors will have to face to successfully implement 
democratisation. It first delimits the general socio-political and economic environment of the 
province and then delimits the specific political context. 
a. Socio-political and Economic Environment 
Two kinds of factors intricately shape Kosovo’s post-conflict socio-political and 
economic environment: first, the influences found in cases undergoing similar circumstances, 
such as countries issuing from the break-up of Yugoslavia, communist transitions and/or post-
conflict reconstructions; and second, issues specific to the socio-political and economic 
heritage of the province itself. 
i) Inheritance from the Former Yugoslavia 
The socio-economic environment of post-conflict Kosovo has been influenced by the 
break-up of Yugoslavia on three levels: first, by issues linked to the post-communist 
transition, and the ensuing trials and errors towards a model of liberal democracy; second, by 
the rise of nationalism as a response to the collapse of communism and the dislocation of the 
state;585 and third, by the heavy heritage of the long and violent civil conflict that resulted.   
Even if the idea/ concept of democracy had arguably existed and developed in the 
Former Yugoslavia for a number of decades, it remained in an embryonic stage compared to 
Western liberal conceptions. When Tito took power in 1945, his inclination towards a Soviet-
style socialism as opposed to Western democracy can be explained by three factors: (1) the 
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failure of an embryonic form of democratic experience in the interwar period, which did not 
spur democracy as a raw model to respond to the needs of the Yugoslav state;586 (2) Tito’s 
personal history, as he joined the Red Army after being captured by the Russian forces during 
the First World War, explaining his personal inclination towards Communism/ Socialism;587 
(3) the outcome of the Second World War, where Yugoslavia’s status was negotiated, 
between Stalin and Churchill in Teheran, within the Russian Sphere of influence leaving, 
ultimately, little opportunity for Yugoslavia to choose an external patron. 
  Despite the failure of the democratic experience of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, Tito’s personal inclinations, and the outcome of the post-war strategic game, some 
democratic principles were pursued by Tito’s Yugoslavia and introduced in the 1946 
Constitution.588 Yet, following a strict communist model, it established a single party state, in 
which the government, vested with the citizens’ sovereignty, governed according to the 
party’s directives with the approval of its charismatic leader. With the decentralisation of 
power from Belgrade in favour of the republics and autonomous provinces, the 1974 
constitution seemed to respond in part to demands for liberalisation from certain elites. Yet, 
the nomination of Comrade Tito to lifelong presidency and the concentration of decision-
making power in the hands of the Communist League of Yugoslavia589 left little room for 
further improvements to Yugoslav ‘democracy’ that would enable it to reach a Western 
model.590 
Even after the death of Tito and the dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist League, 
Yugoslavia failed to embrace liberal democracy. Regarding the causes of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, Susan Woodward argues that the failure of Marković to hold multi-party 
elections at the federal level, thus providing a federal solution to the power vacuum before the 
holding of elections in Slovenia and Croatia, left space for the growth of nationalism.591 This 
failure to provide another alternative to nationalism to fill the ideological vacuum and the 
need for quick economic and social changes created by the collapse of communism across 
Eastern Europe enabled nationalism to appear as a natural response. The failure of Yugoslav 
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institutions to liberalise and respond to the calls for change from the republics left a space for 
the republics to feel increasingly the need to find their own way, and left space for 
nationalism to present itself as a ‘solution’. In the case of Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalism, 
as an alternative to socialism, was partly due to the heavily nationalistic history of the region, 
but also to opportunistic moves such as Milošević’s first visit to Kosovo’s Serbs in April 
1987.592  
Finally, the length and the violence of the civil conflict left individuals with a 
particularly deep level of  resentment and worse, fear towards individuals belonging to other 
groups. Besides the obvious psychological and social effects of such violent conflict, ethnic 
conflicts have a particular effect on potential democratisation. As the ethnic conflict 
regulation literature notes, this fear of other ethnic groups and the individuals belonging to 
them creates a political map divided along group lines and does not take individuals into 
account.593 Establishing a liberal democracy, which is based on the individual in a society that 
bases identity on group appurtenances raises a number of issues. First, there is the need for the 
accommodation of the democratic game to the society, and then, the need for a long time-
period and appropriate policies to enable changes in the society’s structure along the lines of 
more liberal norms. This issue is at the heart of the problem faced in all post-ethnic conflict 
democratising societies, and requires specific adjustments.  
ii) The Kosovo Environment 
In addition to the general lack of democratic culture common to states issuing from the 
Former Yugoslavia, a number of local characteristics also have consequences over the 
democratisation efforts in the province. The particular social configuration, ethnic set-up and 
historical significance of the province distinguish its socio-political dynamics from other 
societies issuing from the break-up of Yugoslavia. These factors inevitably have an impact on 
political allegiances and consequently on the political structure. Thus, understanding those 
factors and their consequences is essential for determining an appropriate political structure 
for post-conflict Kosovo and for assessing the capacity of liberal democracy to take root and 
grow; and ultimately, to ensure the capacity of democratisation to succeed. Three factors have 
such an impact: first, the specific nature of the society within ethnic groups; second, the 
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consequences of the ethnic divisions, and in particular the consequences they had on 
alternative socio-political development in the province; third, the less discussed intra-ethnic 
divisions deriving from historical but also social factors within both ethnic groups. 
Despite the modernisation and industrialisation attempts undertaken over the Yugoslav 
period, Kosovo and its society remain mainly rural and patriarchal.594 The socialist system 
brought to Kosovo and its difficult-to-reach mountains the gifts of basic education, health and 
other social services. Its rich mining resources in the north enabled the development of some 
industry.595 Yet, the province remained renowned within Yugoslavia as its poorest and 
roughest region. Kosovo Albanian society singularises itself by being deeply attached to its 
traditions, which rule every aspect of the social life of its inhabitants. Although the Balkan 
peoples as a whole are arguably deeply attached to their respective traditions and lifestyles, 
the structure of the Albanian society in particular does have specificities that influence 
significantly the social organisation of its people. Notably, Albanian society is based on what 
is known as the Kanun.596 This code of conduct stands as law and codifies the behaviour of 
the members of its society and the way it should be run. In particular, it is famous for its 
codification of Vendetta, which allows a clan to seek revenge for the murder of one of its 
members by killing any male member of the murderer’s clan.597 In this social organisation, 
the basic unit is, beyond the family, the clan. Indeed, the political and social development of 
the region can be observed through the feuds and alliances between clans.598 An example of 
the significance of this unit is the religious division of the community. Religious divisions can 
be observed strictly along clan limits, as members of certain clans as a whole embraced Islam, 
while other clans decided to remain Catholic or, in some case, followed Orthodoxy.599 In 
political terms, the consequence of this phenomenon is a top-down approach to decision-
making where unquestionable allegiance is given to the Pater or leader. This allegiance 
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structure is still very much present in modern-day Kosovo and has consequences for the 
democratisation process of the society.600 An understanding of the politics of party alliances 
and politics can be gained by studying the clans’ history, but more importantly by noting the 
allegiance given to charismatic political leaders and more generally, within political parties’ 
dynamics. An example can be observed within the structure of the LDK where its charismatic 
head Ibrahim Rugova remained, until his death, little to unopposed within its party, as in local 
politics.601 Indeed, at the first election after his death. It lost the party support of its electoral 
base and its lead as the major party on the Kosovo Albanian political scene.602 
Yet, the tight and traditional structure of this society enabled the growth of an 
interesting phenomenon: the so-called parallel institutions.603 In response to the exclusionary 
policies set in place by the Milošević regime, Kosovo’s Albanian society established parallel 
structures to respond to its own growing needs. The significance of this structure is twofold 
and lies in its design and policies. Despite its traditional heritage and lack of democratic 
culture, the Kosovo Albanians designed institutions on a democratic representative model. 
The exact imprint of the democratic spirit is, however, hard to evaluate given the 
circumstances in which the system evolved and performed. In particular, it is difficult to judge 
the influence of the base on the policies or the existence/efficiency of accountability 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the creation of parallel structures alongside the legal authority 
eventually shaped a culture of defiance to authority. Nevertheless, it succeeded in running 
efficient parallel services for the population, emphasising a clear inclination and ability to 
pursue basic democracy. Besides, the Kosovo Albanian community succeeded in mobilising 
itself against some of the perverse aspects of its tradition. Facing an upsurge of blood feuds 
based on the Kanun, the parallel government called for a moratorium on all vendettas and 
organised mass reconciliation events. This peculiarity of the Kosovo Albanian community 
arguably positively demonstrated a degree of political maturity as well as the ability of the 
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civil society to organise, beyond its traditional heritage and lack of democratic culture, and 
showed its readiness to take over governance in case of an institutional breakdown.604  
Nonetheless, despite the energy of the Kosovo Albanian community in organising 
governance structures, deep social and economic failings marked the Kosovo context. In the 
1990s, under the cover of the ‘state of emergency’, Belgrade reduced substantially 
investments in the province’s infrastructure and its main source of revenue, its industries. 
When Serb authority withdrew in June 1999, it left behind a shattered economy with hardly 
any basis for reconstruction.605 Besides, in the same way that the Kosovo Albanian society 
had built and relied on a parallel social structure, they developed a parallel economy that 
relied on an alternative source of income through the tight web of the Diaspora. Without any 
income in Kosovo, whole families lived on the salary of a single member of the family, one 
designated to earn an income abroad.606 This source of income enabled the rapid set-up of 
small privately own enterprises after the withdrawal of the Serb authorities. However, it 
rapidly appeared that this source of investment would only provide for a short period and 
would not be enough to respond to the massive needs of the Kosovo economy. In addition, 
despite the organisation of a parallel school system, the lack of educational materials, poor 
working conditions, and lack of qualified teachers left a whole generation with poor academic 
credentials. Both phenomena left little hope for the high proportion of unemployed persons, 
especially among the burgeoning young population,607 providing grounds for the rapid 
development of corruption and an organised-crime based economy closely linked to political 
power.608 
As regards the Kosovo Serb population, after the NATO airstrike a large part of the 
minority Serb population fled – or was strongly encouraged to leave – the province as the 
Yugoslav troops withdrew in line with the Military Technical Agreement.609 Victims of 
severe retaliation in the wake of the conflict, the already small numbers of Serbs in Kosovo 
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was further reduced. The community has been divided between three groups: a group that left 
Kosovo, one that found refuge in the mainly Serb-inhabited northern region of Kosovo, and a 
scattered third one that found refuge within enclaves scattered across the provinces.  
The first group has generally left the region for good. Few seem to really want to come 
back as the low figures of returnees reveal, and increasing numbers of Kosovo Serbs attempt 
to sell their properties to fund a new life somewhere else in Serbia. For the two remaining 
groups that chose to or were forced to stay in the province, Belgrade, in an attempt to help the 
Kosovo Serb population living in tough conditions as well in order to secure their loyalty, 
established a governmental department. The Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija 
funded by the Serb budget was mandated to establish and run Serb institutions that would 
provide Kosovo Serbs with access to services such as education, justice, civil registry, etc. In 
effect, this policy managed to further divide the remaining Serbs in Kosovo, already the 
victims of geographical divisions. The largest Kosovo Serb settlement situated north of the 
Ibar River, remained in a quasi-homogeneous area. Despite the recognition of UNMIK’s 
administrative power over this region as in the rest of Kosovo, the international administration 
did not manage to open an office in this sector until spring 2002. Before that period, the Serbs 
living in Northern Kosovo essentially survived exclusively on their Belgrade-financed parallel 
institutions. Their geographical situation, neighbouring mainland Serbia, enabled them 
primarily to receive continuous financing and services from Belgrade, but also to travel 
around the region as well as to Serbia safely without any Albanian interference. Yet, in the 
enclaves scattered around Kosovo, Serb inhabitants failed to receive this assistance. Often 
surrounded by hostile populations, unable to receive funds and services from Belgrade to 
travel freely to work or get basic necessities, these enclave Serbs continue to suffer heavy 
unemployment, an aging demographic and lack of commodities. The socio-economic 
conditions and geographic distribution of the Kosovo Serbs has a clear influence on their 
political behaviour. 
In this picture of the socio-political context of Kosovo, a last word needs to said about 
the case of Mitrovica. Multiethnic before the withdrawal of the Serb authority, it remained 
multiethnic afterwards, but with a natural boundary between its communities: the Ibar River. 
The main crossing point between the two sides, the city and especially its bridges became the 
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symbols of Serb resistance to UNMIK and the division between the two communities.610 
Despite, the opening of an office in the Serb area of town, UNMIK never managed to impose 
its authority or institutional structures in the Serb inhabited area, unable to compete with the 
ideological and financial support of Belgrade’s Coordination Centre for Kosovo. In addition, 
the violence that occurred on this bridge in March 2000 and the development of the ‘Bridge 
Watcher’ programme represent a clear indication of the depth of the ongoing mistrust between 
the two ethnic groups. 
b. Ethnic Divisions 
i) Inter-ethnic Divisions 
The roots of the interethnic division in Kosovo are deep and intricate. As elsewhere in 
the Balkans, the national appurtenances of the groups play a determining role in the choice of 
political allegiances. Despite centuries of cohabitation, the conviction that only national links 
can provide for the needs and the protection of the society is still anchored in the society as a 
whole. The development of nationalist rhetoric and ethnic cleansing policies, which occurred 
along the twentieth century, have only helped to reinforce this feeling, as much within the 
Kosovo Albanian community as within the Serb one. As a consequence, the society is divided 
along ethnic lines, where the fear of the other reflects on the political scene, which becomes 
thus defined in ethnic terms. Political parties are based on ethnic appurtenances and promote 
clear ethnic agendas at the expense of the economic and social policies so dearly needed in a 
post-conflict situation.  
If one observes the evolution of the political agenda of the main Albanian parties in 
Kosovo,611 despite rare notable exceptions, the main policy pursued by each of them is 
independence for the province. Very little in the way of articulated policy addresses the 
pressing issues such as the rocketing unemployment, the lack of a sustainable economy, the 
failings of the educational system, etc.612 This has an even more dramatic significance as, in 
the elections for which these programs were presented, a decision on independence was not a 
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prerogative of the elected representatives. This resulted only in rerouting the electoral debate 
away from social and traditional political issues concerning the basic needs of the society.  
At the basis of this phenomenon is the assumption that only a political party 
representing one’s ethnic group will represent one’s own interests, promote one’s rights and 
needs, and push forward fair policies. This phenomenon has added to the lack of a democratic 
culture and explains the weakness of the political party program and the search for alternative 
policies to respond to the socio-economic needs of the province. In such a society, political 
parties have an interest to promote the protection and interests of their own group to gain their 
support. In particular, it is quite common to see those parties campaigning on the fears of their 
groups. They present themselves as the only ones capable of protecting the group from others, 
undermining other ethnic parties, presenting them as either collaborators or too weak to 
promote the group’s well being and sometimes even safety. In the same way, parties and 
political figures are prevented from pursuing an open policy towards members of other ethnic 
groups because of the risk of being accused of treachery. Opening the door of the party or 
simply promoting reconciliation is politically seen as a weakness and could lead to a rapid 
political demise, if not physical threats.613 In sum, the ethnic agenda has become the basis of 
legitimacy.614  
The violence of the conflict in 1998/1999 exacerbated and crystallised the divisions 
between the two groups. The evolution of Yugoslav and Serbian politics since the airstrike 
has not managed to change the perceptions Kosovo Albanians have of Belgrade and the 
Kosovo Serbs. Contrary to Western expectations that the fall of Milošević would appease 
tensions and, eventually, enable the integration of the province within a Yugoslav 
framework,615 the successive pro-European/ liberal governments in Belgrade were perceived 
as being driven by the same nationalism as was Milošević.616 The involvement of Belgrade in 
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negotiations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over a change to the border 
between Kosovo and Macedonia (2001) was perceived as a further sign that Serbia would 
always act against Kosovo Albanian interests.617 Regarding the Kosovo Serb minority, 
Kosovo Albanians continued to consider them as Belgrade’s fifth column, in charge of 
ensuring a continuous Serbian presence in the province. They believed that ultimately Kosovo 
Serbs would be exploited as a bargaining tool to restore Serb sovereignty over Kosovo, to 
amputate the territory or to simply delay the settlement of the issue. Kosovo’s Albanian elites 
continuously argued that independence would quieten down fears of Serbian return and 
consequently would ease Kosovo Albanians’ attitudes toward the Kosovo Serbs.618  
ii) Intra-ethnic Divisions  
Besides the traditional interethnic divisions common to all post-conflict and, most 
particularly, post-ethnic conflict societies, less acknowledged divisions are also frequent and 
can be observed in the province.619 Owing to social and historical specificities, the Kosovo 
Albanian and Serb societies underwent deep intra-ethnic divisions. Within the Albanian 
community, the clan system on which the society is based has two types of consequences. 
First there are the traditional clan divisions that run deep in the history of the Albanian people, 
and then there are the more contemporary divisions issuing from the challenge to the 
traditional authority. As we explained earlier, the clan system and the principles upholding it 
are very much alive in the Kosovo Albanian consciousness and influence the system of 
allegiances.  
Besides, the criteria on which the choice of representative is based, tend to be rooted 
on traditional principles rather than on its capacity to pursue its elected mandate. This lack of 
an accountability culture is exemplified many times in the development of the party structure 
in Kosovo. The LDK’s political support rested for the whole eight years of its supremacy on 
the Kosovo political scene on its historical role as the resistance to the Serbian oppression of 
the 1990s. Yet, Fred Cocozzeli notes that ‘[t]his trepidation towards democratizations persists 
in the LDK’s internal party system… According to the [OSCE], the party’s internal statutes 
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1995, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2005. 
 180 
still do not conform to the Kosovo party law [designed by the international community]’.620 In 
particular, the results of the 2007 legislative elections and the failure of the party to maintain 
its pre-eminence shows the importance of the support to the party that was based on its 
charismatic leader Ibrahim Rugova. Indeed, his disappearance threw the party into chaos as 
internal succession fights were set off and led to the loss of a significant support for the 
party.621  
Furthermore, the history of Albanian political parties is plagued by party divisions. 
The pattern traditionally involves the challenge of a charismatic leader within a party that 
leads to the creation of a dissident party.622 This model of division has led to the creation of a 
number of small parties that, with the notable exception of the Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo (AAK), did not even manage to take away support from the mother party.623 
Although challenges to the mainstream line and creation of new parties could be beneficial to 
democracy, this is not the case in Kosovo, as usually the cause of schism is based on an issue 
of personal discord and does not involve the party’s policies.624 In fact the new parties formed 
in this way inevitably fail to bring any new argument or policies to the Kosovo political scene. 
The failure of those new parties to do so is partly due to the crucial lack of this being on the 
agenda for all parties, where the support for the main parties lies in the vigour with which 
they promise what everybody wants – in this precise case independence – and in trying to 
undermine opposition parties with their failures to do so. 
The Kosovo Albanian political scene is mainly characterised by its historical 
development. In the 1990s, the Kosovo Albanian community was united around its 
charismatic leader Ibrahim Rugova, who led the pacific resistance against the Serbian 
totalitarian state. The party’s legitimacy relied on the establishment of successful parallel 
institutions and its non-violent strategy in the hope that this policy would win the support of 
the international community to the Kosovo Albanian cause.625 The failure of this strategy,626 
as well as its failure to prevent the deterioration of the socio-political conditions in the 
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province, led to a deterioration of the party’s legitimacy. Indeed, it encouraged the rise of 
military alternative to pacific resistance and resulted in the creation of the UÇK.627 The 
division between the two strategies became obvious first at the Rambouillet negotiations and 
intensified with the ensuing bombing that followed, with the UÇK winning increasing support 
from the Albanian population. In the wake of the conflict, the Democratic Party of Kosovo 
(PDK), the political wing of the UÇK, filled the power vacuum left by retreating Serbian civil 
servants and proclaimed itself the legitimate representative of Kosovo’s Albanians.628 In this 
regard, the PDK based its legitimacy on the UÇK’s active involvement in the ‘liberation war 
against Serbian oppression’. As Cocozzeli puts it: ‘it claims to represent those who have 
sacrificed the most for the war effort is backed up by the provision of social services and 
assistance, primarily to the legitimately poor, but also to the war affected’.629 This attempted 
coup crystallised the divisions within the Albanian community. The beginning of the post-
conflict Kosovo Albanian political scene was marked by chaos and violence. This violence 
reflected the struggle culture in which the Kosovo Albanian society grew in the last years and 
decades leading to the NATO airstrikes.630 
A notable exception to this pattern is the AAK. The party issued from the split of its 
leader, Ramush Haradinaj from the PDK leadership. The success of this party rests on a 
couple of factors. The first was the charisma of the party leader, a general of the UÇK, 
considered as a war hero, coming from a family renowned for its involvement in the guerrilla 
warfare that occurred at end of 1990s;631 but also because of its popularity in interacting with 
international circles.632 After realising that Hashim Thaçi and his party would not be as easily 
manipulated as originally expected,633 United States diplomats supported the dissident 
Haradinaj. Yet, far from being a puppet, Haradinaj managed to use this support to present a 
modern style party.634 His charismatic image of war hero enabled him not to have to prove his 
allegiance to the Albanian cause, giving him the freedom to promote the creation of a 
                                                
627 Tröbs, Op. Cit., p. 10; Cocozzelli, Op. Cit.  
628 de Vrieze, Op. Cit., p. 15. 
629 Cocozzeli, Op. Cit. 
630 ‘Effondrement de la Scène Politique Albanaise’ in AIM, 21 May 1999; Mushkolaj, I., ‘Qui Lance des bombes 
Contre la Ligue Démocratique du Kosovo ?’ in IWPR, 30 November 1999; Kelmendi, M., ‘Le Schisme Inter-
Albanais’ in Java, 16 January 2003.  
631 Hamzai, B., A Narrative About War and Freedom, Zëri, Prishtina, 2000. 
632 Cocozzeli, Op. Cit. 
633 Dérens, J-A. & C. Samary., Les Conflits Yugoslaves, L’Edition de l’Atelier, Paris, 2000, p. 298. 
634 Interview with Arta Ramaj, Party Development, Democratisation department, OSCE, Prishtina, June 2004. 
 182 
multiethnic party.635 Although the multiethnicity of his party remained limited, he openly 
promoted an open hand policy towards minority members.636 In particular, after being elected 
as prime minister in 2004, he was seen meeting Kosovo Serbs politicians openly in cafes of 
Prishtina without specific protection.637 The support from international actors that he secured 
for his party enabled him to build a modern type of party, as proven by the structure of the 
party and a more modern and socially minded political agenda.638 Yet the success of this party 
has been short lived as, despite some signs of modernisation, the party still rests on its 
charismatic leader, and has failed to pursue its stated agenda after Haradinaj was indicted and 
imprisoned in The Hague.639  
In the same manner, the end of the conflict revealed the growing divisions within the 
Serb community.640 Milošević’s policies at the international and national levels increasingly 
divided the political scene in Belgrade. What the Serbs considered their ‘loss’ of Yugoslavia 
and the ensuing economic sanctions imposed on Serbia in the early 1990s increasingly 
brought the elites opposed to Milošević to monopolise the growing discontent of the 
population, which was suffering increasingly from the difficult living conditions in the 
Republic. Yet, the unity demonstrated by the anti-Milošević movement in 2000 was highly 
artificial and the coalition that resulted was very unstable. In the following year, the question 
of the delivery of war criminals to the Hague Tribunal and the issue of joining the 
Stabilisation and Association agreement increasingly weighed on the political scene in 
Belgrade.  
Belgrade’s political divisions were reflected on the Kosovo Serb political scene. Yet, 
this division was further complicated by more pragmatic fault lines. The gap between the 
Serbs living north of the Ibar and those living in enclaves increasingly deepened. The former, 
relying on services provided by Belgrade could afford to maintain a radical policy. Their 
policy stand was one of staunch opposition to the international authority and Kosovo’s 
institutions, placing their ‘belief’ in legitimacy in Belgrade’s authority. The latter, suffering 
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increasingly from the lack of many basic necessities, at first became radicalised,641 but 
increasingly came to terms with the fact that they would have to cooperate to some extent 
with the local institutions.642 The worsening of the relationship between Belgrade and 
UNMIK/ Kosovo institutions inevitably affected the living conditions of some segments of 
Kosovo Serb society. Increasingly, Belgrade’s policy shifts raised discontentment as it 
appeared to enclave Serbs that their difficult living conditions were not the focus of Serbia’s 
policy but indeed had become a bargaining tool within Belgrade’s political circles.643 
Ultimately, some agreed to participate in the new institutions, organising themselves within a 
coalition (KP) to increase their weight, and withdrawing from the process when they deemed 
that Kosovo’s institutions did not promote their interests.  
3. Institutional Framework: Trials and Errors644 
In June 1999, although the violence had officially ended, the province faced a deeply 
divided society, in the grip of nationalist claims exacerbated by the pain of the conflict, and a 
total lack of governmental structures needed to respond to the humanitarian, economic and 
social crises left by the hostilities. To deal with the underlying struggle, the international 
actors had to quickly find solutions to the issues that undermined the establishment of a stable 
governmental structure capable of administering the province. This task appeared problematic 
in a socio-political scene that clearly did not have the basic requirements for the establishment 
and flowering of liberal democracy:645 democratic principles and concepts rooted in the 
society; integration of the different segments of society; responsiveness to different groups’ 
expectations; moderation of tensions between the different political forces; and appeasement 
of group cleavages. Yet, pressed by the international community and the humanitarian 
situation, UNMIK had to launch an emergency strategy to plant and develop the institutions 
needed to govern the province.646  
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a. Provisional Institutions of Self-Government  
The first task of the international administration has been to prevent the cooptation of 
power by victorious local extremist elites. Yet, in the face of the growing demand for self-
management, UNMIK has set in place a number of policies to organise a political system that 
would respond to those demands while maintaining the multiethnic society ideal. Those 
policies aim to enforce a common political system, one which would encompass all segments 
of Kosovo society. The first attempt at a multiethnic political system came about with the 
adoption of regulation 2000/1 after long and arduous negotiations.647 This regulation 
established formally the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) as the organ that would 
administer Kosovo until the establishment of democratically elected institutions. The aim of 
this structure was, first, to initiate the transfer of power, monopolised by the international 
community and yearned for by extremist elites, to ‘the people’. The second aim was to 
prevent a takeover by UÇK and to enable other political and ethnic factions, including 
Kosovo’s Serbs, to participate in decision-making. The JIAS system, headed by the Special 
Representative, is based on three institutions: the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), the 
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) and a system of co-administered ministerial 
departments.648 All organs are composed of international civil servants and of local 
representatives, the latter being selected on the basis of a quota system enabling proportional 
representation between the different ethnic and political groups. Franklin de Vrieze notes an 
interesting aspect regarding the KTC: ‘[i]ts formation reflected the UNMIK aspiration to 
include a broad spectrum of Kosovo civil society into the administration’. Indeed eminent 
members of the civil society, well known intellectuals and journalists such as Veton Surroi or 
Blerim Shala were invited to take part in the institutions. Yet, despite this promising attempt 
to include the civil society in decision-making, this practice was not pursued in succeeding 
institutional frameworks. Furthermore, in practice JIAS only enjoyed a consultative role. The 
final decision making power continued to rest in the hands of the Special Representative and 
the international civil servants remained the actual decision-makers on crucial issues. Despite 
the limited role of local representatives in the decision making process, this system enabled 
the introduction of power sharing mechanisms at all levels of the political system. However, 
regardless of its multi-ethnic character, the system failed to convince the local Serb 
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community to participate in the new institutions. They refused to participate in the various 
councils, but demanded alternatively ad hoc observation posts.  
At the local level, the promulgation in August 2000 of Regulation 2000/45 established 
the roles and powers of the municipal assemblies.649 This document attributes to local 
authorities decision-making powers regarding health, education, and the economy at the local 
level, while reinforcing multiethnic management at the municipal level. After a period of 
hesitation due to the unstable political environment, municipal elections were held in October 
2000 to replace the local institutions – which had been monopolised by UÇK members – by 
‘elected representatives, and thus to strengthen and legitimise the multiethnic system 
established.  
With the holding of violent less pluralist elections, the international mission seemed to 
have achieved some relative success in setting the foundations for a new political system. 
Nevertheless, UNMIK’s monopoly over the executive, legislative and judicial powers at the 
central level, as well as its inability to guarantee the participation of the Serbian community in 
the new institutions, brought into question the legitimacy of the institutions as a whole, and 
thus weakened the stability of the system itself. The need for an institutional structure that 
would grant more power to Kosovo’s representatives and guarantee the protection and 
participation of minorities became imperative.  
b. Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government  
The launch of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in May 
2001 marked the first decisive step of UNMIK towards securing the legitimacy of its policy 
and that of the new institutions in the province.650 The fourteen-chapter document deliberately 
failed to tackle the issue of the future status of the province, but rather aimed to lay out the 
structure of the ‘provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government’, the 
foundation for the introduction of democratic practices and the base for a sustainable 
system.651 In fact the title itself of the document was purposely given as a ‘Constitutional 
Framework’ and not ‘constitution’, against Kosovo Albanian wishes, so as to prevent the 
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feeling that the mission was pushing towards the establishment of independence, and 
consequently to ensure the support of Belgrade and Kosovo’s Serbs.652 
The Constitutional Framework laid the foundations of an institutional structure 
reflective of UNMIK’s democratic aspirations: separation of powers; establishment of an 
elected parliamentarian assembly, government, a representative president indirectly elected; 
and provisions for the devolution of a number of local competencies to elected municipal 
assemblies.653 Due to the fragile nature of the political system in Kosovo, the international 
community adopted – as its underlying approach to the Framework – the method of 
progressive devolution of power. The international administration was to initially retain the 
prerogative over key competencies – i.e., justice and the police – and gradually hand them 
over to local institutions as they built up their capacity to cope with the tasks assigned to 
them. Other devices, such as power-sharing mechanisms or regulatory powers granted to the 
Special Representative, were also designed within the framework to respond specifically to 
the concerns of ethnic minority issues. 654 
In its design, the Constitutional Framework attempted to find a compromise between 
the expectations of both Serbs and Kosovo’s Albanians. Through the establishment of locally 
run executive and legislative bodies in charge of substantial governance issues, the 
Framework seeks to respond to Kosovo Albanian calls for self-government, while using a 
certain degree of consociational mechanisms; at the same time, the Special Representatives’ 
reserved powers aim to ensure minority participation in the institutions, control any counter-
democratic tendencies and guarantee a de jure Serbian sovereignty over the province. The 
attempt to respond to these divergent expectations, while assuring the inclusion of all ethnic 
groups in the political process and obtaining the support of Serbia is a clear indication of 
UNMIK’s determination to secure legitimacy for the new institutions to sustain a stable 
democratic political system.  
In practical terms, the Framework generated a number of positive achievements, such 
as the participation, to some extent, of some Kosovo Serbs in the province’s institutions – 
which had not been the case until then – and the organisation of operational legislative and 
executive bodies. Yet, those achievements did not succeed in masking the Constitutional 
Framework’s failures. The initial optimism of having gained the Kosovo Serbs’ support in the 
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institutions, with the participation of a minority of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary 
elections and the participation of a Kosovo Serb coalition in parliament, soon faded. The 
frequent Serb self-suspension from parliament, the widespread parallel institution network 
and the very controversial nature of their participation in the new institutions are clear 
indications of the overall lack of Kosovo Serb support for them. The Serbs in general 
considered those institutions to be a preamble to the independence of the province. Clearly a 
small minority of Kosovo Serbs were willing to participate in the system, not out of 
conviction, but out of resignation. Due to their lack of resources and institutional support as 
well as of an alternative place to live, they believed that not to lose the little that they had left 
– i.e. house, lands, etc – they would have to cooperate with Kosovo’s central government.655 
On the Albanian side, the establishment of the first self-governing institutions encouraged 
ambitions to push forward for independence. The first sessions of the parliamentary assembly 
were literally high jacked to the independence cause, with different attempts by the Albanian 
parliamentarians to proclaim independence, or overrule Serbia’s decisions affecting what was 
still, under international law, their territory.656 The Special Representative’s reserved power 
and other consociational stipulations were perceived by the Kosovo Albanians as excessive, 
undemocratic and in total breach of their right to self-determination. Their inability to have an 
effect on the status of the province and to enjoy full self-determination entitlements, such as 
foreign relations, increasingly alienated the support of Kosovo’s Albanians to what came to 
be perceived as theatre governance. 
The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government is incontestably a 
fundamental document in the transitional process of the Kosovo political system. It managed 
to lay out a comprehensible institutional structure to integrate minority groups, responding to 
some divergent demands and maintaining the international status quo while not impeding the 
future status of the province. Given the particularly hostile environment in which it was 
elaborated, shaped by the profound grievances and mutually exclusive demands of the deeply 
divided society that is Kosovo, those achievements represent a creditable first step in the 
transition. Yet, the arrangements failed to satisfy either side, thereby demonstrating the 
indisputable need for further policies to sustain the system.  
                                                
655 Interview Milorad Todorović, Op. Cit.  
656 23 May 2002 assembly resolution on condemnation of the February 2001 border agreement between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Cf. Surroi, V., ‘Assembly 
surpassed its competencies’ in Epoka e Re, 27 May 2002. [Translated in UNMIK Media Monitoring]. 
 188 
c. Concerns 
Despite the efforts of the international administration to establish a coherent 
democratisation process, a number of concerns marred their efforts and ultimately affected the 
legitimacy of the new governance system. The major issues Kosovo’s new political system 
faced were: (1) the power sharing mechanisms embedded in the Constitutional Framework; 
(2) the ‘reserved powers’ and the disproportionate powers of the Special Representative; (3) 
the failure of elections to legitimise the system; and (4) the enduring Serb issue. 
i) Power Sharing Mechanisms 
Beyond the initial criticisms that dogged the Constitutional Framework when it was 
first introduced, the power sharing mechanisms it entailed were critical to the difficulties 
encountered in legitimising the new institutions. Despite a number of flaws, consociational 
arrangements are central in the literature on conflict regulation and have been adopted as the 
foundation for numerous post-ethnic conflict peace building efforts.657 Carefully designed to 
ensure power sharing, proportionality and a reasonable local autonomy, Kosovo’s institutional 
framework aimed to empower the majority group while assuring minority participation. 
Despite this legitimate aim, this power-sharing model was criticised on the basis that it 
entrenched differences and failed to assure the institutions’ legitimacy.  
Consistent with traditional criticisms of such power sharing mechanisms, Kosovo’s 
Albanians blamed the Constitutional Framework’s minority protection mechanisms for being 
undemocratic. Traditionally, ‘consociational’ proportionality has ensured that non-
homogeneous populations have a natural balance of power between the different groups. 
However, in Kosovo, Albanians form about ninety percent of the population,658 so the 
mechanisms in this case were specifically designed by UNMIK to outweigh the numerical 
disadvantage of the minorities and prevent a majority dictatorship. On the other hand, the 
Albanian ninety percent majority resented the outweighing mechanisms that granted up to 
twenty-five percent of the one hundred and twenty parliamentary seats to minorities.659 
Unreflective of the demographics, in a society where numerical superiority is a precondition 
for ethnic survival and a source of power, Kosovo Albanians felt the power given to the 
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disproportional minority represented an unjust and a further obstacle to their legitimate 
national goal of self-determination. Despite the need to maintain mechanisms for minority 
protection, those measures became the focus of the majority’s discontent towards minorities 
and perceived as an obstacle to the majority’s belief in the institutions’ legitimacy, thus 
furthering the problem of ethnic polarisation. 
Beyond the Kosovo Albanian resentment of such mechanisms, consociational 
arrangements represented a further obstacle to the institutions’ legitimacy, as they polarised 
the society along ethnic lines. Ensuring and protecting representation on an ethnic basis 
entailed that only representatives of an ethnic group are capable of protecting it from other 
groups’ coercion and domination. Entrusted with this role, experience has shown that political 
elites then tend to focus their actions on this protective role and neglect other crucial socio-
economic concerns. It has been argued that in post-conflict situations, consociational 
arrangements were, if not the top alternative, at least the best political compromise for 
regulating the smouldering conflict.660 This statement is probably true for Kosovo, as at the 
end of the conflict consociational arrangements enabled reasonable multicultural foundations 
for the new institutions. Nevertheless, in the long run, ethnically focused politics – as 
demonstrated by the Albanian resentment towards minority protection mechanisms – only 
lead to the deepening of tensions between various political forces and increased inter-group 
cleavages. It is usually argued that in deeply divided societies, cross-ethnic politics would be 
a utopian dream. However, Kosovo’s institutions needed to ensure legitimacy, and under the 
cover of the transitory period, sought specific policies to achieve such a political ideal. In 
order to secure such policies, appropriate protections against ethnic retaliation fears needed to 
be ensured, to free the political discourse and allow institutional attention to focus on the 
specific socio-economic issues of the society as a whole.  
ii) ‘Reserved Powers’ 
The ‘reserved powers’ of the Special Representative, granted under chapter eight of 
the Constitutional Framework, constitute a specific conflict regulation mechanism aimed at 
minority protection. They enable the head of the international administration to block any 
legislative or executive decision that could be considered as anti-constitutional or hostile 
toward minorities and their rights. In the case of Kosovo, ‘reserved powers’ were 
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institutionalised to replace the traditional consociational minority veto that can potentially 
block the decision-making process, leading to the constant rejection of policies, and 
ultimately, to a political dead end. Despite the crucial importance of those powers in post-
conflict Kosovo, their institutionalisation entailed a major flaw: their lack of any 
accountability mechanisms. Despite the awkward situation of UNMIK setting up institutions 
in a foreign state, ruling over a foreign population, the international administrator is, by law, 
not required to be accountable to either the sovereign state or the Kosovo population. Far 
from any democratic principle, the ‘reserved powers’ grant UNMIK a totalitarian capacity, 
dismissing elected decisions and representatives, without providing Kosovo’s population with 
the most crucial of democratic devices: accountability.  
As the international administration attempted to establish elected institutions which 
were supposed to be accountable to and representative of the will and the soul of the people, 
UNMIK set up a supra institutional body that could override their decisions. This 
phenomenon left the Kosovo Albanian elite feeling deceived and coerced into giving their 
trust to an arrangement which in itself was not managed in accordance with the purported 
democratic principles of the new system. Just as in the other power sharing mechanisms, these 
reserved powers became an essential regulatory mechanism in post-conflict Kosovo, 
dominated as it was by ethnic fears and grievances. Since its application, the Special 
Representatives have used their powers to essentially coerce the parliament into turning away 
from their agenda for independence, and to focus instead on what they believed to be the 
genuine problems of Kosovo. Nevertheless, in the long run, UNMIK continued to send mixed 
messages to the Kosovo population and ultimately jeopardized the population’s belief, trust 
and respect for their institutions. 
iii) Elections as Legitimation 
Elections are the link between the citizens and their institutions. Through their votes, 
citizens can show their support for the policies of a candidate and, should the candidates not 
fulfil their mandate, the citizens can vote them out in the next round. Thus, the election 
process legitimises the political system through the expression of the people’s belief. Yet, in 
the case of international administration led institution building in post-conflict societies, 
Kaldor notes that ‘elections are often held as an exit strategy for the international 
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community’.661 The holding of elections is presented as the achievement of democratisation; 
the administration has fulfilled its mandate and can therefore retire. This false syllogism 
demonstrates that indeed elections have become a means for the international administration 
to legitimise itself to the international community.  
 In 2000, the Kosovo political scene was characterised by chaos, where political 
interactions were ruled by violence. In this context, the effect of organising elections was 
questioned, given that conditions overruled by fear was not were not favourable for holding 
fair and meaningful campaigns. Besides, holding polls in such conditions threatened to 
legitimise extremists. Yet, Special Representative Bernard Kouchner insisted on holding 
elections as soon as possible to settle the basis for the institutions he had been developing. 
After the holding of violence-free elections, UNMIK congratulated itself for what it portrayed 
as a success.662 The Kosovo Albanian turnout was significant, and the election result balanced 
power between the two main contenders, tilting slightly towards the party the international 
community considered less radical.663 Yet this result failed to show the motivations of the 
voters, a vast majority of whom had voted in what they considered a plebiscite for 
independence.664 In practical terms, those elections technically enabled the replacement of 
self-proclaimed UÇK municipal governments with elected representatives. Yet, the actual 
effectiveness of the new assemblies proved to be very poor. Elected mostly on a program 
supporting independence and not the development of a local economy or social services, the 
representatives settled into the roles of critics of UNMIK’s policies, which they blamed on the 
basis of the lack of transfer of competencies at the municipal level. In the next municipal 
polls, most of the representatives were re-elected on the basis of personality; thus they were 
not sanctioned on the basis of their inefficiency.  Finally, despite the huge turnout for what 
was largely portrayed as the first democratic elections in the province, the Kosovo Serb 
population boycotted on a large scale what they considered as an illegitimate vote.665 In an 
effort to comply with the requirement to reflect the multiethnic nature of municipalities in 
their assemblies, with no elected Serb representatives, UNMIK was obliged to reserve seats 
for the Kosovo Serbs, who eventually might wish to participate; in vain. In order to secure 
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their voting in the next elections, UNMIK entered on a regular basis into discussions with the 
Kosovo Serb elites, the Coordination Centre, and ultimately Belgrade. Agreements with the 
Serb authorities to support the participation of Serb voters resemble increasingly a bargaining 
process between the international administration and the Serb authorities, casting a veil over 
the actual legitimacy of a vote where the minority needed to be ‘bought out’. 
A last note on the electoral process relates to the actual electoral laws designed by the 
international administration, in particular the issue of open party lists. A segment of Kosovo 
Albanian elites called on the international community to allow an open list system in the 
general elections. The basis for this call was the rigid party structure that did not permit the 
constant renewal of party elites. They argued that enabling electors to choose their 
representatives from within a list would increase representativeness and counter the grip of 
the old political elites on their parties and Kosovo political life. Yet, the international 
administration refused this proposition on the grounds that instead of enhancing democracy, 
this system would favour nepotism, and preferred to enforce stricter rules on list formation, 
such as the obligation to have a woman for every three names on the list. 
Elections in Kosovo have had mixed results. Generally portrayed as a ‘success’ for the 
international community because of the participation of the Kosovo Albanian population, it 
failed to show the actual poor support for the new institutions by the Kosovo population. 
Indeed participation does not automatically imply support. Holding elections where people 
participated and mechanically elected representatives enabled UNMIK to proclaim, for the 
benefit of the international community, that the democratisation process in Kosovo was 
ongoing, reassuring themselves that they were fulfilling their mandate. Yet, the lack of 
participation of the minority and the actual lack of political power and the inefficiency of the 
institutions failed to legitimise the system itself.  
iv) The Enduring Serb ‘Minority’ Issue  
Beyond the inconsistencies of institutional design, ethnic-related issues also 
undermined the new institutions. Despite UNMIK’s attempts to develop inclusive institutions, 
Kosovo’s political system remained anchored in ethnic terms. Keeping in mind Serb 
grievances against UNMIK and the new political institutions, two elements of the Serb 
‘minority’ question still represent a major obstacle to the new institutions’ legitimisation:  the 
phenomenon of parallel institutions and the problem of returns.  
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The concept of parallel institutions sprang from the Serbs’ resentment of the loss of de 
facto sovereignty over their heartland, and was a response to the inability of the international 
administration to secure protection and the appropriate living conditions for the Serb minority. 
Embittered, Belgrade entered into a harmful competition with UNMIK, de facto undermining 
the new, autonomous institutions. Conscious that the stability of the new system relied on the 
peoples’ belief in the legitimacy of the institutions – and therefore on the support and 
integration of all segments of the population – Belgrade sought to fill the institutional vacuum 
before the international administration could. This move aimed to take advantage of the 
inability of UNMIK to provide for the Kosovo Serbs’ needs, and was meant to secure 
Belgrade the allegiance of the Kosovo Serbs and their consequent rejection of the new system. 
In practice, Serb parallel institutions have had two significant consequences: for the Kosovo 
Albanians, and more importantly, for the Kosovo Serbs themselves.  
Perceiving its moves as an act of sabotage, Kosovo Albanians resented Belgrade’s 
manipulation of their self-governing institutions. The Kosovo Serb endorsement of the 
parallel system and their unwillingness to take part in the new institutions provided the 
Kosovo Albanians with a justification against granting more rights to minorities. Since the 
Kosovo Serbs were believed to have no interest in the success of the democratisation and 
stabilisation of Kosovo, some Kosovo Albanian elites promoted their exclusion whenever 
possible. Within the Kosovo Serb community, the establishment of those parallel institutions 
had a further divisive effect. As a result of their access difficulties and the ability of the 
international administration to keep a tighter control over their enclaves, the parallel 
institutions soon could not be sustained. Living in these challenging conditions and unable to 
receive assistance from Serbia, an increasing number of enclave Serbs had a strong incentive 
to cooperate with the new Kosovo institutions.666 Participation in Kosovo’s autonomous 
institutions was considered and depicted in Serbian nationalist rhetoric as cooperation with 
the Albanians in their efforts to rip the Serbian heartland from the Serbs. Portrayed as traitors, 
the Kosovo Serb political elite that decided to participate in the new institutions became the 
object of sharp criticism and public denigration campaigns in Belgrade. 
The difficult living conditions experienced by Serbs in Kosovo were constantly 
exploited by Belgrade spin-doctors and blamed, at best, on the inability of the international 
administration to secure protection for the Serbian community; or of a deliberate international 
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policy to cleanse Kosovo of its minority at worst. In either case, UNMIK faced the real 
problem of ethnic grievances expressed in the harassment of minority populations, which tend 
to frighten away possible Serbian returnees. In line with Resolution 1244 and its goal of 
establishing a multicultural stable democracy, the international administration was conscious 
of, but unable to provide for, a safe environment for both the return of displaced Serbs and 
their expressions of support for the new political system.667  
Belgrade’s parallel institution policy clearly succeeded in undermining the legitimacy 
of the new Kosovo institutions by forcing a sense of alienation on the Kosovo Serbs and by 
creating further ethnic cleavages between Serbs and Albanians. They worsened the chances of 
legitimisation by further dividing the already weak Kosovo Serb group, creating further 
internal cleavages and fomenting unsolvable divisions between the population living north of 
the Ibar River and the one living in the enclaves. The international administration’s attempted 
responses to this new challenge were inadequate. Despite the opening of an UNMIK office in 
Mitrovica North in spring 2002, Serb civil servants still received a second salary from 
Serbia.668 In addition, courts north of Ibar still recognised Serbian jurisdiction. Lastly, the 
denigration campaigns against Serb officials involved in the new UNMIK institutions were 
virulent. As the new institutions had to ensure the support of the Serb minority to secure 
legitimacy, it was essential that the international administration actively pursue policies 
specifically targeting ethnic cleavages. Yet, considering the nature and intensity of the 
cleavages, the short-term solutions that were provided by UNMIK were like band-aids on a 
knife wound. Specific support for minority living conditions was needed, as well as a bigger 
return to targeted projects so essential to winning the hearts and minds of Kosovo’s Serbs.  
4. Decentralisation 
Decentralisation commonly appears in states where the population has entrusted 
political legitimacy in segmented distinct groups which require access to decision-making 
power.669 As the literature demonstrates, a number of decentralisation options are offered to 
multiethnic states to enforce devolution, and thus ownership, to all segments of the 
heterogeneous society. The primary goal of what is called here decentralisation is to respond 
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to specific demands for access to political decision-making through an appropriate amount of 
devolution of power. This concept is not innovative, but it has become a central concern of 
international administrations involved in the establishment of modern state apparatuses upon 
multiethnic territories. 
The arguments generally advanced to justify the need for decentralisation in ethno-
national states centre on the ability to find a mechanism to distribute political power among 
the different segments of the society in a manner perceived as legitimate by the various 
factions. First, decentralisation provides limits to the central authority. ‘It introduces a type of 
control over central government… [it] allows a system of checks and balances which is likely 
to set limits on the central government in its attempts to overstep or abuse its powers’.670 
Second, decentralisation aims to enhance numerical minority group participation in the 
political process through enhancing their political weight in decision-making process. It 
attempts to protect them from the failures in political systems – such as the risk of the so-
called ‘majority dictatorship’. Finally, it enables groups to deal with local issues on a 
localised level and leaves the possibility open for immediate issues to be dealt with more 
efficiently.  
However, decentralisation mechanisms also raise criticisms focused on the practical 
implications involved with their implementation.671 First, the establishment of decentralisation 
mechanisms on an ethnic basis is believed to reinforce and legitimise ethnic divisions instead 
of limiting conflicting antagonisms between groups. Second, the territorial implementation of 
decentralisation may be difficult to apply in situations where ethnic groups are not 
homogeneously distributed. The new territorial division(s) will inevitably create new 
numerical minorities, which in turn will grow dissatisfied with the new political settlement. 
Finally, the extensive devolution of political power is often viewed suspiciously by state-
minded critics who are concerned with its implications for issues of state sovereignty. The 
devolution of too many state prerogatives to homogeneous territories is feared to increase the 
chances of secession. The failures of decentralisation in such cases as in the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia – but not only these – which have allowed grave ethnic 
conflicts to foment, have spurred doubts within the international community as to the 
                                                
670 Kälin, W., ‘Decentralized Governance in Fragmented Societies: Solution or Cause of New Evils?’ presented 
at the Conference Facing Ethnic Conflicts, Center for Development Research, Bonn, 16 December 2000, p. 4. 
671 Kurti, A., ‘Is it true that an independent Kosova will inevitably be a mono-ethnic state, unless Serb 
communities - and their territories become autonomous?’ in di Lellio, Op. Cit., p. 145-154. 
 196 
adequacy of decentralisation mechanisms to respond adequately to the needs of multiethnic 
states. 
a. Decentralisation in Post-conflict Settlements 
Despite the shortcomings of political decentralisation that the Yugoslav and Soviet 
examples illustrate, and a palpable scepticism that can be sensed within certain segments of 
academia, federalism and other forms of political autonomy arrangements are still on the 
agenda of international peacemakers. In cases of post-ethnic conflict, the realities of the 
multiethnic state are even more acute, as the population is more divided as a direct 
consequence of the continued culture of violence embedded within the conflict. Fear and 
distrust of other groups is more intense, spurred by the displacement of large parts of the 
population that have usually suffered discrimination and abuse. More than ever, the 
challenges faced by the international community from claims to national self-determination 
have pressed peacemakers to reconsider the alternatives offered by decentralisation to appease 
various ethnic demands without threatening the balance of the international order. For the 
same reasons that made the model attractive for dealing with multiethnic states in the first 
place, decentralisation is used to deal with the demands for self-government of different 
groups.672 However, because of the more acute ethnic divisions and hatreds left by the 
conflict, the international community is faced with the burden of trying to establish 
autonomous arrangements sensibly, while also operating in an environment that threatens to 
make the implementation and success of these models even less likely. Beyond trying to 
provide the different ethnic groups equal access to decision making, the international 
community expects the model to provide faith in the political system. However, such 
reassurances are not entirely convincing for ethnic groups that have lost faith in both the 
system and the possibility of reconciliation due to the deep divisions left by the violent nature 
of the conflict. Hoping to stabilise the entity, the international community has aimed to 
appease these secession claims with the goal of ultimately preserving a weakened and loosely 
held together state. Decentralisation is no longer a factor of democratic advancement but 
becomes a political device against secession. 
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An attachment to decentralisation as the means of choice to regulate conflict is heavily 
reflected in the contemporary literature, where advocates have re-actualised and refined the 
concepts, in an attempt to bring solutions to some of the models’ failures. A classic example 
can be found in literature involved in the Dayton or Ohrid settlements of the Bosnian and 
Macedonian crises, where Lijphart’s ‘consociational’ or Horowitz’ ‘integrative’ arrangements 
are said to be unavoidable, even if deployed in some hybrid form.673 In other words, 
decentralisation has become a major component for providing long-term solutions to the 
problems of post-conflict regulation. However, the assumptions and principles underlining 
decentralisation need to be reworked and re-examined in relation to addressing the causes of 
ethnic conflicts if it is to be at all tenable. 
Two broad categories of decentralisation models are offered in the academic literature 
and in international practice: territorial decentralisation and, non-territorial arrangements. The 
first category is the most commonly implemented, for practical reasons. As John Coakley 
reminds us in the introduction to his book, the demands of ethnic groups nearly always have 
territorial implications.674 In addition, modern states, through the exercise of their 
governmental prerogatives and sovereignty rights, involve an inescapable territorial 
dimension. Alternatively, to respond to the criticism that ethnic groups are rarely distributed 
homogeneously on a contiguous territory, scholars have attempted to articulate a model of 
autonomy that would satisfy certain demands of dissenting groups through non-territorial 
autonomous arrangements.675 Each model has its advantages, disadvantages and 
inconveniences, which makes the practical implementation of decentralisation models in post-
conflict situations arduous. 
Scholars have developed a further literature on hybrid forms of these models: two 
among these are the ‘asymmetric federation’ and the canton system.676 Asymmetric federation 
aims for units within a state to gain additional autonomy from central government, in relation 
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to other units or, in some cases, to the rest of the state – e.g. Italy, Spain.677 The canton 
system, also referred to as ‘communisation’, is an administrative territorial division that is 
usually specifically designed for territorialised ethnic groups in order to provide them with 
self-management.678 The degree of autonomy from central government is defined according to 
the decentralisation system adopted.679  
Finally, a word on the concept of non-territorial autonomy. Much less developed in 
the literature than in practice, this type of model aims to provide non-homogeneous groups 
with a certain degree of autonomy in fields that are not of common interest, such as culture or 
education.680 This model specifically aims to grant ethnic groups satisfaction in fields relevant 
to them while not disturbing existing ethnic territorial distributions, which can entail, as 
witnessed in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, large population movements. Free from the 
burden of dealing with core ethnic issues, a general administration in charge of current affairs 
can be established on a non-territorial basis. Some degree of local autonomy can be provided 
to these administrations, with specific power-sharing mechanisms, but such settlements 
cannot threaten the fulfilment of core ethnic interests through another apparatus that does not 
require ethnic territorial divisions.681 This type of autonomy arrangement appears particularly 
appealing to prevent ethnic entrenchments; yet it might be difficult to implement. In 
particular, specific mechanisms need to be developed to ensure the safety of isolated minority 
group members that a non-territorial arrangement would not provide for.682 
b. The Decentralisation Problem in Kosovo 
The international community was faced increasingly with the issue of the status and 
political future of the province. The precedents behind the settlement of ethnic conflict 
through decentralisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and Macedonia in 2002 provided 
some sorts of ‘lessons learned’ for peacemakers in Kosovo. In both these earlier cases, 
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decentralisation had proven to have made some positive strides in regards to the appeasement 
of tensions and the immediate conflict. However, in both cases, they have failed to provide 
any substantial reconciliation, strong political cooperation and/ or the taming of ethnic 
divisions in the longer term. In Kosovo, owing to the successes and failures of various 
decentralisation strategies, the debate surrounding decentralisation has become extremely 
polemical.683 Radically diverse solutions were suggested with significantly different 
outcomes, and new fears have grown among the different ethno-political actors of the 
province. Within academic and politics circles the theme of the decentralisation of Kosovo 
has revolved mainly around the issue of the accommodation of Kosovo Serbs in the new 
political system. Nonetheless, the issue of decentralisation in Kosovo in reality entails two 
dimensions: one external and one internal. 
i) External Decentralisation 
Although the decentralisation debate in Kosovo has mainly focused on internal 
political arrangements, the first and foremost dimension that should have been considered was 
the external dimension behind the devolution of power in the province. In other words, the 
first priority should have been to determine the future relationship of the province with what 
was, under international law, its sovereign state. After the end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, 
the international community through Resolution 1244 reaffirmed its recognition of the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Yugoslavia over the province, while acknowledging the right 
to self-government of Kosovo through ‘substantial autonomy’ and postponing the decision 
over the final status to a future date.684 Due to the diplomatic nature of the document, it 
remained relatively vague over a number of important and key issues. These included the 
relationship that should exist between Serbia and the province, the degree of autonomy that 
should be given to the province, and what alternatives would be available in regards to the 
final status of the province. In the meantime, the Constitution of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro – formerly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – explicitly stated that ‘the state 
of Serbia which includes … the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija’,685 thus 
waiving any confusion over the status of the province, making Kosovo clearly a sub-unit of 
the Federal state of Serbia. 
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In an attempt to enforce this idea, Belgrade has proposed down the years a number of 
decentralisation alternatives within Serbia. The most articulated was the proposal made by 
Prime Minister Đinđić before his assassination. He enunciated a proposal where Kosovo 
could be decentralised on an asymmetric federal basis, in which Kosovo Serbs would be 
granted the status of a ‘constituent people’ of Kosovo and would be able to retain an 
administrative link with the central government in Belgrade, while the Kosovo Albanians 
would enjoy strong autonomy within the province free from Belgrade’s involvement.686 Yet, 
accepting the realities on the ground, voices were increasingly raised to propose the 
independence of the province on the basis of an exchange of populations between the 
homogeneous Serb area north of the Ibar river and the Albanian dominated area of Southern 
Serbia. The latest proposal was met with reluctance from Serbs living in enclaves in that they 
did not favour either losing all constitutional links with their motherland or having to leave 
their homes and last belongings.687 On their side, the Kosovo Albanians unsurprisingly 
rejected as a whole anything less than independence. 
Despite their attempts to postpone the major issues involved in the situation of Kosovo 
so as to avoid further conflict,688 the international community was increasingly pressed by 
both Belgrade and Prishtina to come to terms with the question of status. Yet, as the 
international community was about to start talks over the status of the province at the 
beginning of January 2006, it was faced with very divergent alternatives, complicated by the 
multiplicity of actors and expectations.  
ii) Internal Self-Determination or Local Self-Government? 
In line with ethnic conflict regulation practice, decentralisation is strongly considered 
as an essential tool to empower the Kosovo Serb community and give them a sense of 
ownership within the boundaries of Kosovo. As the international community established new 
self-governing institutions – in accordance with Resolution 1244 – the problem of involving 
the Serbian minority has weighted increasingly on the process of legitimisation that requires 
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Serb identification with these new institutions. In addition to not taking part in local political 
life, the Serb-inhabited territories voluntarily maintained a system of parallel institutions, 
supported by Belgrade, which enabled them to live independently from Kosovo’s institutions. 
In order to secure the participation of Serbs in the first general elections and in attempts to 
solve the increasingly difficult and disgraceful situation in Mitrovica, the then Special 
Representative Michael Steiner put the idea of decentralisation on the table in 2002. The 
proposed decentralisation project consisted in institutionalising ethnically based self-
government. This project was first proposed on 1 October 2002 as part of Steiner’s ‘Seven 
Point Plan’ to solve the problem of Mitrovica.689 This plan entailed a bargain with the Serb 
population of North Mitrovica and a promise of allowing the formation of self-governing 
municipal units if they were to take part in the general election. This strategy was later 
extended to the rest of the Serb inhabited areas.690 Municipal units could be established for 
sizable non-majority communities within a municipality and could be composed of one or 
more villages, settlements and urban quarters. Such sub-units would be established on the 
basis of a request to have elected municipal assembly participants or through a petition from 
community residents’.691 In practice, this project aimed to ‘cantonise’ Kosovo along ethnic 
lines, as was done for the Bosnian model, and as a result is in total contradiction with the non-
territorially based precedent set by the Ohrid Agreement signed a year earlier.692 This project 
of the compartmentalisation of the province along ethnic lines was violently rejected by the 
Kosovo Albanian community because they saw the long-term possibility of territorially 
defined self-governing units choosing future secession from Kosovo.693 Steiner’s plan was 
eventually abandoned and the term ‘decentralisation’ became marked with a negative 
connotation. This forced the Special Representative to entrust the Council of Europe with 
looking into a more appropriate model of what has now been labelled ‘local self-government’. 
Unfortunately, by the time the Council of Europe presented its report nine months later, the 
new Special Representative Harri Holkeri did not believe in the relevance of a 
decentralisation/local self-government model, and left the Council of Europe and different 
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local initiatives drift away without any concrete results.694 After the March 2004 events, the 
issue of local self-government was placed once again on the institutional and political agenda. 
Given the history of the province and the particularly high political stakes, the implementation 
of decentralisation mechanisms proved difficult because of the need to obtain support from all 
segments of the society. Nevertheless, some sort of agreement appeared increasingly crucial 
for the institutional structure of the province. The positions of the ethnic groups were clearly 
diverging.  
Kosovo’s Serbs, after Steiner’s failure to provide his promise of self-governing 
municipal units, have launched in early 2003 their own Union of Serb Municipalities.695 This 
movement, supported by the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija, aimed to create 
‘the reorganisation of Kosovo Serbs in the sense of federalisation or the forming of two 
entities’.696 It established a de facto ethnic self-governing unit, which ironically reinforced 
what Steiner had aimed to weaken. This movement failed to gain the support of UNMIK, who 
did not believe it was well organised enough to be effective. Besides, this union only managed 
to alienate some parts of the Kosovo Serb population further, especially within the enclaves 
that were not benefiting from what remained of the north Ibar movement. Within Belgrade, 
the issue of decentralisation in Kosovo did not manage to gain a consensual view or change 
anyone’s position on the overall status of the province. Even if most proponents agree that 
administrative divisions should reflect ethnic territorial distributions, the fact that internal 
political feuds continue to hamper these wishes reflects the multiplicity of the plan proposed. 
In Prishtina, most Albanian parties have reconciled themselves to the idea of the creation of 
local self-governments rather than decentralisation, but have refused to consider 
cantonisation, which would imply hermetic territorial units that could evade central 
government and ultimately might form a basis for potential secession.697 Along with the 
recommendations of the Council of Europe, they supported the idea that administrative units 
must be drawn up using non-ethnic criteria and must retain a degree of connection with the 
central government. Under the pressure of responding to the failures underlined by the 
upsurge of March 2004, a Working Group on Local Government composed of international 
                                                
694 Interview with Owen Master, Op. Cit. 
695 Culafic, Z., ‘Serbs Unite’ in IWPR, 4 March 2003. 
696 Rada Trajković quoted in UNMIK Local Media Monitoring, 27 March 2003. 
697 Limani, Z. and Salihu, A., ‘A Contested Decentralisation Plan’ in IWPR, 4 March 2005.  
 203 
and local actors – yet without Serb representation – was established in May 2004 and released 
a Framework for the ‘Reform of Local Self-Government in Kosovo’ on 19 July 2004.698  
Yet with the launch of negotiations over the future of the province in October 2006, 
the issue of local self-government became subordinate to the issue of status. In fact, 
decentralisation did become the core of the Ahtisaari proposal on which the independence of 
Kosovo is based. As far as decentralisation is concerned, it should be kept in mind that despite 
its shortcomings, the Bosnian agreement had been negotiated and accepted by all parties. 
Support from the Kosovo Serbs and Albanian population is therefore essential to the future of 
the project. As some Kosovo Serbs, especially in some enclaves, are faced with harder living 
conditions and Belgrade’s solutions are increasingly viewed as counter-productive, a few are 
now willing to consider that their future might ultimately lie with mutual cooperation in 
Kosovo’s institutions.699 Yet, the rejection of Belgrade’s policy does not mean support for 
UNMIK’s. Furthermore, those Serbs still represent a small minority and more of them need to 
be convinced in order for the system to gain legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
Kosovo is the first articulated international attempt to democratise a territory from 
scratch. In 1999, when the international community took on board this mission, it was 
conscious of the extent of the challenge, and yet, it did not seem able to provide the 
appropriate means to fulfil the colossal task. Inscribed on a page of European history – the fall 
of Communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia – Kosovo, with its generalities and 
specificities demonstrates an obvious lack of democratic culture. Few of the conditions for a 
stable democratic political system existed here. Thus, if not impossible, its democratisation 
required careful planning and strict policies to first deal with the humanitarian crisis and then 
the development of a long-term democratisation strategy. Yet, this analysis of the institutional 
set-up in the province reinforces the argument that the international community did put more 
emphasis on legitimating themselves at the international level by providing a set of 
institutions and processes acceptable to the international community that mandated it, rather 
than on consolidating the institutions themselves through the integration of all segments of the 
society or their reinforcement within the civil society.  
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Yet, the study of the international administration’s institutional design, and more 
specifically, the observation of the trials and errors of those policies and their constant ad hoc 
adaptation to the new situation on the ground, gives us an important insight into the fact that 
the mission was aware of this deficiency and attempted to remedy it. It is interesting to note 
that the solutions provided were always considering further institutional alternatives and did 
not involve securing the process within the civil society, which is crucial for the process.700 
Yet, the observation of the institution building process in Kosovo clearly demonstrates the 
heaviness of the international and local imperatives involved, but also, a clear conscience on 
the issues and the will to pursue a democratisation policy despite the inimical environment. 
Alternatives like the emphasis on local government are a clear example of this trend. Yet, 
considering the complexity of the international and local imperatives, no one-size-fits-all 
solution is feasible. The next chapter examines the roots and alternatives offered to the 
pressing imperative of the status question which, despite the efforts of the international 
administration, has remained the main legitimating factor for the local population. This study 
will enable us to complete this analysis of legitimacy or its lack thereof in international post-
ethnic conflict regulation. 
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 Chapter 6 – Towards a ‘Final Status’ 
On 17 February 2008, the assembly of Kosovo declared independence. It was not the 
first time that the province’s legislative organ did so;701 yet it was the first time that it received 
some acknowledgement from the international community. This event has historical 
significance on two scores: (1) for the province, stuck in constitutional limbo for decades, this 
declaration demonstrated the will to make a decisive step towards a constructive change; (2) 
for the international community as a whole, as it was the first national self-determination 
movement based in Kosovo that found some support outside of the decolonisation context. 
Yet, in sharp contrast to the euphoria this declaration sparked among the Kosovo Albanian 
community,702 it did not produce a ‘done deal’ and has remained far from providing a 
conclusion to the ‘Kosovo Question’. Several issues that were left unanswered still need to be 
addressed appropriately to ensure the sustainability of the new equilibrium. Indeed, the 
institutions on which this new state relies are far from legitimate, let alone stable.  
Instead of providing a solution, the internationalisation of the Kosovo issue has 
complicated its overall matrix. The inability of the international community to take a common 
position over the future status of the province bears increasing consequences for the 
legitimacy of both the international administration and the Kosovo political system. 
Ultimately, international political concerns, under the cover of international law, have 
weakened the position of the international administration and enabled the entrenchment of the 
issue. In other words, an international concern became of the criterion for judging perceived 
local legitimacy. In this context, it would be difficult to finish a study of the international 
institution building exercise in Kosovo without considering the ‘final status’ issue. 
Thus, to conclude this research, I would like to reflect upon the issue of the final status 
of Kosovo and assess its significance for the legitimacy of the international action and the 
resulting framework. Political and academic circles have both emphasised the determinant 
role that the final status question had over the future development of the province.703 
Nonetheless, I argue that despite its importance in shaping the ‘beliefs’ of the Kosovo 
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population, the resolution of Kosovo’s status only proved marginal in the overall legitimacy 
framework of the province, owing to the fact that it remains greatly determined by 
international concerns. Indeed, the declaration of the independence of the province by its 
assembly and its recognition by a portion of the international community has only granted 
marginal legitimacy to the new state, and has not succeeded in bringing stability to the 
province. On the contrary, it has managed to divide the international community and place the 
province in a legal and political grey zone that the international community has so far not 
been able to fully handle.704  
To support this argument, I wish to map out the background to the status issue before 
analysing the current developments in Kosovo. I first consider the key elements that have an 
influence over the issue. In the light of those factors, I then review the different alternatives 
offered to the province, determining the strengths and weaknesses of each to understand the 
path eventually chosen by the international community. Finally, I review the option followed 
and analyse the implications of the current status for the legitimacy framework of the 
province.  
1. Issues 
After the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
an independent working group was commissioned by the Swedish Government to analyse the 
consequences of the Kosovo crisis and to evaluate options open for the province to resolve the 
pressing political, social and economic crises that existed. In late 2000, the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo published a report where it presented a number of status 
alternatives open to the province.705 At the base of the problem, the Independent International 
Commission identified ‘four essential elements’ that had to be addressed to provide 
reasonable alternatives to the conundrum: (1) ‘the relationship of the province to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’; (2) ‘the relationship of Kosovo’s institutions of self-government to 
any continuing UN administrative presence and to the NATO/KFOR security presence’; (3) 
‘the nature of Kosovo’s borders and its relationship to neighbouring states’; and (4) ‘the 
definition of Kosovo as an entity within the international community’.706 Key to the 
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settlement of a long-term solution for Kosovo, those points need to be considered to 
understand the issues at stake, and ultimately, to enable the development of a credible 
alternative for the province.  
a. Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
The relationship of the province to the Federation of Yugoslavia has been the key 
issue at the root of the ‘Kosovo Question’. For decades, successive constitutions of Socialist 
Yugoslavia have attempted to define and redefine the status of the province within the federal 
framework, without managing to satisfy fully all the parties involved. Prishtina was always 
pushing for more autonomy within – and later out of – the federation, while Belgrade 
consistently attempted to limit the province’s autonomy within its sovereignty.  
Beyond the relationship of the province to the federation lies the crucial question of 
the relationship of Kosovo to Serbia. The distinction is extremely important. On the one hand, 
by claiming an equal position within the federation, Kosovo’s Albanians refuse to recognise 
Serbia’s sovereignty over them. Instead, they present Kosovo on an equal footing with Serbia 
and the other Yugoslav Republics. On the other hand, Belgrade’s claim has been that Kosovo 
is defined within the Yugoslav framework only as part of Serbia, which is itself member of 
the federation. By withdrawing the status of Kosovo as a federal entity in the late 1980s, 
Belgrade attempted to restrain the latitude Kosovo had gained within the federation and to 
bring it back firmly within its realm. It wished not only to restrain the role of the province in 
the federation, but also to limit the influence of the federation over the province. From then 
on, the Federal Government’s sovereignty over the province could only be exercised through 
Serbia. 
The third dimension to the Kosovo-Yugoslavia/Serbia relation issue is the question of 
the Kosovo Serb community. Whatever long-term settlement the province will eventually 
adopt, the province is assured by the international community of its autonomy from the 
republic of Serbia;707 thus the status of the Kosovo Serb population in the new Kosovo entity 
and their relationship to the motherland becomes crucial – all the more so should the 
‘autonomy’ of the province vis à vis the Serbian state increase to outright ‘independence’.  
Before 1999, under the Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions, Kosovo’s Serbs enjoyed 
sovereignty within Kosovo as one of the ‘constituent people’ of the Republic of Serbia. With 
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the withdrawal of sovereignty in 1999, the Kosovo Serbs became de facto a minority within 
what was legally still part of their motherland. Besides the psychological problem of 
becoming a ‘minority’ within their own state, especially in the context of the former 
Yugoslavia, this raises a practical issue as regards the fulfilment of ‘national’ interests and the 
inability to influence decisions on crucial issues relevant to their community due to their 
numeral inferiority. To address this deficiency, two relationships need to be carefully 
designed: (1) the relationship of the Kosovo Serb community to Kosovo’s central institutions; 
and (2) the relationship of the community to their motherland: Serbia. The fulfilment of those 
two links has been perceived as mutually exclusive as it encompasses a sensitive web of 
cross-allegiances. If the community retains too strong a link to the motherland, fears of their 
lack of allegiance to the central institutions appear. In the same way, should they be forced to 
have strong links to the central authorities, the community fears the deterioration of their links 
with the motherland, which they clearly see as the only sincere defender of their community 
needs.708 In fact, a balance between the two is important. To respond specifically to this 
concern, three major proposals were elaborated: (1) granting Kosovo Serbs within the 
province’s new constitutional framework the status of ‘constituent people’; (2) developing 
models of decentralisation; and (3) redrawing borders and proceeding with the movement of 
populations, thus enabling the creation of ethnically pure zones.  
The first option was at the heart of the proposal of late Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić 
(DS).709 Although this labelling might seem trivial, it bears in fact important political and 
constitutional implications. In the context of the Former Yugoslavia, granting a ‘constituent 
people’ status to a national group gives them a number of inalienable rights. First, groups 
granted this status have in constitutional terms equal access to decision-making as other 
groups, irrespective of their demographics. Second, it enables them to benefit from minority 
protection mechanisms. Minority groups enjoying this status have a right of veto over 
decisions that they consider would violate their interests, which in normal circumstances their 
numerical minority would not allow them to outvote in a majority democratic system. Third, 
it grants them the opportunity to establish and maintain political and institutional links with 
their motherland. Finally and more crucially, although not clearly stated, this status implies a 
right of secession should they choose to exercise it. Given the emotional baggage the status of 
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a ‘constituent people’ has in the Former Yugoslav context, Kosovo’s Albanian political 
leaders remain reluctant to accept such a clause.  
The second option offered the Kosovo Serbs a better representative weight within the 
new institutions. Based on the model of ‘cantonisation’, this alternative would grant them a 
certain degree of autonomy from Kosovo’s institutions and enable the community to maintain 
close links with Serbia. In particular, the Serbian parliament’s proposal, adopted in unanimity 
in May 2004, entailed cultural and personal autonomy as well as specific protection 
mechanisms for cultural properties.710 The different plans which supported this concept, from 
Michael Steiner to Marti Ahtisaari’s proposals, have undergone strong criticism from 
Kosovo’s Albanian elites, who saw these as attempts to provide the Kosovo Serbs with an 
escape route from accepting the former’s sovereignty.711  
The third and more radical alternative implicitly acknowledged the loss of Kosovo for 
Serbia and a redrawing of Serbian internal and external borders. Far from providing a 
sustainable solution, this alternative generates new issues, such as that of entrenching 
homogeneous ethnic blocks living side by side in an unstable region like the Western Balkans, 
thus creating a potential future conflict spot.712 This alternative has been opposed by the 
international community and found little support within some segments of the Kosovo Serb 
and Kosovo Albanian communities. 
Clearly a sensitive issue and a source of conflict, the relationship of the province to its 
sovereign state’s being defined in constitutional terms makes it crucial to the long-term 
settlement of the Kosovo Question. In 1999, when the international administration initiated its 
work, Belgrade and Prishtina’s positions were the same as they had been at Rambouillet. If 
anything, NATO’s airstrikes only entrenched the positions of the protagonists as divisions 
between the communities were exacerbated. Conscious of the sensitivity of the issue, 
resolution 1244 remained purposefully equivocal on this aspect of the conflict so as to enable 
the appeasement of immediate tensions without influencing a final solution. Nonetheless, by 
recognising the sovereignty of Yugoslavia – and not Serbia – over Kosovo, and by supporting 
a large degree of autonomy for the new political institutions of the province, the resolution 
endeavoured to deceive the parties to the conflict into their own understandings of the 
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implications of the resolution, in a – failed – attempt to focus attention on immediate, crucial 
and more practical emergencies. Yet, the postponing of the status issue only led to further 
tensions.713 The sensitive nature of the issue places the international actors in the difficult 
position of facing diverging alternatives complicated by the multiplicity of actors and 
expectations. 
b. Kosovo’s Institutions and the International Administration 
The second element required to determine an appropriate settlement for the Kosovo 
question is that of the relationship between the new institutions and any eventual international 
mission. Lacking a political power capable of running the territory, the international 
community substituted itself as the sovereign state and the local government in order to 
manage a province in the grip of a deep social, economic and political crisis. As the local 
institutions are strengthened and begin to reclaim their natural power, yet conscious of their 
inability to run the province on their own,714 external help is still required. Yet, the role, 
mandate and terms of engagement of the international actors need to be clearly defined within 
the new framework. In concrete terms, the new international actor would need to play two 
essential roles in Kosovo’s ‘post-conflict settlement: as providers of technical support and as 
guarantors of the new status, which needs to be defined and codified in the settlement 
proposal.  
At the end of the NATO airstrikes, the province faced difficulties which Kosovo’s 
Albanian elites acknowledged they were unable to provide adequate answers to. Through its 
experience in dealing with transitional and democratising countries, the international 
community had gained a wealth of resources in the form of the technical expertise necessary 
for the management of Kosovo’s challenges. In particular, through its schemes of 
‘Stabilisation and Accession’, the European Union played a similar role in a number of other 
Western Balkan countries. This scheme is a European Union negotiation framework for 
Western Balkans countries. It consists of an agreement to provide tariff-free access to the 
European market as well as financial or technical assistance in exchange for commitments 
from the Balkan parties to undertake significant reforms in the fields of politics, economics, 
trade and human rights. This framework aims to help countries issuing from the dissolution of 
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Yugoslavia and Albania to reach European standards in the hope of eventually integrating 
them into the European Union. In practical terms, it set in place ‘carrot and stick’ mechanisms 
to motivate those countries, which went through a difficult transition period out of 
communism/socialism, to set in place policies to liberalise their economies, political scenes 
and societies.715  
Nonetheless, the most important role the international actor must play is as guarantor of 
the process. The difficulties encountered in the settlement of the final status come primarily 
from the problems fomented by the deep distrust between the parties and their reluctance to 
make concessions to each other. As bargaining tools to enforce the final status process, the 
international community could act as a guarantor of the good faith of the parties. In other 
words, the international community would ensure the security of both parties, in that each of 
the opposing sides would respect its engagement, through the imposition of sanctions on the 
party failing to fulfil their commitments. In this case, the European Union’s role is potentially 
crucial. Through its multi-layered framework system, the European Union has the potential to 
propose significant economic advantages that would appeal to both parties in accepting a 
compromise. The European Union favoured, from the beginning of its involvement, a 
resolution of the Kosovo question within a federal Yugoslavia, itself integrated within the 
accession framework.716 This solution was also pushed forward and implemented for the 
resolution of the Serbia/Montenegro issue.717 Yet, as the departure of Montenegro from the 
State Union in 2007 and the difficulties encountered by the stabilisation and accession 
negotiations with Serbia the following year demonstrated, the European Union’s incentives 
had only a limited effect. In the case of Kosovo, the option of the province remaining under 
Serbia’s sovereignty, or at least within the Yugoslav federation, was proposed in exchange for 
the European Union’s guarantee of the rights of the Kosovo Albanians to self-management. 
Yet this guarantee was judged as being unrealistic by Kosovo’s Albanians, who were proven 
right by the inability of the European Union to get the cooperation of the Serbian Government 
with the Hague war crimes Tribunal. Following the same line of argument, the ability of the 
European Union to convince the Kosovo Serb community of its capacity to preserve their 
safety and rights in an independent Kosovo is also questionable.     
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c. Kosovo’s borders and Regional Stability 
The third determinant element of the settlement of the Kosovo status issue relates to 
the territorial configuration of the new Kosovo entity. This issue has two dimensions, namely 
the determination of Kosovo’s internal and external borders respectively. Thus what is 
involved is the definition of the territory of the former Yugoslav province, and then the socio-
political impact this design has over the durability and preservation of regional stability.718  
Linked to the relationship of the province to Serbia and the status of the Kosovo Serb 
minority, a clear definition of the nature and design of Kosovo’s internal borders is essential 
to the settlement of the issue. As this is primarily a territorial problem, a political agreement 
clearly defined in territorial terms is fundamental. In the aftermath of the NATO bombing, 
Kosovo is ethnically divided along the River Ibar, which roughly divides a homogeneous 
Serbian community in the north bordering with Serbia and a quasi-homogeneous Albanian 
population in the south. As discussed previously, Serbia made a proposal, endorsing the idea 
first sketched by the International Independent Commission in their report,719 for a partition of 
the province along this ethnic line with, in possible compensation for Kosovo, the 
incorporation of the Albanian-inhabited regions known as Eastern Kosovo into Southern 
Serbia.  
Although this alternative seemed to receive some support, especially in the North of 
Mitrovica,720 it has been opposed by the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs living in 
enclaves, and is looked upon with suspicion by the international community. On the one hand, 
Kosovo’s Albanians reject this proposition on doctrinal and economic grounds. The ethnic 
division line runs through the industrial, thus potentially richest, economic region of Kosovo. 
Most of the industrial and mineral infrastructures are situated either north of the Ibar River or 
are divided by the fault line. Losing access and control of this apparatus is perceived as 
damaging the economic future of the province. Furthermore, the Kosovo Albanian leaders 
refuse to amputate what they consider as being legitimately their territory. On the other hand, 
the Kosovo Serbs living in enclaves also did not favour this alternative, which would isolate 
them conclusively from Serbia proper, leaving them only the option to depart from Kosovo 
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leaving behind most of their assets. On the same lines, this alternative was never seriously 
supported by the international community, which feared the entrenchment of ethnic territories 
in the heart of an unstable region of the Western Balkans.721 
Besides its international and local dimensions, the issue of Kosovo also has substantial 
regional significance.722 Owing to its geographical location, ethnic nature and political 
characteristics, it has a great potential for causing instability within the whole region. First, 
the province is contiguous with a number of politically and economically unstable states with 
weakly enforced borders.723 A political vacuum in the province favouring the breeding of 
criminal activities would quickly spread to the whole region and could destabilise 
neighbouring governments.724 Second, a strong nationalist government in Kosovo not under 
anyone’s control could turn the province into a breeding centre of Albanian nationalism, 
stirring up nationalist sentiments and territorial claims in neighbouring countries with unstable 
Albanian minorities,725 further destabilising their governments and throwing the whole region 
into unrest.726 Finally, it was feared that the independence of Kosovo might set a precedent 
that would spur independence claims not only within Albanian inhabited areas elsewhere but 
also from Republika Srpska, reviving further quarrels and nurturing unrest. In all these cases, 
the international community could not afford to risk resolving a local problem by setting off a 
‘domino’ effect, starting more unrest in a region that already suffered its share of instability, 
as argued in the following section case by case. 
i) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
The last Republic of the Yugoslavia to declare independence, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia claims to be the ‘Switzerland of the Balkans’ thanks to its unusual 
peaceful transition towards statehood in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia.727 Yet by 
2001, the spectre of conflict had emerged in the Southern Republic. Macedonia, neighbouring 
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Albania and Kosovo, has a large ethnic Albanian minority.728 Far from the idea Ivan 
Michailov had in mind, but aware of the significance of its Albanian minority, the 1991 
Constitution featured the political recognition of its minority groups and incorporated 
provisions to defend their political participation.729 Yet it did not enable those groups to be 
well represented in public administration and security services, and did not adequately 
provide for the use of their of language for administrative matters.730 A multiethnic coalition 
helped to shape the political scene of Macedonia into ‘non transparent and elitist modes of 
decision making’, but had little effect on the reinforcement of a multiethnic character of the 
society as had been expected from this type of political cooperation.731 The different groups 
within the society lived side by side, but exchanges where kept to a minimum and allowed the 
deepening of divisions between groups. In fact, elite deals within majority parties did little to 
enhance the development of a healthy democratic multiethnic state. As the decade passed, 
these bargaining elites failed to resolve the growing discontent of the Albanian minority. 
Although the 1991 Constitution recognised minority groups – considered as ‘national 
minorities’ – the state of Macedonia was recognised as the fatherland for all Macedonian 
people, leaving the so called ‘national minorities’ with a sense of non-belonging .732 
In 2001, ethnic violence erupted in the Albanian inhabited zones in the north/north 
east of the republic bordering with the province of Kosovo. The events that started the unrest 
are still unclear. Violence from militarised Albanian groups started against Macedonian 
military forces, and intensified with time to involve increasing attacks against civilians.733 The 
demands of those militarised groups were also unclear and evolved over time to include the 
whole spectrum from total independence for the Albanian inhabited areas, to the recognition 
of their status as constituent people, to calls for a simple revision of the constitution and 
extended local self-government powers.734 The first demand was negatively received by both 
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the international community and the Macedonian government; both feared the disruption of 
the regional and ultimately, international order. Furthermore, the carving out of an ‘Albanian’ 
territory would prove difficult as the population is not homogeneously distributed on clearly 
demarcated territories. Besides, giving in to Macedonian Albanian nationalists’ demands, it 
was feared, would open the door to further disruptions in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and 
eventually to the Albanian populations living in Montenegro. The second demand proved 
equally as problematic for the government, since the title of ‘constituent people’ in the 
Yugoslav context has attached to it the right to national self-determination. Recognising the 
status of Albanians as a ‘constituent people’ would be a tacit agreement to give them the 
option to secede in the future, providing fuel for further nationalistic disruptions. The Ohrid 
Framework Agreement that was eventually signed on 13 August 2001 thus responded to the 
final and most acceptable demand for decentralisation. 
 Despite the settlement reached in the Ohrid agreement, tensions between ethnic 
Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians remained vivid. Certain essential provisions of the 
agreement, such as the return of refugees, failed to be implemented. Furthermore the 
governmental coalitions, inclusive of the Albanian representatives, did not seem to consider it 
as a priority. Considering the still tense situation in the country, it seems fair to appreciate the 
potential danger that a weak Kosovo would represent for its southern neighbour. If long-
lasting violence erupted in Kosovo, there would be a risk of a spill over effect with a potential 
crossover of arms and paramilitaries into Macedonia. In the same way, a corrupted or weak 
government in Kosovo could encourage further illegal trade.735 Finally, the Macedonian 
government feared that an independent Kosovo would trigger a potential reaction within the 
Macedonian Albanian community for secession or the promotion of a pan-Albanian 
agenda.736 
ii) Southern Serbia 
In the same way, after the allies’ bombing and the establishment of an international 
‘protectorate’ in Kosovo, further violence erupted in the Albanian inhabited territories of 
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Southern Serbia bordering with Kosovo. In 2000, the Liberation Army of Presheva, 
Medvegja, and Bujanoc (UÇPMB) called for autonomous status on the same grounds as their 
Kosovo counterparts.737 In fact, more than autonomy, they demanded to be reattached 
territorially to the neighbouring autonomous province on the basis of their ethnic 
appurtenances. At this stage, the political connection between Kosovo’s politicians and the 
Albanian elites of Southern Serbia is unclear. However, it seems fair to consider that 
underground groups within Kosovo did provide the necessary men and artillery resources for 
the development of the UÇPMB.738 A contributing factor to the development of this guerrilla 
group is the fact that three municipalities were situated within a buffer zone imposed on the 
Yugoslav army after the military settlement of Kosovo.739 Serbia blamed NATO forces for 
not letting them use the necessary policing capacity within this buffer zone while not ensuring 
a proper control of the border and letting paramilitaries enter from Kosovo. Nevertheless the 
conflict remained mostly limited, with a minimum displacement of population and a few 
altercations between the local police and the guerrilla group. 
After the fall of Milošević, the new Serbian government entered into negotiations with 
local representatives. Unwilling as it was to grant them at this stage either the redrawing of 
borders with Kosovo or formal autonomy, the parties negotiated a compromise granting the 
three municipalities a certain degree of autonomy through partial decentralisation, while the 
paramilitary groups agreed to dissolve and stop their secessionist activities.740 As this and the 
Macedonian episodes demonstrate, there is a genuine concern about the capacity of the 
situation in Kosovo to influence the behaviour of Albanian communities in neighbouring 
countries. The March 2004 violence clearly demonstrated that militaristic extremist forces 
were active in Kosovo. The question was then raised as to what extent the new Kosovo 
institutions would have the capacity to control them in a future autonomous or independent 
Kosovo, assuming they would not support them.741 Although violence in those three 
municipalities has been negligible since 2001, Belgrade is aware of the growing potential 
problem they might represent should they recognise Kosovo’s independence. In fact the 
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region became a bargaining chip for Belgrade, as the proposal considering the exchange of the 
three municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa against the northern region of 
Kosovo in case the province attained independence demonstrates.742 
iii) Montenegro 
The ‘Albanian’ issue seems to have had slightly different consequences in the case of 
Montenegro. Numbering 7% of the population, the Albanian population in Montenegro has 
never really presented a challenge to the government and, until now, there has been little sign 
of tensions involving ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups in the republic.743 In fact, part 
of the explanation can be found in the strategy of Montenegro’s emblematic politician Milo 
Đukanović, who targeted ethnic Albanians’ electoral support, including in the crucial 
secession referendum to leave the State Union with Serbia in 2006.744 The interrelationship 
between Montenegro and the final status of Kosovo concerned, until 2006, the membership of 
the Republic in the shadow successor entity to Yugoslavia along with Serbia. Although 
Montenegro was the only Former Yugoslav Republic to stay within the Yugoslav Federation 
after its dissolution, from 1997 on the Montenegrin Government, lead by Milo Đukanović 
questioned the politics and control of Serbia over the federal entity. As a result of the 
catastrophic economic consequences of the embargo imposed on Yugoslavia after the 
Croatian and Bosnian conflicts and the increasingly nationalist politics of Milošević, 
Montenegro started to publicly acknowledge its political and diplomatic differences with 
Serbia. During the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo, Montenegro officially remained neutral 
and maintaining a pro-western discourse in the hope of gaining support from the West for its 
aspiration to leave the Federation. Finally in 2001, despite the fall of the Milošević regime, 
Đukanović called for a referendum of independence. Concerned about the effect the secession 
of Montenegro would have on an economically and politically weakened Serbia and the 
general objection to another micro state in an unstable region, the European Union used their 
influence to reconcile the two parties into remaining within one state.745 In early 2002, Javier 
Solana secured an agreement between Serbia and Montenegro to remain within a looser 
confedereral arrangement, with the option of holding a referendum on independence after 
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three years of cohabitation. The aim behind this provision was that the liberalisation of the 
framework and the supervision from the European Union that it involved would have been 
enough to convince Montenegrins to see their interest in staying within a union with Serbia. 
In March 2002, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became officially the State Union of 
Serbia-Montenegro,746 which was officially dissolved with the creation of two independent 
states after a referendum on independence held in Montenegro in 2006. This dissolution of the 
State Union had three important consequences for Kosovo: (1) it indirectly affected the Serb 
national consciousness and Serbian politics; (2) it had an influence on the options of status 
open to the province; and (3) it reflected on the credibility of the European Union’s capacity 
to undertake such a responsibility.    
First, the independence of Montenegro was experienced in the Serbian national 
consciousness as a further blow to the Serbs’ supremacy within the former Socialist Federal 
Yugoslavia. Second, Kosovo Albanian politicians argued that according to the wording of 
Resolution 1244, Kosovo was legally under Yugoslav and not Serbian sovereignty. Should 
Montenegro decide to leave the Federation, there should not be any obligation on Kosovo to 
stay on with Serbia. Members of the political extremist fringes further argued that the 
dissolution of the Federation into the State Union was enough to justify the immediate 
independence of the province, which despite being part of the Federation – according to 
Resolution 1244 – had not been invited to the negotiations on the creation of the new state. 
Although all those arguments appear farfetched, they remain relevant when considering the 
options open to the province. Yet, in 2002, the Constitution of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro made sure to fix the imprecise wording of the Security Council Resolution by 
explicitly stating that ‘the state of Serbia which includes … the Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo and Metohija’,747 thus making Kosovo an official sub-unit of the Federal state of 
Serbia.748 This establishes the clear sovereignty of Serbia rather than Yugoslavia over 
Kosovo. Thus, when Montenegro attained its independence in May 2006, despite some 
criticisms in Kosovo, the granting of formal independence to Kosovo was never a realistic 
issue. 
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Finally, the inability of the European Union’s multi-layered framework to provide 
enough guarantees to convince the Montenegrins to remain within the State Union with Serbia 
raised some doubts over Brussels’ ability to deal with the more delicate case of Kosovo. The 
economic advantages incorporated into the framework had not proved attractive enough while 
the coercive mechanisms had completely failed to convince Montenegrins to trust the 
international actors to protect them from Serbian hegemonic tendencies. The framework 
appears to be too weak to deal with the roots of the suspicions and resentments present in 
Kosovo. It would need to be drastically reconsidered to enable a peaceful guarantee to the 
province to proceed towards a long-term, peaceful and sustainable status. 
iv) Albania 
In the case of Kosovo’s last neighbour, the Republic of Albania, the consequence of 
the final status is not a problem of a spill over of instability, but concerns the regional and 
international fear of the consequences of a potential ‘Greater Albanian’ scheme.749 The fear of 
a Greater Albanian movement following the possible independence of the province finds 
ground in both Southern Serbia and Macedonia, where local secessionist groups seem to find 
support among extremist and criminal groups based in Kosovo. Thus, it is important to 
evaluate the Albanian position on possible irredentist claims. Although opponents to 
Kosovo’s independence have developed this argument, the proponents of a Greater Albania 
seem to be limited to a set of small, non-powerful groups enjoying little support from the 
political elites in both Kosovo and Albania.750 Despite their primordial ethnic ties, Albania 
and Albanian minorities across the Balkan region are economically, politically, socially, and 
to some extent culturally, very different.751 Those differences are explained mainly by the 
different political cultures in which the different parts of the Albanian population have 
evolved since 1912. Suffering from deep economic and social problems following the forty 
years of its Stalinist regime, Albania is despised by the Kosovo Albanians who, under Tito, 
had better economic and living conditions.752 Although the economic trends of both territories 
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seem now to be reversed and despite the existence of a minority that claims that the two 
ancestral lands should be reunited, no credible Kosovo politician is ready to give credit to 
such a political move. After the 1997 economic collapse of Albania, Tirana has put a lot of its 
efforts into rebuilding the country economically and politically. Turning towards the West, 
Albania, like other Western Balkan states is tuned towards membership of the European 
Union, having entered into preliminary talks to join the stabilisation and accession framework 
in 2003.753 Consequently, no official in Tirana would be ready to compromise Western 
support for what they only consider now as ‘cousins’.754  
v) Republika Srpska 
Finally, beyond the implication of the Kosovo question for its neighbours, the final 
status of the province entails possible repercussions for the federal entity of Republika Srpska. 
Under international law, as the Badinter Commission stressed, both Kosovo and Republika 
Srpska have the same status.755 According to the Commission, both Kosovo’s Albanians and 
Bosnia’s Serbs are only entitled to internal self-determination as provided by their minority 
status. The parallel drawn by the Badinter Commission between the two territories has 
potentially important consequences. Should Kosovo be granted more than the autonomy 
enjoyed by Republika Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina, fears that the Bosnian Serbs might 
ask for a reappraisal of their status have appeared.756 In addition, the future of the two 
territories has been further intertwined with a proposal of an exchange of territory, where 
Serbia would gain Republika Srpska in compensation for the loss of its province.757 However 
this argument has not received much support from traditional parties in Belgrade, and in any 
case does not make much sense politically and legally. It is very hard to justify under 
international norms the settlement of a national problem by involving and destabilising 
another state. In addition, if the logic is pursued, the question of the compensation of Bosnia 
Herzegovina for the loss of Republika Srpska would arise, and there are serious doubts that 
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the international community would accept the endless redrawing of borders in this unstable 
region. 
The political and legal settlement of the province will have important consequences 
for the stability of the region. Whatever the positions of Belgrade, Prishtina and the Kosovo 
Serbs, the negotiation of the settlement of the status question should also consider the 
potential repercussions it will have on its unstable neighbours. For this reason, arguments for 
a regional settlement of the Kosovo issue have developed, offering the opening of 
negotiations not only between Belgrade and Prishtina, but also involving the other regional 
neighbours.758 In addition to securing the fulfilment of regional interests, the aim of this 
proposal is to add a regional guarantee to the settlement by neighbouring countries. Regional 
implications and indeed the consequences the issue of Kosovo has for the stability of the 
fragile region are important concerns for the design of the final status of the province, if for 
no other reason than to secure a successful exit from the Kosovo problem. 
d. Definition of Kosovo in the International Order 
The last critical element in the settlement of the political and legal status of the 
province is the international dimension of the problem. What should/would be the position of 
Kosovo within the international community? Besides the national dimension, the nature of the 
conflict and its repercussions has propelled what was primarily and internal matter onto the 
international scene. As observed throughout this research, all legitimate developments in the 
province inevitably revolve around the politico-legal definition of the province in 
international terms, despite the international administration’s attempts to focus the political 
debate on more concrete and practical issues relevant to the well-being of its population. As 
the province’s institutional maturity has been circumscribed within the international 
legitimacy framework rather than a national one, the settlement of Kosovo’s status requires 
support on the international scene and will receive careful international scrutiny.759 
Nonetheless, the international community has been divided over the issue of Kosovo, 
especially as regards what might be politically and legally acceptable in international terms. 
Ultimately, understanding the position of the main actors and what they are ready to support 
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and accept becomes relevant to capturing the international dimensions of the issue as well as 
its implications for the province itself.  
i) The United States 
From the beginning of their involvement in the Kosovo question, the United States has 
favoured, along with the European Union, the settlement of the problem within the context of 
Yugoslavia for practical reasons.760 They did not see with a favourable eye the creation of 
another micro state in such an instable region as the Balkans. Despite their clear lead in 
involving the international community to settle the dangerously deteriorating situation in 
1999, the new Republican administration, elected in 2000, attempted to withdraw from this 
role, leaving primacy to the European Union for ideological reasons – the Western Balkans 
should primarily be a European issue – and practical ones – the strain the war on terror was 
putting on American resources. Yet, their strategy was rather short-lived as, with the outbreak 
of further violence in Kosovo and the clear inability of the international administration to 
regulate the tensions in the province,761 the United States acknowledged the need for stronger 
political involvement on its part and signalled itsdetermination to ‘place a high priority [to] 
help to lead international efforts to stabilize the Balkans’.762 Following the first anniversary of 
the March 2004 riots against the Kosovo Serbs and the international administration, the new 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated the conviction of the United States that it 
would be necessary for the new Kosovo institutions to meet strong standards in order to 
pursue a long-term final settlement. Yet, the American administration also emphasised the 
need to pursue negotiations over the status issue as soon as possible in order to avoid further 
violence and destabilisation in the region.763 On 18 May 2005, the Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, presented a statement in front of the House Committee 
on International Relations advocating the need for a rapid opening of negotiations between the 
different local parties regarding the status.764 Although the United States refrained from 
advocating any final solution, Burns reiterated that the criteria defined by the Contact Group 
should serve as ‘basic principles [which] should guide a settlement of Kosovo’s final 
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status’.765 Yet, he also emphasised the need for Belgrade ‘to accept some change from the pre-
1999 situation’.766 Although the United States’ objectives as presented by Burns remained as 
vague as the terms of resolution 1244 over the issue of status, the repeated warnings towards 
Belgrade seem to confirm the general feeling within international circles in Kosovo that 
anything less than independence would be hard to obtain support for from any Kosovo 
Albanian negotiating team.767 As Richard Holbrook noted: ‘Belgrade will have to accept 
something politically difficult: giving up Serbian claims to Kosovo … the Serbs will have to 
choose between trying to join the European Union and trying to regain Kosovo. If they seek 
their lost province, they will end up with neither.’768 The position of the chief negotiator of 
the Dayton peace accords and United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 1999 to 
2001 reflects well the unacknowledged policy that the United States pursued on the issue of 
Kosovo, and its stance as regards the settlement of the Kosovo issue. 
The post-2004 renewed efforts of the American administration to be more active on 
settling the issue of Kosovo illustrated a number of important trends in the attitude of the 
United States towards the future of the province. First, the United States was determined to 
deal with the issue and commit to the stability of the region. Second, any decision had to be 
taken with the consent of the European Union, which the US considered ultimately as the 
guarantor of the region’s stability through its multilayered frameworks. 
ii) The European Union 
In line with its North Atlantic Alliance ally, the European Union was not inclined to 
further instabilities at its doorstep and favoured the resolution of the Kosovo question within 
the Yugoslav state. Aware that the status quo was not sustainable and would only lead to 
further instability, the EU favoured at first a peaceful transition of the province within the 
Federation, under the supervision of their Stabilisation and Accession process.769 As the 
situation in the province deteriorated and proactive involvement was required, the European 
Union joined the international mission as its fourth and crucial pillar in charge of the 
reconstruction and development of a sustainable economy in the wrecked province.770 Unable 
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to lead the mission for ethical and practical reasons,771 the European Union nevertheless 
aimed to play a more significant political role beyond mere economic and technical 
reconstruction, in particular on the issue of the long-term settlement of the status of the 
province.772 
However, across the policies and actions of the European Union on the settlement of 
the Kosovo issue lies one core issue with serious consequences, with its endemic internal 
divisions at two levels: (1) specifically as regards Kosovo; and (2) more generally concerning 
the European Union’s integration and geostrategic political future.773 From the beginning of 
Brussels’ involvement, there has been a clear divergence among member states about the 
degree of support to Kosovo Albanians’ national self-determination demands, with clear 
opposition to uncontrolled self-management from a number of member states based on two 
grounds: first, the fear that the fulfilment of the Kosovo Albanians’ independence claims 
would be regarded as a precedent by secessionist movements within their own borders – e.g. 
Spain, Cyprus; second, the fear the regional stability would be shaken by the rise of an 
Albanian nationalist and secessionist core within the Balkans – i.e. Greece, Bulgaria. This 
divergence of opinion among its member states triggered the lack of a clear common policy 
from the European Union on a subject crucial to its strategic concerns. Besides the damaging 
consequences this lack of consensus has on its credibility as a core international actor, it has a 
further harmful effect over its ability to deal with the problem at hand.774 In particular, the 
lack of an articulate common policy further enhanced the division within European 
institutions. In 2004, faced with the need to react in a coherent manner, but unable to obtain a 
clear position from the council of ministers, the High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy Minister, Javier Solana, had a liaison office opened to influence 
negotiations alongside the member states’ and European Union’s liaison offices.775 This trend 
reflected the divisions within the European Union regarding the allocation of competences 
and the question of the future of the province, and occurred both along national lines and 
institutional ones. 
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Ultimately, internal divisions affected the European Union’s ability to impose itself – 
and its stabilisation framework – as a credible actor and facilitator for the long-term 
settlement of the issue. In the volume Europeanization and Conflict Resolution, Bruno 
Coppieter and other authors develop through case study analysis a model of European 
involvement in conflict resolution at its periphery on two levels: first as an actor and then as 
the provider of a multilateral integration framework. 776 As actor, it has aimed to play a 
decisive role in solving the problems, lying as they do within what it ultimately considers as 
its zone of influence. The American policy of the first Bush administration supported this 
idea. During his first presidential campaign in 2000, candidate Bush ran his foreign affairs 
program on scaling down American involvement in Europe and European affairs.777 Then, the 
European Union has developed a multilayered framework of integrative policies towards 
neighbouring countries which ultimately aspire to join the integrated European institution.778 
As in the case of earlier Western Balkans countries, the European Union attempted to 
integrate post-conflict territories through treaty bodies with cooperation and assistance as 
incentives to settle their internal conflicts. Using a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy, the European 
Union aimed to integrate Kosovo in the stabilisation framework which already involves other 
Balkan states.779 As had been done in the case of the State Union solution to Serbia and 
Montenegro’s dispute, the incentive of European Union accession was used to coerce/attract 
both parties into a settlement.780 Yet, in order to integrate it within the European framework, 
the province crucially needed a defined status vis à vis Serbia and the international 
community. In legal terms it was tricky to justify the integration of Kosovo as a single unit 
into a framework that usually involves exclusively independent states.781 Yet, even if 
Prishtina ultimately sees its future in the European Union for strategic and practical 
reasons,782 it took a dim view of potential conditions that might be linked to this status.783 In 
the same way, conditions imposed on Belgrade regarding cooperation with the Hague tribunal 
and the approval of the status of Kosovo, in addition to the inability of the process to prevent 
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the secession of Montenegro, increasingly weighed on Serbian politics, and ultimately on 
their cooperation with European institutions.784 Furthermore, Prishtina and Belgrade nourish 
divergent views on how the integration process should be implemented, i.e. whether Kosovo 
should be integrated as part of Serbia or as an independent state. 
As far as the European Union’s policy towards Kosovo is concerned, in political terms 
neither the prospective integration into the Stabilisation and Association process nor the 
involvement of the European Union as actor has been very enticing in persuading the parties 
to settle their differences. Yet, the opportunities offered by the European Union to the region 
remain an essential tool of the international policy for the province to ultimately leave the 
international governmental framework and play an important role in the settlement of the 
Kosovo issue.785 The question that persists is to determine whether their role in the future 
settlement of the province’s status will be as determinant as the European actor wishes, or just 
remain another tool in a wider international policy. 
iii) Russia 
The Russian Federation’s conception of the settlement of the final status issue clearly 
differs from those of its Western counterparts. In terms of political support, despite its 
continued pro-Serbian and anti-secessionist stances, Russia kept a relatively low profile on the 
issue of Kosovo’s status until the allies pushed towards a settlement. Although they did not 
abandon the Serbs’ claim to the province, it seemed at first that Russia did not want to oppose 
strongly the other members of the Contact Group whose support they needed on other 
strategic issues.786 Nevertheless, as its Contact Group counterparts pressed for a rapid 
settlement of the Kosovo issue, clearly in favour of the independence of the province, the 
Kremlin emphasised the risk that Kosovo would be as international legal precedent, and 
threatened to recognise other secessionist movements under its sphere of influence. As 
President Vladimir Putin advocated in a ‘prophetic’ way:  
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‘If someone believes that Kosovo should be granted full independence as a state, then why 
should we deny it to the Abkhaz and the south Ossetians? I am not talking about how Russia 
will act… However, we know that Turkey for instance, has recognised the Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. I don’t want to say that Russia will immediately recognise Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia as independent, sovereign states, but such precedents do exist in international 
practice.787 
At the international level, it is clear, from the Security Council resolution 1244 and the 
evolution of the international administration, that the legitimacy of the mission and of its 
policies increasingly relied primarily on its ability to maintain international order, as 
measured in two ways: (1) The lack of violence within the province, and (2) maintenance of 
international boundaries. This trend can be observed in the attention of the international 
community, slowly shifting away from improvements in the policies implemented to bring 
about the political improvements necessary for the sustainability of any status resolution, to 
being increasingly concerned with the potential impact of the settlement over the international 
order. At the beginning, the administration’s progress in securing stability was closely 
monitored, as observed within the successive General Secretaries’ mission reports or the fact 
that the settlement talks were initially conditioned on the ability of the local parties to set in 
place the right conditions for the settlement of status. Yet, the constant push from local actors 
to settle the status issue despite their inability to find a common ground to solve technical 
problems brought the international community to consider alternatives to avoid any 
international spill over of the conflict. Evidence of the trend can be observed in the focus of 
international assessment missions that were organised after the 2004 tour de force. In 
particular, one can point to the Eide and Ahtisaari reports, which focused on settling the status 
alternative despite the lack of social, economic and political cohesion within the province, but 
also to the evolution of the rhetoric used within the Security Council itself, which showed a 
growing concern for international rather than local stability.788 The fact that the international 
decision to finally resolve the issue coincided with the rise of violence in the region clearly 
sent a mixed message to secessionist movements that violence indeed attracts international 
attention.  
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2. Status Alternatives 
To provide a solution to those different concerns, the International Independent 
Commission identified five potential alternatives to regulate the relationship of Kosovo vis à 
vis Serbia: (1) protectorate; (2) partition; (3) full independence; (4) autonomy within a 
democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and finally (5) conditional independence. Those 
alternatives responded to the situation of Kosovo at the time of writing, 1999/2000. Indeed, 
some of those options were gradually waved away following developments and realities on 
the ground. In particular, the first option was never seriously considered by an international 
community that was neither ready nor able to commit itself to a long and costly mission in the 
region.789 Although the United Nations Administrative Mission to Kosovo was often 
compared to an effective international protectorate, the March 2004 violence against the 
international mission demonstrated the limits of this option. The remaining proposals are 
hereafter examined in order of the increasing degree of autonomy for the province which they 
entail. 
a. Autonomy within a Democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
This option, in line with resolution 1244, proposed that Serbia retain sovereignty over 
Kosovo, while Kosovo’s Albanians could enjoy a large degree of autonomy on matters of 
their interests. Late Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić’s used this alternative as the base of his own 
proposal, which offered Kosovo Albanians an asymmetric federalism in which they would 
enjoy a large autonomy over internal affairs while Serbia would limit its prerogatives to 
foreign affairs and other matters strictly relative to the interests of Serbia.790  
At the time of the Independent International Commission report’s publication, the fall 
of Milošević had just occurred. Changes in the Serbian political scene bolstered hopes within 
the international community that the new Serbian government would have a more lenient 
approach towards the issue of Kosovo and that democratisation in Serbia would temper the 
Kosovo Albanian extremists’ call for independence. However, those hopes did not 
materialise. The new Serbian government faced a country in deep economic, social and 
political crisis. In addition to high unemployment and a society still alienated by the 
Milošević era and the successive Yugoslav wars, the Kosovo issue remained high on the 
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Serbian political agenda and discourse. In addition, the federal context and the push from 
Montenegro for a political transition from the Federal Republic to a State Union weighed 
heavily on the development of a stable democratic regime capable of dealing with maturity 
with such a sensitive issue as Kosovo. Besides, the Kosovo Albanians did not see the 
nationalist rhetoric of the new Serbian president, Vojislav Kostunica (DDS) as being more 
lenient than was Milošević’s. The strong Kosovo Albanian belief that eight decades of 
Serbian domination were enough, sustained the determination to push for outright 
independence. 
After the death of Đinđić and the opening of formal negotiations over the status of the 
province between the conflicting parties in 2006, Serbian politicians held on to the belief that 
Kosovo should be granted ‘more than autonomy, less than independence’,791 failing to explain 
how this would be achieved in institutional terms. To have any real chance to be considered, 
the degree of autonomy would have been rigorously defined as well as its implications for the 
European integration framework. Nevertheless, faced with the uncompromising stance of the 
Kosovo Albanians over the issue of autonomy, this alternative never really proved realistic in 
either national or international circles. 
b. Kosovo as an Entity of the Federation of Yugoslavia 
The second option offered to the province was to become a formal entity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – later State Union of Serbia-Montenegro – on an equal 
footing with Serbia and Montenegro. This option received criticism from both parties, 
although it represented a balanced compromise between the mutually exclusive claims of both 
parties. In this proposition, Serbia would have lost its sovereignty over the province while 
Kosovo would not quite reach independence. This solution gained the support of the United 
States and the European Union, which since the beginning of their involvement, made the 
point that they were not ready to deal with another unstable micro state in the region. The 
major problem of this solution lay in the fragile relations between Serbia and Montenegro. 
The year 2006 turned out to be a critical year for the State Union, which was dissolved after a 
referendum on independence in Montenegro. The insertion of Kosovo and its fragile balance 
would have, on the one hand further weakened the State Union, and on the other, the 
dissolution of this fragile state would have provided an argument for Kosovo’s Albanians to 
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make a final push for independence. To ensure the success of this alternative, the European 
Union should have played the same role it did for Serbia and Montenegro in 2002 as 
guarantor of the process and status of each entity. Yet, the limited success of European Union 
in ensuring the continuity of the State Union beyond the 2006 Referendum cast serious doubts 
on the ability it would have had in guaranteeing the status of Kosovo in such an institutional 
structure. 
c. Conditional Independence  
Proposed by the International Independent Commission in their report, conditional 
independence implies: 
‘expanding the autonomy and self-government promised by 1244 in order to make 
Kosovo effectively self-governing outside the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], but within an 
international framework. The international community would take responsibility for an initial 
security guarantee and for overseeing the protection of minority rights and would also integrate 
Kosovo into an effective stability pact.’792 
In effect, this provided for the province to reach independence: (1) under international 
supervision in the field of security and minority protection; and (2) on the condition that it 
worked towards fulfilling the criteria set by the stabilisation and accession framework already 
in place in other states of the region. This option would have granted Kosovo’s Albanians the 
independence they have been striving for decades, securing a certain degree of regional and 
national stability while responding to the concerns of its minorities.  
Given the weak economic and political condition of the province and the fear that the 
new political system could collapse within a short period, this alternative was legitimate. 
Despite European Union policies and efforts to resuscitate the economy and reconstruct the 
territory, half of the population still remained unemployed and lived under the poverty 
threshold. In those poor conditions, little success could be expected from a micro state, while 
threatening to destabilise the whole region. March 2004 and the violent action against the 
Kosovo Serbs and other minorities reinforced this fear within the international community.  
Although the ‘conditional independence’ proposed and supported by the International 
Independent Commission encompassed the idea of a loose ‘trusteeship’ that would guarantee 
the stability of the newly independent territory, the term ‘conditional’ was understood as 
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being linked to a catalogue of stipulations that the new Kosovo institutions would have to 
fulfil in order to qualify for independence. This understanding was associated with the policy 
of ‘Standards before Status’ proposed by the international administration in November 2003 
and enforced in April 2004. The Security Council declaration in April 2004 that negotiations 
towards the resolution of status would not be initiated unless the new institutions proved 
themselves competent for self-management on the basis of UNMIK standards further 
reinforced this idea,793 beyond the initial intention of the International Independent 
Commission. Yet, this declaration is evidence of the uneasiness of the international 
community and is wedged between local expectations and international Realpolitik, ultimately 
failing to provide a clear-cut answer to the Kosovo issue. Nonetheless, the proposed standards 
defined by the international administration are indeed crucial components necessary for the 
sustainability of the province. As the local politicians acknowledged, their capacity to deal 
properly with the challenges that the province faces is limited. Most of them were happy to 
recognise the need for international assistance in certain political and economic fields.794 Yet, 
they insisted on the fact that this assistance should be rendered only as technical expertise, 
without accompanying veto powers going to the international community.  
The alternative of conditional independence, already favoured by the International 
Independent Commission,795 remained the most realistic alternative and in fact formed the 
basis of the Ahtisaari suggestions that were eventually followed at the time of the declaration 
of independence.796 Nonetheless, it faced some opposition from the different local actors. 
Although the Kosovo Albanian elite recognised the need for international technical assistance 
and supervision, no one wished to have their status dependent on their achievements. In their 
minds, the suffering their community underwent in the hands of Serbia should have been 
enough to justify their secession. On their side, Belgrade maintained their position opposed to 
any concept of independence. Although conditional independence ensures some protection for 
their ethnic minority, this alternative was perceived as a further national failure and injustice 
imposed on Serbia after the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Few 
politicians in Belgrade would, without having any other alternative, accept the loss of 
Kosovo. Should they have to, they would impose a number of conditions, clearly different 
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from the ones envisaged by the international community, as they would imply a change of 
borders and/or an exchange of populations. 
d. Independence Alternatives 
The last two potential alternatives offered to the province were unconditional 
independence or secession from Serbia and union with Albania. Both options entail their own 
sets of concerns at very different levels. Unconditional independence does involve risks over 
the stability of the region and the protection of Kosovo’s minorities. The alternative of the 
unification of the province with Albania was rejected on the basis of the lack of interest in 
both Prishtina and Tirana to pursue this alternative.797 Besides, in international legal and 
political terms, the union of Kosovo with Albania would present grave concerns. Such a union 
would be considered as irredentism. Irredentism is defined as the claim of a state over the 
population and territory of another generally on historical grounds, and is condemned under 
international law as a source of instability for the international order.798 Should Kosovo reach 
independence, it would already present a predicament for the international community that 
might face an outpouring of secessionist threats across the world, and could certainly not 
afford the further disruptions likely to emerge from the precedent of a successful irredentism 
claim. 
Besides, the accession to independence from the province would further call into 
question the stability of the Republika Srpska’s status. According to the Badinter Commission 
in charge of arbitrating over the issues of territorial status in the context of the Former 
Yugoslavia, both Kosovo and the Republika Srpska are subordinated to the sovereignty of 
states and are therefore entitled only to autonomy within those sovereign states. The question 
of the repercussions of the accession to independence of Kosovo for the case of Republika 
Srpska or any other secessionist territory can rightfully be asked. In strict international legal 
terms, the drawing of legal status parallels between the two entities of the former Yugoslavia 
is perfectly justifiable.799 Depending on the grounds on which the international community 
justifies the independence of Kosovo rather than any other self-determination movements, 
such recognition poses a deep legal predicament with broader implications. 
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Beyond the case of Republika Srpska, the literature has attempted to make parallels 
between Kosovo and the similar case of East Timor. This comparison rests on the similarity 
and temporality of the two cases, which benefited from similar international administrative 
missions. Yet in the case of East Timor, it eventually benefitted from the recognition of its 
independence after an internationally sponsored referendum. However, in strict international 
legal terms, both cases cannot be compared, as East Timor gained international support on the 
basis of its claim to self-determination in a decolonisation context. After the withdrawal of the 
Portuguese from their South East Asian colonies, Indonesia unilaterally annexed East 
Timorese territory without giving them a chance to express their right to national self-
determination. Thus the referendum organised in 2002 that legitimised the independence of 
East Timor cannot represent a precedent for the case of Kosovo under international legal 
terms. Indeed, regardless of the different attempts to compare the cases of Kosovo, Republika 
Srpska, East Timor or any other self-determination movements, when some members of the 
international community eventually recognised the independence of the province, they failed 
to support convincingly the exceptional character of the case of Kosovo in international legal 
terms.800 
In conclusion, a large number of options were open to Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs 
to settle the issue of the province’s status. Yet, the international transitional management has 
clearly not been able to forge a consensus between the parties on the most appropriate 
solution to pursue. Indeed it has only succeeded in alienating them and reinforced their 
diverging expectations. As the negotiations over the status of the province were launched, the 
alternatives favoured by Kosovo Albanians and Belgrade were on diametrically opposite ends 
on our spectrum of options: the former going for the largest degree of independence, while the 
latter opted for the minimum. Neither of those two alternatives was realistic, and both sides 
needed to make concessions to reach a sustainable agreement. 
3. The Way Forward 
After five years of international administration, the riots that occurred in March 2004 
revealed that the status quo policy pursued by the international community was no longer 
tenable.801 Increasing pressure from local elites, but also from the political, social and 
economic realities of the province convinced the international community to no longer ignore 
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the issue of status and assume its responsibilities towards the people of Kosovo, namely: to 
assist the province in getting out of the constitutional limbo in which it had been in since June 
1999; and to solidify its legal and political position on the international scene. In autumn 
2004, the United Nations Security General nominated the Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide to 
evaluate the situation on the ground and to assess the relevance of the opening of negotiations 
between the parties on the status options. Following the positive response to his report, Kofi 
Annan further appointed former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari to launch and supervise the 
status negotiation and, should the case arise, to advise on an alternative strategy to settle the 
Kosovo question.802  
The remaining section of this chapter maps out the local context in which the initial 
negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina began before analysing the specifics of the 
international settlement proposal. I finish this analysis by assessing the relevance of the 
unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo assembly in February 2008 and observe 
its consequences for the prospective future of the province. 
a. Between ‘Dialogue’ and ‘Negotiations’ 
After the fall of Milošević, hopes rose in Belgrade of breaking with the isolationism 
that his politics had buried the country in – with their severe economic consequences – and of 
opening to the West and more precisely to the European Union’s accession scheme. Indeed, 
by attempting to appear more conciliatory on certain aspects of sensitive issues such as 
Kosovo or collaboration with the Hague Tribunal, Serbia wished to benefit from a number of 
economic advantages to alleviate the economic and social crisis of the Republic. 
Nevertheless, the legacy of Milošević’s nationalist strategy stood strong at the roots of the 
Serbian political scene. Kosovo remains to this day too important for Serbian political elites to 
secure their legitimacy for them to appear to be losing too much ground on the issue to the 
international community. Beside the hardcore nationalists who have refused categorically to 
envisage anything else other than the ultimate return of the province to Serbian sovereignty, 
some political ‘democrats’ or ‘moderates’ were coerced into adapting the traditional Serbian 
position towards Kosovo. In this context, two broad proposals were supported: those of the 
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proponents of the return of the province to the sovereignty of Serbia,803 and those of the 
proponents of the secession of the province provided that there could be a change of borders 
and an exchange of ethnic populations.804 The latter accepted the realities of the situation and 
were ready to grant independence to the province provided that all the territories dominated 
by Serbs were returned to Serbia in exchange for Albanian-inhabited areas in Southern Serbia.  
Nonetheless, in recent years, the weight of its socio-economic difficulties and the fear 
of hard-core nationalist policies that endangered Serbian chances to move on with the 
European Union accession process has grown within segments of the Serbian population. This 
trend was reflected in 2004/2005 in the rising popularity of alternative parties such as the 
G17,805 which ran for elections on a pro-European platform, or even what appeared to be a 
more conciliatory attitude from some Serbian officials to the opening of a dialogue with 
Prishtina. In fact by 2005, an increasing number of Serb politicians were tempted to 
acknowledge in private that Kosovo was indeed a weight on the development of Serbia.806 
Yet, these trends should not be overstated or hide the significance of the unstable politics in 
Belgrade. Events such as the 2004 election, which saw the Radical Party’s victory or the 
dismissal of Goran Svilanović for his participation in the International Commission on the 
Balkans report supporting the independence of Kosovo in Spring 2005,807 underline the 
sensitivity of the question in Serbian politics. Indeed, in a country were legitimacy is defined 
with a strong nationalist rhetoric, supporting in public such announcements would surely 
result in a political ‘suicide’, if not actual physical threats.808 
The divisions within Belgrade over the Kosovo issue are mirrored within the Kosovo 
Serb population, which became further divided over more pragmatic issues. The international 
community’s inability to protect the Kosovo Serbs from Albanian retaliation in June 1999 and 
sporadically until March 2004 has exacerbated a lack of trust in the international 
administration, but more importantly in any Albanian-run government. The 17-19 March 
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2004 riots proved that their security and status in the province remained fragile and few could 
seriously be convinced that life in an independent Kosovo would improve dramatically their 
living conditions, despite Kosovo Albanian claims. The view that the new institutions 
developed in Kosovo are the preamble to the independence of the province is widespread. 
Consequently, the Kosovo Serbs living north of the Ibar River, who are homogeneously 
distributed and living contiguously to the Serbian border, remained fervent supporters of the 
return of Serbian sovereignty over the province, and in the worse of case would be ready to 
accept the independence of Kosovo provided that they were themselves reattached to Serbia 
proper. For reasons of their inauspicious geography, these views are less supported in 
enclaves. Independence on the basis of an exchange of population would imply that they 
would have to leave their homes and properties and move to Serbia, where little is waiting for 
them. Although they would clearly prefer the return of Serbian sovereignty, they recognise the 
poor chance that this alternative has and prefer to start preparing for their future through 
cooperation with the new institutions. What is interesting is that both UNMIK and the 
international community have tended to concentrate their attentions on extremist elements 
rather than supporting moderates and building through them a strategy to win the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the Kosovo Serb community. In practice, the international community has 
interacted with Belgrade, which it has taken to be acting on their behalf, demonstrating once 
more concerns for international rather than local support.  
Within the Kosovo Albanian community, no political party was ready to promote 
anything less than total and full independence.809 As the then Prime Minister Kosumi (AAK) 
made clear, conditional independence would not be an acceptable option.810 This opinion 
entered into the political discourse with Serbia, since Kosumi refused to negotiate the future 
of the province with Belgrade on the grounds that Belgrade had ultimately no say in the 
running of any independent Kosovo of the future.811 Nevertheless, in private spheres, political 
leaders were ready to acknowledge the need for concessions provided it would gain them 
independence. 
As early as 2003, the international community attempted to engage the different 
parties in a dialogue for the sake of the future of the province. In line with the ‘benchmark’ 
policy initiated by the Special Representative Michael Steiner, the ‘dialogue’ that opened in 
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Vienna in October 2003 aimed to have Belgrade and Prishtina working together on a number 
of ‘technical’ issues to improve the conditions of the Kosovo population as a whole.812 This 
first attempt met with a number of difficulties, including the inability of the Prishtina 
delegation, supposedly representing the Kosovo community as a whole, to involve the 
Kosovo Serbs;813 the focus of the discussion remained on the final status of the province 
despite the international community’s efforts; and ultimately, all of this demonstrated the 
clear entrenchment of all parties on their mutually exclusive positions.814  
The next round of official negotiations that opened in 2006 under the auspices of 
former President Ahtisaari did not prove to be more reconciling. Although the Serbian team 
managed to involve a wide segment of the Kosovo Serb community,815 beyond the enclave 
divide, the negotiation team stumbled on similar issues as the obstacles the delegations met in 
Rambouillet, which ultimately led to the same results.816 Although in international circles few 
expected to return Kosovo to Serbian administration, none seemed ready to make a committed 
prognosis on Kosovo’s final status until the very last few months before the unilateral 
declaration of independence.817  
b. The Ahtisaari Plan 
In spring 2007, after months of the limited success of the direct negotiations between 
the Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs, the United Nations envoy Ahtisaari delivered to the new 
United Nations Secretary General his conclusions. In his report, Ahtisaari recommended that 
‘Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community’.818 He 
highlighted what the international community was very well aware of, namely that 
‘reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option’ and that a ‘continued international 
administration is not sustainable’. Yet, he emphasised that the inability of the existing 
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institutions to run Kosovo and the remaining important minority issues justified 
‘independence with international supervision [as] the only viable option’. The report is 
accompanied by a sixty-page detailed proposal detailing implementation mechanisms.   
The Ahtisaari plan involved a number of important elements: first, a time element. 
Contrarily to Russia and Serbia’s claims, Ahtisaari pointed out that further negotiation would 
not bring any benefit to the resolution of the status issue. On the contrary, according to his 
conclusions, the settlement of the issue should be made as soon as possible in order to ensure 
support for the plan and therefore its success. The impatience of the local political elites was 
obvious and further delays would only undermine the credibility of the international 
community. In fact, the greatest fear of the international community was that Kosovo’s 
Albanians would declare independence unilaterally, without any prior preparation and 
adjustment of resolution 1244. This catastrophic scenario would put UNMIK and the rest of 
the international community in an awkward and unsustainable position. Yet, Russia insisted 
that any settlement should be obtained on the ground of a consensus between the two parties. 
In the face of the failure of the talks that occurred in 2006/2007, where each side stuck to their 
guns, a negotiated agreement of both parties was highly unrealistic.819 
The second important element of the Ahtisaari plan laid emphasis on the exceptional 
nature of the situation of Kosovo. Recommending the independence of a territory under a 
national self-determination claim represents a serious issue in international legal terms. 
Access to independence by a secessionist group is feared for its potential to initiate a domino 
effect. It is therefore essential for the Ahtisaari plan to promote independence as an 
exceptional circumstance.820  
Third, the Ahtisaari plan insisted on the multiethnic nature of the resulting future state, 
in line with the policy pursued by the international community since the beginning of its 
involvement. For the success of any transition, he emphasised that it was essential for the 
international community to preserve the multiethnic character of Kosovo. To prevent the 
rewarding of ethnic cleansing and from a practical point of view, and to prevent a further 
humanitarian crisis with the further displacement of populations was regarded as essential. To 
ensure the multiethnic character of the province, the proposal suggests the enforcement of 
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minority participation in the political life of the province through local self-government.821 
The decentralised units proposed would be redesigned municipalities that would ensure a 
significant majority for the minorities in the municipalities concerned. In this framework, the 
competencies of municipalities would be enlarged to enable the local management of key 
aspects of the community’s life. In particular, the plan contemplates inter-municipal 
cooperation and cooperation with institutions in the Republic of Serbia, and includes 
provisions on the funding of municipal activities by the Republic of Serbia.822 Despite the 
controversial nature of ethnic base decentralisation, especially in the Kosovo context, this 
measure forms an essential tool to inspire the confidence of the Serb population in Kosovo’s 
institutions, and to thereby secure their support to the system as a whole.823 In particular, it 
ensures them a degree of decision-making power on important issues such as education in 
their own language, and gives them some sort of institutional link with Serbia.  
Finally, the last significant provision of the Ahtisaari plan concerns the role granted to 
the international community. In the same way as the Eide report made the previous year,824 
the Ahtisaari plan emphasises the urgency of reaching a solution, but remains realistic about 
the capacity of the local institutions to live up to the responsibilities that will face them as an 
independent state. He proposed independence under international supervision. Conscious of 
the limits of UNMIK, the Ahtisaari plan considered two new international institutional 
supports. First, it suggested the establishment of an International Civil Representative 
(ICR).825 On a similar basis as the office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the ICR would be in charge of ‘supervising the implementation of this Settlement and support 
the relevant efforts of Kosovo's authorities’.826 In particular, powers would be granted to this 
ICR to ensure the respecting of the settlement’s spirit: multi-ethnicity, democracy and 
adherence to the international human right norms. Then, the ICR would be in charge of 
coordinating the work between the international actors, and of them with the Kosovo 
institutions. The second international institutional support proposed was the creation of a 
European Security and Defence Policy mission (ESDP) to form the executive branch of the 
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European mission.827 Ultimately, both the ICR and the ESDP were to take over the role of 
UNMIK, enforcing the role and responsibility of the European Union in the settlement of 
Kosovo.828  
The Ahtisaari plan attempted to provide an answer for a situation that did not manage 
to solve itself through decades of conflict. Understandably, it cannot be considered as an ideal 
solution to the question of the final status of Kosovo. Yet, despite the difficulty of its task, it 
did manage to provide a clear decision on a number of issues that the international community 
had been unable to do until then. The reception of the document was as might have been 
predicted. The United States, France, United Kingdom and the German presidency of the 
European Union welcomed the document which, if not perfect, brought sensible solutions to a 
thorny situation.829 It was expectedly rejected by Serbia and Russia, with the latter threatening 
to oppose it by veto if it was submitted to a Security Council vote. In order to gain time and 
support for the proposal, the European Union offered to send a mission to assess the situation 
on the ground and the capacity of the European Union’s institutions to provide for it. 
However, after months of back and forth discussions between the supporters and opponents of 
the plan, the feasibility of the plan’s gaining support grew following the Security Council 
thaw and the impatience of the Kosovo Albanians to declare unilateral independence without 
Security Council backing, hence legitimacy.  
After the legislative elections of November 2007 and the nomination of a new PDK-
led government, the risk of a unilateral declaration increased. To prevent the imminent 
declaration of independence from occurring outside of international supervision, the European 
Union gave the green light for the launch of a European Union support mission to Kosovo 
outside of any Security Council mandate on 15 February 2008. This decision is significant for 
two reasons: first, it gave a clear indication of the possible support of the European Union for 
an independent Kosovo; and second, it secured the European Union a positive reception from 
the new state’s institutions. In tactical terms, it would have been problematic for the European 
Union to lose leverage over the new State’s government, and thus the capacity to influence its 
future. Yet, in practical terms, outside of any the Security Council mandate, the European 
mission lacked the internationally legitimate basis vital for its deployment. To respond to this 
issue Elizabeth Pond gives an interesting argument: ‘[the European mission] turned to 
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alternative sources of legitimacy for the changeover [from UNMIK to the European mission]. 
These consisted of direct invitations from the newly independent government in Prishtina to 
the EU to supervise Kosovo’s independence’.830 Indeed it is an interesting argument but one 
which lacks a legal basis. It would be difficult in international legal terms to justify an 
unrecognised/illegitimate government’s legitimisation of an international intervention, which 
in turn legitimises this government. In fact, to fully deploy, the European mission had to wait 
for a formal invitation from the United Nations itself before it could legitimately enter into 
functioning.831  
Nonetheless, the Ahtisaari plan involves two further concerns: legal and political. 
What was meant to be a blueprint entails international legal consequences. Indeed, it 
dangerously intertwines political needs with international law. It could be argued that 
Ahtisaari, through its conclusions, implied that political concerns could overrule the 
established international order. By drawing the independent institutional structure of a 
territory which would otherwise not qualify for independence, this framework undeniably 
opened the ‘Pandora’s box’ of international law.832 Yet it should be kept in mind that the 
Ahtisaari plan was intended to be endorsed by the Security Council, and did not aim as such 
to upset the international order. Another sharper criticism of this plan concerns the clear top-
down approach of this framework.833 Indeed once more, the international community 
designed a process within the international legitimacy framework, imposing a solution from 
above with little care about its enforcement or the securing of grass-roots support.  
c. Declaration of Independence and its Consequences 
On 17 February 2008, the province’s assembly declared ‘Kosovo to be an independent 
and sovereign state’.834 According to the declaration, the new state claimed to be ‘a 
democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination 
and equal protection under the law.’ It swore to ‘protect and promote the rights of all 
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communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in 
political and decision-making processes’.835  
Although the declaration endorsed resolution 1244 and the Ahtisaari plan, including 
the responsibility to minorities that they entailed,836 the declaration was issued unilaterally 
without any approval from the Security Council. The following day, Russia called for an 
emergency meeting of the Security Council where given the clear disagreement between the 
permanent members, no formal decision over the response to be given or any resolution was 
submitted to a vote.837 The United States, France and the United Kingdom supported the 
recognition of the new state on the basis of the difficult history of the province and the lack of 
significant alternatives offered since the implementation of resolution 1244. They further 
emphasised that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence would be a beneficial step for the 
region as a whole. They insisted on the unique character of the case of Kosovo and defended 
themselves as not supporting the emergence of a new international law; nor did they believe 
that this declaration of independence could act as precedent for other national self-
determination movements.  
On the other side, the newly re-elected Serbian President Boris Tađić emphasised the 
unfairness of the recognition of the independence of Kosovo for the Serbian people on three 
grounds. First, Serbia had agreed to play along with the international community’s rules in 
1999 by withdrawing their effective sovereignty from the province; second, Serbia was being 
further punished for the actions of Milošević, who had since long gone and died in prison; 
finally by re-electing him in January 2008, Serbia had chosen to face an open international 
community rather than entrenching itself in obscurantism and radical nationalism. Thus, the 
recognition by the international community of the secession of Kosovo would be perceived as 
a failure to reward Serbia’s transition towards liberalism and democracy.  
Finally, Russia condemned the declaration of independence on the basis of the 
sacrosanct international principle of sovereignty, emphasising the dreadful precedent the case 
of Kosovo would have on demands from other national self-determination claims. Yet more 
importantly, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin condemned the mission European Union 
had sent to Kosovo as illegitimate, as it was acting outside of any Security Council mandate, 
and it asked the Secretary General to ensure that the legitimate international presence, 
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UNMIK, pursued its mission within the resolution 1244 framework. Caught between two 
fires, Secretary General Ban Ki Moon stressed the preservation of UNMIK in the region, but 
also stated that the new European Union mission had its place within the overall UNMIK 
framework. Still, it was not until 12 June 2008 that he openly supported the 
incorporation/replacement of UNMIK by the new European Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX).838  
Contrary to the Kosovo Albanians’ expectations, the declaration of independence did 
not rescue the territory from its constitutional imbroglio. Indeed, the ‘state’ of Kosovo 
received some recognition as such and entered into diplomatic relations with other states to 
fulfil the last requirement of the Montevideo Convention’s criteria to gain ‘state’ status.839 Yet 
once more it also found itself in international legal limbo, which threatens its legitimacy and 
overall its sustainability. Beyond the diverging interests of the Serbs and the Kosovo 
Albanians, international Realpolitik dictated its rule. Since the declaration of independence, 
Kosovo exists within different/diverging realities: independence for the Kosovo Albanians; 
occupation for the Serbs; and virtual purgatory for UNMIK, which is required to remain there 
without any real powers and uncertain of its new – if at all – role.840  
In practical terms, Kosovo’s Albanians have been recognised by a portion of the 
international community to be sovereign over their territory, yet without effective control over 
the Serb inhabited areas of the North and with an ‘invited’ power that withholds the right to 
veto decisions which it deems as violating minority interests.841 Belgrade, ignoring the 
realities on the ground, continues half-heartedly to defend its sovereignty by opposing the 
deployment of the ‘illegitimate’ European Mission, continuing the parallel structure in 
Kosovo Serb areas and pushing forward for the General Assembly to put a case to the 
International Court of Justice to deliberate on the legality of this declaration of 
independence.842 As for UNMIK, the only ‘legitimate’ international administration according 
to Russia – and its veto rights – it maintains reluctantly a shadow administration in Serb 
                                                
838 Pond, Op. Cit., p. 102. 
839 Cf. definition of the state as codified by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 
December 1933, art 1; Fierstein, D., ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of Legality, 
Policy and Future Implications’ in Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 26. pp. 417-442, pp. 439-
440. 
840‘The New International Presence’ in Life in Kosovo, 19 June 2008. 
841 Pond, Op. Cit., p. 98. 
842 International Court of Justice, The General Assembly of the United Nations Requests an Advisory Opinion 
from the Court on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, Press Release, No. 2008/35, 10 
October 2008,  
 244 
inhabited areas that refused to recognise the European mission’s authority. To respond to the 
genuine fear of unilateral secession of the Kosovo Serbs, the international community has 
legitimised both the deployment of the EULEX and the Serbian parallel institutions under the 
terms of resolution 1244 and the Ahtisaari plan. Indeed, the former legitimises the European 
mission as it enables UNMIK to rely on other agencies to perform administrative tasks; the 
latter, under its annex III art. 11, allows the financing of a Serb institutional structure within 
Kosovo.843 De facto, UNMIK, unable to dissolve owing to international Realpolitik, is 
confined to the pathetic role of keeping up appearances to allow the different actors to save 
‘face’. This latest international imbroglio, in an attempt to provide international legitimacy for 
a framework that clearly should, but in fact lacks local support, provides a sad end to a 
mission that should have been the pioneer of its kind.  
Conclusion 
The resolution of the final status issue has been a trying experience both for the 
international community and for the local actors. The latest international effort to deal with 
the question as well as its failure to provide an appropriate answer has been in line with 
former attempts and the inability to respond adequately to them by the successive Yugoslav 
regimes. With the internationalisation of the issue, the resolution called for international 
solutions defined in an international framework. As a result, the different actors increasingly 
forgot or ignored that at the root of the problem lay very local issues and concerns. The latest 
episodes of the Kosovo question demonstrate the lack of international commitment to set 
Realpolitik aside in order to provide for local communities, who besides immediate 
humanitarian needs, crave a peaceful and stable political environment to live in and prosper. 
More crucially, the political games that occurred over Kosovo – and later in the summer of 
2008 with the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia in 
retaliation844 – heavily weaken the international legal framework and as a consequence the 
basis of international legitimacy.845 Those two episodes send a message that only national 
self-determination movements with strong international sponsors were really entitled to 
secession rights. By recognising states that do not qualify under international law for 
independence, international actors have demonstrated their lack of belief in the international 
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legal framework and have consequently weakened the legitimacy framework at the 
international level as a whole. Destabilised, international legitimacy now calls for a 
reappraisal: either for the international actors to reassert their ‘belief’ in the international legal 
system, or for the international legal system to develop in order to reflect the evolution of this 
‘belief’.846 
As regards international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction, this study of the 
Kosovo status question teaches us that the definition of the international constitutional 
framework of the territory is indeed essential to the development of a suitable political 
environment.847 Issues over the possibility of Kosovo joining the European Stabilisation and 
Association process because of the uncertainty of its status were the prime arguments to 
support this claim. Yet it is also not enough. I argue that the reason why the international 
community did not manage to secure international legitimacy for an independent Kosovo, 
beyond international legal and political concerns, lies in their failure to build an appropriate 
structure on which to ground the new state. The international mission failed to use its supra-
conflict role to impose the changes necessary in the society and in fact became another party 
in the struggle matrix. Indeed, it missed the opportunity to use its position to demystify the 
‘belief’ that the problems of Kosovo would be solved with the resolution of its final status. 
Thus, the declaration of independence generated great dissatisfaction on all sides, which were 
all coerced into absurd compromises. De facto, the Kosovo Albanians missed the independent 
state they were striving for and had to settle for an independent territory. The enthusiasm of 
the international community about the recruitment of a few Kosovo Serbs in early 2009 and 
the final deployment of the European mission (one year later than it should have)848 are pale 
consolations that will not stand long unless the international community redesigns its strategy 
in Kosovo. 
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 Conclusion 
Through the development of an analytical framework applied to the case of Kosovo, 
this thesis has aimed to test the impact of the presence or absence of legitimacy over the 
capacity of international involvement to achieve sustainable conflict resolution through 
institution-building. It argues that in order to provide long-term stability in a post-conflict 
divided society, the legitimacy of the institution-building process and its outcome, both in 
relation to the international community and the relevant local populations, are critical 
preconditions for the success of international missions in reaching stability. I developed a 
two-level working concept and analytical framework of legitimacy specific to the study of 
international administration and institution-building in deeply divided societies drawing on 
the theories of Max Weber, David Beetham, and Seymour Lipset. I analysed the degree, 
nature and impact of legitimacy of the international actors and their policies at each stage that 
led to the establishment of a new political system in Kosovo. From this analysis, I argued that 
the failure of the international community to establish local legitimacy in Kosovo is the main 
explanation for its inability to offer a satisfactory and sustainable solution to the Kosovo 
issue. 
As General Assembly resolution 180/LX underlined, the international community 
‘[r]ecogniz[es] that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and 
mutually reinforcing, [and] Emphasiz[es] the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated 
approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving 
sustainable peace’.849 On the basis of Seymour Lipset’s argument, I related the achievement 
of a ‘sustainable peace’ with the founding of a legitimate political system to deal with the 
needs of the divided society. Nonetheless, by nature, the development of a political system is 
a ‘domestic’ affair; thus the involvement of international actors in sovereign prerogatives 
entail specificities when it comes to considering the legitimacy framework of any political 
system that might be developed. Thus, through a concept of legitimacy defined in terms of 
beliefs based on rules and actions shaped by rational elements and powerful ideologies, I 
developed a two-dimensional analytical framework that considers the issue of legitimacy at 
the international and local levels. 
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On this basis, I set out to analyse the process of international actors’ institutional-
building through the prism of legitimacy, illustrating my argument with the case of the 
international involvement in Kosovo. The study of the convoluted history of the province 
demonstrates that Kosovo is defined by the clash of two nationalisms competing over the 
same territory, which consequently developed in opposition to each other. With the fall of the 
integrating socialist ideals, the power vacuum provided the space for these nationalist 
ideologies to redefine the fundamentals of the Yugoslav state. From then on, Kosovo 
witnessed the building of resentment against political deceptions in its political discourse. 
Yet, contrary to the usual assumptions, I argued that the visceral opposition of the two 
ideologies, far from being rooted in an irrational sentiment originating in some shadowy past, 
is a carefully crafted design of the respective national ideologies and their ensuing policies. 
Indeed, they have enabled the establishment of geographical and ultimately psychological 
barriers between the two communities. But there was a window of opportunity in the 
aftermath of the NATO bombing, had the appropriate policies been set in place to reconcile 
the society to, if not live together, at least alongside each other.  
Thus, based upon the evidence, the ‘local’ legitimacy framework of Kosovo is firmly 
entrenched in the political discourse of local elites that through their claims to power and 
decision-making seek to ensure the trust and support their communities. In opposition, 
Bernhard Knoll makes an interesting remark. He notes that in a framework defined in terms of 
local ideologies and cultural backgrounds, the international administration is by its nature 
unable to root its legitimacy on the crucial foundation myths that form the ultimate source of 
such national ideologies.850 Nonetheless, instead of using its natural leverage as not being 
party to the conflict as an opportunity to implement policies to enforce the cohesion of the 
society, depoliticise the local discourse through the support of non-political actors, the 
development of a politically conscious civil society and the running of parallel debates,851 
UNMIK, despite initial attempts to integrate the different factions in the institution, soon had 
to face a deepening lack of local support and was ultimately increasingly tempted to play 
along the established ideological roots. The ethnic conflict literature argues that the realities 
of violent post-conflict environments make it impossible not to play by national ideological 
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rules.852 One flagrant example would be the lack of any political alternative to the extremist 
elites that have gained support during the conflict. Yet, those assumptions take for granted 
that ‘the rules’ of the local legitimacy framework cannot be ‘changed’. Indeed, such elites 
play on the fears of their communities to ensure grass-roots support. Should the international 
community be in a position to ensure the security and meeting of the basic needs of the 
population, this would provide it with a window of opportunity to implement the grass-roots 
work needed to ‘shift’ the political discourse to more constructive debates than those about 
mere survival. In the same way, I developed the argument that by not enforcing fully their 
policies in North Mitrovica, the international administration showed a lack of coherent 
strategy as well as will and capacity to enforce it, undermining further their legitimacy in the 
eyes of all segments of the local community. It is clear that, given the impossibility of testing 
the counterfactual, it is hard to prove that pursuing those policies would have indeed won the 
hearts and minds of the Kosovo society to the international administration; yet it is relatively 
easy to see how the lack of progress in those fields did undermine their overall goal. Indeed, I 
would argue that the case of Kosovo demonstrated that the failure of the international 
administration to secure local legitimacy is indeed rooted in the lack of real support from the 
international community itself, which becomes the victim of a politically based self-
legitimacy crisis. 
The international legitimacy framework is based on a legal system primarily aimed at 
fulfilling state interests. In this context, it has difficulties in providing adequately for 
populations that do not have a legal personality, but are still not adequately represented by 
their sovereign states. Based as it is on concepts from another time, the legal system fails to 
provide answers to the contemporary problems of an ever more globalising international 
society. This inability set up a serious handicap at the base of the system itself. The case of 
Kosovo highlights this phenomenon very well, as NATO’s airstrikes on a sovereign state, far 
from endorsing the norms and the legitimate authority that ruled the system, instead opened to 
question its ability to maintain international stability, and thus legitimacy. Indeed what this 
episode demonstrates is the failure to prevent the legal legitimacy framework from being 
taken over by Realpolitik. In this case, as William Bain points out, resolution 1244 de facto 
‘legitimised’ the allies’ action in an attempt to allow the system to keep face in spite of its 
own deficiencies. In addition, I would suggest that the ‘diplomatic’ and blunt nature of the 
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document, reflecting the political antagonisms of a core few members of the international 
community, is further proof of the failings of the international system’s legitimacy. On this 
basis, UNMIK was vitiated from the start, which explains its attempts to reinforce itself 
through self-legitimacy and its conscious attempts to secure international legitimacy for itself 
and for the pursuance of its mandate. This phenomenon is evidence by the top-down approach 
implemented by the international administration, pursuing a policy of democratisation 
according to international principles, but one which lacked a coherent strategy to enforce a 
key component of democracy: grass-roots empowerment.853 Unable to secure proper support 
from the organ that created it, UNMIK set off upon a dangerous path of ad hoc policies, 
increasingly sliding towards nationalistic ideological demands in a desolate attempt to pursue 
its mandate. Eventually, these policies, or rather their lack of any overall strategy, undermined 
its legitimacy at both the international and local levels, overshadowing the initial – and 
relative – success of the establishment and enforcement of the institutional structure of the 
new political system. Indeed, UNMIK found itself to be the unfortunate link between two 
parallel dimensions evolving in closed circles.  
The March 2004 riots, which turned into a Kosovo Albanian nationalist display of 
force against Serbs, but even more crucially against the international community, were the 
basis that caused the collapse of the international administration. The launch of the Eide and 
Ahtisaari missions were clear proof of the withdrawal of the international community’s 
support for UNMIK. Indeed, both reports concluded by noting the fragile basis of Kosovo’s 
institutions; yet they appealed for the pursuance of a final status leaving little doubt as to the 
outcome. At no point did the reports consider providing the administration the necessary 
political support that it lacked. The result consigned the international administration to being 
its own shadow in the middle of the veto-powers’ arm wrestling. Yet, contrary to what the 
nationalist discourses promised, the declaration of independence has not solved Kosovo’s 
issues. Lacking the institutions necessary to support sustainable stability, it is still prey to a 
deep economic and social crisis. Besides, the refusal of Belgrade, the Serb community as well 
as a portion of the international community to recognise Kosovo’s independence leaves the 
new state in a new political limbo, even if now upgraded to the international rather than 
national level.  
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Besides the issue of Kosovo itself, the failure of UNMIK is evidence of a much deeper 
issue. The recognition of the independence of the province by some of the leading Western 
nations and the ensuing recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by 
Russia sends an ambiguous message that only national self-determination movements with 
powerful international sponsors are entitled to a right of secession. The astonishing 
significance of these events in international political and legal terms met with 
disproportionately little response in the media and in the academic literature. Undeniably, 
NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 had instigated an industrious political and academic 
debate at the time of the event. Beyond the strict context of conflict regulation, this study of 
Kosovo through a double-layered legitimacy framework highlights the deepening legitimacy 
crisis of the international order. Clearly international rules do not meet the ‘beliefs’ of states 
any longer, which manifestly do not act according to them. In this scenario, two alternatives 
are indeed possible: first, the community’s belief adapts to fit the established rules. In a 
framework without enforcement mechanisms such as that characterising the international 
community, this is highly unlikely; the other possibility is that international rules evolve to 
match the new ‘belief demands’ of the society of states.  
The irony lies in the fact that the international order, in an attempt at self-preservation, 
is indeed undermining its own stability. The Westphalian system had its relevance in the 
eighteenth century. As Clark has underlined, since the signing of the treaty, there has been a 
constant reappraisal of the rules undermining the system in order to adapt to the new demands 
of political ideologies. The fundamental question that the international community nowadays 
faces is: to what extent is a state order made for states still relevant? At the time the 
Westphalian system was established, the aim was to prevent war, and thus suffering. At the 
time, the state appeared as the most sensible unit for protecting populations from the 
afflictions of conflict; hence it made sense to preserve them as central units of the system. Yet 
at a time when state sovereignty has become a screen behind which governments can proceed 
with gross human right violations, the international community should consider whether the 
need of states for sovereignty is still relevant.854 Contemporary cases of gross humanitarian 
violations in Zimbabwe and Sudan are reminders of the relevance of this debate. 
Nonetheless, beyond the failures of Kosovo, the relevance of adopting coherent 
international institution-building as an efficient conflict regulation mechanism in the case of 
                                                
854 Bain, W., Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligation of Power, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2003, p. 163-170 
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collapsed states is indeed still highly relevant. Beyond the context of the fall of the 
socialist/communist model in Europe, cases such as Afghanistan demonstrate the threat power 
vacuums can hold for the international order. Certainly, in addition to the threat represented 
by internal instability, the power vacuum was filled in this case by offensive ideologies 
towards foreign states. ‘Lessons learned’ in the field of conflict regulation are difficult to 
export, especially to cases of ethnic-based struggles. Indeed, the case of Kosovo is hardly 
comparable to the intricacies of the difficulties faced in Afghanistan. Yet, what this thesis has 
attempted to do is develop an analytical framework that could potentially be applied to other 
conflicts to analyse the deep-rooted causes of international efforts’ struggle to develop 
institutions to deal with such conflicts. As the international community got involved in the 
restoration of the Afghan state, it decided to adopt, probably based on the lessons of the 
unconvincing results in Kosovo and East Timor, what Simon Chesterman calls the ‘light 
footprint approach’,855 which implies increasing local empowerment from the beginning of 
institution-building efforts. Yet, the particularly difficult political conditions, still major 
sources of political instabilities after eight years of international involvement, brings up the 
heuristic value of the double layer model developed in this thesis. While I do not have the 
capacity to enquire further at this point into the case of Afghanistan, I would like, however, to 
hypothesise that the legitimacy analytical model and test developed here could address some 
of the difficulties encountered by the international actors involved there in establishing 
institutions as basis for the state’s stability. In particular, it could provide insights into the lack 
of a coherent international strategy to address the conflict, or the assessment of grounding 
local legitimacy on ‘local ideologies and cultural backgrounds’. 
Nevertheless, as regards this research, the choice of illustrating my analysis with the 
case of Kosovo has been relevant for two reasons. The first is empirical, in the sense that the 
international administration established in Prishtina was unique in its nature and outcome. It 
was the first time that the international community, through the United Nations, was granted 
such extended powers and responsibilities in a sovereign state, though without its outright 
support – thus ultimately leading to the secession of the territory. Ultimately, the case of 
Kosovo proved to be the impetus for a large and diverse academic literature on relevant 
topics: the breakup of Yugoslavia, nationalism studies, conflict regulation, humanitarian law, 
and i around ‘recognition’ as constitutive or declarative element of state formation. The case 
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of Kosovo has engendered reflection beyond the conflict regulation scholarship and enabled 
the development of a model with interesting implications beyond the simple syllogisms that 
were developed on the theme of  ‘to be or not to be’ independent, which earlier tended to 
dominate a large part of the literature about Kosovo. Second, the choice of Kosovo proved 
relevant for methodological reasons. Indeed it provided a valuable analytical opportunity. The 
development of the mission occurred within a time-span of ten years, which permitted the 
observation of the full implementation and development of the relevant policies, ultimately 
enabling a better assessment of the outcome. Because I was personally involved in research 
on the region since the summer 1999, it enabled me to gain a thorough understanding of the 
intricacies of the issues at stake and their consequences. Besides the relevance and originality 
of the nature of international involvement in the case of the Kosovo conflict, the sizes 
involved in the development of the mission are interesting. Indeed, UNMIK was 
comparatively a large mission for a relatively and comparatively small territory. From a 
practical point of view, the size of the area covered and the relatively safe conditions favoured 
the development and outcome of my fieldwork. The concentration of relevant actors, 
relatively all willing to exchange their points of view, has also proved beneficial. High-
ranking officials and local leaders were quite easy to access and demonstrated a particular 
eagerness to talk. In sum, the specific circumstances enabled me to have a better 
understanding and benefitted this research more than they might have been given the difficult 
conditions in which missions dealing with conflict/post conflict zones generally evolve.  
Since the first presentation of my work in progress, then entitled ‘In Search of 
Legitimacy: The Obstacle to Conflict Regulation in Kosovo', at the ninth Annual World 
Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities in April 2004, the theme of 
legitimacy and international administration has gained increasing relevance in the academic 
literature. Yet, this research modestly contends that it finds its place by adding to the existing 
significant work on the issue international administration, such as Dominik Zaum’s The 
Sovereignty Paradox or even Knoll’s work, which develops a similar concept of double 
legitimacy. Indeed, this research has aimed to provide an analytical model that might be of 
constructive explanatory value, identifying and stressing one of the – many – crucial variables 
necessary to account for the complexity of ethnic post-conflict regulation. Concentrating on a 
single case study – hence proceeding with a vertical rather than horizontal/comparative 
analysis – enables this research to explore the deeper sources of the difficulties encountered 
by UNMIK. Indeed, the literature that deals with the international administration in Kosovo 
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tends to use a comparative approach to highlight the issues relevant to the structure and 
procedure failures of international administration – lack of accountability, corruption, etc. 
Beyond technical issues, which are in any case covered by political analysts and other 
academics in an articulate way, this thesis aims to add to a heuristic contribution, in the form 
of analytical concepts that, for the investigation of models of international involvement in 
institution-building, are relevant for the stabilisation of collapsed states around the world. 
Indeed, this research has not exhausted the topic of legitimacy as regards the role of 
international institutions. It has, however, developed a critical perspective that may help to 
expose and resolve certain tensions illustrated by the Kosovo case study for cases similar to it 
in the future.  
 
 
 254 
 Bibliography 
1. Books, Chapters in Books, Journal Articles and Unpublished Papers 
Allen Dauphinee, E., ‘Rambouillet: a Critical (Re) Assessment’ in Bieber, F. and Z. 
Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo, Frank Cass Publisher, London, 2003.  
pp. 101-117. 
Altmann, F.-L., ‘Le Statut du Kosovo’ in Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité Union de l’Europe 
Occidentale, Quel Statut pour le Kosovo?, Cahiers de Chaillot, No. 50, 2001. pp. 21-37. 
Andersen, A., Transforming Ethnic Nationalism: The Politics of Ethno-nationalistic 
Sentiments among the Elites in Kosovo, Institute of Social Anthropology – University of 
Oslo, Oslo, 2002.  
Anderson, P., ‘Air Strike: Nato Astride Kosovo’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (eds.), The 
Kosovo Crisis: the Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 2001. pp. 
183-203. 
Andreani, G., ‘Force et Diplomatie à Propos de la Guerre du Kosovo’ in Annuaire Français 
de Relations Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 163-178. 
Annon., ‘Aspect de l’Intervention au Kosovo’ in Annuaire Français de Relations 
Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 161-162. 
Antonenko, O., ‘Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo’ in Survival, vol. 49 (3), 2007. pp. 91-
106 
Archibugi, D., ‘A Critical Analysis of the Self-determination of Peoples: a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective’ in Constellations, vol. 10 (4), 2003. pp. 488- 505. 
Armstrong, J., ‘Post Communism and Nationalism’ in M. Guibernau & Hutchinson, J. (eds.), 
Understanding Nationalism, Polity, Oxford, 2001. 
Artisien, P., ‘A Note on Kosovo and the Future of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: a Balkan 
Perspective’ in Soviet Studies, vol. 36 (2), 1984. pp. 267-276.    
d’Aspremont, J., ‘Legitimacy of Government in the Age of Democracy’ in Journal of 
International Law and Politics, vol. 38 (4), 2006. pp. 877-917. 
---, ‘Les Administrations Internationales de Territoire et la Création Internationale d’Etats 
Démocratiques’ presented at the Conference Legitimacy and Accountability of International 
Administrations, European Society of International Law, Geneva, 26-28 May 2005. 
Bächler, G., Conflict Transformation Through State Reform, Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2004. 
Bain, W., Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligation of Power, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003. 
Balcer, A., ‘Kosovo: The Question of Final Status’ in CES Studies, 2003. pp. 48-63. 
Bardos, G., ‘Containing Kosovo’ in Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 16 (3), 2005. pp. 17-43. 
Bárdos-Féltorronyi, N., ‘La Question Albanaise Est-elle à Nouveau Balkanisée?’ in Waele de, 
J,-M. and K. Gjeloshaj (eds.), De la Question Albanaise au Kosovo, Edition Complexe, 
Paris, 1999. pp. 35-56. 
 255 
Barker, R., Legitimating Identities: the Self Presentation of Rulers and Subjects, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
---, Political Legitimacy and the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990. 
Barkin, J. and B. Cronin, ‘The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of 
Sovereignty in International Relations’ in International Organization, vol. 48 (1), 1994. pp. 
107-130. 
Barnes, S., ‘The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies’ in 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 95 (1), 2001. pp. 86-101. 
Basta Fleiner, L., ‘Can Ethnic Federalism Work?’ presented at the Conference Facing Ethnic 
Conflicts, Center for Development Research, Bonn, 14-16 December 2000. 
Bastian, S. and R. Luckham (eds.), Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional 
Choice in Conflict-torn Societies, Zed books, London, 2003. 
Bauböck, R., ‘Why Stay Together? A Pluralist Approach to Secession and Federation’ in 
Kymlicka W. and W. Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford University 
Press, 2000. pp. 366-392. 
Beauvais, J., ‘Benevolent Despotism: a Critique of the UN State Building in East Timor’ in 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 33, 2001. pp. 1102- 
1171. 
Beetham, D., The Legitimation of Power, Macmillan, London, 1991.  
Belloni, R., State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, Routledge, London, 
2008. 
Bieber, F., ‘Power Sharing after Yugoslavia: Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power-
sharing Institutions in Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo’ in Noel, S. (ed.), From 
Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2005. pp. 85-103. 
---, ‘The Legal Framework for Post-War Kosovo and the Myth of Multiethnicity’ in 
Dimitrijević N. and P. Kovacs (eds.), Managing Hatred and Distrust: The Prognosis for 
Post-Conflict Settlement in Multiethnic Communities in the former Yugoslavia, LCI, 
Budapest, 2004. pp. 118-135. 
---, Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans Managing Change in Deeply Divided 
Societies, European Center for Minority Issues, Flensburg, 2004. 
---, ‘What Final Status is Possible for Kosovo? Plans and Their Critiques’ in European 
Balkan Observer, vol. 2 (1), 2004. pp. 14-17. 
---, ‘Serbia After the Kosovo War: the Defeat of Nationalism and Change of Regime’ in 
Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo, Frank Cass 
Publisher, London, 2003. pp. 321-335. 
---, ‘Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. Internationally Driven 
Processes of Institutional (Re-)Design’ in The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 2 (2), 
2003. pp. 3-16. 
Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo, Frank Cass 
Publisher, London, 2003. 
Bieber, F. and S. Wolff., ‘Election in Divided Society’ in Ethnopolitics, vol. 4 (4), 2005. pp. 
359-363. 
 256 
Bogdanovic, D., The Kosovo Question Past and Present, Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, Beograd, vol. DLXVI (2), 1995. 
de Bois, P., ‘L’Union Européenne et le Naufrage de la Yougoslavie (1991-1995)’ in Relations 
Internationales, no. 104, 2000. pp. 469-485. 
Black, H., Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1990. 
Blumi, I., ‘Ethnic Borders to a Democratic Society in Kosova: The UN’s Identity Card’ in 
Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo, Frank Cass 
Publisher, London, 2003. pp. 217-236. 
Bojičić-Dzelilović, V., ‘Managing Ethnic Conflicts Democratic Decentralisation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina’ in Bastian, S. and R. Luckham (eds.), Can Democracy Be Designed? The 
Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies, Zed Books, London, 2003. pp. 
277-302. 
Bose, S., Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, Hurst, 
London, 2002. 
Bothe, M. and T. Marauhn, ‘UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, 
Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration’ in 
Tomuschat, C. (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment, 
Martimus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hagues, 2002. pp. 217-242. 
Buchanan, A., Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. 
Buckley, M., ‘Russian Perceptions’ in Buckley, M & S. Cummungs (eds), Kosovo: 
Perceptions of War and its Aftermath, Continuum Internatinoal Publishing Group, 2001. pp. 
156-175. 
Brand, M., The Development of Kosovo Institutions and the Transition of Authority from 
UNMIK to Local Self-Government, Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations 
(CASIN), Geneva, 2003.   
Buchheit, L., Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-determination, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1978. 
Bugajski, J., ‘Is it True that the Independence of Kosova would Destabilise the Balkans and 
Endanger the Possibility of Stabilising Other Areas of the World, for Exemple Chechnya or 
Nagorno Karabach?’ in di Lellio, A. (ed.), The Case for Kosova: Passage to Independence, 
Anthem Press, London, 2006. pp. 195-200. 
Campbell, J., ‘Tito: the Achievement and the Legacy’ in Foreign Affairs, vol. 58 (5), 1980. 
pp. 1045-1059. 
Canapa, M.-P., Des Etats Pluriethniques dans l’ex-Yougoslavie? Etat du Citoyen (Gradjanska 
Drzava) ou Etat du Membre de la Nation (Nacionalna Drzava)? Les Cahiers du CERI, 
Paris, 1993.  
Caplan, R., International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. 
---, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia’ in International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 12 (3), 2005. pp. 463-476.  
---, A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories, Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford, 2002. 
 257 
Caplan, R. and J. Feffer (eds.), Europe’s New Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.  
Carson, D., ‘The Kosovo Question’ in Florida Coastal Law Journal, vol. 2 (1), 2000. 
Caruso, U., ‘Kosovo Declaration of Independence and the International Community – an 
Assessment by the Kosovo Monitoring Task Force’ in Journal on Ethnopolitics and 
Minority Issues in Europe, vol. 7 (2), 2008. 
Caspersen, N., Intra-ethnic Competition and Inter-ethnic Conflict: Serb Elites in Croatia and 
Bosnia, 1990-1995, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2005.  
Cassese, A., ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritus: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ in European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10 (1), 1999. pp. 23-30. 
---, Self-determination of People: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995. 
---, ‘Political Self-determination: Old Concept and New Development’ in A. Cassese (ed.), 
UN Law / Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law, Alphenannden Rijn, The 
Netherlands, 1979. pp. 137-165. 
Chandler, D., ‘Building Trust in Public Institutions? Good Governance and Anti-corruption in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’ in Ethnopolitics, vol. 5 (1), 2006. pp. 85-99.  
Charney, J., ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ in American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93 (4), 1999. pp. 834-841. 
Chesterman, S., You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-
building, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.   
Chesterman, S., M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur, Making States Work: From State Failure to 
State-Building, International Peace Academy, New York, 2004.  
Chiclet, C., ‘L’Importance de la Question Albanaise’ in Waele de, J.-M. and K. Gjeloshaj 
(eds.), De la Question Albanaise au Kosovo, Edition Complexe, Paris, 1999. pp. 15-20. 
Chinkin, C., ‘Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War?’ in American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 93 (4), 1999. pp. 841-847. 
Churruca Muguruza, C., ‘The European Union and Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo: A 
test for the Common Foreign Policy’ in Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding 
the War in Kosovo, Frank Cass Publisher, London, 2003. pp. 237-252. 
Cinnalli, M., ‘Bellow and Beyond Power Sharing: Relational Structures across Institutions 
and Civil Society’ in O’Flynn, I. and D. Russell (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for 
Divided Societies, Pluto Press, London, 2005. pp. 172-187. 
Čirjaković, Z., ‘“Kosovozed” Bosnia’ in Waller, M., K. Drezov and B. Gökay, Kosovo: The 
Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. pp. 71-75. 
Clark, H., Civil Resistance in Kosovo, Pluto Press, London, 2000. 
Clark, I., Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. 
Clark, J., ‘National Minorities and the Milošević Regime’ in Nationalities Papers, vol. 35 (2), 
2007. pp. 317 – 339. 
Coakley, J., ‘Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: the Strategy of Non Territorial 
Autonomy’ in International Political Science Review, vol. 15 (3), 1994. pp. 297 - 314. 
 258 
Coakley, J., The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, Routledge, London, 2003. 2nd ed. 
Cocozzelli, F., ‘Kosovo at the Crossroads: Competing Solidarities’ in GSC Quarterly, vol. 11, 
2004. 
Cohen, L., Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević, Westview Press, 
Oxford, 2000. 
---, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993. 
Connolly, W. (ed.), Legitimacy and the State, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984. 
Coppieters, B., Kosovo and the Principles of Just Secession, CEPS Policy Brief no. 146, 3 
December 2007. 
Coppieter, B. and al, Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case studies from the 
European Periphery, Academia Press, Gent, 2004. 
Corten, O., ‘Déclarations Unilatérales d’Indépendance et Reconnaissances Prématurées du 
Kosovo à l’Ossétie du sud et à l’Abkhazie’ in Revue Générale de Doit Internaitonal Public, 
2008. pp. 721-760. 
Cox, M., ‘Building Democracy from the Outside: the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’ in Bastian, S. and R. Luckham (eds.), Can Democracy be Designed? The 
Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies, Zed Books, London, 2003. pp. 
253-276. 
Crowley, J., ‘The Adjudication of Ethnic Claims’ in Questions de Recherche, CERI, Paris, 
2001.  
Damm, S., ‘The Limitations of Violent Intervention (Written in December 1999)’ in Waller, 
M., K. Drezov and B. Gökay (eds.), Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 
2001. pp. 131-137. 
Decaux, E., ‘La Conference de Rambouillet: Négotiations de la Dernière Chance ou 
Contrainte Illicite?’ in Tomuschat, C. (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A 
Legal Assessment, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hagues, 2002. pp. 45-64. 
Delcourt, B., ‘L’Union Européenne: Acteur des Relations Internationales? Authorité, 
Autonomie et Cohérence de l’UE dans la Crise du Kosovo’ in Annuaire Français de 
Relations Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 522-531.  
---, ‘La Position des Autoritées Serbes et Yugoslaves au Sujet du Kosovo: Entre Raison d’Etat 
et Logique Nationale’ in Waele de, J,-M. and K. Gjeloshaj (eds.), De la Question Albanaise 
au Kosovo, Edition Complexe, Paris, 1999. pp. 97-108.   
Dent, M., ‘Lessons of Kosovo (written in December 1999)’ in Waller, M., K. Drezov and B. 
Gökay (eds.), Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. pp. 120-130. 
Dérens, J.-A., Kosovo, L’Année Zero, Paris-Méditerranée, Paris, 2006. 
Dérens, J-A. and C. Samary., Les Conflits Yugoslaves, L’Edition de l’Atelier, Paris, 2000. 
Dimitrijević, N. and Kovacs, P. (eds.), Managing Hatred and Distrust: The Prognosis for 
Post-Conflict Settlement in Multiethnic Communities in the Former Yugoslavia, Local 
Government and Public Service Reform Initiative / Open Society, Budapest, 2004. 
Dimitrova, K., ‘Municipal Decisions on the Border of Collapse: Macedonian Decentralisation 
and the Challenges of Post-Ohrid Democracy’ in Southeast European Politics, vol. 5 (2-3), 
2004. pp. 172-186. 
 259 
Doyle, M., ‘Kant Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 
12 (3), 1983. pp. 204-235. 
Drezov, K., ‘Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War’ in Waller, 
M., K. Drezov and B. Gökay, Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. 
pp. 59-69. 
Duijzings, G., Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, Routledge, London, 2000. 
Dziedzic, M., ‘Kosovo’ in Durch, W. (ed.), Twenty-first-century Peace Operations, US 
Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2006. pp. 319-388. 
Esman, M., ‘Ethnic Pluralism: Strategies for Conflict Management’ presented at Facing 
Ethnic Conflicts, Center for Development Research, Bonn, 14-16 December 2000.  
Falk, R., ‘Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo’ in Mertus, J. and J. Helsing (eds.), Human 
Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Link Between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding, United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2006. 
---, ‘Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law’ in American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93 (4), 1999. pp. 847-857. 
Fierstein, D., ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of Legality, 
Policy and Future Implications’ in Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 26. 
pp. 417-442.  
Flauss, J.-F., ‘La primauté des Droits de la Personne: Licéité ou Illicéité de l’Intervention 
Humanitaire’ in Tomuschat, C. (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal 
Assessment, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hagues, 2002. pp. 87-102. 
Frank, T., ‘Lessons of Kosovo’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 93 (4), 1999. 
pp. 857-860. 
---, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990. 
Gagnon, V., ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: the Case of Serbia’ in 
International Security, vol. 19 (3), 1994. pp. 130-166. 
Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006.  
Ghebali, V.-Y., ‘Trois Points de Vue sur le Pacte de Stabilité - Le Lancement du Pacte de 
Stabilité pour l’Europe du Sud-Est’ in Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, vol. 
1, 2000. pp. 227-242. 
Gjoni, R., Decentralization as a Conflict Transformation Tool: The Challenge in Kosovo, 
Presentation Paper, Institute of Federalism, 10 September 2007. 
Glenny, M., McMafia: Crime Without Frontiers, Bodley Head, London, 2008. 
Goodman, R., ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations and State Consent’ in American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 96 (3), 2002. pp. 532-560. 
Gowllan-Debbas, V., ‘The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the 
Framework of UN Peace Maintenance’ in European Journal of International Law, vol. 11 
(2), 2000. pp. 361-383. 
Grbac, D., ‘Balkanisation, un Nom Fourre-tout pour Toutes les Saisons?’ in Newropeans 
Magazine, 5 March 2008. 
Greenberg, R., ‘Keys to Stability in the Balkans’ in Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 4 (33), 
1999.  
 260 
Grmek, M., Gjidara, M. and N. Simac., Le Nettoyage Ethnique: Documents Historiques sur 
une Idéologie Serbe, Fayard, Paris, 2003. 
Guibernau, M. and J. Hutchinson (eds.), Understanding Nationalism, Polity press, Oxford, 
2001. 
Guizina, D., ‘Kosovo or Kosova: Could It Be Both? The Case of Interlocking Serbian and 
Albanian Nationalisms’ in Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding the War in 
Kosovo, Frank Cass Publisher, London, 2003. pp. 31-47. 
Hadden, T., ‘Integration and Autonomy: Minority Rights and Political Accommodation’ in 
O’Flynn, I. and D. Russell (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, 
Pluto Press, London, 2005. pp. 30-44. 
Hamzai, B., A Narrative About War and Freedom, Zëri, Prishtina, 2000. 
Hannum, H., ‘Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step toward Secession?’ 
presented at the Conference Facing Ethnic Conflicts, Center for Development Research, 
Bonn, 16 December 2000. 
Hajrullahu, A., ‘The Perception of the ‘Kosova Issue’ Regarding the EU-Integration’ 
presented at the Conference European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in 
the Western Balkan Countries, Graz, 25 February 2006.  
Harland, D., ‘Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration’ in Global 
Governance, vol. 10 (1), 2004. pp. 15-19. 
Hayden, R., ‘American Proposals for the Constitutional and Political Status of Kosovo: The 
State as Legal Fiction’ in East European Constitutional Review, vol. 7 (4), 1998. pp. 83-92. 
---, ‘Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-determination and Ethnic Cleansing in 
Yugoslavia’ in American Ethnologist, Vol. 23 (4), 1996. pp. 783-801. 
---, ‘Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics’ in Slavic Review, vol. 
51 (4), 1992. pp. 654-673.  
Heiler, J., ‘Institutions, Civil Society and Nationalism in the Context of Democratic 
Consolidation. Prospects for Democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ in Peace, Conflict and 
Development¸ vol. 2, 2002. 
Heinemann-Grüder, A. and I. Grebenschikov, ‘Security Governance by Internationals: The 
Case of Kosovo’ in International Peacekeeping, vol. 13 (1), 2006.  
Held, D., Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective, Centre of Global Governance, London, 2003. 
---, ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty’ in Legal Theory, vol. 8 (1), 
2002. pp. 1-44. 
Henkin, L., ‘Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”’ in American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93 (4), 1999. pp. 824-828. 
Hill, C., ‘The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention’ in European Foreign Affairs Review, 
vol. 6 (3), 2001. pp. 315–333. 
Henig, S., ‘Britain: To War for a Just Cause’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (eds.), The 
Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 2001. pp. 
39-58. 
Hermet, G., Histoire des Nations de l'Europe, Seuil, Paris, 1996. 
 261 
Hoxhaj, E., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation in Kosovo, Center for the Study of 
Glocal Governance, London, 2005.  
Hurwitz, A., ‘Towards Enhanced Legitimacy Rule of Law Programs in Multidimensional 
Peace Operations’ presented at the Conference Legitimacy and Accountability of 
International Administrations, European Society of International Law, Geneva, 26-28 May 
2005.    
Ignatieff, M., ‘Nationalism and Toleration’ in Caplan, R. and J. Feffer (eds.), Europe’s New 
Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 
213-. 
Jackson, R., Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
Jarstad, A., ‘To Share or to Divide? Negotiating the Future of Kosovo’ in Civil Wars, vol. 9 
(3), 2007. pp. 227-242. 
Jia, B., ‘The Independence of Kosovo: A Unique Case of Secession?’ in Chinese Journal of 
International Law, vol. 8 (1), 2009. Pp. 27-46. 
Johnson, C., ‘Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography and Ethnic Civil Wars’ in 
International Security, vol. 32 (4), 2008. p. 140-170. 
Judah, T., ‘The Growing Pains of the Kosovo Liberation Army’ in Waller, M., K. Drezov and 
B. Gökay, Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. pp. 20-24. 
Kaldor, M., ‘Democracy and Globalisation’ in Global Civil Society 2007/2008: 
Communicative Power and Democracy, Sage, 2008. pp. 34-44. 
---, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Polity Press, London, 1999. 
---, ‘Cosmopolitanism Versus Nationalism: The New Divide?’ in Caplan, R. and J. Feffer 
(eds.), Europe’s New Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996. pp. 42-58. 
Kälin, W., ‘Decentralized Governance in Fragmented Societies: Solution or Cause of New 
Evils?’ presented at the Conference Facing Ethnic Conflicts, Center for Development 
Research, Bonn, 16 December 2000. 
Kettley, C., J. Sullivan, and al., Resolving Self-determination Disputes: Through Complex 
Power Sharing Arrangements, Pembroke College, Cambridge University, 2001. 
King, I. and W. Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo, Cornell 
University Press, 2006. 
Kirgis, F., ‘Security Council Governance of Post-conflict Societies: A Plea for Good Faith 
and Informed Decision Making’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 95 (3), 
2001. pp. 579-582. 
Knoll, B., ‘Legitimacy and UN Administration of Territory’ in Journal of International Law 
and Policy, vol. 4 (1), 2007. pp. 1-15. 
---, ‘Legitimacy Through Defiance: The UN and Local Institutions in Kosovo’ in Helsinki 
Monitor, vol. 17 (4), 2006. pp. 313-326. 
---, ‘From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an International 
Administration’s Open-ended Mandate’ in European Journal of International Law, vol. 16 
(4), 2005. pp. 637-660.  
 262 
Kola, P., The Search for Greater Albania, Hurst, London, 2003. 
Koskenmäji, R., ‘Introductory Remarks’ presented at the Conference Legitimacy and 
Accountability of International Administrations, European Society of International Law, 
Geneva, 26-28 May 2005. 
Kostovičová, D., ‘Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for 
Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective’ in International Peacekeeping, vol. 15 (5), 
2008. pp. 631-647. 
---, Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space, Routledge, London, 2005. 
 ---, ‘Albanian Schooling in Kosovo 1992-1998: “Liberty Imprisoned”’ in Waller, M., K. 
Drezov and B. Gökay (eds.), Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. 
pp. 11-19. 
Kotsovilis, S., ‘Problems of Multiethnic State-Building in the Post-Conflict Balkans: Western 
Hopes on Paper, Balkan(ized) Realities on the Ground’ presented at the ASN 10th Annual 
World Convention, New York, April 2002. 
Kouchner, B., Les Guerriers de la Paix: du Kosovo à l’Irak, L.G.F., Paris, 2004. 
---, ‘The Challenge of Rebuilding Kosovo’ in NATO Review, vol. 47 (3), 1999. pp. 12-15. 
Krasner, S., ‘Compromising Westphalia’ in International Security, vol. 20 (3), 1995. pp. 115-
151. 
Krstić-Brano, B., Kosovo: Facing the Court of History, Prometheus Books, London, 2004.  
Kullashi, M., Vers L’Independance? La Question du Statut du Kosovo? CERI, Paris, 2006. 
---, ‘Le Régime Serbe et le Kosovo’ in Waele de, J,-M. and K. Gjeloshaj (eds.), De la 
Question Albanaise au Kosovo, Edition Complexe, Paris, 1999. pp. 75-96. 
Kullashi, M. and B. Pula, Why Independence for Kosovo? The Status Issue, Political 
Challenges and the Path to European Integration, Coalition for Euro-Atlantic Integration, 
Forum 2015, Prishtina, 2005. 
Kupchan, C., ‘Independence for Kosovo’ in Foreign Affairs, vol. 84 (6), 2005. pp. 14-20.  
Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights’, Oxford 
University Press, 1996. 
Lakshmann-Lepain, R., ‘L’Albanie: Une Nation Encore à Inventer?’ in Waele de, J.-M. and 
K. Gjeloshaj (eds.), De la Question Albanaise au Kosovo, Edition Complexe, Paris, 1999. 
pp. 57-74. 
Lamizet, B. and S. Debras, ‘France: questions of Identity’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig 
(eds.), Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 
2001. pp. 106-121. 
Lapidoth, R., Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, Institute of Peace Press, 
Washington DC, 1997. 
di Lellio, A. (ed.), The Case for Kosova: Passage to Independence, Anthem Press, London, 
2006.  
Leurdijk, D. and D. Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001. 
Lijphart, A., Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University 
Press, Yale, 1980. 
 263 
---, ‘Consociational Democracy’ in World Politics, vol. 21 (2), 1969. pp. 207-225. 
Lipset, S., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Heinemann Educational Books, 
London, 1983. 2nd ed. 
Luckham, R., A.-M. Goetz and M. Kaldor, ‘Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics’ 
in Bastian, S. and R. Luckham, Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional 
Choice in Conflict-torn Societies, Zed Books, London, 2003. pp. 14-57.  
Lukić, R., L’Agonie de la Yougoslavie (1986-2003): Les Etats Unis et l’Europe Face aux 
Guerres Balkaniques, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, Saint Nicolas, 2003. 
Majza, B., ‘Un Pacte de Stabilité pour l’Europe du Sud-Est: Vers L’«Européanisation» des 
Balkans?’ in Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 243-255. 
Malanczuk, P. and M. Akehurst, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 
Routledge, London, 1997. 7th ed.    
Malazogu, L., ‘Power Sharing in Local Government in Kosova under International 
Administration: A Cross-Case Comparison and the Case of Gjakova’ in Dimitrijevic, N. and 
Kovacs, P. (eds.), Managing Hatred and Distrust: The Prognosis for Post-Conflict 
Settlement in Multiethnic Communities in the Former Yugoslavia, Local Government and 
Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society, Budapest, 2004. pp. 167-185.  
---, ‘When Doves Support War and Hawks Oppose It: An Analysis of Humanitarian 
Intervention in Kosova’ in Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding the War in 
Kosovo, Frank Cass Publisher, London, 2003. pp. 125-143.  
---, ‘Institutionalized Ethnicity’, Unpublished. 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo: a Short History, Papermac, London, 1998. 
---, Bosnia: a Short History, Papermac, London, 1996. 
Manning, C., ‘Party-building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Mozambique’ in Democratization, vol. 14 (2), 2007. pp. 253-272. 
March, A. and R. Sil, (eds.), The “Republic of Kosova” (1989-1998) and the Resolution of 
Ethno-Separatist Conflict: Rethinking “Sovereignty” in the Post-Cold War Era, University 
Park, Pennsylvania, 1999. 
Matheson, M., ‘United Nations Governance of Post-conflict Societies’ in American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 95 (1), 2001. pp. 76-85. 
McMahon, P and D. Forsythe, ‘The ICTY's Impact on Serbia: Judicial Romanticism meets 
Network Politics’ in Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 30, (2), 2008. pp. 412-435. 
---, ‘Asymmetrical Federalism and the Plurinational State’ presented at the Third International 
Conference on Federalism, Brussels, 3-5 March 2005. 
---, ‘Federalism (Federation) as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation’ presented at the 
Conference From Power-sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically 
Divided Societies, London, Ontario, 9-10 November 2002. 
McGarry, J. and B. O’Leary, ‘Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation’ in Noel, 
S. (ed.), From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically 
Divided Societies, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2005. pp. 263-296. 
---, ‘The Political Regulation of National & Ethnic’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 27 August 2003. 
 264 
--- (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, Routeledge, London, 1993. 
Mertus, J., ‘How to Create a Sovereign Kosovo’ in Christian Science Monitor, 3 October 
2000. 
---, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, University of California Press, Berkley, 
1999. 
Mertus, J. and J. Helsing (eds.), Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Link Between 
Rights, Law and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2006. 
Van Meurs, W., ‘Kosovo’s Fifth Annicersary – on the Road to Nowhere?’ in The Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 3 (3-4), 2004. pp. 60-74.  
Michnik, A., ‘Dignity and Fear: A Letter to a Friend’ in Caplan, R. and J. Feffer (eds.), 
Europe’s New Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1996. pp. 15-22. 
Miller, A., ‘UNMIK: Lessons from the Early Institution Building Phase’ in New England Law 
Review, Vol. 39 (1), 2004. pp. 9-24. 
Millić, A., ‘Nationalism and Sexism: Eastern Europe in Transition’ in Caplan, R. and J. Feffer 
(eds.), Europe’s New Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996. pp. 169-194. 
Mitchell, I., ‘The Ambiguities of Elections in Kosovo: Democratisation versus Human 
Rights?’ in International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 4 (3), 2000. pp. 246-262. 
Mole, N., ‘Who Guards the Guards: The Rule of Law in Kosovo’ in European Human Rights 
Law Review, vol. 1 (2), 2001. pp. 280-299. 
Morrow, D., ‘Breaking Antagonism? Political Leadership in Divided Societies’ in O’Flynn, I. 
and D. Russell (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, Pluto Press, 
London, 2005. pp. 45-58. 
Motyl, A., Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the 
USSR, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990. 
Munn, J., ‘Gendered Realities of Life in Post-conflict Kosovo: Addressing the Hegemonic 
Man’ in Nationalities Papers, vol. 34 (3), 2006. pp. 289-304. 
Musgrave, T., Self Determination and National Minorities, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1997. 
Nagle, J. and A. Mahr, Democracy and Democratization: Post-communist Europe in 
Comparative Perspective, London: Sage, London, 1999. 
Newman, E. and R. Rich (eds.), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and 
Reality, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2004. 
Noel, S., From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided 
Societies, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2005. 
Nodia, G., ‘Nationalism and the Crisis of Liberalism’ in Caplan, R. and J. Feffer (eds.), 
Europe’s New Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1996. pp. 101-119. 
Norris, J., Collision Course: NATO, Russia and Kosovo, Praeger Publisher, Westport, 2005. 
Novosseloff, A., ‘L’Organisation Politico-militaire de l’OTAN à l’Epreuve de la Crise du 
Kosovo’ in Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 179-196. 
 265 
Oberschall, A., ‘The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and 
War in Yugoslavia’ in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 23 (6), 2000. pp. 982–1001. 
O’Connell, M., ‘The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo’ in Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 22 (1), 2000. pp. 57-89. 
O’Flynn, I., Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2006. 
---, ‘Democratic Values and Power Sharing’ in O’Flynn, I. and D. Russell (eds.), Power 
Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, Pluto Press, London, 2005. pp. 15-29. 
O’Flynn, I. and D. Russell, ‘Introduction: New Challenges for Power Sharing’ in O’Flynn, I. 
and D. Russell (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, Pluto Press, 
London, 2005. pp. 1-13. 
O’Halloran, P., ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction: Constitutional and Transitional Power-Sharing 
Arrangements in Bosnia and Kosovo’ in Noel, S. (ed.), From Power Sharing to Democracy: 
Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal, 2005. pp. 104-118. 
O’Leary, B., ‘Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments’ 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Philadelphia, August 2003.  
O’Neill, W., Kosovo: an Unfinished Peace, Lynne Reinner Publisher, 2002. 
Orentlicher, D., ‘International Responses to Separatist Claims: Are Democratic Principles 
Relevant?’ in Macedo S. and A. Buchanan (eds.), Secession and Self-Determination, New 
York University Press, New York, 2003. pp. 19-49. 
O'Shea, B., ‘Kosovo: the Triumph of Ignorance’ in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 28 
(1), 2005. pp. 61-65. 
Ottaway, M., ‘Democratization in Collapsed States’ in Zartman, I. (ed.), Collapsed States: 
The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 1995. 
pp. 235-249. 
Palairet, M., ‘Ramiz Sadiku: A Case Study in the Industrialisation of Kosovo’ in Soviet 
Studies, vol. 44 (5), 1992. pp. 897-912. 
Paris, R., At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2004. 
---, ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’ in Review of International 
Studies, vol. 28 (4), 2002. pp. 637-656. 
---, ‘Kosovo and the Metaphor War’ in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117 (3), 2002. pp. 
423-450. 
---, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’ in International Security, vol. 
22 (2), 1997. pp. 54-89. 
Pavković, A., ‘Kosovo/Kosova: A Land of Conflicting Myths’ in Waller, M., K. Drezov and 
B. Gökay (eds.), Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. pp. 3-10. 
Peci, L., I. Dugolli and L. Malazogu, Negotiating Kosovo’s Final Status, CERI, Paris, 2006.  
Pegg, S., ‘The ‘Taiwan of the Balkans’? The De Facto State Option for Kosova’ in Southeast 
European Politics, vol. 1 (2), 2000. pp. 90-100. 
 266 
Pélissier, N., ‘L’Information en Guerre: Les Médias Français et le Conflit du Kosovo’ in 
Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 206-225.  
Pellet, A., ‘Brief Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force’ in European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 11 (2), 2000. pp. 385-392. 
Pettifer, J., ‘The Kosovo Liberation Army: The Myth of Origin’ in Waller, M., K. Drezov and 
B. Gökay, Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. pp. 25-29. 
Pettifer, J. and M. Vickers, The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans, I. B. Tauris, 
2007. 
Perron, C., Le Kosovo à la Croisée des Chemins, CERI, Paris, 2006.  
Pond, E., ‘The EU Test in Kosovo’ in The Washington Quarterly, vol. 31 (4), 2008. pp. 97-
112. 
Poulton, H., ‘Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs’ in Djorkić, D. (ed.), Yugoslavism: 
Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992, Hurst, London, 2003. pp. 115-135.  
Pula, B., ‘The Emergence of the Kosovo “Parallel State” 1988-1992’ in Nationalities Papers, 
vol. 32 (4), 2004. pp. 797-826. 
---, ‘The UN in Kosova: Administering Democratization?’ in Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski 
(eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo, Frank Cass Publisher, London, 2003. pp. 199-
216. 
Radan, P., The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law, Routledge, London, 2002. 
Ramet, S., The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2004, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 2006.  
---, ‘The USA: To War in Europe Again’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (eds.), The Kosovo 
Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 2001. pp. 163-182.  
---, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1999. 2nd ed. 
Ramet, S. and P. Lyon, ‘Germany: the Federal Republic, Loyal to Nato’ in Weymouth, T. and 
S. Henig (eds.), The Kosovo Crisis: the Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, 
London, 2001. pp. 82-105. 
Ramirez, J.D. and M. Szapiro, ‘The EU: Old Wine From New Bottles’ in Weymouth, T. and 
S. Henig (eds.), The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, 
London, 2001. pp. 122-142. 
Reilley, B., Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.  
Reinisch, A., ‘Governance without Accountability’ in German Yearbook of International 
Law, vol. 44, 2001. pp. 270-306. 
Reisman, W., ‘Kosovo’s Antinomies’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 93 (4), 
1999. pp. 860-862. 
Reynolds, A. (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict 
Management, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. 
Robertson, A., Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of the International 
Protection of Human Rights, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996. 
 267 
Ross, M. and J. Rothman., Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing 
Success and Failure, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999.  
Rothchild, D., ‘Settlement Terms and Post Agreement Stability in Ending Civil Wars’ in 
Lake, D. and D. Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear 
Diffusion and Escalation. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998. pp. 12x. 
Rothschild, J., Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1981. 
Rothschild, Z., Tough Talk: Civil Society’s Untapped Potential in the Belgrade-Prishtina 
Dialogue, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003. 
Roux, M., Les Albanais en Yougoslavie: Minorité Nationale, Territoire et Développement, 
Paris, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1992.  
Ruffert, M., ‘The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the International Community’ 
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 50 (3), 2001. pp. 613-631. 
Rugova, I., La Question du Kosovo: Entretiens avec Marie-Francoise Allain et Xavier 
Galmiche, Fayard, Paris, 1994. 
Rupnik, J., Le Statut du Kosovo: Enjeu des Elections Serbes, CERI, Paris, 2008.  
---, ‘Recomposition Guerrière dans les Balkans et Constuction d’Etats Nations Homogènes’ 
presented at the Conference La Guerre Entre le Local et le Global: Sociétes, Etats, 
Systèmes, CERI, Paris, 29-30 Mai 2000. 
Rusinow, D., ‘The Yugoslav Idea before Yugoslavia’ in Djorkić, D. (ed.), Yugoslavism: 
Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992, Hurst, London, 2003. pp. 11-26. 
Salla, M., ‘Kosovo, Non-violence and the Break-up of Yugoslavia’ in Security Dialogue, vol. 
26 (4), 1995. pp. 427-438. 
Sambanis, N., ‘Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical 
Literature’ in World Politics, vol. 52, 2000. pp. 437–83. 
Schenker, H., Violence in Kosovo and the Way Ahead, European Center for Minority Issues, 
Flensburg, 2004.  
Schneckner, U., ‘Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in 
Ethnic Conflict Regulation’ in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39 (2), 2002. pp. 203-228.  
---, Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management Test Case Macedonia, Working Paper # 
14, European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, 2002. 
Schöpflin, G., ‘Power, Ethnicity and Politics in Jugoslavia’ in Schöpflin, G. (ed.), Nations, 
Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe, Hurst, London, 2000. 
---, ‘Nationhood, Communism and State Legitimation’ in Tishkov V. (ed.), Ethnicity, 
Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union:  The Mind Frame, SAGE, London, 
1997. 
---, ‘Nationalism and Ethnic Minority in Post-Communist Europe’ in Caplan, R. and J. Feffer 
(eds.), Europe’s New Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996. pp. 151-168. 
Seidel, G., ‘A New Dimension to the Right of Self Determination in Kosovo?’ in Tomuschat, 
C. (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment, Martimus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hagues, 2002. pp. 203-215. 
 268 
Sejdiu, K., ‘The Revival of a Forgotten Dispute: Deciding Kosova’s Future’ in Rutgers 
University Journal of Law and Urban Policy, vol. 3 (1), 2005. pp. 106-118. 
Sekelj, L., Yugoslavia:  The Process of Disintegration, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1993.  
Simma, B., ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ in European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 10 (1), 1999. pp. 1-22. 
Simons, J., ‘Kosovo: The Desecrated Icon’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (eds.), The Kosovo 
Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 2001. pp. 226-245. 
Singleton, F., A Short History of the Yugoslav People, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1985.  
Sisk, T., Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington, 2002.  
Smith, D., ‘Reconciling Identities in Conflict’ in Caplan, R. and J. Feffer (eds.), Europe’s 
New Nationalism: States & Minorities in Conflict, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
pp. 195-212. 
Smith, G., ‘Sustainable Federalism, Democratization and Distributive Justice’ in Kymlicka 
W. and W. Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
pp. 345-365. 
Smith, J., The Bolsheviks and the National Question 1917-23, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999.  
Sorensen, G., Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing 
World, Westview Press, Boulder, 1998. 
Stahn, C., The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to 
Iraq and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 
---, ‘Accountability and Legitimacy in Practice: Lawmaking by Transitional Administrations’ 
presented at the Conference Legitimacy and Accountability of International 
Administrations, European Society of International Law, Geneva, 26-28 May 2005. 
---, ‘Justice under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critical of a Paradigm’ in 
Houston Journal of International Law, vol. 27 (2), 2005. pp. 311-344. 
---, ‘Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional 
Framework for Self-government’ in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 14, 2001. p. 
521-561. 
Stahn, C. and A. Zimmermann., ‘Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or 
Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo’ in Nordic 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 70 (4), 2001. pp. 423-460. 
Stedman, S., ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’ in International Security, Vol. 22 (2), 
1997. pp. 5-49. 
Steiner, H., P. Alston and R. Goodman (eds.), International Human Rights in Context: Law, 
Politics, Morals: Text and Materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. 3rd ed.   
Stillman, P., ‘The Concept of Legitimacy’ in Polity, vol. 7 (1), 1974. pp. 32-56. 
Strohmeyer, H., ‘Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations 
Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 95 (1), 
2001. pp. 46-63.  
 269 
Suny, R., The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998.  
---, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1993.   
Taras, R. and R. Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, 
Longman, New York, 1998. 
Tardy, T., European Security in a Global Context: Internal and External Dynamics, Taylor 
and Francis, London, 2009. 
Tansey, O., ‘Democratization without a State: Democratic Regime-building in Kosovo’ in 
Democratization, vol.14 (1), 2007. pp. 129-150. 
Taylor, A., ‘“We are not asking you to hug each other, but we ask you to co-exist”: the 
Kosovo Assembly and the Politics of Co-existence’ in Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 
11 (1), 2005. pp. 105-137. 
Thornberry, P., ‘“Come, friendly bombs…”: International Law in Kosovo’, in Waller, M, K. 
Drezov and B. Gökay (eds.), Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. 
pp. 43-62 
Tishkov, V., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union:  The Mind 
Frame, Sage, London, 1997. 
Tomuschat, C. (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment, 
Martimus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hagues, 2002. 
Tourard, H., ‘La France dans la Crise du Kosovo: Cohabitation et Processus Décisionnel’ in 
Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 197-205. 
Travers, D., ‘The UN: Squaring the Circle’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (eds.), The Kosovo 
Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 2001. pp. 246-276. 
Treneska, R., ‘Multiethnic Coexistence in the Republic of Macedonia Before and After the 
Conflict of 2001’ in Dimitrijevic, N. and P. Kovacs (eds.), Managing Hatred and Distrust: 
The Prognosis for Post-Conflict Settlement in Multiethnic Communities in the Former 
Yugoslavia, Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society, 
Budapest, 2004. 
Tröbst, S., Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-
1998, European Centre for Minority Issues, Working Paper N°1, May 1998. 
Uerpmann, R., ‘La Primauté des Droits de l’Homme: Licéité ou Illicéiteé de l’Intervention 
Humanitaire’ in Tomuschat, C. (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal 
Assessment, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hagues, 2002. pp. 65-86. 
de Varennes, F., ‘Towards Effective Political Participation and Representation of Minorities’ 
presented at Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Working Group on Minorities, Fourth Session, 
25-29 May l998. 
Vickers, M., ‘Tirana’s Uneasy Role in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999’ in Waller, M., K. 
Drezov and B. Gökay, Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 2001. pp. 30-
36. 
---, The Albanians: A Modern History, I.B. Tauris, 1999. 
---, Between Serb and Albanian: History of Kosovo, Hurst, London, 1998. 
 270 
---, The Status of Kosovo in Socialist Yugoslavia, Research Unit in South European Studies, 
University of Bradford, Bradford, 1994. 
Vladisavljević, N., ‘Grassroots Groups, Milošević or Dissident Intellectuals? A Controversy 
over the Origins and Dynamics of the Mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s’ in 
Nationalities Papers, vol. 32 (4), 2004. pp. 781-796. 
---, ‘Nationalism, Social Movement Theory and the Grass Roots Movement of Kosovo Serbs, 
1985-1988’ in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54 (5), 2002. pp. 771-790. 
De Vrieze, F., ‘Towards Self-Government in Kosovo’ in Helsinki Monitor, vol. 13 (1), 2002. 
pp. 11-25. 
Vujacić, V., ‘Perceptions of the State in Russia and Serbia: The Role of Ideas in the Soviet 
and Yugoslav Collapse’ in Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 20 (2), 2004. pp. 164-194. 
Vukadinović, N., ‘Le Pacte de Stabilité pour L’Europe d Sud-Est’ in Annuaire Français de 
Relations Internationales, vol. 1, 2000. pp. 256-264.  
Waele de, J,-M. and K. Gjeloshaj., ‘Un Indispensable Retour sur le Passé’ in Waele de, J.-M. 
and K. Gjeloshaj (eds.), De la Question Albanaise au Kosovo, Edition Complexe, Paris, 
1999. pp. 21-34. 
Waller, M., K. Drezov and B. Gökay, Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, Frank Cass, London, 
2001. 
Warbrick, C. and D. McGoldrick, ‘Kosovo: The Declaration of Independence’ in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 57 (3), 2008. pp. 675-690. 
Weber, M., Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, New York: 
Bedminster Press, 1968. Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (eds.). 
---, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Connolly, W. (ed.), Legitimacy and the State,  Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1984. pp. 32-39. 
Wedgwood, R., ‘Unilateral Action in the UN System’ in European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 11 (2), 2000. pp. 349-359. 
---, ‘NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 93 
(4), 1999. pp. 828-834. 
Wedgwood, R. and H. Jacobson, ‘Symposium: State Reconstruction After Civil Conflict – 
Forwords’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 95. (1), 2001. pp. 1-6. 
Weiss, T., ‘Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo – Commentary’ in Falk, R., 
‘Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo’ in Mertus, J. and J. Helsing (eds.), Human Rights 
and Conflict: Exploring the Link Between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding, United States 
Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2006. pp. 209-216. 
Weller, M., The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: From Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet 
and the Outbreak of Hostilities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 
---, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’ in International Affairs, vol. 75 (2), 1999. pp. 
211-251. 
Weller, M. and S. Wolff., ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Lessons for 
Internationalized State Building’ in Ethnopolitics, vol. 5 (1), 2006. pp. 1-13. 
Weymouth, A. and S. Henig (eds.), The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, 
Pearson Education, London, 2001.  
 271 
---, ‘Why War, Why NATO?’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (eds.), The Kosovo Crisis: The 
Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 2001. pp. 1-14. 
---, ‘The Media: Information and Deformation’ in Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (eds.), The 
Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, London, 2001. pp. 
143-162. 
Widner, J., ‘Courts and Democracy in Post Conflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s 
Perspective on the African Case’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 95 (1), 
2001. pp. 64-75. 
Wilde, R., ‘A commentary on Four Papers’ presented at the Conference Legitimacy and 
Accountability of International Administrations, European Society of International Law, 
Geneva, 26-28 May 2005. 
---, ‘Representing International Territorial Administration: A Critique of Some Approach’ in 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 15 (1), 2004. pp. 71-96. 
 ---, ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial 
Administrations’ in American Journal of International law, vol. 95 (3), 2001. pp. 583- 606.  
---, ‘Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East 
Timor’ in ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7, 2001. pp. 455-460.  
Wilkinson, S., ‘Conditionality, Consocialism and the European Union’ in Noel, S. (ed.), From 
Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2005. pp. 239-262. 
Williams C. and Z. Golenkova, ‘Russia: Walking the Tightrope’ in Weymouth, T. and S. 
Henig (eds.), The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Pearson Education, 
London, 2001. pp. 204-225. 
Wilson, R., ‘Towards a Civic Culture: Implications for Power Sharing Policy Makers’ in 
O’Flynn, I. and D. Russell (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, 
Pluto Press, London, 2005. pp. 204-218. 
Wolff, S., ‘Electoral Systems Design and Power Sharing Regimes’ in O’Flynn, I. and D. 
Russell (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, Pluto Press, London, 
2005. pp. 59-74. 
---, ‘The Limits of Non-military International Interventions: A Case Study of the Kosovo 
Conflict’ in Bieber, F. and Z. Daskalouski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo, Frank 
Cass Publisher, London, 2003. pp. 79-100. 
Woodward, S., ‘Genocide or Partition: Two Faces of the Same Coin?’ in Slavic Review, Vol. 
55 (4), 1996. pp. 755-761 
---, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, 1994.  
Yannis, A., ‘The UN as Government in Kosovo’ in Global Governance, Vol. 10 (1), 2004. pp. 
67-81. 
---, ‘Kosovo under International Administration’ in Survival, vol. 43 (2), 2001. pp. 31-48. 
---, Kosovo under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict, Hellenic Foundation 
for European and Foreign Policy, Athens, 2001. 
Zartman, I. (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 1995. 
 272 
Zaum, D., The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
2. Interviews 
Bob Charmbury, Municipal Officer, UNMIK, Prishtina, 26 May 2004. 
Olivier Revah, Democratisation Officer, OSCE, Prishtina, 27 May and 6 June 2004. 
Dmitry Shlapachenko, SRSG Office of Political Affairs, UNMIK, Prishtina, 29 May, 5 june 
and 8 June 2004. 
Leon Malazogu, Executive Director KIPRED, Prishtina, 31 May and 1 June 2004. 
Karen Vokner, Country Director, ECMI, 31 Mai and 15 June 2004. 
Julia Nietsh, Civil Society and Reconciliation, OSCE, Prishtina, 2 June 2004. 
Reecca Kiefner, Assembly Monitor, OSCE, Prishtina, 2 June and 16 June 2004. 
Jeta Xharra, IWPR/Koha Ditore, Prishtina, 3 June 2004. 
Owen Master, Country Director, CoE, Prishtina, 3 June 2004. 
Ulrich Steinle, Assembly Support Initiative, OSCE, Prishtina, 4 June 2004. 
Maja Zozolly, Political Advisor, OSCE, Prishtina, 8 June and 14 June 2004. 
Sergio Martin-Moreno, Electoral Commission, OSCE, Prishtina, 8 June 2004. 
Jennifer Slotin, UNDP, Prishtina, 10 June 2004. 
Heredin Kuqi, Vice-president and Assembly Member, PDK, Prishtina, 14 June 2004. 
Petrit Salimi, Media Officer, OSCE, Prishtina, 14 June 2006 
Anna-Myriam Rocatello, Department of Justice, UNMIK, Prishtina, 14 June 2004. 
Alush Gashi, Member of Parliament, LDK, Prishtina, 15 June 2004. 
John Furnari, Department of Justice, UNMIK, Prishtina, 15 June 2004. 
Ruairi O’Connel, 2nd Secretary, Political Affairs, British Liaison Office, 15 June 2004. 
Daniel Ratier, 1st Secretary, Political Affairs, French liaison office, Prishtina, 15 June 2004. 
Carel Brands, 1st Secretary, Dutch Liaison Office, Prishtina, 16 June 2004.  
Milorad Todorović, Interministerial Coordinator for Returns, Office of the Prime Minister, 
Prishtina, 17 June 2004. 
Blerim Shala, Editor, Zëri, Prishtina, 17 June 2004. 
Arta Ramaj, NDI, Prishtina, 17 June 2004. 
David Carne Ross, Strategy Coordinator, SRSG Office, UNMIK, Prishtina, 18 June 2004. 
Ramush Haradinaj, President of Political Party and Assembly Member, AAK, Prishtina, 21 
June 2004. 
Minna Jarvenpaa, Former Municipal Officer for Mitrovica (March 2003-March 2004), 
UNMIK, London, 26 May 2006.  
3. Documents 
a. Constitutions 
Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 14 March 2002. 
Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, 
No. 51/1991.  
 273 
Declaration of Kaçanik and Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 7 September 1990. 
Constitutional Amendments of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1989, in Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Serbia, No. 30/89. 
Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 21 February 1974. 
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1974 
Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, 1974. 
Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Constitutional amendments, 
December 1968. 
Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 7 April 1963. 
Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 31 January 1946. 
b. United Nations 
Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945 
i) General Assembly 
General Assembly Resolution 180 (LX) on the Peacebuilding Commission, A/RES/60/180, 
20 December 2005. 
General Assembly Resolution on 2005 World Summit Outcome, United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 60/1, 24 October 2005. 
General Assembly Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and 
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Resolution 53/144, 8 March 1999. 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and 
Linguistic Minorities, General Assembly Resolution 47/ 135, 18 December 1992. 
General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI), 16 December 1966.  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Assembly 
Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966. 
General Assembly declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960. 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), 10 
December 1948. 
ii) Secretary General 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2009/149, 17 March 2009. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2008/692, 24 November 2008. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2008/458, 15 July 2008. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2008/354, 12 June 2008. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2008/211, 28 March 2008. 
 274 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2007/768, 3 January 2008. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2007/395, 29 June 2007. 
‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2007/134, 9 March 2007. 
Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK, S/2007/582, 28 September 2007. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2006/906, 20 November 2006 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2006/707, 1 September 2006. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2006/361, 5 June 2006. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2006/45, 25 January 2006. 
Situation in Kosovo, S/2005/635, 7 October 2005. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2005/335, S/2005/335/Corr., 23 May 
2005. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2005/88, 14 February 2005. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2004/907, 17 November 2004. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2004/613, 30 July 2004. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2004/348, 30 April 2004. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2004/71, 26 January 2004. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2003/996, 15 October 2003 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2003/675, 26 June 2003. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2003/421, 14 April 2003. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2003/113, 29 January 2003. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2002/1126, 9 October 2002. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2002/779, 17 July 2002.  
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2002/436, 22 April 2002.  
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2002/62, 15 January 2002.  
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2001/926, 2 October 2001. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2001/565,7 June 2001. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2001/218, 13 March 2001. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2000/1196, 15 December 2000. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2000/878, 18 September 2000. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2000/538, 6 June 2000.  
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/2000/177, 3 March 2000  
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/1999/1250, 23 December 1999. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/1999/987, 16 September 1999. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999. 
iii) Security Council 
Resolutions 
Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
Security Council resolution 1199 on the Situation in Kosovo (FRY), S/RES/1199 (1998), 23 
September 1998 
 275 
Security Council resolution 1203 on the Situation in Kosovo, S/RES/1203 (1998), 24 October 
1998. 
Security Resolution 1037 on United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, 15 January 1996.  
Transcripts 
United Nations Security Council meeting records, S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008. 
iv) UNMIK 
Speeches 
‘Remarks by the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo on European political perspectives’, 
Prishtina, 22 June 2007. 
‘For Exemple Kosovo: Seven Principles for Building Peace’, Transcript of the Speech of 
SRSG Michael Steiner delivered at the London School of Economics, London, 27 January 
2003. 
Regulations 
UNMIK Regulation 2006/06 on the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, 
UNMIK/REG/2006/06, 16 February 2006 
UNIMIK Regulation 2001/9, on a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government 
in Kosovo, 15 May 2001. 
UNMIK, Regulation 2000/45 On Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo, 11August 
2000.  
UNMIK Regulation 2000/38 on the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in 
Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2000/38, 30 June 2000. 
UNMIK regulation no. 1999/1 on The Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, 
UNMIK/REG/1999/1, 25 July 1999 
UNMIK Regulation no. 1999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, 
UNMIK/REG/1999/24,12 December 1999 
UNMIK, Regulation 2000/1 On the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, 14 
January 2000. 
Miscellaneous 
‘The Kosovo Standards Process 2003-2007’, UNMIK/StratCo 070420, Prishtina, 2007 
‘Revised Manual for Sustainable Return’, Prishtina, July 2006  
‘Kosovo Action Plan for the Implementation of European Partnership’, Prishtina, August 
2006 
OSCE/UNHCR, ‘Tenth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (Period 
covering May 2002 to December 2002), Prishtina, March 2003. 
c. Miscellaneous 
International Crime Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Milošević trial transcripts, 18 October 2005, pp. 
45362-45415. 
 276 
LDK; PDK; AAK. Electoral program for the 2004 general elections, cf. Sergio Martin-
Moreno, Electoral Commission, OSCE, Prishtina, 8 June 2004. 
Čović Plan, May 2001. 
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and  the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 
Kumanovo, 9 June 1999 
European Community Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No.2. 11 
January 1992. 
4. Others 
a. Reports 
Aljaf, B., Parliamentary, Provincial and Local Elections in Serbia: EU Interferes in the 
Election Campaign, International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Ljubljana, 
7 Mai 2008.  
Curris, R. and C. Monteux, ‘“Kosovo/a Standing Technical Working Group”, 5th and 6th 
Session Economic Development and Reconstruction’, UN Government Building, Prishtina, 
27 October and 8 December 2001, ECMI Report no. 23, March 2002. 
Dahrendorf, N., A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change, International Policy 
Institute, Kings College London, London, 2003. 
European Stability Initiative, Cutting the lifeline. Migration, families and the future of 
Kosovo, Berlin/Prishtina, 18 September 2006. 
---, Utopian Visions: Governance Failures in Kosovo's Capital, Berlin/Prishtina, 8 June 2006. 
---, Mitrovica: Kosovo's Litmus Test, Berlin/Prishtina, 28 April 2006. 
---, The Development Trap at the Heart of the Balkans.  A Socio-economic Portrait of Gjilan, 
Kumanovo and Presevo, Berlin/Prishtina, 5 July 2005. 
---, Towards a Kosovo Development Plan: The State of the Kosovo Economy and Possible 
Ways Forward, Berlin/Prishtina, 24 August 2004.  
---, The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Futur of Kosovo’s Serbs, 
Berlin/Prishtina, 7 June 2004.  
---, People or Territory: A Proposal for Mitrovica, Berlin, 16 February 2004. 
---, A Post-industrial Future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and Zvecan, 
Berlin/Prishtina, 30 January 2004. 
---, The Ottoman Dilemma, Berlin/Prishtina, 8 August 2002. 
---, De-industrialisation And Its Consequences: A Kosovo Story, Berlin/Prishtina, 1 March 
2002. 
Holliday, G., ‘“Kosovo/a Standing Technical Working Group”, Training Workshop: 
Administration of the Judiciary & Human Rights’, Flensburg, 12-15 July 2001, ECMI 
Report no. 16, August 2001. 
Holliday, G., ‘“Kosovo/a Standing Technical Working Group”, Third Meeting: 
Administration of the Judiciary’, UN Government Building, Prishtina, 30 June 2001, 
ECMI Report no. 15, August 2001. 
Holliday, G., ‘“Kosovo/a Standing Technical Working Group”, Second Meeting: Health 
Sector and Reconstruction, UN Government Building, Prishtina, 26 May 2001, ECMI 
Report no. 14, August 2001. 
 277 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future, April 2005. 
International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Fragile Transition, Europe Report no. 196, 25 
September 2008. 
 ---, Kosovo's First Month, Europe Briefing no. 47, 18 March 2008. 
---, Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Transition, Europe Report no. 188, 6 December 
2007. 
---, Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility, Europe Report no. 185, 21 
August 2007. 
---, Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan, Europe Report no. 182, 14 May 
2007. 
---, Kosovo’s Status: Difficult Months Ahead, Europe Briefing no. 45, 20 December 2006. 
---, Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky, Europe Report no. 177, 10 November 2006. 
---, An Army for Kosovo?, Europe Report no. 174, 28 July 2006. 
---, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, Europe Report no. 170, 17 February 2006. 
---, Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide, Europe Report no.165, 13 September 2005. 
---, Kosovo after Haradinaj, Europe Report no. 163, 26 May 2005. 
---, Kosovo: Toward Final Status, Europe Report no.161, 24 January 2005. 
---, Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report no.155, 22 April 2004. 
---, Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG, Europe Report no. 148.  
---, Kosovo’s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civic Contract, Europe Report no.143, 28 May 
2003. 
---, Return to Uncertainty: Kosovo’s Internally Displaced and The Return Process, Europe 
Report no. 139, 13 December 2002. 
---, Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo, Europe Report no.134, 12 
September 2002. 
---, UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica, Europe Report no. 131, 3 
June 2002. 
---, A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status, Europe Report no. 124, 1 March 2002. 
---, A Kosovo Roadmap (II): Internal Benchmarks, Europe Report no. 125, 1 March 2002. 
---, Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development, Europe Report no.123, 19 December 
2001. 
---, Kosovo: Landmark Election, Europe Report no. 120, 21 November 2001. 
---, After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace, Europe Report no. 108, 
April 2001. 
---, Religion in Kosovo, Europe Report no. 105, 31 January 2001. 
---, Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica's Victory, Europe Briefing no. 14, 10 October 2000. 
---, Kosovo Report Card, Europe Report no. 100, 28 August 2000. 
---, Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy?, Europe Report no. 97, 7 July 2000. 
---, Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Kosovo 
1999, Europe Report no. , 27 June 2000. 
---, Kososvo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division In Mitrovica, Europe Report no. 96, 31 May 
2000. 
 278 
---, What Happened to the KLA?, Europe Report no. 88, 3 March 2000. 
---, Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s Unfinished Business, Europe Report no. 
85, 26 January 2000. 
---, Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon Is Over, Europe Report no. 83, 10 
December 1999. 
---, Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Europe Report no. 82, 26 November 1999. 
---, Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom?, Europe Report no., 2 November 1999. 
---, Waiting For UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, Europe Report no. 79, 18 October 
1999. 
---, Who's Who in Kosovo, Europe Report no. 76, 31 August 1999. 
---, The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, Europe Report no. 74, 6 August 
1999. 
---, Back To The Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo, Europe Report no. 70, 28 
June 1999. 
---, The New Kosovo Protectorate, Europe Report no. 69, 20 June 1999. 
---, Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Europe Report no. 66, 17 May 1999. 
Malazogu, L., Where Does the Legitimacy in Kosovo Really Lie? Legitimacy of Political 
Parties and Electoral Behavious in Kosovo, discussion paper, KIPRED, 2004.  
Monteux, C. and G. Holliday, ‘“Kosovo/a Standing Technical Working Group”, Training 
Workshop: Reconstruction of Health Systems in a War-torn Society’, John Knox Center, 
WHO Geneva, 26 August - 1 September 2001’, ECMI Report no. 19, December 2001. 
OSCE, Assessing the Impact: Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams, 6 March 2009. 
---, Municipal Assembly Inaugural Sessions and the Set-up of the New Municipal Structure, 5 
March 2008. 
---, Relationships between Central and Local Authorities in Kosovo, 21 February 2008 
---, Analytical study at the end of the second mandate of the Assembly of Kosovo, 19 
December 2007 
---, Assessment of Municipal Communities Committees, 17 March 2004. 
---, Parallel Structures in Kosovo, 7 October 2003. 
---, Joining In Minority Voices, 3 July 2003. 
---, Boycott at Municipal level, 15 May 2003. 
---, JIAS employment survey: Results report, 12 November 2001. 
---, Kosovo's concerns - Voters' voices, 1 October 2001. 
---, Voters' voices - Community concerns, 7 September 2000. 
United Nations Development Program, The Kosovo Mosaic, Prishtina, 2003. 
b. Periodicals856  
ASI News Letter 
Balkan Crisis Reports 
                                                
856 All Articles are fully referenced in the footnotes; Unless specifically stated, articles published in local news 
papers were translated by Courrier des Balkans [http://balkans.courriers.info/] 
 279 
BBC News 
Courrier des Balkans 
Danas 
The Economist 
Evropski Forum 
Financial Times 
IWPR 
International Heralds Tribune 
Javas 
Koha Ditore 
Le Monde 
Le Monde Diplomatique 
New York Times 
Nezavisna Svetlost 
Osservatorio Sul Balcani 
RFE Balkan Report 
UNMIK Official Gazette 
UNMIK News 
UNMIK Press Release 
Vreme 
Washington Post 
Zëri 
